Fat Dave

The other thing we need to be careful of is seeing this through our own lenses.  I have no doubt the Ukrainian government published these dramatic numbers in order to reinforce their very real continued need for support; however, they may have misjudged the western reaction because we see this war through a very different lens.
The West has been human security focused for about 30 years - and this does not matter which side of the political house you are within - it is the natural evolution of highly powerful (and entitled) societies, to value the security of the person as the highest priority.  And even though human security is a key consideration within this war (e.g. war crimes, displacement, food security) it is not the key consideration.  [Oh dear, I can hear the collective shudder in some circles.]  Definitely for the Ukraine, and in a lot of way for the West this war is about collective existence and is therefore existential collective security focused in nature. 
We must avoid our own Western baggage with respect to casualties and war because the framework we use to make those assessments does not apply here.  This is the Old Red God - many hoped had fallen asleep forever, which was naïve wishful thinking.  He has woken up groggy and angry and decided on the old-school option to shake out the cobwebs.  Ukrainians taking 500 causalities per day may seem shocking when looking through a human security lens, which we then project into "Ukraine is losing...human tragedy...they should negotiate!  However, in the annals of warfare this is solid 5/10 of intensity (e.g Jul 1st 1916 - 57k UK casualties and on average 6k per day in WWI -  http://www.100letprve.si/en/world_war_1/casualties/index.html).  
Existential wars are on an entirely different level and as such we should not focus on "500 casualties per day" but instead on what those 500 troops are buying for their side.  Is Ukraine upside down in expenditure of people for what it is gaining losing...based on Russian speed of advance I have to go with a "no".  Now, Russia is likely losing more than 500 per day on the basis that it is still the attacker - is it upside down on its cost-to-benefits?  Much more likely.  And why it is trying desperately to have a lot of other people doing the dying besides actual Russian's right now.  Russian is losing at the same or worst rate and gaining literally feet of ground of seriously questionable operational value. 
Finally back to a central premise of mine - who is spending lives for options right now?  Who's option spaces remain sustained or expanding while the other side is in a losing equation?  The calculus of an existential war is absent of drama.  I have seen a lot of western media playing up the human drama in this war and it is counter-productive.  We can unpack the drama of this war for decades after it is over - this is about colder harder metrics where the value of a human life is only relative to what it is doing to your opponent.  What is chilling about all this is that this is one thing the Russian's already know, and we are just finding out.  Anyone think that Putin is having trouble sleeping at night right now?  If he is, it is not over the "good boys lost at Severodonetsk". 
We need to accept and understand that we, the West, are invested in killing Russians right now...in fact we are part of the kill-chain to do so and we cannot rationalize our way out of it.  We also need to become more cold blooded and objective focused and a less human security focused (obviously within reason) because the cost of this war is already high.  If we want to ensure that the 500 teenagers who die/hurt today did so for a good reason then it is on us to finish this thing on our terms, definitively.   
 

RU tactical aviation cannot operate anywhere UKR dug in and because UKR dug everywhere RU Tac Air is weak everywhere.
When Tac Air cannot support Land Forces the drone support is of critical importance.
AZER Forces destroyed ARMEN Arty with drones (implying it was war winning tactics). ARMEN Soviet AA made AZER Air ineffective, but AZER drones got arty (implying ARMEN Soviet AA could not deal with AZER drones).[AFAIR it was RU-based AA, it looks like Girkin just do not want to admit RU AA have difficulty with Drones)
RU extremely lacks recon drones.
Very few strike drones (but more than they have recon drones but not by much).
RU uses Caliber missile to do what US does with long range drones.
It looks like sone Tochka U will be used in masses due to lack of other PGMs (may be exaggeration as Girkin got emotional)
No comment regarding UKR shopping list - they look like they do not know what to say.
There are some preparation for mobilization but it means nothing as there is no guaranty mobilization will be called.
There is secret partial mobilization to make up losses. New formations are being made but there are too few of them. It is not a strategic reserve.
For 1 Army HQ (there are around 11 armies deployed) there are 1.2 classical division as per number BTG/battalions.
100,000 additional soldiers will allow only match UKR numbers.
RU RPO-A flamethrower (rocket propelled one) has real range about 100 meters due to accuracy. Still needs skilled shooter.
Main fight happens with Arty and mortars. everything short ranges is more or less irrelevant.
A RU general at Kharkiv asked his forces why they are running and not hitting UKR back with RPO-A (implying it happened during that famous RU collapse). They replied we are being hit with arty with much longer range. [Anecdote to show military incompetence and strange RU believe in magic of RU flame weapons)
Girkin used to shoot with RPO-A once. Missed from 50 meters. Claims he could hit standing man target with underslung launcher from 50 meters.
TOS difficult to use due to short range - lightly armoured, kills crew when hit even with mortar round.
They do not know why RU command does not systematically destroy all bridges in Donbas area. Aviation cannot reach them due to AA. They do not know why Spetznas cannot do it. They believe it is due conspiracy. [Apparently both RU Aviation and Speznas suck]
Girkin fuming that de facto there is no Flying Zone over UKR. He is claiming foreign planes deliver weapons directly to UKR. Claims there is conspiracy of sort.
LDNR tries to block RU volunteers from joining LDNR forces. Probably to block spread of information that LDNR forces are poor and poorly controlled cannon fodder.
RU grabing anybody they can for contract soldier but do not recall reserve officers - probably believe they have enough. They have enough regular officers and reserve officers could be politically unreliable. Ru main concern loyalty and not merit.
There is not enough modern weapons.
Kremlin is afraid of forming Ukrainian formations due to their questionable loyalty.
They believe West will exterminate RU that why they must destroy Ukraine to stop being used by West to kill RU. [No comments]
Operations take that long time because with current forces it is impossible to win (implying they are just prolonging the war).
Lack of drones is because nobody cares in MOD and other GovDepts.[Where Girkin was last 20 years? On a different planet?]
Girkin believe in due time UKR will start striking Crimea but he is not sure.
RU did not surround Severodonets area before assault due to lack of forces. UKR are fighting back hard.
When RU cut Artemovsk-Lisichans road UKR counter-attacked and pushed them back. Road is currently under RU fire only.
UKR terrain is flat terrain cut by recess with rivers and creeks and there are a lot of agricultural roads around. In dry season very easy to put bridges over these rivers and creeks to make another fully usable road to bypass dangerous part. Because of that the supply of UKR group is not cut.
Because supply is not cut UKR is not retreating from Zolotoe and Gorskoe to Lisichansk.
Because of that the only way is to frontally assault them.
Not enough forces to assault Slavynsk - tough defenses. It is large city agglomeration which needs to be assault from everywhere (implying not enough forces)
RU offence continues not because they hope for success but because they need to show activity. [Remember I talked about Pressure Cooker?] Also because they try to fix UKR forces. Finally if it stops UKR from getting initiative (implying RU will go totally defensive if stops)
Everybody already realized that current RU offensive cannot destroy UKR donbas group.[It looks like RU forces have to go defensive but cannot accept that and advancing where they can advance due to previous preparations. They simply cannot advance everywhere else even if it will yield better results)
They do believe that RU is not fighting seriously due to Kremlin conspiracy
They claim Brigadisation of RU army was to improve rebellion suppression capabilities of the Army. After some time it was canceled but they could not in time create enough proper divisions (Army HQ - divisions ratio above)
It was better to advance toward Kharkiv. Had better chance of success with much worse moral effect for UKR.
Current RU offensive did not give RU any strategic advantages except  [Victory] reports on TV.
They hope Slavyansk would not be attacked at all due to expected heavy losses.
Without general cleansing of top RU command and government war cannot be won.
But they will win anyway with or without Putin.
I am off to bed. Write if you need to clarify anything. If i have time tomorrow I will check it. 

