cyrano01

So Kherson...ooo boy.  Well first off, I am buying off on the whole "traitor" theory that Kherson was likely sold-out, that or the UA simply got stretched too thin but this is the major southern axis so I do not see how they did not prioritize it - maybe they did and Russians down this way actually demonstrated talent.  Why?
Well because on paper this city should be damn near impossible to take from the South:

By my eyes there are roughly 5 crossing sites that one can pull from Google.  The Dnieper is a deep old river so I cannot tell if there are any fording sites but I doubt it.  Wiki says the Dnieper runs at about 1.5 m/sec which is fairly slow and easily swimmable and pontoon-able.  However, Kherson is right on a major delta stretch, to the point that a second river breaks out called the "Konka" (sp?).  Anyway this is a major water obstacle, like Rhine river "major".  The river itself ranges from 500-1000m but that is not the rub, it is the delta - that is a very angry and hungry looking swamp that looks like the mouth of a Dune Sandworm to mobility.  Sure you can pontoon the bridge but those wetlands look like they will eat Divisions, we are talking major road and causeway work in order to sustain.
As I said there are 5 possible crossing sites: 
-Starting on the far left, there is a possible amphibious run between Sofiivka and Rybal'Che but this is also a major undertaking.  That is a 12km run so we are basically talking D-Day but there is infrastructure on either side to support (I am not sure about the shoreline, would need to do an MSFS flight).
- Then we have the Antonovskiy Bridge that the UA is currently turning into swiss cheese.  That is a 1000m crossing without the bridge and a lot of greenish looking swamp hell on the N bank.  Tough.
- We then have what looks like a rail bridge called "Antonivsʹkyy Zaliznychnyy", not sure if it still up but it is about 6km upstream from the Antonovskiy.  If the UA did not blow that one up it will have to go as well (did a quick check but cannot see if it was already).
- Next is what I think is the only decent amphib/pontoon site along this gawd-awful shoreline.  Just on the western outskirts of L'vov about 34 km up from the Antonovskiy there is what looks like a viable crossing site.  The south bank aint great but this is a hydro-electric line crossing so road infrastructure is there (note would have to do a second small bridging op about 1km to the east on a small inlet), which takes one up to an old monastery in Korsunka.
- Last, is the road bridge at the Kakhovka hydro electrical station.  Looks modern and solid.
After that further upstream the Dnieper expands out and although one could find a decent shore line we are basically back to D-Day.
So What?  Well it is like Stalingrad, a city with it back to a major obstacle coming from the UA side.  All war is communication and retaking Kherson will send big political signals in all directions.  It would be a clear sign that the UA can do offensive in a major way, which should assist in shoring up the cottage-cheese spines of some in the West.  It would also be a major blow to Russia, effectively undeciding that entire front.  I am sure they will try and sell it as "we withdrew for the good of the people" noise but even the most doe-eyed Russian believer will have a seed of doubt planted.  
So to the big question: how does the UA take Kherson? Well a couple schools of thought, first a Western solution:

Coming from the Western School of Manoeuvre, the game here would be to cut off Kherson and choke it out, without having to do heavy urban combat.  So Shape, Manoeuvre, Isolate and Attrit would be the order of the day.  A big armored led spearhead thrust down from the North across all that wonderful tank country.  A bounce crossing on those two eastern sites, complete with SF, Airmobile snaps and then swing westward and cut the Russian LOCs completely.  Meanwhile keep the pressure on Kherson from the North, while using deep strike to Fix supporting forces.  Very nice, so long as one has air supremacy.  
I will say it now, if the UA can do this, the war will be over much sooner than anyone thinks. As I have noted before, I have grown allergic to big bold strokes in this war.  The biggest issue, beyond establishing pre-conditions, is time-space-force.  That is about a 130 km thunder run and would likely take a couple modern heavy divisions to pull off, maybe three.  I do not think the UA has that kind of force, nor are they going to get the pre-conditions to support it.  I have no doubt that pundits will start drawing stuff like this...use it for profiling purposes.  I pray to god that the UA could pull off this offensive but I also do not think he is listening...very unlikely.  So what could a UA offense look like?

