Fat Dave

Hmm, well I know nothing of the good retired Gen but I am sure he has his own calculus upon which to base his opinion.
Personally, given the data and information I can see, the Russian military system is sick.  The devolution in tactics, the loss of anything that resembles operational offensive - they never really came out of the "pause", and them now dancing to Ukraine's tunes around Kherson are all symptoms.  Right along with reports of low morale, poor support, flailing targeting and other indicators of system failures (e.g. baffling suicidal OPSEC violations) point to an eroding Russian military system.  Russian option spaces have shrunk to the point that it appears all they have left are WMDs, "holding on" and tactical nibbling - they appear to have exhausted all others, if they have another gear they should have dropped into it back in Jun.
Of course Russia can lose, any nation can lose a war...I think we have demonstrated this enough times.  I suppose the question is "how much is enough?"
All war is negotiation - and sacrifice.
So in these sorts of things definitions become incredibly important.  "Russia cannot lose" - what does that actually mean?  Because by any political or strategic goals metrics, it already has lost this war. 
From a selfish western perspective, stepping back, one could argue that 'we' have gained-
- Ukraine - there is no other end-state to this thing other than Ukraine in the UE and NATO - Putin and his cronies can quack and blather but that ship sailed after March.
- Finland and Sweden.
- NATO defence spending commitments for the next decade.
- A clear demonstration to the globe that we are willing to defend the current global order to any and all revisionist states (kinda) - we have re-established a certainty.
Our opponent, on the other hand, has gained about what 60-80k sq kms of destroyed, largely empty countryside? [Aside: no there is not mountains of resources in the area they control, we covered that one already]  A crushing economic trajectory that will put them in the 3rd world if it goes on long enough.  A Europe that is literally re-wiring themselves away from Russia's one trump card.  A pretty much destroyed military - in both physical and more importantly psychological domains.  And a historic loss of global influence and credibility that will haunt them for the rest of the century.
Doesn't look too bad on paper...however, it leaves a nasty unresolved feeling doesn't it?  The single largest problem is that we in the west have never defined our war goals, our strategic and political endstates.  We went from "oh crap, ok so let's figure out how to support an insurgency", to "oh crap, ok so let's how to support a defence", to now, "oh, crap, let's figure out how to support an offence".  We have been stuck on, "let's make sure Ukraine doesn't lose" that we never figured out what it means to ensure that "we win...enough."  The west's victory is directly tied to Ukraine's outcomes in this war - all stop.  So what does that look like?
I have opinions but it is really up to our political leaders to lead and determine what "that" is, or is not.  The absence of this is apparent in a lot of the narratives such as Gen Dannatt's where we are very nervous about a run-away war in intensity or duration - especially duration because we have all had our fingers burned recently.
I think the impulse to re-establish certainty is overpowering, particularly within the large establishments of power such as government and militaries - they are the very definition of positive capability. Russia as a scary global power was a certainty, people built entire careers on it, trillions spent on defence for it.  The global order as we knew it, another enormous certainty, we built everything on it.  This entire war has been one enormous global uncertainty, and it is offensive to our sense of order - there are parts of the world where this sort of behaviour is expected, Europe was not one of them.
So victory is directly tied to "how much certainty is enough?"  And here is the thing, victory does not simply 'happen', which is very disconcerting trend I am seeing in the west - Ukraine+snazy weapons and support = "victory happens"...what it is not happening fast enough....happen faster!....hmm, maybe they should negotiate....
Victory is work, it is built, it is earned.  And we are back to sacrifice.  If we cannot define what we want, we cannot define what we are willing to spend to get it - which makes our negotiation position largely in the blind - more an act of faith and hope than a deliberate extension of collective human will to re-assert our certainty.  
I guess my question back to Gen Dannatt (with respect) and the mass of the mandarinate ( @LongLeftFlank that is a brilliant word btw) - "What is our certainty?" "What are we willing to lose?"  Until someone can answer that, then we really have no idea if this war is worth the continued effort from a western interests point of view.
Personally, I think that if we keep doing this for a decade, it will be time and money better spent than other adventures that were far less central to our certainty - but "how much?!", "how long?!"
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022
But what about the "recession" and my gas prices?!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007–2008
My advice - we are in this thing until Russia is back in their box and we have a gang of thugs in power we can actually do business with - we will then risk manage that train wreck of a nation, we have dealt with worse.  We are in it until Ukraine is re-built into a shining example of what western national building really means.  We are in it until we can demonstrate what western collective resolve looks like for the rest of the world into the 21st century, and that while we may have to renegotiate what world order looks like, my grandkids will damn well have their hands on that pen.
But I am just some guy on the internet.  
 