And that would entirely be on us in the West.  If we do crack and fold, well we deserve what happens next and maybe we should not be holding the pen that writes the global order. 
We (the West) are the military industrial complex for the Ukraine - we committed to that pretty early on.  Ukraine has demonstrated that they will fight, we need to demonstrate that we will back them until the job is done. 
I am not sure how potentially losing a tiny berg in the Donbas is somehow shaking everyone's resolve.  I swear the online tone is as jumpy as the prettiest goat at an Afghan barn orgy right now.  "Oh no, we have lost Severdonetsk!  The war is lost!!"  Why? Because the Russians actually managed to get a very costly tactical win?  A win that is unlikely to go anywhere?
The UA is collapsing!!!!  Really?  Where is that coming from?  Based on Russian rates of advance, we in the west have clearly forgotten what an operational collapse actually looks like, which is really weird as we just saw the Russians do one in March.  Ukraine is hurting right now but there is a whole lotta country besides the Donbas and for every day the Russians are burning resources, Ukraine has an opportunity to make more.
We, in the West, are either in this to win it - which includes, at least: continuing to backstop UA force generation, building/funding a Ukraine internal military industrial complex for a long war and re-construction of the country after this is all over.  Hell we did this in spades in Afghanistan...FFS!  And the global stakes are orders of magnitude higher in this war than that "interesting adventure".
Or we get ready to accept that we have pissed away billions, fracture and withdraw support, and live what happens next.
There is no "easy out", or hedge fund strategy here...this is war.  You do not take the Last Argument of Kings option lightly and to steal from Stephen King, we will have forgotten the faces of our fathers if we fail on this one.

So for the record, calling Jomini a "little conservative" is akin to calling Billy Graham "a little religious" - the man tried to create a deterministic theory of warfare based on geometry, and Clausewitz called him on it...and frankly I think Uncle Carl was extremely conservative by modern standards.
That said, I am not sure what the story is around Severodonetsk to be honest.  I completely disagree with J of the West assessment that Severodonetsk is a "strategic decisive point for the RAF" and by taking it they gain "a pivot for operations" and a "pivot for manoeuvre".  If we look at wiki for the latest situation:

And then a G-Earth shot (I will try and do an MFSF flight later):

None of what J of W is stating as "importance" makes sense.  If this was a break out battle over the river and to take Lysynchansk, maybe.  But his argument that the "undefendable terrain of the western Donetsk Oblast" on the other side of this river, also make no sense as we know the RA advances out of Popasna have stalled.  As have the attempts coming down from the North out of Izyum...this is all the same type of rolling terrain spotty with water features.  The idea that if the RAF somehow takes the far bank town of Severodonetsk it is set up for a rolling breakout manoeuvre battle is sensationalism at best, and applying metrics from the Gulf War to this one at worst.  If the RA takes Severodonetsk, they still have a major water obstacle dominated by a very long ridge line to try and assault, then more urban area, and then rolling terrain which the UA has stopped them on along other axis.  So seriously, WTF "Jomini of the West"?
This battle is likely more along the lines of Verdun albeit what I suspect are for different reasons (I am not sure of the historical angle but Haiduk did mention this was a big fight in WW2).  This is a "I want that" and "you can't have it...jerk" type fight.  The UA is there because it is a spot they can make the RA's life miserable an pull in forces. The RA wants it...well why does the RA want anything?  Likely because Putin has been briefed and figures it is also "really important" for reasons.
This battle is interesting in 1) it is definitely attritional, and 2) it looks like it may be the one spot where the Russians have managed to create information parity (but I have a major caveat to this).  The noise about guns and UA casualties is just that "noise".  The UA is not stupid, that is one thing they have proven in this war.  They would not be holding onto a far bank defence - one they really do not need - unless there was some serious advantage attached to it.  My bet is that it comes down to two things: the concentration of arty and EW.
Lets leverage Jomini for a second and lay it out (in some ways he was not wrong):