Attrition-to-Manoeuvre, not the other way around.  The UA could compress Kherson and pull in a lot of RA in reaction.  With their superior ISR and deep strike they could do a lot of damage in depth - given the ranges, this whole thing at Antonovskiy could be a setup for ATACMS arrival.  If they start hitting EW, then UAS are also back on the menu.  As they compress Kherson, their artillery will pull in range as well.  As they pull and bleed the RA, an opportunity to do a North South offensive opens up but only take it to the bridge at the hydro-plant, while cutting every crossing.  You might bag the RA forces to the east.
The major problem with this one is Kherson itself.  If the RA is trapped like rats, they will fight like them.  The UA could break itself in a city of that size (which they know after Mariupol).  My guess is that they will simply bleed the RA white here, hitting them once again along the entire length of the RA operational system.  This presents the modern dilemma of "stay and bleed out" or "withdraw, preserve force and lose the city", either way, so long as the UA can keep pulling the RA in and killing them in numbers while they try and hold onto Kherson it is a winnable situation.
Key will be setting operational conditions and holding onto them.  Deep strike, deep strike and deep strike.  They need to keep hitting RA logistics to keep the RA guns silent and then the UA guns can go to work on the rest without fearing overwhelming c-btty.
How is it actually going to go down...no idea.  In fact it might not happen at all, the whole thing could be a feint.  But one thing is for sure, it has got the Russians wondering.  And on the battlefield uncertainty on your opponent is a useful thing. 

My addendum to Arquilla’s three new rules of modern warfare:
Mass beats isolation; connected precision beats mass; Integrated mass precision beats everything.  
My sense drawing from both this war and the Nargono-Karabahk is that we have entered into an age of Firepower dominant warfare, not unlike where we found ourselves in WW1.  The ability to Find and Fix has far exceeded abilities to counter, combined with the ability to Finish at trending 1:1 kill ratio capability rates, is transforming our concepts of mass on the modern battlefield.  The only forms that have worked so far in this war have been overmatch-mass of the Russians in a very small area at Severodonetsk, which was extremely costly and slow.  And the distributed mass we saw employed by the UA in Phase 1, which was highly effective in defence/denial but we have not yet seen it effective at scale in the offence.
Integrated mass PGMs/Unmanned swarms on the offence employed at an operational level would be a revolutionary moment in the history of warfare.  We can see it from here in this war but we will have to wait and see if it actually happens.

Stanley Baldwin
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_bomber_will_always_get_through

Their drill and locker layouts will be up to scratch at least 😉

There is a nice quote from MacDonald Fraser's 'Quartered safe out here', where he reflects on the effectiveness of the conscript platoon he was in...
"Professionals? No, we weren't professionals. We were experts!"

Let's not go too far down that track - as I recall the M-113 owning side came second in that conflict.

From one random guy on the internet to another, our difference is, I think, that you see the infantry/recce guys doing infantry stuff then supplementing that with some fires task, while I read the same vignette as a couple of infantry guys doing fires stuff throughout.

Doctrine is doctrine - but if you want to get into it...
If you look past the tactical vignette the dilemma is the same as it has been for ages; however, how it is delivered is different.  Those "recce dudes" now have eyes in the sky that stretch for kms in all directions and are linked to quick response (and pretty accurate) indirect fire.  So the Russian forces can either stay dispersed and hidden - and have their combat power dislocated and/or static.  Or they concentrate that combat power to manoeuvre, get spotted at much longer ranges and get hammered - Finding beats flanking.
Do that in enough locations across the Russian positions (and indications are that is exactly what the UA was doing - this account sounds very familiar), and now they can because "eyes", and you have attrition across the Russian system, which can (and perhaps did) cause collapse.  It is a form of attrition-to-manoeuvre, as opposed to the other way around, which we have been slavishly adhering to like a religion for years.
Infiltration - even if by UAVs - and attrition is not a "mere nuisance", over time it erodes the physical and moral elements of combat power (upscale it and you can strain the social as well).  Which means more rotations of units to and from the front, which leads to more friction.  
The only way out of the box appears to concentrate your mass to such a ridiculous extent that you overcome the artillery through sheer bloody-mindedness - a Zap Brannigan strategy if there ever was one.  It will gain you a few kms of ground on a narrow front but you will pay dearly for it.  The force ratios the Russian are having to employ to do this are crazy - e.g. Severodonetsk - 900 guns to cover a 30 km frontage is just insane...and that got them to inching.  The old MRD had, by my count, about 216 tubes and was expected to cover off 20 kms ( see: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-3.pdf, pg 4-39, and: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf, pg 5-19).  Even with a second MRD in depth, that is about double the gun density for frontage being employed compared to what the Soviets had planned on to invade West Germany. 
So What?  Well if that is what it takes to create enough mass to attack in a box while staying secure from those "nuisances", then I would say that the combined arms tactics being described are pretty damned effective.