 

Go back through Oryx and the pages on this thread from the early war and a complete collapse of the Russian operational system is exactly what happened.  Completely broken on the Northern Fronts - casualty percentages of 50-60% for BTGs pulling out.  Count the logistical vehicles.  Count the abandoned and captured.
Ukrainians did punch the front end and bloodied it, plenty of evidence of that, but it was the deep strikes which created enormous friction along the overstretched Russian system is what broke it.  The entire Russian system of conventional mass collapsed.  The RA then devolved into WW1 tactics to try and re-establish an airtight operational corridor to make very small gains in Donbass.  Incredibly costly and was not decisive in any sense of the term.
Then Ukraine looks like they did it again in Donbass when they got HIMARs as the Russians never got out of the operational pause.  Now Ukraine have pointed the whole thing the other way, taken the initiative and are starting to setup for an offensive, or at least that is the consensus.

Would it be too simplistic to say that the MANPAD will do to armor what the bullet did to the heavily armored mounted knight? What was the result then? Lighter cavalry used as pursuit and heavier cavalry used occasionally as shock but both being much lighter in protection and higher in speed than before. 

That's where the asymmetry comes in.  Right now and for the foreseeable future, it takes a good fraction of the world's military spending to be able to set up the precision ISR/targeting/kill chain. That's not likely to change because a) money, and b) energy.  It takes enormous resources to put together the systems that make it possible, and it's not like there's a small, well defined set of stuff you can go buy to do it.  Given how distributed microelectronic manufacturing is, I'm not even sure if the US could do it alone within any reasonable future.  Countries will gradually figure out that wars of aggression are counterproductive and join the alliance, which might eventually be referred to as a "federation", gradually decreasing the number of wars on Earth to zero.  And then there will be Rollerball. 