I am going to be extremely generous here and say the RA has its guns positioned within 30km of Severodonetsk based on ranges (D-20s do about 18 and the Pions can reach out at about 37, so for arguments sake).  That is a slice of a pizza that is 188 km around.  The Russians can realistically put their guns in about 1/3 of that circle - so about a 63 km arc, which translates into about 942 sq kms.  At "900 guns" that is a density of a gun per sq km.  That is a pretty high density of gun positions - not WWI - but likely the highest of this war.  Further you have all the logistics to support all them guns.  
Finally, the RA has concentrated a lot of EW to try and make this op box go dark for the UA: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-technology-90d760f01105b9aaf1886427dbfba917  All these emitters are pumping out an ungodly amount of EM and easily visible.
So what?  Well there is a lot of talk of Ukrainian losses in this fight, and I believe them.  But war is negotiation and sacrifice.  Those lives are not being spent for the far bank town the UA really does not need.  They are likely being spent to pull in the concentration of arty and EM...so the UA can hit them - attrition, like tracers, cuts both ways.  What is missing from all this is the RA losses on key arty, EM and logistics because  they are concentrating them around and on top of this operationally near-worthless town, that when successfully taken will bring all the joy of a colicky baby because you still have to take that brutal set of ridges...on the other side of a freakin river.
We have no idea how bad the Russians are taking it right now, because "dark box"...but you know who does...the UA.   The one thing all that EW cannot turn off are the space-based ISR assets that the West (primarily the US) are beaming directly to the UA.  All those RA assets are very visible to multi-spectral space-based ISR and I have every faith are being hit regularly in this fight; it is the only thing that makes any sense - the UA are trading infantry for RA arty, EW and logistics right now.  If they wanted to trade infantry-for-infantry they would be doing it from all those ridges, which is the the obvious fallback position.
The Russians on the other hand are trading their own critical resources so that Putin can declare a "great victory" of very little military value - just like they have done throughout this war.

I've just passed to this page and read THIS. Guys, I though this was just a joke, but now my heart is melted down and I can't reject this gift. Though, I feel myself awkward... and also huge gratitude to all of you and Kinophile personally for idea     

You are only telling half the story to match your narrative.  The UNSC passed 3 resolutions to get Serbia to stop killing people (a fourth after the bombings)  and then passed 1244 which authorized a direct ground intervention by NATO (KFOR).  Further, NATO nations tried to get a resolution but were blocked by China and Russia as you note above...why?  Because Serbians were ethnic cleansing again which everyone still remembered from 1995.  This followed the precedent set in 1995 of NATO airstrikes to protect UNPROFOR, which led to UNSCR 1031 and the NATO ground intervention of IFOR.
Making a link back to US politics and "expansion" in Kosovo makes zero sense - just as it does for Libya frankly.  For Libya, UNSCR 1973 was put forward by France, Lebanon and the UK...what in the hell does this have to do with "Congressional approval"?  1973 was a classic Chapter VII, and again, Russia and China were on the SC and let it go.  Kosovo and Libya were interventions to try and stop repeat humanitarian offenders and dictators from doing worse - not some Rub Goldberg attempt by NATO to rule the world as a puppet of the US.
France intervening without the US - you have heard about Mali (Op Serval)?  In fact there were more: https://www.okayafrica.com/french-military-in-africa/
I can say NATO is a defensive alliance - the history of the Alliance has been defensive from the beginning.  NATO has done interventions on behalf of the UN and failing that, with the support from the international community.  To  make all this some self-centered US political issue is frankly insulting to all the nations and its military members who participated on those missions.
Finally, we know NATO is not a US puppet because it stayed out of Iraq in '03 (which did not have UN cover) and only went into Afghanistan when it did.  This is not the behaviour of a "puppet alliance doing the bidding of a US president who can't rule the planet based on domestic political landscape".  Russia is paranoid...because they are Russia, and no one likes/trust them because of history.  And Putin just took out a big red marker and underlined that dislike/trust for the next 50 years by unilaterally invading a neighbor.  And attempts to play "pick-and-chose" history to create a justification for Russian behaviour is just wrong.   
 

NATO was designed to stop Soviet imperialism and now serves to limit revanchist Russian imperialism. It serves to prevent war in by far the most dangerous place in the world for a large war to start. That expressly does *not* mean it solves every other problem and no alliance does. Or does Russian colonialism not count for you?

Ah, pro-Russian-troll o'clock again.  Yay.
"NATO filter bubble", you clearly know nothing about NATO.