Yes it is.
combined arms – The synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if
each arm was used separately or sequentially. (ADP 3-0)
combined arms team – (DOD) The full integration and application of two or more arms or elements of one Service into an operation. (JP 3-18) Referenced in ATP 3-01.81.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31809-FM_1-02.1-000-WEB-1.pdf
 
Further it is also the more likely 21st century version - infantry, unmanned systems and indirect fires.

Wanted to come back to this one as well.  I think we are muddling some issues here:
- Cost.  A strategic issue that many countries are wrestling with but a UAV with a Stinger was what I was talking about to deny manned aircraft and here the cost is upside down for the traditional manned aircraft.  Counter-drone, or drone-v-drone warfare needs a new set of cheaper weapons, which they will be because they don't need the same HE payloads to bring down...finding and hitting them is the primary issue.
- Unmanned warfare.  We are coming up to 120 days of this war and drones are not going anywhere.  In some areas it looks like Russian EW is cooking the sky enough to cause problems for everyone - I would love to see how many EW emitters have been hit.  A shooting drone-v-drone war is going to last a lot longer than a "couple of hours". Why?  Because if you run out of drones in a couple of hours and your opponent has not, you are basically screwed, this war has demonstrated that trend.  Unmanned systems will not be a niche layer we rub on the old one, that once "shot away" allows us to go back to the "good old fashion", there is too much competitive advantage in these systems.  So rapid production and deployment of unmanned systems (of all types), integrated across the depth of the battlefield is going to be a primary driver.
- Good 'ol CAS.  It brings payload and range, I will give it that.  However, it is big and visible - stealth may help but I do not think modern Stealth is built for the ISR environment we have found ourselves within.  So even if you manage to destroy an opponents UAV AD layer, which will not be an easy ask, you still have ground based systems in depth which is what the Russians are facing right now.  Those MANPADs are only going to get smarter, more lethal and able to hit higher.  This is likely why the Russians haven't found "air gaps" on such a large frontage, MANPADs everywhere means there is really no gaps unless you make a major push, which could get very expensive very quickly.  Back to cost, time is a resource as well and one can produce cheap lethal unmanned systems much faster than modern manned military aircraft.  I argue that it will go the other way...manned CAS/Strike/Air Superiority will rain down for the first couple hours - or basically get left sitting out - and then everyone will be relying on unmanned systems.
I keep getting the sense that the big powerful predators of the battlefield are in trouble.  And it is integrated small cheap nasty bite-y little things that are hurting them.

Talking of military ineptitude ... the Saudis have been using AMRAAMs to knock down Houthi 'suicide' UAVs in the Yemen conflict for quite a while now.

This is another good one; what in the sweet name of Billy Bishop is going on with AirPower in this war?  We have discussed at length the realities of unmanned systems, which are making air superiority at low levels simply impossible.  MANPADS and AD seem to be making any air superiority at medium altitudes also nearly impossible.  We have been holding out for SEAD but that is not a cheap or easy capability, that does not work against MANPADS that can hit at 20k feet nor UAVs.  Like heavy mech I also suspect that air cannot deliver on surprise and are being picked up well out from the areas they want to effect. 
I keep wondering if this is not some weird air asymmetry situation we have not accounted for because superiority, let alone supremacy seem like a fond dream of a gentler time.  I am not sure what to make of traditional AirPower, and it is a matter of time until someone figures out how to gun tape a Stinger to UAV.  A swarm of short-range MANPADS on UAS, sounds like a freakin 21st century nightmare.  We are definitely entering into an age of denial and firepower, which may mean the Defensive may be shifting towards primacy…or until a week or two from now when someone pulls off operational offensive and we all wonder “what the hell just happened”…again.

