gunnergoz

I can't wait until they implement this and watch all the gnashing of teeth and pulling of hair on the forum as people start whining, "My Tiger's too slow" and "My Panther's Dumbed Down."

I wonder why?

Here's an example of how the army wanted them used: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM18-20.PDF

Nice. A flying lawnmower for Area 51.

Hilarious. An accurate depiction of what will happen if you use styrene model glue in an enclosed space.

Its conversations like this one that leave me flabbergasted but then I have to remind myself that, for many if not most, it is only a game and the M10's in it are just another toy to shove around and go "bang, bang" with.

There is also a difference between fighting from buildings in an urban, built up area and simply shoving a squad or more into a farmhouse all by its lonely in the countryside. It is hard to locate and pin down the enemy in the former, but the latter as often as not is a death trap for the troops within.

They perfected a power drive for the M10 in late 1943 but by then production had been pretty much completed and retrofitting the ones in the field was apparently never considered a priority. Recall that it was supposed to be a long-distance killer, where slow but accurate manual traverse was seen as an advantage.

The M10's design was as a no-compromise AT weapon. It did not even have a coaxial MG nor a bow MG, such was the determination by McNair and other army leaders that it not be anything other than a dedicated tank killer. They did not envision its use in general support of the infantry and thought of TD employment like swarms of AT weapons held at the Corps/Army/GHQ level to be unleashed on the enemy armor when the enemy's main thrust was identified. The AA .50 was a concession that, at the time it was designed, the Allies did not yet have air superiority over anticipated battlefields. Like the TD men of yore, CM:N players get to discover for themselves all the neat shortcomings deliberately designed into weapons conceived to fill slots in an unproven doctrine. Battlefield experience has a way of deflating such grand schemes.

Seems off to me, given how little use they actually saw in the ETO compared to all the regular tube artillery of the day.

Hiding troops seem somehow...demoralized...by the hide order. They seem to respond to threats more slowly and seemingly lose confidence or aggressiveness. Maybe that's the way its supposed to be, but if so, then perhaps we need an "ambush concealment" order that preserves their fighting edge without turning them into quaking, indecisive Uphams.

So now we need CM:N to adopt "3-D smell-o-rama". "Is that the K-rations you just ate or are we on fire?"

Yep, the .50's placement is optimized for its use in the AA role, in which of course seldom got used. It reflects the army's very convoluted internal politics regarding the role and duties of TD's. At one time the army actually converted some SP TD battalions (albeit with obsolescent 75mm HT's) to towed 3" gun configuration. Of course the latter were proven to be only fractionally as effective as the fully SP units with M10's, but such is the state of doctrinal dogfighting in the wartime army.

We are on the same, albeit warped, track, no question...

I was going to ask if there are any nude beaches in the area now... Seriously, some shots of bocage and typical fields of fire would be nice.

Did they bother to talk to any radiation and climatology experts before making this claim? The infant deaths, as tragic as they are, may as just as easily be blamed upon nervous parents smoking more in the household due to stress and panic incited by an ignorant media.

Actually, you mean "Audie Murphy standing"...on top of the TD's engine deck, where he could fire the .50 from. And exposed his derriere to enemy fire in the process.

Nice to know...around here, one can never tell...

So you find BFC's current tac AI inadequately describes tank crew behavior under stress?

The point has been made before that Panther supremacy was in part situational and related to the training and leadership of its crews and commanders. As has mentioned here before as well, Panthers' well-known mechanical fragility ensured that many never reached the front in operational condition, or were sidelined with breakdowns before even seeing combat. If you had one that was in prime mechanical condition, with a seasoned crew, it could hold its own. The problem for the Germans was that they were not fighting in a vacuum: they had to contend with opponents well versed in combined arms anti-tank warfare, whose own tanks placed mechanical reliability and mobility at a premium and whose TD's were out there looking for Panthers to take on to the TD's advantage.

With a monicker presumably honoring Sepp Dietrich, do you expect him to?

In fairness to LongLeftFlank, I think in his post he was simply saying that the performance of African Americans in the context of a segregated army was exemplary in a number of instances. I did not perceive him to be arguing that segregation was proper or correct. At the same time the following point could be argued: that the pervasiveness of racism in white American society of the time of WW2 is reflected in its conscript army and had the army been integrated by fiat at the war's beginning (as it was some years later) there is a good chance that individual performance of minority soldiers would have been negatively impacted by their having to cope with massive prejudice from the majority of their mates. As much as even I hate to admit it, the nation was likely not ready for integration in 1941. However, the performance of segregated units during the war was so commendable (due to the individual heroism and devotion to duty of their members) that it paved the way for the subsequent integration of the Army by President Truman's order in 1948.

Panthers were probably (IMO) more often taken out by TD's (M10s and M36's) though I doubt anyone wants to go out hunting for a Panther in one of those. Its time to stop comparing Panthers and Shermans. They were two different designs for two different strategies. They were the result of two different economic and technological models of society. They had entirely different wars to fight. We delude ourselves when we try to compare them one on one. Sure, they had to fight each other on occasion and the outcome, one on one, was pretty likely one sided - but the war's outcome did not evolve around what happened when Panthers met Shermans, but had more to do with how the armies with superior combined arms and superior coalition warfare and better strategic vision, succeeded over their inferior opponents in those same areas.

Yes, imagine the "Cricket Sonata in D Major" when the FO tries to forward the barrage coordinates...

History as written by the first ones to have a journalist handy...