Meanwhile, the stage continues to be set for the Russian Monte Cassino. 
It took Ivan 10 days and reinforcements from 90th GTD to secure the (flatter) woodlands on the north bank, and now they get to sit under nonstop fire from the Cave Monastery and its massif on the south bank. Even in the drone era, these kinds of vantage points matter.
The UA OPs are doubtless up on the hilltops, but I'm sure that won't stop the orcs blasting these beautiful monasteries to rubble.
They withdrew, that was baked in when Yarova fell. I doubt a single Ukrainian soldier was left behind.  And 'city' is a bit of a generous description. This district is mainly a bunch of woodland resorts in a national park, very scenic but not much economic or logistical significance.
If RU can somehow take the massif, that could well unhinge the Sloviansk defences at long last, and give credible form to a 'northern pincer' against Donbas.  But that requires a contested river crossing overwatched by high ground, a mountain assault (did I mention the caves part?), or else a breakthough via that 'Sherwood Forest' place into Bohorodychne.
And once more, the Ukrainians are forcing the Russians to attack straight into the worst, least tank-friendly terrain they can find, at the end of tenuous supply routes. Sun Tzu is smiling.  And whatever are this war's version of the Black Tulips continue to go home....
And here we were (I was, anyway) thinking the summer war on the 'steppes' of Southern Ukraine would be largely like Kursk, mainly grasslands or sunflower fields and undulating hills, perfect tank country....

Not wrong, but not entirely correct either.  Ukrainian defence was brilliant in the opening phase of this war.  We don't know much and likely will not get the full story for some time, however, the plan for the Phase I defence was decisive in itself.  If the UA had tried to fight the same way as the RA and sought decisive battle, it could have gone poorly.  Instead what we saw was a hybrid warfare campaign for the history books.
First Ukraine had (and still has) information superiority.  They are on their home ground and were also being fed western intel from before the war started.  This mean that in places like Hostemel, they could concentrate and defeat the RA initial moves in detail.  I think Hostomel is also a battle for the history books and was decisive in this war.  The RA tried to use SOF and Light in concentration and failed enormously, once again underlying that when misemployed SOF and Light are extremely vulnerable [aside: it is odd on all the talk of the "death of the tank" but we have not seen a lot on the "death of airborne/heliborne].  Russia made that airfield snap central to their main effort, it was their Plan A, and it collapsed in a couple days.
Second, Ukraine set up what I can only describe as an unconventional warfare defensive campaign.  This was hybrid in nature (a mix of conventional and unconventional forces) and looks a lot like what the Norwegians have set up in their Northern districts - for obvious reasons.  Basically, we had TD and irregular forces defending their local regions, backed up - and very importantly linked by UA SOF.  These forces were already in location along that very long initial front line and armed with next-gen smart-ATGMs, UAVs and comms.  Those comms linked them back to UA artillery creating an entirely distributed defence network - or at least that is my working theory.  The Russians sticking to road networks, lit up by ISR of all sorts were then hammered all along their own system - F ech, A ech, B ech and all the way back to SLOC nodes.  All that Russian armor/mech, the ready-force of the RA was cut to pieces in the first month of this war by that system; this wasn't "war amongst the people" this was war of the people. 
Third, Ukraine's political level, assisted by a massive social media effort allowed Ukraine to win the strategic narrative, even before the war crimes.  We all started to cheer for the little guy and realized that this war was an political and strategic opportunity.  All that money and aid, essentially the military industrial complex of Ukraine, was riding on getting this part right...and the Ukrainians did it very right.
I am not like Steve to be honest.  I had no idea how this war was going to go before it started.  It wasn't until about 72 hours in that it became very apparent that something was happening that no one in the business predicted.  That is when the sickness symptoms of the Russian system began to appear. 
Could Russia have won? Of course, no war is pre-determined.  Ukraine could have split or simply failed to resist - they could have ignored western intel, Zelenskyy could have run and/or capitulated.  Or the Russians could have had a much better plan - why they did not make the capture of Lyviv and disruption of all western support the main effort is beyond me.  But they did not, and now they really cannot.  No matter how this little dance in the Donbas goes, Russia has lost this war already.  There is no renormalization after this.  Sweden and Finland are not going to change their minds, those sanctions are going to stick as economies re-wire.  Ukraine is not going to "de-militarize" nor is it going to go quietly back into Russia's sphere with a friendly government.  Russian hard power is empty, to the point that I would not be surprised to see more disruptions in it near-abroad- Russia as a state might already be dead, it just does not know it yet.

I mean seriously - Just ignore them - what are they going to do ? Not sell anyone  any more military hardware  ?    Close down the local Rolex/Omega  dealerships ?   Not take your ill gotten billions into their  secretive banking systems ?  Switzerland's loss  - Buy your gear from elsewhere .

The single biggest lesson I took from Clausewitz: Killing Russians isn't the point.
Imposing the will of Ukraine on Russia and the Russian invaders is what matters. Being able to target Sevastopol and put it beyond military use has far higher utility than merely killing Russians.
While many Ukrainians will have no qualms about killing every Russian in Ukraine, it benefits them little unless Russia withdraws. A tool that makes Russian presence untenable damages Russian interests far more than killing a few more thousand poor rural Russians.
That's why the range matters, why it changes the nature of the threat to Russia. The Russian ship movements to the Baltic show that they are actually scared, and while it's amusing to see such cowardice from the supposedly strong motherland that fear will influence their decisions and reactions to a change in circumstances.
This doesn't mean a full range HIMARS capability shouldn't be provided to Ukraine, but it does need proper thought, risk analysis and a conscious decision to provoke and accept those associated risks.