The only takeaway lesson from this war I am drawing is - nothing is working like it was supposed to.  Airpower, cyber, armor/mech, and yes, artillery have not performed anywhere near what we thought going into this war.  No matter how hard we try and tie reality into knots to explain it, we likely will not know why for some time...and even then we will likely ignore it if history is any indication. 
Worse, I am hearing this is in military circles and moves to tie this to military procurement as politicians scramble to "spend more" in order to demonstrate collective resolve.  While military services are using this war as justification for stuff they have been wanting to buy for years without actually looking at what is happening on the ground.
Let's take artillery - "the king of battle" (talk about 'presents well'), no it has not been the ruling monarch in this war.  It has been the "king of attrition" but it has not been decisive in the least.  If massed artillery fires were still decisive the Russians would have taken Kyiv by now, let alone this small rump in the Donbas.  If "more guns" was the solution then Russia would have already taken their operational objectives instead of this war-by-inches bleeding out.  The one instance we did see decisive use of artillery was in the first phase of this war by the Ukrainians, and that wasn't any of that sexy western stuff.  It was highly integrated and linked to a superior UA C4ISR/information system so that the smaller artillery was hitting the right targets to cause the most stress to the Russian system - decisive attrition has been the "king of battle" if anything has been in this war so far, and even that is weird because we were supposed to be seeing the dominance of manoeuvre a la Gulf War.
Back to procurement; we are already hearing services drooling over "investment" in "new capabilities" we have had since WW2 and using this was as "proof".  Right now the only "proof" I have seen is for: unmanned like crazy including all forms of next gen ATGM/MANPAD systems (NLOS, self-loitering etc), dispersed light infantry that one can generate from reservists very quickly,  resilient and pervasive battlefield communications systems that include crowdsourcing, new forms of logistical systems that look more like Amazon than what we have, C4ISR that includes space-based assets to tie it all together rapidly.  And all that will buy you is an ability for large scale defence-thru-denial that may force an opponent's system to collapse under its own weight.  We have no idea what works for offensive operations because neither side has been able to do it yet.
"Tanks, guns, IFVs, F-35" are what are being pitched right now and that is billions of dollars into tools that Ukraine did not employ decisively to defeat the RA, but they are the capabilities that Russia invested heavily in, brought to this war, and are now scattered all over the Ukrainian countryside. 
One thing I am seeing out of all this is "we have to understand what 'fighting smarter' really means".  And it does not appear to be more expensive singular platform centric-warfare.  This is like France '40 - the French had more, better tanks but they had not created a smarter integrated tank-system - the Germans did (often in spite of themselves).  All domain systems integration, while denying the same to your opponent may be the future "king of battle" [when you really think about it, maybe it always has been] but again we have only see it work decisively on the defensive, so the jury is still out. 
I am hoping that the UA is employing this whole Severodonetsk thing as an attritional honeypot to bleed the Russians white in order to open up options for some old-school operational manoeuvre in Phase 3 of this thing.  My guess is this may occur in the western side of this theatre around Kherson-Melitopol as the Russians over-commit more and more to this baffling fight in the Donbas - "Lure your enemy onto the roof, then take away the ladder."
 

Iran-Iraq War?

