LongLeftFlank

1. DefMon drills nicely into this very topic in this thread... .... Nice forensics here. 2. The ginger gnome there is Russian video tweeter WarGonzo As noted by others, the Russians seem to have committed nearly all their elite units into this bridgehead, a la Wacht am Rein 1944.

Surprise. They were expecting to capture all kinds of sinister foreign operatives at Azovstal.

Interesting thread here on Russian attempts to scrape together a new army. Georgian source, no idea of the quality of their info or analysis.... One comment: Wait... they want to form *and* train reserve battalions in THREE WEEKS? Da'hell? More from the commenter (a fellow gamer):

1. 4+ weeks and the Russians still haven't reached the river behind Lyman. 2. And to do that, they still gotta clear a small force of 79th AB out of this stuff.... https://kyivindependent.com/national/welcome-to-hell-ukrainian-airborne-fighting-russia-in-donbas-woods/ Swedish-made 84 mm AT4s, American M141s (SMAW-Ds), widespread British NLAWs, and rarer RGW-90 MATADORs, all lean against the earthen trench walls next to machine guns pointed against the deep forest. “Our big regards to taxpayers giving us these toys,” the paratroopers laugh. “This forest has a lot of destroyed Russian vehicles if someone wants an illustrated cost performance report.” ....“We tried to talk to him. He was 20, maybe 21. He only managed to say that his name was Vadim, he served with the 15th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, and that his unit’s main mission in the area was to just get entrenched and wait.” That last bit seems to confirm that the RA objective in this sector is to secure the river line. Whenever that happens. 3. OTOH, they do seem to be bringing up (towed) guns in anticipation of bombarding the Sloviansk transport junction. 4. Classic Russian mech attack (a few weeks back). AFVs turn a building into swiss cheese from a distance, with no confirmation of whether anyone's still in it, or any other kind of fire lanes set up to isolate it. Video is too grainy to see if there are any RU infantry flanking the position, but you just kind of know there aren't. Recon by fire, a pointless waste of ammo. **** Bonus meme...

Do you remember? your President Yanukovitch / Do you remember the bills you have to pay for even yesterday ... Young Ukrainians young Ukrainians we were the young Ukrainians

1. another view on T62. I actually just like the Operation CTRL-Z meme... 2. Bunching up kills, part 2! (in this case, nearly....)

Yup, that's a CM tree all right.... And yeah, Newsweak again, but, interesting info.... https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-russias-air-war-ukraine-total-failure-new-data-show-1709388 Of the 20,000 or so sorties that the Russian air force has flown so far in the Ukraine war, fewer than 3,000 have entered Ukrainian airspace, almost all of them over the battlefield. Russia flew fewer and fewer bombing aircraft beyond its own army's front lines, just over 10 percent of the total number of sorties flown, according to U.S. intelligence numbers. Long-range strikes on so-called "strategic targets" continued, but they were undertaken by a combination of air, sea, and ground-launched missiles. Over 32 years, some 2,300 Tomahawks have been used in combat... in 85 days of strikes 2,275 missiles have been successfully launched [by Russia].... Iskander missiles (630 of them) have been launched from the ground in Belarus and Russia.... A dozen Kinzhal hypersonic aero-ballistic missiles have been fired. "Right now, we're holding Russian missile success at just below 40 percent," the DIA official says.... two to three out of every ten missiles fired fail to launch or fizzle during its flight. Two more have technical problems such as not fusing properly even if they fly to their intended range. Two to three more miss their aim-points even when they reach their intended target. Ukraine says that it has shot down 110 Russian cruise missiles, almost 10 percent of those that make it into Ukrainian airspace. "And then there's the question of what they [the Russians] are hitting, and what their intentions are even when they do succeed," the DIA official adds. "For a couple of days it's airfields and air defenses. Then the emphasis shifts to ammunition depots, then oil, then factories, then the transportation grid. In each case, we are not seeing effective attacks and we are seeing little if any follow-on strikes." **** Hey, while I'm citing Newsweak, let's go all Popular Mechanix too!

Good map of the action around Bakhmut. Quality mapmakers are starting to take more care with their Big Red Arrows of Doom.

Good thread here on 'why' the T62....

Major Minderbinderski.....