I like the thinking, let's keep that up, however - there are issues
Ok, so let's unpack this a bit .
Area.  So a mechanized combat team in the advance over open country has up to a 2km frontage - giver or take.  We then need to extend that bubble to at least 8km, so double the range of the ATGM, so that the next tactical bound is secured, or at least scanned, before the mech force gets there.  So adding that all up we are talking an op box of about 16 sq kms, or in more tactical terms: 16,000,000 sq ms.  Why sq ms?  Well a 2-man ATGM team such as Javelin, takes up about 4 sq m (and I am being generous - but maybe they have quad or buggy for quick get away).  So the game here is to try and spot two humans, with little or zero vehicles that take up a 4 sq m area in an overall area of 16 million sq ms...and sustain it.
Finding.  Finding two humans in cover on the a conventional battlefield is still the third hardest ISR challenge that exists.  Even with TI, which is not designed to find people it is designed to find vehicles, is going to be severely challenged in doing this.  The average human being runs at 36 and change degrees C, which is only about 10 degrees hotter than ambient air in summer in temperate regions.  Then they wear clothes, modern uniforms actually are designed for some of this (https://www.innovationintextiles.com/protective/hohenstein-develops-textiles-for-screening-against-ir-radiation-for-use-in-military-uniforms/).  Next they are trained to stay under tree canopy, or dig into the ground, tall grass etc.  So this is not like those wands at the airport that are going to squawk when they find your keys.  A number of 500m was tossed around for a Tac UAV to be able to spot a human with TI, but I seriously doubt it if that human is half decently trained and equipped.  UAVs are the best bet, but it will not be easy by any stretch.  Those humans on the ATGM-side do not have the same problem as mech is huge, hot and loud - we can see them from space-based now - so this is not an advantageous exercise for the attacker from the get go...tale as old as time. 
Fixing.  The next major problem with the proposal is the role of SF "infiltration" as the lead edge of this screen.  I like where this is going, very hybrid, however: 1) that is a lot of "SF" - in reality decently trained light infantry would fill this role - to cover off all that ground, even doing "spot" close recce.  They are also going to take casualties so they will need medivac and support, Sustaining this is not small but doable.  2) The entire mech force can now move at the speed of "SF Infiltration" which is damned slow compared to mech advances - think walking speed.  So now a mech force which is designed to punch holes and advance quickly to an enemies rear areas to bring the righteous hand of gawd almighty to REMFs is crawling behind light infantry infiltration...kinda defeats the point of mech in the first place.
Finishing.  One big piece missing from the diagrams is indirect fires.   The logic of spotting small ATGM teams and then dropping the sky on them - rinse and repeat, makes sense even if it is at a human crawl.  However, that nasty indirect fire points in two directions.  The logistics train for a 2 man ATGM team hiding on 4 sq ms is pretty modest - like bag of trail mix and some toilet paper, modest.  The logistical train for this proposed hybrid advance mech model is pretty significant, and will also be seen from space.  So unless that SF infiltration extends out past artillery range, the tail of this mech force, the mech force itself, and with HIMARs, the parking garage said mech force was hiding in before it moved out, are going to get lit up and blown all to hell before the ATGM teams stop bird watching and start shooting. 
So we are back at Fog Eating Snow.
Why bring the mech force along at all?  In fact until you completely break an enemy line past the artillery support distance, mech forces would be held back until pre-conditions are met, namely - degrade enemy ISR, degrade indirect fires, collapse logistical system and crack the line.  This is firepower-attrition-to-manoeuvre, not the other way around which is in all our doctrine - [although honestly, I have to ask myself when have we ever actually done that?  We always lead with an air campaign that makes the Valkyries look like a chicken dance.] 
Anyway, SF infiltration, yes...slow but proven one of the few real ways to advance in this war.  Infiltration with all sorts of ISR to find, and then isolate any heavier force concentration - going to be a lot of screening battles, but their sneaky peeky ATGM teams do not matter...cause we didn't bring any "Ts" during this phase.  Instead of WW1 levels of dumb massed fires, back up that infiltration with precision fires to shtomp anything that they can find with accuracy - rinse and repeat, and continue to support with deep strike on anything that even looks high value - particularly C4ISR, EW, Logistics and throw in an airfield or two for the sunbathers.
You project this as a series of tactical undecidings of their operational integrity, until their system starts to collapse.  Here breadth is likely more important than speed.  You project corrosive force along their entire operational system, and when they buckle...then you send in the mech/armor to do the deep stabby work, before they can re-establish a defence line, tempo here will still matter...I think.
It is a theory, at least.  I have no idea if it would work - and it is not without problems of its own.

Gonna climb up on a hill, dig in and say we've been watching the offensive for the last few weeks or so.

It's just getting hard to draw a line between traditional pre-offensive shaping operations and the potential for the long-range precision deep battle to be decisive in and of itself.

Doesn't mention the ammunition/stores at the locations of the craters... assumes SOF raid must have been during the day as opposed to the night before... doesn't explain multiple planes in revetments with some blast cover being destroyed... doesn't show his working on judging the craters to be 'consistent with 500lb warhead', apart from saying one has a  'diameter in excess of 10m'... 
Not a thorough assessment I feel. 
EDIT: Still up in the air for me, SOF was my guess, I don't know enough about explosives to say whether detonating ammunition would create the focused craters we see.  The blasts were powerful enough to knock over a bunch of stuff I would have assumed had protection from a ground-level blast judging from some of the images, so I don't know.

Hmm, not sure this matches observed history to be honest.  We had a conversation awhile back on Russia culture and it influence on this war and obviously there are some very strong opinions.
I don’t think it is easy to paint any culture in one monotone colour, internal divisions and stressors exist in far more closed cultures that Russia (eg NK), it is human nature.  We in North America have a proud tradition of lemming [I know it is a myth but just put that aside: insert Marlin Perkins meme] behaviours.  Ours come from religion and sub-cultures - we convinced ourselves that slavery was a good idea and that God supported it- that have been just as restrictive as any autocratic government.  In fact these “norms” can be more tyrannical than any one leader - plenty of evidence of that.  Also there is the fact that Russia has had 2 major revolutions and a pretty nasty Civil War in 20th century, so I am not all onboard that they are “sheeple”.
I do believe that Russia appears to have a bit of an addiction to autocrats, democracy has never really stuck in that nation.  We discussed this previously and I don’t think there was a consensus as to why.  I suspect Russians are a product of their environment, so a weird collection of outsiders who have been invaded repeatedly likely has a role to play in them embracing strongmen leaders.
Regardless, based on history the Russians can definitely “awaken” and pretty violently.  The real question is “what will it take for that to happen?”, followed by “does this insane war qualify?”.  And then finally, “do we need to help that happen sooner than later?”