Due to secrecy, it is always difficult to know. But we can see certain trends. 
Kremlin power struggle is better view as Power Clans struggle than personalities struggle. Personalities can change any moment; Clans are very stable. 
There are three main Clans: KGB clan, Party clan and Military Clan.
For example, in Death of Stalin you see KGB clan (Βeria) was fighting with Party clan (Khrushchev) but Party clan allied with Military clan (Zhukov) and won. 
Fast forward to the end of 90s. Due to Chechnia and Yugoslavia the Party clan (Yeltsin) politically got weak. They needed somebody young and strong. Due to some cunning maneuvers KGB clan managed to finally sneak a young and strong trojan horse (Putin) to Party clan and got power. As a result, KGB clan forcefully allied and further weakened Party clan (now with sort of Medvedev head). Then during Chechen war KGB clan allied with Chechen Joker (Kadirov) against Military clan. Finally, there is Russian Joker (Navalny) 
So, the current disposition is:
 Party clan (Medvedev) weak and mostly irrelevant. But tough guy rhetoric means he is looking toward alliance with hardcore nationalists. That is Military clan. KGB clan (Putin) currently controls everything but politically very weak due to Putin starting the War. Unless they scheme something, they will be out one way or another. Military clan (military junta). Real hardcore nationalist. Dumb, brutal, and angry that KGB clan made them fight real war as a result of which their reputation was flashed to toilet.  Chechen Joker (Kadirov) - seemingly not very important Kadirov is in fact Putin most loyal ally against Military clan. Both Military and Kadirov hate each other due to atrocities during Chechen wars. Kadirov has his own small but well equipped and motivated military. But Kadirov hold loyalty only to Putin and has his own plans to achieve full Chechen independence. Russian Joker (Navalny) - the guy seems to have unnatural ability to survive where all others died. Even current imprisonment can be seen as making sure he survives until he is needed. This implies he is under KGB protection but most likely not under Putin but somebody else because of Putin's ego issues. My take is: 
Military and Party are allying. Medvedev is the Facade, Military junta is a real ruler. They are most likely close to power but probably cannot take out Putin. Putin is scheming to shift blame to military and finally cleanse them. Severodonetks can be a good place to bury Miliary. The more Military lose men and reputation the easier will be to clean them. In case of disloyalty there is a loyal Tik Tok guard. That is why they are not really fighting. Not their job. Somebody in KGB (Patrushev?) is waiting for Putin to die to activate Navalny so he can rise people against military like it was in august 91 then at least guaranty KGB clan survival. Everything hinges on Putin. That's why there are few men following him around to pick up his poo, so nobody can be certain.  That is as far as I can go. I can speculate further but it will not be very reliable. Because for example Military clan is brutal dumb nationalists. That scenario is bad. Like really bad. On other hand they seems to ally with useless Party clan. Which means they are hoping to deal with the outside world. So, at the end they might be not as dumb and brutal as they were in the past and are not going to start WW3.
Who knows. We will have to wait and see. 

Sure, but that description fits more or less all western air forces save for USAF. 

@cyrano01
That it was a barrel failure was disseminated through separatist channels themselves. You can also see that the guys hanging around aren't in standard Ukrainian camo, and looking too unprofessional to suggest Ukrainian elites.

I think there are kinds of operations that are just not viable anymore. At least they are not viable with anything like the current force structure and doctrine. I would argue with 2020 hindsight, that getting out of Afghanistan was a prerequisite for success in Ukraine, because it obvious the Russians would have started supplying the Taliban with all the ATGMs and man portable SAMs they could carry. Deciding to take over a truly hostile country at this point in time requires some combination of an absolutely ridiculous number of troops, and a willingness to be as least as unpleasant as the Russians.  That is just going to require a rethink of a great many things from the grand strategy level all the way down.

In many ways a Taliban type opponent so -equipped would be even harder to deal with. The Ukrainian army is, at least, a regular army in the sense of wearing uniforms, carrying their weapons openly etc. A Taliban type foe (with NLAWs/Javelins, Stingers/Starstreak and UAVs all backed up with a modular cell network) who merged back into the population following their actions would be a nightmare for any military, even one as well equipped as the US,  that had ambitions to stay more or less the right side of the Hague and Geneva conventions.

So I ask myself "what if the Taliban had NLAWs/Javelins, Stingers/Starstreak and UAVs all backed up with a modular cell network?  And the support of a great power(s) behind them for training, force generation and ISR?"
We concentrate forces too and our logistics lines are built on sustaining heavy mass.  I think technology may be lowering the cost of what it means to be "peer" at some levels of warfare.  Finally, unless we are talking about war in mainland NA or western Europe, we are talking interventions/crisis response wars.  We historically have been allergic to high casualties in these types of conflicts since the end of the Cold War.  A much smaller power could theoretically become a strategic peer in war simply by creating too high a cost for us to get directly involved.  The whole thing points to a re-emergence of attrition/exhaustion as a strategy...although many will argue it never really went away.

@Combatintman I know this is ancient by now, but I just found this map a week ago and got very excited. I did because back in late 2006- early 2007 this place was my hood. I was deployed with the Danish Army back then, and this place (Al Harta) was the southern tip of my company's AO.
I just thought it would be fun to do a little review (everybody's a reviewer these days, right?) of your map and compare it to some actual images.
I've marked a few spots on the overview where the following images were taken.
 

Qarmat Ali bridge. There are some clear limits in the CM editor, so I get why you made a land bridge. But the real thing was very large and frankly daunting. Like in your scenario, we also had a lot of trouble with it. We had one man KIA a hundred meters south of it (if just applying North to the top of the map), and 2 WIA just when they reached the northen side, at another time. Also single shots fired at us.

