LongLeftFlank

It appears Azovstal is indeed becoming Thermopylae....

God willing!

While I'm not in the Donbass (Kramatorsk), I am not sure the situation is quite so dire. The RA has now lost yet another week, with the bulk of 2 divisions fighting to reach the river line of the Donetz. Heavy attacks too, based on the NASA forest fire maps (which are loose proxy for artillery bombardments). Where's the threat? 1. The RA push south from Izyum has stalled out, and is getting counterattacked and bombarded along its western face. 2. The failed river crossings between Yampil and Kreminna have been talked to death. 3. Every village the Russians take along the fortified front seems to cost them hundreds of casualties. It's a 'grinding game', but they are the ones getting ground. 4. So that leaves the UA holdouts across the river northeast of Sloviansk (Lyman industrial complexes and Sviatohirsk hills). Sources kept reporting Lyman falling or surrounded a week or more ago; there was fighting in the streets, the Russians had taken the retreat route. Nope, not yet. I am no terrain analyst, but if you look closely at the topography, there is some very boggy terrain along the (late spring flood) river on either flank of Lyman; there is no further way to flank the defenders. They still have an escape route, on foot, which suits the UA just fine. And once the Russians finally secure Lyman (presumably once the UA rearguard decides to go), they FINALLY reach the river at the end of May. So great, they are now facing a rank of densely wooded hills that still separate them from their objective at Sloviansk-Kramatorsk. Where's the crisis again?

Very nice maps here showing the unit positions in the noted fronts, as well as the various crossroads and bridges.

Chinese OSINT analyst Suyi, notes the following regarding the southern front ('land bridge'): The initial actions of the Russian army in the direction of Kherson-Melitopol-Tokmak were indeed impressive, and it should be said that this was the direction in which the Russian army performed best in the first phase of the war. However, it should also be noted that after the Russian army arrived in Tokamak, it was 200 kilometers away from Dankoy, the railway terminal on the Crimean Peninsula. During this period, there were only a few hardened roads (no more than 2 main roads) to maintain logistics, which has placed the limit on the Russian military offensive. In addition, due to the fact that the Russian army entered a centrifugal offensive after crossing the Perekop Isthmus, its existing 2 armies and 1 army were continuously diluted, and in multiple campaign targets (Nikolaev-Voznexian, hesitating between Sk-Odessa, Novikahovka-Krivorog, Meritopol-Tokmak, Berdyansk-Mariupol). It is hard to imagine that it can quickly capture Zaporozhe, a city with a population of 750,000 (such a city needs at least 30,000 troops to fight, which is equivalent to 1/2 of the fighting force on the southern front, and the Russian army cannot concentrate so many troops), regardless of the threat to Dnipro. Judging from the results, except for Berdyansk-Mariupol, the four follow-up targets of the Russian army's southern cluster were all bankrupt and suffered heavy losses, and were soon turned to defense.

Well worth watching in full. This is about as close to von Rundstedt's "Make peace, you fools!" as you are likely to see in Russian media.

'Rescue mission' never came out of my mouth. A TF Baum type of deep raid (90km) would have *zero* chance of success, would get hammered by air power, and deliver the Russians a badly needed tactical victory, on camera. I'm talking about a conventional attack by c.2 UA heavy brigades in the general direction Melitopol; to destroy or rout Russian forces opposite and force a full scale RA relief effort which has every chance of turning into yet another C-Fk and further sapping their strength. The infantry-heavy UA actions to clear the Kharkiv environs and menace the Izyum LOCs can continue. They aren't using their heavy forces for those; the built up terrain is not favourable. Russia is reeling now, mainly from its own manifest incompetence. A summer 'pause' lets them off the ropes to regroup and dig in on their early gains in the south and in the Izyum-Kreminna river line. That's all basically stalemate, except for Kharkiv. I just don't buy the 'collapse' theory. The Russian army must be beaten, on defence, to collapse it. Or they will keep fighting, with whatever they have. While foreign pressure on Ukraine to accept a ceasefire and 'negotiate' will only rise over time. So with your 'pause' you have just voluntarily ceded the initiative and shifted back to a long game Putin can play and win.

Of course, but if you ever played M1TP, it was the first video game to capture the flavour of ASL; use of terrain, fields of fire, calling in arty, etc.

VII.29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. VII.30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession. VII.31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.... XI.18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." **** As folks here know, I've been keen for UA to strike along this front since early April. 1. The best outcome of course is a relentless 'march to Azov', routing and destroying all Russian forces between Kherson and Donetsk. 2. But forcing the Russians to divert, commit and expend what's left of their mobile reaction forces (VDV, etc.), airlift and tac airpower in frantic (and likely blundering) efforts to shore up this (for them) remote and extended front could yield Ukraine a victory nearly as great, strategically speaking! 3. It would be an ideal test case for the reconstitute UA mech forces on the attack, steppelands with limited river barriers. A failure to advance as expected, for whatever reason, would not result in a significant defeat or exposure to a Russian riposte, and would provide extremely valuable learnings. At some point UA are going to have to figure out whether they can do this, and IMHO it may just as well be here. 4. It would also force the withdrawal of substantially all Russian assault forces from Azovstal in order to defend their own supply lines.

M1 Tank Platoon was CM before there was CM!

Ha, Dovhenke is still in play! .... since early April, b!tchez.

[EDIT: looks like you either changed your post, or else there's something strange going on with Twitter links, in which case my apologies] As others here have noted, take Roepke's reporting with many, many grains of salt. He uses a weird mix of sources, many quite dated and draws overly dramatic conclusions. Repeatedly. While reporting from the Ukrainian side, he bears many hallmarks of a concern troll.

So based on this rather dramatic action, the UA is still very much on the defensive in Donbas. UA logistics problems in the 'bulge'? That said, they clearly had enough shells to repel the river crossings

Not being European, or a TV viewer, I will confess the whole Eurovision thing has passed me by, so this piece by Aris Roussinos filled a few gaps. It also mentions that ubiquitous song.... https://unherd.com/thepost/as-in-war-ukraine-summons-its-folk-roots-for-eurovision-victory/

Nothing especially 'left' there, Steve, largely stuff we've been observing here for 750 pages now. Good map, though dates compressed, as the author noted:

Nice illustration of the 'interior lines' advantage here. And how much harder yet is it for the Russians to shift forces to Hulyaipole? Just sayin' P.S. Paging @Aragorn2002 tax dollars hard at work....

3 bloody weeks later and the Russians finally seem to hold Dovhenke, which @Combatintman flagged back on 23 April as a tough nut to crack on the road to Sloviansk. ... I am a little skeptical though that the Russians are going to be doing any broken-field running at this point though, still less pocketing anything. ...DefMon seems to think that's a southern limit for the Izyum bridgehead.

We have been saying for a long time that the Russian army that Russia is trying promote in various training videos does not exist. It is a horde of people with weapons. That's all they've got. Mic drop

Indeed. And whose bodies are being 'thrown?'

Old Chinese dude: VII.2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. VII.3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. VII.4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. VII.5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.... VII.13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. VII.14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.... Zero out of six.

News you can use....

Looks like the RA has indeed adopted the expedient of beefing up its BTG infantry strength for attacks by attaching VDV paras, a la Kampfgruppe Peiper. Makes sense since these guys are supposed to be trained to fight cross-country and independently. Although they still bring their BMDs along....