So...DOOOOOOOOOOM?
Well all war is negotiation and sacrifice, so the question will come down to both sides coming to terms with those two factors.  My pushback to the "inevitable partitioned Ukraine" is that Russia talks a good game but Ukraine has lived it.  Russia is only just starting to feel the pain and like any good nut-sack shot, that pain takes some time to build. 
Here is a dirty little inside baseball secret - professional soldiers are supposed to die, it is what we get paid for; civilians, not so much.  Every society knows this and accepts it.  We can lose people who choose this lifestyle who, like mercs, take the Queen's Coin and do the dirty work.  We have Remembrance Days and "Thank you for your service"-free coffee but in order for a society to be truly tested in war, it must be willing to feed it people who had nothing to do with warfare before it started.  The harsh calculus of regular everyday people dying in numbers is a threshold that we in the West have not crossed in a very long time (e.g. WW2 for Canada and Vietnam for the US).  Nor has Russia by this point, but it is approaching it quickly. 
However, you know who is already living in that stark land?...Ukrainians.  They have been "all in" since 24 Feb, to the point that there are no longer "regular Ukrainian civilians", the whole nation is in on this.  I see pictures of 12 year old holding a wooden AK properly and that says it all; war, has become the way of life for Ukraine.  Out of everyone talking and positioning, only Ukraine (and possibly the folks in the DPR/LPR...many involuntarily by the looks of things) has crossed that threshold.  Putin is very nervous of it, and it shows.  The US was terrified of it in Iraq, that is why they imposed all sorts of crazy things to try and keep the professional troops they had.
So before I pass judgement on the current situation with finality, I would want to see how Russia reacts when the civilian population starts bleeding heavily.  They are hurting but it has been a slow burn, and frankly I think Russia is culturally masochistic...to a point. However, despite a bunch of retired Russian warhawks barking from the cheap seats, Russia has not been tested in this trial in a very long time either.  Ukraine is the single largest hot-war they have been involved in since WW2.  History looks great in the movies and we can all get our pulses up watch Saving Private Sasha; however, watching the guy next to you get blown in half by long range arty when you were working at a now-closed Starbucks a month ago, is an entirely different experience.
So no, I do not think Russia and Ukraine or on the same wavelength when it comes to negotiation and sacrifice...at least not yet.
As to communication:
We have been over the challenge of the Russian Defence, which they need in order to "freeze" this conflict.  Right now they are keeping Ukraine busy by this very slow grinding offence, but it has been costly as hell.  At some point if they want to "freeze" they are going to need to dig in and let the UA crash upon the shores of the great Russian Steel Wall.
Problem is what it will take to build that wall.  Did some research and frankly we do not have modern troop density calcs for this sort of thing - we have lots on peacekeeping/making and COIN but basically sweet FA on modern conventional conflict.  So we are going to have to make some assumptions here and keep checking them.  In warfare the concept of "troop density" is a bit controversial.  It is a hold over of the Jomini-esque "war is math" approach.  It holds water but it is not deterministic as we already know a lot of soft non-linear factors play into this.  With this in mind, all caveats etc lets break this down a bit:
- We are talking about 800kms of frontage from the Russian western position around Kharkiv to its position ion the East near Kherson.  That is a long active front...very long.  In WW1 the Western Front was about 400 miles, or about 640 kms in comparison.
- Troop density requirements have decreased over time.  It is well documented that weapons ranges, ISR and battlefield mobility have increased the combat influence each soldier has on the battlefield over time.  Problem here is that reality cuts both ways.  In both offence and defence effectiveness and range have increased, so it is competitive. 
- Troop density in WW1 - a frozen conflict - was in and around "5000 troops for mile" or roughly 3125 per km: (https://books.google.ca/books?id=nhhlHGWCnzYC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=troop+density+western+front&source=bl&ots=WWfd6Y7VIl&sig=ACfU3U1M05Ef9GIbmBAREwu-_obJPnXEpw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi_rO_4jf33AhXvjIkEHRJEDUoQ6AF6BAg7EAM#v=onepage&q=troop density western front&f=false).  This jives with the roughly 2 million troops each side had to sustain in the trenches, in depth, replacements and rotation, in order to sustain that deadlock.  This does not count logistics and support overhead -which is likely why each side had on the order of 12-15 million troops in total.
- Based on WW1 metrics, Russia would need approximately 2.5 million men in those trenches to achieve the same deadlock...and then have the architecture behind them to sustain it, which at a very generous 1:1 (which means a very slow burn war) means roughly 5 million men to dig in and hold that front a la WW1.  But as I noted we are not in WWI - although if the Russians tried to force generate these numbers they would probably start looking like they were from that era equipment-wise. 
- Actual Russian troop numbers as of today are hard to find; however, with the 200k they brought with them and assuming they have kept that force level (big assumption), Russia currently has a troop density of 250 men per km of frontage.  This is less than ten percent than the WW1 number. But as we noted modern forces can cover more ground, which makes this a weak analogy.  The question is, "versus a very well armed attacker, how much troop density does Russia need to "freeze" this front?"  My bet is a lot more than 200k troops, but how much more?
So let's tackle this from another direction.  Things in this war are challenging a lot of our rules of thumb; however, we can go with the 1:3 ratio of defender to attacker, at least locally.  So Russia likely needs to put at least a Company per km frontage.  This forces the UA to concentrate a BG on the attack, with all the support bells and whistles in order to make an effective shot at it.  This makes sense from a force-space-time perspective for both attacker and defender but I am not sure about firepower in the least [Note: it might be a lot less if things like UAVs and precision artillery are involved.  This is one of the unknowns]. Terrain may also give them a break, particularly on the Dnipro, however, they also have urban areas so I am betting things even out.  
So a Russian Company of say 150 men per km.  They will need at least on more company behind them to create effective depth and prevent breakthrough of that UA BG, while also accounting for attrition, so now 300 men per km.  And then they will need to rotate troops in and out of those positions.  We are not designed to live in the open, under harassing artillery/Switchblade fire indefinitely.  So we are now looking at another company for rotation and sustainment.  Throw in an armored reserve to plug holes and supporting fires/assets and we are getting dangerously close to a BTG, per km.  This would bring the Russians up to about 1500 (a fat BTG) men per km, about half of WW1 troop density.  Or 1.2 million men.  And that is just the fight stuff and basic tactical logistics.  As we know from this war, the Russians like to travel light on logistics and formation-level support, so we can probably add another third of that number, say 400k to build the backbone to keep those 1.2 million men in the field = about 1.6 million men...and they have to sustain that for years, under increasingly crushing sanctions.
I have to be honest, if I was an average Russian and I saw these types of numbers I would be asking myself "how badly do we need Putin". 
Finally, checking the old CIA factbook (https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#people-and-society) Russia has roughly 37 million fighting aged men aged 15-54 (I am going to assume good old Putin male chauvinism holds and they do not a start tapping women).  You can throw out a third right off the top for all sorts of medical conditions etc that make them simply unfit for service.  So roughly 24 million men to draw from, in entirety.  To freeze this Ukrainian war, to the point that you can force Ukraine to "tap out" you need to commit at least 5 percent of all eligible fighting aged males...up front.  And you count on needing an extra 1.2 million just to sustain it over time.  Now I can hear the demographic nerds out there pointing out that over time more men come of age...well the news for Russia in that regard is not good either:

Russia is in a bit of a demographic hole right now and it is going to take what look like 3-5 years to dig its way out.  Worse the big bulges in the 35-44 range are going to age out in the same timeframe.
And finally, finally, this does not take into account the the standing military bill for the rest of the country - Russia can make all the noise it wants with Finland and Sweden, everyone is going to be fully engaged on this Ukrainian thing for a few years so you may as well shut down everything else.  
So What?  After all that it comes back to: how much does the average Russian want a bunch of new broken Republics vs how much does Ukraine want its country back? 
If I were a betting man, I would put my money on the country that has already demonstrated the commitment.  If this war goes long, we will likely need to shift from send guns and bullets (fish), to funding the creation of a Ukrainian domestic arms industry (fishing rods) and then figuring out what to do when Russia totally collapses under the weight of this thing.

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Whoa there!  So I have taken a few days away because this great Russian offensive has taken on all the glam of watching a blind goat wooing a virgin armadillo.  So we are talking about that 7km "blitz" and a couple UA TD outfits bailing, right?  I mean did I miss the fall of Lviv or something?
So, I disagree that this is "strategic", hell it probably is not operational but we will see if the RA can actually advance more than 20kms before it runs out of gas.  We have been here before.  There was the terrible Izyum offensive that was poised to "pinch off and crush the UA defenders" in some sort of Failais Part Deux, which petered out to whatever that melanoma looking thing has become.  Then the imminent crossing of the S-D River, which turned out to be a catastrophe.  And now the Russians take 7km and we are at the End of Days?
"Imminent collapse" - how many times does this need to happen before people get the point?  The RA has already collapsed twice, strategically and operationally - even if I grant that the UA may have "collapsed" tactically at Popasna.  First was the RA collapse of an entire front in the North, we still remember that part right?  That was likely the turning point in this war and was a collapse by any standard.  Then we have seen another operational level collapse around Kharkiv, my understanding of military theory is that when you are the invader and have withdrawn until the enemy is at your border, things are not going well.
So the real question here is "can the UA do operational offensive?"  And the jury is still out to be honest.  That operation around Kharkiv (a much higher priority than the villages in the Donbas) demonstrated that the UA can re-take ground and pretty quickly.  How well the RA was dug in, how the UA did it and is it repeatable are the unknowns.
We have talked at length about the Russian problems defending a line approximately the same length as the Western Front with a fraction of the troops needed. The line density is something like 100 men per km with what they were showing, and that is stuffing the line with replacements straight from the recruiting depot.  I don't care what the Russian grandfathers were good at, there is a force-space reality here that is going to be impossible to make airtight without another 1 million men and the equipment to arm them.
Meanwhile Ukraine has a 3 month head start in mobilization, I personally think that the UA has more combat ready troops than the RA at the moment and everyday they are getting more with better equipment.  While Russia continues its downward spiral economically and militarily.
As to post-ceasefire (if it happens - Ukraine is signaling the other way, and losing a few dozen kms in the Donbas is likely not to break a nation who had guns within range of its capital) - we had better be ready to pony up and re-build Ukraine a la Marshal Plan, or there was no point in the sunken costs.  Re-building national infrastructure will likely sustain the Ukrainian economy in the short to middle term, in the long term private industry will show up because they are a greedy bunch and this is a market filled with US greenbacks for reconstruction.  We need a functional and well defended Ukraine very badly right now because it will mean the "global order" won this war, and we are willing a pay a lot to ensure that happens (or should be).  We need a bright and shiny Ukraine as a demonstration that the Western based global order still works.  This needs to be a lesson for Russia, and more so for China that we will not let the pen that writes the rules go easily.  If we fail, then we deserve what happens next.

Once again, this thread is valuable when it stays on the topic of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
(As a citizen of the United States, do any of you think my opinion of Dutch politicians, Australian politics, or worse, a combination of both, would either be pertinent or accurate?)
 

S’ok, Afghanistan was my second war, tough time etc.  Still is a bit of a trigger.  Honestly I do not think we could ever have enough resources to win that war without full occupation and then they would have ate at us for a century if we tried that.  Afghanistan needs to fix Afghanistan and there are layers of issues there that made it a doomed mission for us from the get go, which frankly makes all those kids dying there such a waste.
Anyway, don’t mind me.  From experience the math is easy at one level, and very hard the deeper you go.  The trick is figuring out which of the maths matter and when.  Sometimes one has to go with the gut and instinct, other times you need facts and stats because they can tell more than what you are seeing.  Messy miserable business all of this, but in the end someone has to do it.