It's me.  I've been holding off saying anything just because then I'll get all sorts of pressure from everyone with an opinion on how it should be done.  Hold on a minute, phone ringing off the hook..... 
Hi Joe.  What?  Just send the f'n rockets already will ya? 
Sorry I'm back anyway where was I?
Seriously, there isn't a single person.  There are entire communities, military, intel, state. etc  Where I give Biden credit is
1. He's listening to his experts
2.He's following through and doing his portion of the job
3.He isn't grandstanding for points.  Just slow and steady and doing what smarter people are telling him we need to do.
The issues pointed out earlier about mistrust of intel is based on situations where our politicians wanted to do something and didn't want to listen to anything counter.  That's where you get into trouble trying to justify what you've already decided to do.
 

The SAMs are exploding in the same place. They are sending them up on a pre-set in the hope the explosion does something. What you are seeing cannot credibly be called air defence, it is impotent flailing at an enemy they cannot not touch or even see.

Speaking of funny picture (just this one and I'll stop, sorry).
 

Which is 30 minutes longer than you last in Sudan.  It is not easy by any stretch, that’s why they are called “special”.

What initially appears to be one large crater here actually seems to be two overlapping larger craters with even more smaller craters overlapping:


IMO, the areas of light grey tarmac that show somewhat irregulars lines and squares of dark grey (like in front of the rusty-roofed structure here) are stockpiles of dumb bombs.  They correspond perfectly to the cratering in this case.

Hopefully there is one GMLRS set aside just for him.

So far we are getting reports from civilians, and they do indeed need fresh pairs of pants. Tourist season in Crimea is closed. 

This

  You are describing a war of attrition, or exhaustion in which Russia is able to trade "ammo" for UA "people" - Russia has "endless ammo"; UA does not have endless "people" = Bad outcome for Ukraine in the long run.  Would be true if that were the entire picture.  Points:
 - It isn't about Russian "ammo", it is about Russian indirect fire capability.  An ocean of 152 ammo is useless if one does not have the trains and trucks to move it, the guns and gunners to fire it, and the ISR to direct it.  And lets not forget the assets to protect the entire system.  That systems ability to translate solid materials into effective kinetic energy, and then apply that energy to a target is not solely a question of "Russian ammo".  Through that lens, and we have heard anecdotes of how bad Russian logistics are getting, the Russian attrition picture does not look so good.
- The graphic above is half the picture, there is a Ukrainian one going the other way - they are in collision.  So as the Russians dry-hump their way, about 100m per day (and this has been consistent since Severdonetsk), the theory is that - just like WW1 - that "one more push" will cause the UA to break.  Then the Russians can get back to doing what they do best; stringing mechanized forces without enough infantry, logistics and air cover along 100km advances, so that the UA can cut them to pieces because RA density becomes so shallow that the UA gains defensive manoeuvre in depth (go Russia!).  This is "Effect" space, an the problem from the Russian side is becoming unsolvable.  That ocean of 152mm ammo has a very low probability of delivering the Effects, Decision or Outcomes because it is too slow, and even if it leads to "fast" the Russians are worse prepared for that than they were in Feb.
- The biggest missing piece in all this is the one thing the Russians can afford the least, and that is time.   There is a perception in the West that "We have all the watches but Russia has all the time" - we see our greatest fears in our opponent and a long drawn out stalemate scares us cause that is how we got burnt in Afghanistan (and Iraq to some extent).  Truth is that Russia does not have the time.  Why?  Because everyday they lose is one more day for the UA to get stronger, larger and better. With every shipment of support from the west, every training serial and further ISR integration the hill Russia has to climb gets steeper.  Finally, back to that nasty Will thing, Ukrainian Will does not appear to be going anywhere because it is shored up by national power and stunning levels of unity, which for the Ukraine is growing via western support. 
Russian Will is held together by an autocrat and his cronies who have been adept at lying, suppressing freedom, and generally greasy dealings.  All built on an economy that is making some ominous sounds, and a war machine that has already had to regress in order to stay in the game.  From where I sit I think we might be at the end of the road for RA operational offensive capability - they never really came out of the operational pause of Jul, I am not sure they can.
What we are all waiting for is the UA to solve the Riddle of the Modern Operational Offensive, if it can be solved under these conditions.  I suspect it can but the UA are waiting for their moment, patience in your opponent is a bad sign as it means they have the initiative.
In summary, I think the RA is doing everything it can with what it has because "the boss is watching" - but it is not enough, it will never be enough, Russia broke their best chance for victory in this thing back in Feb-March.  The theories that Russian pundits have about EU falling apart in the winter, US presidents coming in and cutting off Ukraine, NATO collapsing are sounding more and more desperate...all the while the UA is poking and pinching, waiting for its moment.  
 