Yup. https://mobile.coconuttimes.com/articles/Remembering-WWII/WORSE-THAN-A-VISIT-TO-THE-DENTIST

Not just in Russia, sadly. It's painful to watch Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith, whose Old Left blog I used to read with great interest even though I am no leftie, contort herself into mental knots trying to make sense of this parallel universe where Russia are the Good Guys and could steamroll the 'nazis' any time they like, if only it wasn't for those evil NATO meddling kids.... Some of the same topsy turvy pops up over on The American Conservative (not just the Buchanan isolationists, who are at least consistent), and in the comment section of Pat Lang's blog.

Yes, this is my take too. Lukashenko is pursuing a Franco strategy, where sure, he'll join Hitler's crusade against Bolshevism but he simply needs the following materials first to modernize the Spanish army, e.g. an entire year's production of PZIVs and SfH150mm howitzers. Oh, and the entire tungsten supply. ...But in the meantime, if you want to recruit some annoying Spanish fascist wingnuts to spend the winter in the Volkhov swamps, sure, fill yer jackboots mate!

Galeev describes vividly how these levies use the USSR era bureaucracy against it. "Collapse" may be Kafkaesque.... "Procedure of mobilisation requires a compulsory medical examination. Nobody examined us. Many have chronic illnesses" Btw: every young Russian male with an IQ above the room temperature collects as many certificates about chronic illnesses as possible. For this very reason. Galeev also points out elsewhere that Kafka was an experienced bureaucrat, highly valued by his superiors.

Really? That was your takeaway from my post?

1. Mortar work 2. Javs on the steppe 3a. Mariupol defenders came out looking in better shape than these 'attacking forces'.... 3. Meanwhile, the beleaguered and supposedly trapped defenders of Lyman look fairly... chipper. 4. These guys, not so much. Bunching up kills, as we CMers all know. 5. WHOOOMPH!

The Poles are delighted not to be hosting a massive European land war just for once. But yes, now that the Poles are rid of their apatrid feudal nobility, and with the Germans remaining good neighbours, Poland has a real chance to step up postwar as an Eastern European leader. Poland + Ukraine + (in time) Belarus creates a potentially powerful economic zone of over 100 million people, well equipped with all resources (human and otherwise) save oil. The river basins also look like they will suffer less acutely from climate change than other areas of the planet. I am going out over my skis again here, but the basic 'carrying capacity' of the land seems very good. And that's going to matter over time. And the peoples seem compatible: socially conservative, stubborn, hands-on and individualistic (forgive me for stereotyping). Politically, a new 'Commonwealth' could form a potent counterweight, both to Moscow and to French-German 'hegemony' within the EU.

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win. Kobayashi Maru. Having bungled his original plan, he is scrambling to recover, and he may well do it! He has no choice; it is literally do or die for his regime. In spite of the tough talk and righteous anger, I believe a cease fire will be inevitable at some point in 2022. So sorry guys, I'm gonna be a pessimist again here. If nothing else, it forces us to reexamine what underlies our faith in victory. 1. Sure, by early winter the UA can likely build up enough combined arms ground strength for a massive 1918 offensive to retake these (now refortified) areas. But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. However intense and righteous their anger at present, that victory will need to be paid for in their blood, and it won't be easy. Also, other world crises may well arise by year end that sap foreign attention and funds. 2. And sure, Russia's army and economy could collapse between now and then, going bankrupt gradually then all at once, starved of beans, bullets and motivated men.... Revolts, mass surrenders, or RA troops simply leaving their trenches and walking home as Saddam's army did in 2002. I don't think the pain and privation meter is nearly high enough yet for that though. I hear the arguments and the anecdotes, but I can't personally see a disintegration, absent a major military defeat (i.e. where a full RA CAA army is blasted / routed from its defenses by large scale UA offensive action). 3. A cease fire that leaves Russia in possession of most of Donbas plus (far more valuable) the Dnepr south bank/land bridge will absolutely be spun at home as a Win and most Russians will shrug and accept it. This will leave Putin and/or the national-fascist power structure in power in Moscow. Russia will patch up its broken army and economy and regear for its next move (which will surely not be a repeat of 2022, but also won't let its neighbours breathe easy). 4. Once the guns fall (mainly) silent, there will be zero consensus in the West to sponsor a Ukraine-initiated 'Liberation War'. They will look like 'aggressors' (yes, I know, but that's how it will be spun and lots of people will agree). 5. So the Ukraine partition will become 'facts on the ground'. I take note of the valid points by @The_Capt about the drain on battered Russia of manning such a long frontier (and resettling/rebuilding a now devastated okrajina with whom? Cossacks and Kadyrov's Chechens?). But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around. I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare. That won't force out (brutal) occupying forces by itself, and only so many citizens will risk martyrdom or deportation. Most will merely accept the new reality, as was true in Donetsk and Lukhansk. 6. Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army. 7. Also, a long term Western blank cheque for nonmilitary rebuilding and subsidies is NOT a given. Aid monies will be stolen or wasted, vile factional politics will resume, etc. Zelenskyy doesn't have the personality to become either a Lee Kwan Yew or a caudillo; his hero aura will fade with time, and growing citizen frustration. With no clear end game, a country can only hang fire as a huge armed camp for so long. Ukraine is not South Korea, and it took the latter 15 years to get off the floor after 1954, with massive US aid (plus large US bases). 8. Unlike the attractive investment market I could see following a decisive victory where Russia is forced back to the Feb start line (or, at minimum loses the 'land bridge' which menaces Odessa and Dnipro), private foreign investors aren't going to deploy capital in a country where so many key cities lie in Russian artillery range. They will look elsewhere. CONCLUSIONS: A. A summer Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson and the land bridge, and rout the Russian armies in that zone before they dig in too deeply, remains critical in shaping the postwar fate of both Ukraine and Russia. B. Waiting and building up, a la COSSAC/OVERLORD, for winter or 2023 hugely *raises* the cost of victory, it doesn't lower it. And I think it doesn't end up happening. IMHO, FWIW. Have at it, Steve et al.