Ok, everyone note, this is where Tha Capt and Steve disagree, was bound to happen.  First off, show respect for the venerable "lunch-box war" as it has seen more action that just about any other carrier (I know, the BTR, blah blah).  She still has legs and can still get some jobs done.
I would not take her directly into battle as all those chain guns will cut her up but lets not forget the more elegant features of this grand dame:
- Simple, simple, simple.  You can literally teach a junior officer to drive one in an afternoon, from experience.
- Relatively easy maintenance.  Not as easy as wheeled but very simple analog systems onboard that can be done by driver and crew.
- Modular.  You can literally stick anything on this thing, so it can fulfill a lot of different roles.
- Mobile.  People would not believe where this thing can go but this little beetle has great battlefield mobility.
- Elegance.  You can't stop staring at those elegant lines.  She is built like a German milk maid...seriously I need a minute. 
So poo-poo all you want Steve, the M113 is one of the finest vehicles to ever grace the battlefield - to know her is to love her. 

Ok, so apologize for what will be a longish post, even for me.  So welcome to The Capt's terrain analysis for the possible upcoming fight between Izyum and Donetsk.  Basically I wanted to get a view of the terrain this next major fight is squaring  off over and try and pull some deductions from that.  
So here is what I did.  I booked an MS Flight Simulator (MSFS) flight from Donetsk to Kharkiv roughly along this google maps line:

For reference you can see the ISW map of where this next great Russian offensive is spooling up:

They buried Donetsk under the legend but this is the area of concern.  So I did not use live weather as it is pissing rain there right now and based on what I am seeing it is a big reason the Russian have not started anything.  I flew at 1000 feet up but employed the drone feature to get down and grab a birds eye view.  Overall I would summarize the terrain in military terms as such:
On the 8th day, while recovering from a hangover God looked upon the earth and said to himself "You know these shaved apes are going to go at each other the second I turn my back so I may as well make it interesting.  Let there be tank country!"



These shots are just south - southwest of Izyum.  So on the surface you can immediately see a lot of room for manoeuvre tailor made for armored warfare.  I mean I can see frontages of kms just aching for big ol tank formations to come charging through with all sorts of room for bypassing, flanking and all that good stuff.  But then go a bit deeper:

So if you take a look at that last one, check out the VFR map in the upper right.  There are a lot of water features distributed all over this area and in the spring they are going to be deep and muddy.  Little lakes and rivers just about everywhere that amphib IFVs can probably bounce but tanks, arty and logistics are going to have trouble with.  So what?  Target the engineering stuff with all them fancy switchblades, then arty, then C2...we will get to logistics.  Next how about all them rectangles:
 Yep, a lot of these little and big squares all over the place...damn Ukrainian real estate laws.  For armored warfare these are going to be a problem.  Easy button answer...arty them all!  Well no one on earth has enough arty for that as these things are everywhere.  Each one a short range tank hunting dream, with ready made tractor trails to boot off on once you have fired off a couple NLAWS and are falling back to the next one to re-set.  These thing will soak up attacking infantry to sweep and will slow things down a lot.  Oh wait there is more:
These are not CM3 previews (but we can dream) but in MSFS you can drop right down to eye-level and wow.  First off this area is not flat. "Undulating" is the term we would use, with lots of small hills and ridges, all of which give some sightlines we normally only see in a desert.  So if I had a smart, fire and forget ATGM system with a listed range of 4.0km and was trying to sell it, these are the marketing shots I would take.  I found these everywhere along the route but more so towards the south end of the likely Russian advance (or North from Donetsk but that is all trench country from the last war, so not likely). 
Ok so what? 
- First off if this thing goes off it will be a conventional battle for the history books.  I mean the next one with this sort of potential is likely Armageddon itself.  We have a near perfect storm of mass meets mass forming up.  The collision on this has potential to be heard around the world. 
- Second, this will be a major exam for conventional armored warfare.  "End of Tanks: No They Are Not" may very well be settled in this one.  You cannot really find much better terrain for armored warfare on one hand.  While on the other, this is also excellent terrain for an mobile defence.  The Russians should be able to create a break out with overwhelming mass here, if they play it right.  While at the same time between prepared defenses and a combination of short and very long sightlines the Ukrainian defence should be able to stop them cold - that is an epic collision in the making. 
- Third, so much of this will hinge on C4ISR it is looking more like an aerial dogfight than a traditional land-battle.   The side that can see first at the tactical level will likely hit and win first.  We should see more exchanges like were seen in the Nagorno-Karabahk which were very long range and then working in for the dirty work.  
- Fourth, the Russian offence is going to have to evolve.  They cannot bring their last fight to this one.  They will need to rethink C4ISR collection and sharing, logistical planning - pushing a lot more forward faster, and targeting.  The UA can keep doing what it was to be honest but it had better have made use of this pregnant pause to put in a lot of AT minefields that tie those water obstacles and rectangles together, they had the time and I can only hope they have the resources; this country is set up for nightmare defensive belts.
- Fifth, this will also be an exam for artillery, ATGMs, self-loitering and unmanned systems.  This will show what they can really do together, primarily in the defense but let's not forget the offence as well.  There are sightlines that can make full use of the ranges these systems can come bring to bear.  Honestly if I were the UA, I would stick with hybrid at the front end, and then wait for my moment for a conventional c-attack because it could be a bone crusher.  Given enough gas, a UA formation could drive right into the Russian rear areas and cry-freakin-havok back there looking at this terrain.
- Sixth, the awkward conversation about airpower.  This is perfect CAS country, the Russian's need it, the UA needs to deny it. With full on air superiority this country would be a challenge for an attacker, without it we could be looking at a nightmare. 
Finally, I would close by saying that I also get the sense that this is perfect terrain for an operational trap - it is what I would do.  