Hmm. Drones receive radio signals, have to decrypt them and assess their validity before they can discard them.
That takes power.
Overwhelm a drone with a high volume of control signals and even if none of them are accepted, it's using battery power. It may also be in danger of overheating its CPU - they won't be designed for continual running.
It wouldn't be instant but even if all you do is stop the drone having enough power to return home, your opponent has one fewer drone.
(I'm not sure how viable an attack that is, but it passes the smell test for plausibility)

Beautiful video.  Damn, I love tanks.  Always have, always will.  Even russian-designed tanks (as long as they fly UKR flag).  I think tanks are not obsolete, because God loves tanks.  If he did not love them, he would not have made them so beautiful. 
Lots of people like airplanes, but they worship a false god. Tanks are God's chosen war machines. 

Putin is a post-truth leader, “reality” is whatever he says it is (there is a bit of a global trend in this field of politics).  So he could literally stop right now and declare “victory” right now.  What is stopping him?  He took his land bridge between Crimea and Donbas, took all of Luhansk and enough of the Donetsk.  We literally have western “experts” supporting the idea that the UA is basically been destroyed (see: Macgregor) so demilitarized=done, and denazification is a made up term so he can define success however he wants.
So anymore demonstrating does not make any sense.  The idea that Ukraine would be bombed back to the negotiating table is pretty far fetched unless there is a big puzzle piece they can see that no one else can.  Right now if Ukraine was shaky we would be seeing signals.  Hell it is in the best interest for some if Ukraine was willing to negotiate, we would definitely be seeing more diplomatic pressure if it were the case.  The reality is likely in the other direction, the UA is steadily increasing capability and capacity (we are now sending a mission to the UK to assist in training).
The whole “Russia must attack or look weak”, has some traction but weak failed attacks do not make one look strong either.  This baffling political  bubble Russia has created should serve as a hard lesson for political levels everywhere.  It won’t but it should, because it demonstrates very aptly the touted strength of a “great autocratic leader” to get things done, is offset by the complete lack of sanity feedback mechanisms that greater distribution of political power provide.  Autocrats tend to “get stupid done” very well and Russia is a case study in this.
Back to this war, a doomed RA offensive in the south (as noted, a reactionary one) is not going to accomplish anything given the battlefield conditions we can see, except demonstrate how badly off the RA really is.  I am instead wondering if Russia is not posturing for defence, finally realizing that it has culminated and only a long dragging out provides a viable option set.

Nice work. You've managed to combine a straw man with a false dilemma. Although a common double fallacy, this one is well executed. The judges have scored you a 3.5

Yeah, I am picturing Eisenhower walking into the first big staff meeting during battle of the bulge, seeing map and wetting his pants .  Oh wait, I mis-remembered that.  He actually said something about the great opportunity provided by the germans leaving their defenses.  (Note, I don't think anyone here on the forum is wetting their pants, but the pundit world probably will be)
Current situation is on-going murder, but everything RU gets comes at much greater cost to RU than to UKR.  And if RU decides to keep its arty doing massed fire on this small sector then it's an opportunity for UKR CB fire.  Plus RU is plowing through shells that aren't going to be available elsewhere, all to take one town that is still very, very far from Bakmut.  This is unsustainable for RU.  Meanwhile they are weakening this front to shore up Zaporize & Kherson.  So if they couldn't advance w everything in the donbas, how they gonna do it w less?   RU transferring troops from around Izyum to the west means UKR can move troops also, or try to cut the road thru Izyum, creating another crisis for RU.  
Maybe I'll be proved wrong and this really is the beginning of a local disaster.  But what I see if RU offensives have been getting smaller and smaller and smaller, until the little town of Pisky is the only 'major' thing going right now.

