LongLeftFlank

Number 4. The Naughty Bits. Or is it the post-Abu Ghraib Geneva Convention-Friendly Field Interrogation Kit: "So, you are made of sterner stuff! Cardinal Biggles? Poke her.... with the Soft Cushions! Confess! Confess! (What, have you got all the stuffing up one end?)"

Ah, memories of geeky megalomania flood home. In winter 1977, suburban Buffalo NY, my friends and I pooled 6(x5) sets of CoI counters and boards to reenact "Elefant/Tiger Panzerkeil at Kursk" on my bedroom floor.... the Ballantine paperback being our primary source. I remember being totally pissed at AH for the crappy print quality of the second set of CoI counters (unreadably dark navy and bright orange) and boards (far too much brown) I had ordered for the occasion. For me, age 13 and making my first mail order purchase ever with my paper route money, this was my version of the Rust Belt "crushed beer can and marble in the dashboard" betrayal of the American dream. But unbroken, we soldiered on, listening to Styx and Rush on cassette as our stoner older brothers and parents shoveled snow and lined up for gas back in Canada (Back then, compared to Buffalo, Cleveland and NYC, my hometown of Toronto seemed like an oasis of enlightened civilization: CN Tower. Ontario Place. The bank towers. Game over, eh?) With about 1000 AFV and ordnance counters per side (infantry was largely beside the point), in about 30 hours of snowday play we got through the turn 2 Defense Fire Phase before my mum's cats got into the room and executed Operation Kutuzov on our pathetic Tamiya Sturmpanzer fanboy asses. The Advanced D&D Monster Manual came out around that time, so that was pretty much the swansong for wargaming, as it was for our cardboard SS Panzerkorps. Having drunk the Koolaid though, I kept buying the ASL games all through college, even though there was nobody to play against. They still sit today in my brother's basement, counters neatly arranged in plastic hardware store containers, collecting dust, lost legions of my misspent youth (oh rubbish, I'm a spreadsheet jock today, and where do you think I got so good at large pattern recognition?) What was the Paul Carell caption again: "One game of many; one dork of many"

I don't wanna be buried in a pet cemetary....

I don't wanna be buried in a pet cemetary....

I don't wanna be buried in a pet cemetary....

Wasn't this the guy with the poisoned chalices from "The Princess Bride"? (and I seem to recall a reference to "fighting a land war in Asia").

Hmm. I've learned a lot reading this thread. Thanks, all. I was particularly compelled by the comparison between Iraq-Iran and Texas-Mexico frontiers. Most reasonable parties involved privately admit the latter to be an utterly futile whack-a-mole game, just like the war on drugs (i.e. as long as demand is strong for the smuggled commodity -- cocaine, immigrant labour, arms -- supply will find a way through even if the loss rate is high owing to costly saturation policing by the authorities). I suspect the same dynamics apply to the Syrian-Iraq frontier, even if the USMC refuses to admit that. Just as it was for the "Market Time" and Laos-Cambodia interdiction ops back in the day. Are there any Vietnam vets still active within the DoD command structure? Or did they all take their pensions with Colin Powell before GWB, Rummy and the "government can be managed just like a corporation" gang moved in? (Coincidence? You decide) The above line of reasoning suggests that even if you could magically seal the "hostile" borders, all you'd do is create pressure for substitute flow via corruptible "allies" in Kurdistan, Jordan and Saudi/Kuwait. Which would effectively destabilize the few stable areas remaining within the Artist Formerly Known As Iraq. So, following the logic of the war on drugs/immigrants: supply-side interdiction of a highly fungible commodity (e.g. white powder / hard-working day labourer / Chinese or Slovak knock-off of Soviet-era wire guided missile) is futile. In which case, interested parties should focus on "demand side management". And what is that, exactly?

Oof! So the IDF is moving away from infantry carriers based on fully armored MBT chassis back to pimped out purple heart boxes? That's a TERRIBLE mistake IMHO.

Oops, here's the link. Sorry. Zer Link!

Yes, yes, I know, the LRDG didn't really "beat" Rommel. Write an angry letter to the Telegraph. At least they know what the LRDG was, though! <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/08/24/wiraq24.xml> Telegraph British to adopt the tactics that beat Rommel By Oliver Poole in Amarah (Filed: 24/08/2006) I won't quote more than this, as it is copyrighted material. Click the link.