Hee hee, the "Controlled Oppposition" works very well, until it doesn't.... (sorry, no shorter clip available. Minute 26:04) Trilisser: But for what are these men to be shot? Stalin: For conspiracy to subvert our Revolution. Trilisser: But, they were acting under our instructions. Stalin: Does that excuse them?

Of course, as nearly 3 months of poring over maps has taught us, don't take those "Giant Red Arrows" to be any more than indicative of intent, not accomplishment. They could also be a single road wide (a front of a single vehicle).

Good, bring it Ivan! It seems clear that mech attacks are very challenged at this point in history, for both sides. Let's see if the Russians demonstrate smarter tactical use of leg infantry here too. If they use more VDV paras though, that's a very bad sign for them, as those forces have been heavily depleted since 25 Feb. Also, in simplistic rock-paper-scissors terms, 'mech' was invented to kill machine guns that force infantry attacks to ground (at which point arty takes over the killing). So the requirement to employ combined arms in the attack to achieve break-in and breakthrough, somehow, remains. We will see which side masters that first.

Again, browsing pro-Russian feeds for stuff that isn't prop... 1. Bombardment of Liman town. That distinctive round reservoir appears on the left, so I think this is still the western outskirts 2. Popasna salient: 'Assault on the outskirts of Kamyshevakhi by Russian Marine Corps' Note tactical use of transport (?) helos. 3. As several have noted here, in drone world, open trenches = prefab graves. No really, at least one guy gets buried....

As is my wont, I periodically browse various pro-Russian feeds for notable items that may not be total fabrication. My purpose here is neither alarmism nor defeatism. Simply put, complacency costs lives. Nobody expects everything to go UA's way at all times in a high intensity war, of course, but I do continue to worry about their ability to mount mechanised offensive operations (as opposed to infantry attacks). And I've been eyeing that Zaporizhe front too. Newsweek (not pro-Russian AFAIK although I haven't read it for news since, like, high school), 14 May: https://www.newsweek.com/russian-troops-destroy-2-battalions-ukrainian-tanks-mid-preparation-1708306 The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) said the attack took place near the village of Vishnevoe in the south-eastern Ukrainian region of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The MoD said Russian troops destroyed two mechanized battalions of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with artillery fire and drones as well as incoming fire from tanks and armored vehicles. The Russian MoD said as a result of the attack, they destroyed 26 Ukrainian tanks, 12 infantry fighting vehicles, and killed around 100 soldiers. The Russian military also said that the attack was launched due to the work of reconnaissance troops using drones. (Did they mention enough times that this is Russians claiming this, lol?) ...Maybe battalions aren't the size they used to be or sumfink? But while this isn't exactly Kasserine Pass, still, it's a black eye for one UA battalion, even if inflated (e.g. all hits claimed as kills). Edit: ooh, even better, video from the Sun! Where's the Page Three Girl?

Or else a large proportion of Russians rapidly apply the 'What Good Thing Do I Expect Will Happen If I Give My True Feelings On This Matter' test, and say the 'patriotic' thing?

Droog, Where's My БМП?