It seems to me that it's probably akin to the Drake equation- a fairly simplistic equation with multiple independent terms. The difficulty with Drake is that we have little idea what value to assign each of the values. Reasonable assumptions lead to wildly different outcomes, from "we're alone and always will be" to "Alan the Alien should be here next week".
In the warfare equivalent we have some idea for the factors (recruitable population, GDP, access to trade, ...) there is no certainty about the weighting for each from war to war or even month to month. For example: Allied GDP was crucial in WWI and WWII, yet all but irrelevant in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russian manpower reserves was crucial in WWII, but having no impact so far in Ukraine. Technology was overwhelmingly important at Omdurman, but irrelevant in Vietnam. And so on. We know the factors, but the damn weightings keep changing.

So this post got me thinking and raises a really good set of points.  Right now we have been handing out a lot of fish on this thread.  We pull in the data, filter it, assess and then pull out analysis, which leads to some level of prediction.  What we (I) have not done is provide enough fishing rods.  Of course you guys are swimming around the internet and being exposed to all sorts of narratives, some good and some bad.  It may be helpful to arm you with some ways to do your own analysis so that while you are out there you can come at it better.
Everyone has got their own system, western military teachings all tend to cover the same ground (e.g. PMESII, OPP, whatever that thing Bil does, which must work because he keeps beating me).  Eastern approaches are different and take into account different criteria, I am not an expert on these so I will let someone else weigh in on them.  I will give you my personal system and the one I teach, see if it helps and if it does not keep looking around.
My system is pretty simply to be honest and focuses on two main areas: what is seen, what is not seen, but should be.  That first one is much easier, the second requires a lot more depth but we can walk to that.
What is Seen
I think I posted this before and @sburke lost his mind a bit.  Let me try a less-powerpointy version (seriously guys it is the message, not the medium).