Amen, brother! Patiently stalking Spandau nests in hedgerow hell. The "skin" concept could be an element of the oft requested "Iron Man" Super Duper Extreme FOW option where players have limited visibility into distant terrain details, as well as limited "god views".

Yes, I did a college thesis on the VDV in 1985 that reached much the same conclusion. A division- sized desant complete with BMDs and arty would also have required about 70% of all the Soviet airlift capability (IL-76s and AN-22s) then available, Aeroflot included. An airborne coup de main against Antwerp or Frankfurt was a fantasy. Battalion scale attacks -- maybe. For purposes of my thesis, far more interesting was the location of the 7 VDV division bases: in a loose ring around Moscow HQ'ed at Tula-Ryazan, and convenient to the major highways into town. While the VDV divisions made a useful elite rapid deployment force for places like Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia (and they were almost sent to Egypt in 1973), their primary purpose in the late Soviet era was not to execute WWII style airdrops. It was rather to act as a praetorian guard, counterbalancing the KGB and MVD units and the (ceremonial) Taman Guards. That was one thing Suvorov (Rasun) was quite right about -- one of the CPSU's governing principles was to ensure that no one organization had a monopoly on armed force. And as it turned out, in 1991 guess who showed up at the Kremlin en masse in their BMDs and sailor shirts for the failed anti-Gorbachev coup (and then withdrew equally promptly once it failed)? And while we're speaking of that, what do you think the US 82nd Airborne Division gets special training for? Remember who integrated the schools in Little Rock in 1956 when the Arkansas National Guard proved unreliable?

Looks to me like the marksmanship was about as good as the camera work.

BTW, if anyone remembers "Up Front"/"Banzai", the very unique WWII card game AH put out in the 1980s, that system did a very nice job of simulating recon / infiltration tactics, although the scale was too small to model other types of combat.

I'd second those comments, cassh, particularly about there being a world of difference between an 8m (26 foot) streambed and a 6 foot slit trench. On the other hand, I'm willing to accept that CMSF should focus on other more crucial realism items for the Syrian campaign. Since I understand the second module will be Normandy (i.e. hedgerow hell), I'll just hope that the BFC team will see the value in refining some of the details for us at that time. Please understand, I didn't start this thread to nitpick. Due to RL constraints, I avoid the big mech Rgt/Bn assaults in CMx1, instead preferring single sitting Co/Plt patrol/ambush or infiltration/trench raids. IIUC, company level actions will be the focus of CMx2 and unlike some folks here I'm really looking forward to that. What I've noticed in 5 years of playing these kinds of bumps is that infiltration is a lot harder in CMx1 than it was in RL. Not to say it wasn't quite tricky in RL, it's just IMPOSSIBLE in CMx1 unless you deliberately designed a big gap in the defense. Borg spotting is part of it, but not all. In RL, halfway competent defenders readily observe and mine/ defilade/zero big 20m gullies in their fire zone, and turn them into kill sacks for the unwary (read that 34th ID "lessons learned" document for some horrid examples). What defenders don't always pick up though are the smaller, shallower watercourses (natural and manmade, dry or not, often brushfilled) that crisscross all types of land. A skilled infiltrator gets good at patiently identifying these routes and worming his way into grenade range UNSPOTTED. In CMx1, this can't be easily simulated-- the "stealthy" units invariably get spotted and pounded even at night unless you make the terrain as dense as PTO jungle (which is the same as engineering a big defense flaw). So that's why in the Normandy incarnation of CMx2, I'd really like to see this kind of subtle but important terrain feature modeled distinct from 8m wide streambeds. Even better would be for it to be treated somewhat like foxholes are now ... features you can't prelocate in "god view" by scanning the map pre-game. Something you need to spot as you go along. Here endeth my catechism.

Well that terrain type -- marshlands -- is modeled quite adequately in CMx1, as is the bump-and-run type of ambush you describe. My question concerns a very different terrain feature.

Thanks for the prompt reply. I don't know that I suggested anywhere in my post that some armies were or should be "stereotypically" better than others at infiltration. That wasn't my point at all. My query was: since the new terrain engine lets you create features like narrow alleyways or small footpaths through woods, can you also create narrow trenchlines, ditches, etc. (i.e. narrower than 8m -- that's still pretty wide). This kind of thing may seem trivial, but such terrain features can be key for both defenders and attackers (particularly infiltrators) in company level infantry actions. I've read many accounts of heavily fortified positions being compromised by a tiny ditch or rivulet that went unnoticed and became an infiltration route. And I'd much rather advance along a road with a drainage ditch next to it as opposed to one without, how about you? Best regards, and keep up the good work guys.