#1 - Resist Russian main axis of advance...but just enough to attrit but give them hope.  I would use obstacles to keep them on those axis and help channel them to what they want.

#2 - Oh look at how happy they Russian are, they have their great pincer BUT do not give them time for reorientation or to dig in, or they could use this country against you.
#3- Bil Hardenberger.  That old bastard has snap the jaws closed on me more times than I care to remember.  This country is made for a conventional c-attack to cut that corridor up and off.#4 - Feeding time.
This terrain supports this and the Russians have given the UA a lot of time to set it up.  Higher risk but the payoff is intense. 
Just spit-balling here and I have every confidence they UA commanders on the ground have a grip on this but for a defender that 1) knows what they are doing, 2) are well resourced and 3) have the time to prepare, this could make for a textbook defence that could be turned into something else.

Russian Empire
Born 2 November 1721
Died 13 April 2022
Cause.  Embarrassment
This is just crazy.  Man I'd love to be a fly on the wall at the kremlin to see Putin's reaction.  Zelensky should arrange for a stamp to be sent.  "would you like a little salt in your wound?"

Have to disagree with you there Steve, they don't have our secret weapon:
Rooaaawwr!!  Get those engines running ladies....  

Hello, I am Vladimir Putin and this is Jackass.

Moldovans and Albanians could follow suit too.
WELCOME TO MOLDOVA. YOUR CAR IS HERE ALREADY 🙃
 

I will leave it to Steve and BFCElvis to determine what is, or is not, acceptable on their own forum. 
I can only judge Col (or is it LCol?) Macgregor on what he presented, which was "different" to say the least.  His assessment that "Russia has already won" is definitely contrary to most mainstream military assessment, or media for that matter.  However, Col M argues that Ukrainians are "cut off" and "in cauldrons", near a total collapse tipping point.  Further he argues that the Ukrainians are only capable of "pin pricks" against the Russian offensive.   His noted reason for the slow Russian advance is based on strict ROEs from Putin to "avoid/limit damaging Ukraine" as much as possible, so humanitarian bascially .
So, ok, that is one point of view.  I am left wondering where Col M is getting his information to build this picture because it clearly does not match what we have been seeing - the "so what?" here is that clearly either he is very wrong or mainstream analysis/assessment is very wrong, not a lot of middle ground here.  Thoughts:
- We have a very bad habit of "lack of accountability" for what gets said on the internet.  Once the smoke clears on all this I can only hope that credibility of sources are held to account (faint hope).  We have politicians who have said things, pundits who have said things and that needs to be remembered and assessed after this is over.  If Col M is correct, or even just mostly correct, then we clearly missed some big signs or were totally taken astray, and by "we" I mean just about every mainstream venue.
-  Based on what we have seen on social media, a steady stream of open source information, Col M's thesis appears the total opposite to observation.  If this is all "fake news", then it merits as one of the largest and most thorough disinformation campaigns in human history.  If the Ukrainians, who are according to Col M on their last legs, have managed to create enough "fakes" to show over 1500 lost Russian vehicles, and Russian damage to civilian centers rivalling the invasion of Poland, this is an incredible feat of information warfare and I am talking one that dwarfs Chinese capability.  There is "fake news" and then there is mountains of "fake news".
- If Col Ms assessment of Russians adhering to strict ROEs to the point that they have delayed operational advances to the amount we have seen, then the Russian military is likely be best disciplined military force in human history.  They have literally violated almost every doctrinal principle of warfare in order to meet the demands of the political level.  For a professional military, in the middle of a major invasion, to delay offensive action - particularly against an opponent on their last legs - is one of the most breathtaking displays of military discipline I have ever heard of.  The military risks associated with doing this are extreme, not the least of which is allowing time and space for a western-backed resistance to arm and organize.  Many Russian soldiers will die because of this "restraint".  Problem here is that the Russian military does not appear well disciplined; egregious attacks on civilians, videos of looting, abandoned vehicles, radio intercepts and "lost" PWs point the exact opposite way - unless of course this is also "fake news", and we are back to "how the hell did the Ukrainians pull that off?!".
So these are just a few of Col Ms points that I walked away with and I gotta say that if he is correct well we know that this has been a war changing use of information warfare on the part of the Ukrainians, and the Russian military is nearing Spartan levels of control and discipline.  However, I have to quote Carl Sagan here "the weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness" and one retired Col's "say so" is not enough to go on.
Finally as to "why Ukraine matters?"  Well I am not going to get drawn into a country-specific political debate; however, the simple reasons are 1) it is inhumane; however that is a little to "hippy dippy" for some, 2) there is no more "over there" in a globalized world and 3) Russia has fundamentally challenged the global system that has made all of us in the west, rich, powerful, entitled and frankly "dumb and lazy". 
Let's explore that last one.
The global system that our grandparents/great-grandparents fought and died for and despite all its inequities -there are many- it resulted in massive and persistent stability (crazy but true) and economic, population and technological growth orders of magnitude higher and faster than any point in human history.  This did not happen because a god(s) in heaven ordained it, or weird racial theories that still float out there, it happened because we built it and defended it.  Russia's actions in Ukraine are a threat to security because they challenge that system, they got out of line and they are (or at least were) a global power.  Such actions do nothing for all that stability I mentioned, in fact they act as a global disruptor, and that is definitely a threat to us all.  If anyone is too ignorant or thinks this is some sort of political leverage issue, they frankly deserve what happens next if we let this slide. And what happens next is a new global order being written by someone else while we most likely stand around and blame each other for it.