Ok so this is a representation of what is essentially the western operational system.  It starts on the left with what is basically "Command" and works its way to a desired Outcome.  Everyone is focused on the "Boom"...of course you are...it is exploding!  The reality, however, is that the Target is really only in the middle of this whole thing.  It is an indicator - one of many - but it is not the only indicator.  I think everyone here gets that but they often do not know what else to look for (although some clearly do).
So the big red system on the left is often referred to as the "kill chain" (thanks for nothing Brose).  It is really the center of what we call a "targeting enterprise" and frankly we in the west are very good at this.  This is "cause" space that translates human will, through capability, into energy (and here it can get quite complex), through mediums (also crazy complex) and onto a target and foresaid "boom" (yay!).   Be it an ammo dump, shopping mall, tank or goose (I hate geese) the process is pretty much the same, and volumes have been written as to how to do this faster/better than an opponent.
The point of the big red circle is that when we see a "boom" it is important to analyze the entire Cause chain all the way back to determine 1) if that was the actual intended target or was it simply happenstance, 2) how well the chain is doing in competitive terms and 3) what is this all signaling about Will?  All of this also has to take into account context and the situation on the ground.
Cool. We now have a bead on Cause.  Effect is much harder and more important.  The big blue area is where the pay dirt really sits.  A lot of big booms are impressive, but trust me if they do not translate into that big blue space you are going nowhere loudly - and I speak from experience here.  
So the first question is "what effect is this actually happening?"  Here an effect is a "consequence of action", so for example the effect of all those HIMARS booms - who are at the end of their own kill chain - was (allegedly) to have the Russian logistics system tie it self in knots to get away from them.  Great, outstanding...but was it decisive?
Second is Decision.  I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null.  Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one.  A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures".  There was a future where Russia pounded Kyviv into submission for two months in Mar-Apr 22.  The Ukrainian government tapped out because western support was being cut off from the west and Russia occupied half of Ukraine and the capital, set up a puppet government and then enjoyed an insurgency-from-hell that would last 20 years.  That future died in March when the Russians were held off and pushed back from Kyviv: it was positively Decisive.  The Russians may actually have a future where they are back at Kyviv but it won't be in Mar-Apr of 22, the reality will be very different.  The HIMARS are having an effect, that much is clear.  What is not clear is how decisive the sum of those effects are as yet.  If the Russians lose the ability for operational offensive for a significant duration (e.g. this "pause" never ends) then we can say it has been decisive, because there are dead futures on the floor.
Last are Outcomes.  "What is the difference between a Decision and an Outcome Capt?"  My personal definitions is that an Outcome is a death of options, normally strategic options.  The sum of decisions in western doctrine is supposed to lead to "Objectives" which are the "Deal Done" points in western military planning.  Frankly these have let us down in the past, so I go with Options.  If Options die, they kill off entire fields of futures....a future-cide if you will.  Here something like the entire collapse of the northern Russian front was an Outcome to my mind because the Russian strategic options space collapsed.  Same thing happened after the first week of this war as the strategic options spaces that led to a quick war also died - it is why we got all excited about it back then.  The most significant Outcome is the end of the war of course, but that Outcome is the sum of a bunch of other ones, that all loop back to Will.
So whenever something blows up, look both left and right on that spectrum, and ask a lot of questions.  How is the Cause chain doing comparatively? What is happening with Will? What is the problem with Russian Capability translating into Energy and Targets?  Really keep a close eye on the Blue circle, the indicators of the important stuff are there:  what is the actual effect?  Is this decisive?  what was the Outcome?
Ok, so that was the easy part.
What is not Seen, but should be.
While books have been written on the first part above, the second is the land of experience.  Here a deep understanding of history comes in very useful as it provides a lot of context.  This space (which I do not have a snazzy picture for) is essentially "what should be happening but is not..."  It is very tricky and takes a lot of experience to "see the blank spaces", it is where the effects should be happening but are not based on whatever time and space we are in within a given scenario.
For example, let's take the Russian cruise missiles (and this is not a beat up of @panzermartin, he is asking some good questions).  We know the Russians have a lot of missiles (https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/) and they had launched roughly 1000 of them in about a month at the beginning of the war.
And another report that they were at 2125 total "68 days into the war" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare#:~:text=Russia launched more than 1%2C100,68 days of the war.).  Now if we take "What we see" as the only indication, well this is a clearly functioning Cause chain.  Will, Capability all landing on targets.  A little shaky on the dud rate and "missing" military targets by many reports, and the Medium of UA AD has been pretty effective (then we get into competitive system effects which is a whole other thing - there are red and blue circles in collision); however, that is a lot of "boom".  The Effects we saw were a lot of damage, some of it military and the UA definitely had to react to defend itself by moving AD and C2 around.  I am not sure they have been Decisive, but we will get to that.
So that is what we saw, and on the surface 2125 incoming missiles all over the Ukraine is not small and frankly looks scary...but I only see what is missing:
A Ukrainian strategic center of gravity is the inflow of support from the western world.  We are pushing a lot of money and boom-boom over the border from Poland.  High on Russia's list of high value targets has to be to cut off that incoming support anyway possible.  They have done strikes in Lviv on training bases, so they clearly have the capability to hit.  But what are we not seeing?  I am not seeing rail infrastructure being crippled in Western Ukraine.  I am not seeing road infrastructure being destroyed faster than Ukraine can repair.  I am not seeing 30 Ukrainian ammo depots in western Ukraine being hit to cut off the supply of 155mm shells - it is what I am not seeing that is the biggest indicator something is going very wrong on the Russian side.  The Russians have the capability - range is no excuse as they could park missiles in Belarus, so why are they not using all them there 2125 missiles on what really matters?  First answer is that they are "dumb" but that is too easy.  Split Will, missiles spread across disjointed commands all lobbing on their own priorities much more likely.  Lack of ISR to consistently hit things when they need to be hit like UA ammo dumps and logistics nodes, which tend to move around...also very likely.
This is the same thing very early on in the war - why was I still seeing Ukrainian social media feeds 72 hours into this war?  All them tanks getting lit up, old ladies with balls of steel etc.  Rule #1 of country invasion: make it go dark.  Russian failed in this, it was missing and should not have been.
Wargamers have an advantage here as they play these problem sets all the time.  We have seen it a lot on this thread.  A wargamer can ask..."why did they not do this?  I would have."  
And this has nothing to do with an echo chamber either, but we do need to be careful.  For example, we have not seen UA operational offence yet, and nothing that looks like all traditional arms manoeuvre.  This one has me particularly puzzled and we are getting more data in on why this may be happening.
I will sum up by saying that in order to really filter the "reality" from opinion and BS, take all this and apply it to what we can actually see and not see.  We can build assumptions but they have to remain on speaking terms with the facts.  Once an assumption becomes a fact [edit for @Combatintman. “without sufficient validation”]  we are in trouble.  Enough facts put through the lenses of the two frameworks I give here become a trend, and it is those trends that told us that Russia was losing the first part of the war while most of the mainstream were figuring out how to deal with a Russian victory.
Good luck and surf safe.
 