I've read through the accumulated "bones" and searched numerous keywords, but I've found no information on whether / how trench networks and related terrain features such as irrigation ditches and small watercourses) which are critical routes for infiltration (as well as good emergency cover) will be handled in the CMx2 engine. I've always felt the absence of these features to be a notable shortcoming of CMx1. True, you can abstract them on maps using one square wide terrain dips, but these are more like wide gullies than slit trenches. When I try to use these dips for infiltration tactics that worked very well historically, the units are generally quickly spotted, even at night and even when I fill them with brush. I suppose infiltration is of secondary application in the CMSF age of reliable night vision and motion detection equipment. But in the pre-IED/ATGW era it was pretty much the only reliable asymetrical warfare tactic available to outgunned forces. The German infantry were feared for their night infiltration counterattacks, as were the Red Army, partisans and of course the Korean war CCF and NVA/VC. On defense, communications trenches were also a critical element of fortified positions. Given the refinement of the CMx2 terrain mesh (sounds great BTW!), I'd love to see small but crucial terrain details like these that can't be readily spotted by units until they get close enough. But I'd guess that this refinement would have to wait for the second game. Any information available that I've missed?

Mk. I Pompous Ass My personal fave in the series would be this particular photo, which tells me more about the WWII US officer corps than a million JasonC posts. The immense size of the image (likely exceeded only by the ego of the subject) prohibits replicating it on this forum, but please do click on the link. It's priceless. It's "The Office" WWII style, complete with the Gareth/Dwight suck-up character stage managing the poor doggies in the background. The movie line that instantly sprang to mind is from "Animal House" re Lt. Niedermayer: "Killed by His Own Troops In Vietnam" It's been a while since one of these "Caption That Image" posts has appeared on this forum, but I invite the collective to chime in. Here, I'll start: 2LT Niedermayer demonstrates the proper technique for assaulting the formidable fortifications of the Nazi "Chia-Pet" Line.

I dunno, I guess I like data, just like a lot of the other folks on this board. I consult in manufacturing operations. It's kind of similar except that on the front line the depreciable life of the assets (and labour) can be weeks, days or minutes, as opposed to years. And if you have the patience, data (the kinds of things JasonC writes about -- running vehicles, supply bottlenecks, trench strength, etc.) will tell a fascinating story all its own which can corroborate, refute, or (most likely) put in better context the hazy memories of the veterans. I wrote a college paper (20 years ago now) on the Soviet airborne forces (VDV) which got me into some of the Soviet military historical journals, so I suppose I don't have as one-sided a view of the Russian war as some. But like most 1970s generation AH gamers, my view of the day-by-day is still shaped largely by the German "tragic heroism against the Asiatic hordes" leitmotiv: Guderian, Manstein, Carrell, von Mellinthin / Liddell Hart, Sajer, et al. Glantz is a good antidote to the "faceless hordes" nonsense... The other side of the hill for the other side of the hill, as it were.

I recently decided it was long past time that I read Glantz. I've recently picked up "Stumbling Colossus" and "Colossus Reborn" and am already into them. I take it the forthcoming third book in his trilogy will cover the late war. Question: in the opinion of the Wise Ones (you know who you are), should I also pick up "When Titans Clashed"? Does it provide distinctive information, or is it an earlier work whose core theses are being revised and expanded by the Colossus trilogy? Thanks in advance....

I hear Oliver Stone will be consulting to the BFC team on the ballistics of shooting around corners Back... and to the left....

And if you're up for a more literary diversion, German filmmaker and novelist Alexander Kluge's "The Battle" (Schlachtbeschreibung) It's a very good read, but I think it's out of print in English. It's a very interesting novel structure, with the narrative created by stringing together various snippets of memoirs, contemporary press releases, sermons by clergymen back home, etc., to assemble a compelling thesis on how the Germans got into the whole mess. Some of these snippets may be fictional. Know anything more about this, Andreas, or anyone?

Oy mate, is that a roll of tenpence coins pressing into my back or are you just happy to see me?

So, in light of the above, I'd take it that all the postwar complaining about "Hitler forced us to stand and die in untenable positions" is just the Wehrmacht excuse factory ignoring the role of the despised Russian muzhiks in engineering all those encirclements and defeats. Or did the Germans really make things worse for themselves some/most of the time?