 
The Tate factory, as we called it. We took breaks in there a few times. When I was there the werehouses were just open with tin roofs. Not sure all the holes were damage from fighting, or just decay. There were some families with cute kids living in there. One thing you missed, was that one of the buildings was actually a water tower. For some reason my PL found it a great idea to put a guard up in it. It was the worst position ever. It took 5 minutes to crawl up there. I could not imagine a more ****ty position to be in if you got shot at. Luckily we never did while up there.

 
This is just a shot from a little street we called Happy Street- The image is take a few hundred meters up the road west. One day we got shot at up this street. after searching the area we found a KPV 14.5 HMG in a garden. It wasn't the weapon that fired at us, but at least we got that one off the street. Pulling out we had a firefight again.

But yeah Al Harta, Iraq was a pretty ****ty place. I rate it 2/10.
Your map I'll give 7/10 for realism
--
@Sgt.Squarehead, I mentioned this to you, thought perhaps you'd want to see it.

I'm still waiting for some of the Baltic Fleet ships to try to make a hazardous voyage a̶r̶o̶u̶n̶d̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶ ̶w̶o̶r̶l̶d̶ through the Volga to reinforce battered P̶a̶c̶i̶f̶i̶c̶ ̶̶̶̶ Black Sea Fleet. 

That is pretty low. I figured the Russians as losing ~300-350 soldiers per day. I based that on an extrapolation from casualty figures the Russians released in the first month of the war, from which I guessed that the Russians (as in the Russian side, so Russians + L/DPR + paramilitary groups fighting for the Russians) were taking ~10,000 casualties a month. Assuming 200,000 soldiers on the Russian side that's a proportional casualty rate of about 150-175 casualties per day per 100,000 troops. If that guesswork is about right that means that the proportional Russian casualty right is about on par with historical casualty rates in high intensity warfare. I spent several hours working out proportional casualty rates for various campaigns based on information on Wikipedia, but the text document I made with the exact figures is back home and I'm typing from work, so these are approximate figures. In Poland the Germans took about 80 casualties per day per 100,000 troops, in Barbarossa 160 casualties per day per 100,000, at the Somme the Germans took about 300+ casualties per day per 100,000 troops while the Entente took about 175 casualties per day per 100,000 (similar total casualties divided between more troops). At Kursk the Soviets took 650 about casualties per day per 100,000 to the Germans 350 casualties per day per 100,000, and in Sicily the Allies too about 130 casualties per day per 100,000 troops. So the low end of normal seems to be about 80 casualties per day per 100,000 and the high end of normal seems to be about 400 casualties per day per 100,000 (there were several more battles that I didn't list here with casualties in the range of 300-400 per day per 100,000, while the 600+ the Soviets took at Kursk didn't recur much in the battles I looked at). "disaster" casualty rates seem to be about 1000+ per day per 100,000, with the Soviets taking over 1,200 casualties per day per 100,000 in Barbarossa and the Allies taking over 1,400 casualties per day per 100,000 in France 1940 (I wish I had that text document with the exact numbers in front of me). On the extreme low end the Coalition in Desert Storm took around 23 casualties per day per 100,000 troops and on the extreme high end the Iraqis in Desert Storm took 5,000+ casualties per day per 100,000 troops (very rough estimate).
So the estimated Russian casualty rate seems to be about the middle of normal for a high intensity war. If the Ukrainians are taking 60-100 casualties per day, total, with a frontline strength of ~200,000, then they are taking ~30-50 casualties per day per 100,000 troops. That is shockingly low for a high intensity war. That is especially shocking if, while they are taking these low casualties, the Russians are taking "normal" casualties for a high intensity war. Either I have overestimated the Russian casualty rate, Zelensky has underestimated the Ukrainian casualty rate, or the Ukrainians are absolutely slaughtering the Russians at a rate somewhere between 3:1 and 5:1.
edit: So the Ukrainian casualty figure of 60-100 per day is apparently KIA, not all casualties. And considering that KIA are generally a third or a quarter of all casualties, that means the full casualty rate is probably somewhere between 180-400 casualties per day (or 90-200 casualties per day per 100,000 troops), which puts it roughly on par with the estimated Russian casualty rate.

I can see where you're coming from although it pays to make sure you are not the Allied high command in France 1940...

I can see where you're coming from although it pays to make sure you are not the Allied high command in France 1940...