 

It is an incoherent video with a bunch of weirdly disconnected shots from 21 Mar - about the time the entire Northern Russian front collapsed.  That was a BM-21 as far as I can tell and that last hit on the shopping mall was a ballistic missile of some sort.  The ability of Russian missile to strike targets they can pull from Google Earth is not a clear indicator of superiority in anything.  Yes, they have a lot of long range missiles that can hit static target the size of the building...so what?  How does that lend to leap in logic that the Russians and Ukraine have deep strike parity somehow?
Type in "Russian Ammo Dump explosion" into You Tube and see what comes up.  Type it into Google and you get this:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-military-strikes-with-western-arms-disrupt-russian-supply-lines-2022-07-14/
I could post this and reference stuff posted on this thread all day long.
So let's talk "grounded in reality".  We have reports of over 30 operational high value targets being hit in Russian depth over the last couple weeks.  The Russians are being forced to react.  Their offensive operations are slow and small gains, and very costly - to the point they had to invoke a week+ long operational pause after taking a few acres in the Donbas.  UA c-btty seems to be working.  The Russian offensive has the hallmarks of stalling, just like it did in phase 1, and now we are hearing speculation on a UA Kherson offensive - after they hammered that bridge with PGM, to the point the Russians have to restrict traffic.
We have debated Russian morale and are looking for indicators one way or the other as to where it is pointing.  None of it is pointing to "good news" for the Russian system.  In fact it appears kinda sick, if these trends in desertion keep going.  The RA can still attack so they are not out of it yet but getting a weird vibe.  
Look, you want to be "the counter-thinker", cool we definitely need them.  However, come with facts.  We have been pulling assessments in from everywhere and adding our own, if you indeed have one then lay it out.  Right now I am seeing a lot of opinion and one grainy video that is running counter to about the last 200 pages.  Some questions to consider:
- How has Russian deep strike affected the UA operational system?
- How has that erosion supported the achievement of Russian operational and strategic goals.
- How has Russian deep strike affected Centers of Gravity as different levels?
- Have the Russians achieved any operational level superiority beyond massed artillery fires?  Have they eroded UA superiority.
- How has Russian deep strike opened up strategic options spaces?  (it sure as hell has for the UA).
- How has deep strike affected each sides Will?
Now if you can answer those, with some facts or even a credible professional assessment then lets hear em.
 

Nobody in RU except marginal Nats believes in RU propaganda 100%. Even hardcore LDNR volunteers say it more for public consumption (in private they are far more reasonable than on public. They just need to say something to cover their war crimes). On average RU believe 50% of propaganda, so Nazies translates in to spoiled and dumb people who were duped by heinous westerners (which is very believable because of RU indoctrination of Forteses under Siege and Inferiority of Other Nations mentality).
Regarding Manifest Motherland Destiny outside of RU hardcore Nats it is not much. They might talk much but talking and putting your ass in danger is very different. Motherland Destiny sounds hollow in RU because there is a reason Schevchuk said Motherland is braggard old lady at train station selling potatoes.  
There is also funny side - in RU Kherson literally sounds like [very rude] penis sleep but not in good way, like [here is] penis [for you] instead of sleep. So, I defended Kherson sound extremely funny and laughable. Not a very honorable place to defend.