cyrano01

My bad on Gettysburg v Waterloo, totally mis-remembered that one.  You are correct on relative sizes.  As the Napoleonic Wars being the "largest and bloodiest in human history prior to WW1"...well it must be your turn to mis-remember: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_invasions_and_conquests.
I am inclined to lean towards Haggerman on the use of Napoleonic tactics in the US Civil War.  I think that while they were not totally obsolete by 1863, the writing was starting to be seen on the wall.  At places like Antietam Cornfield, and Peach Orchad/Devils Den at Gettysburg, it was clear that close order troops were entering into a dilemma.  One did not need to mass for firepower in the same manner as they had in the past.  A doubling of effective range of rifles has major effects on the battlefield, from fire control to formation.  The equation of density-to-firepower changes, as does vulnerability.
Read Azar Gat A History of Military Thought.  He does an outstanding job of tracing the evolutions of military theory.  The theories of the day drove mindsets and culture, which drove doctrine and organization, which drove application of strategy and tactics.  One cannot get into a serious discussion of evolution of tactics without reaching back through all that into underlying theoretical thinking and the cultural frames they create.  I think the cultural dynamic is a core concept in this and it is the one that many either miss, or misread. 
Yes, sieges were teasers of WW1...all of them.  They are definitive examples of Defensive primacy and have been since the dawn of civilization.  They require long grinding attritional offensives to exhaust the defenders or become exhausted oneself.  The difference between US Civil War and Franco-Prussian War, was how those sieges were conducted.  In the US Civil War great walled cities did not exist so sieges became trench-based.  At Paris the battle of annihilation early on did not work in creating victory, and offensive options quickly ran out rendering the war a more drawn out affair.  We are seeing a massive War of Sieges in front of us right now - yet I am still hearing all about combined arms manoeuvre and "yay tanks!".  The character of modern day siege warfare is not the same as WWI, why that is and what it means is a central question we will have to solve.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/leavenworth-papers-4-the-dynamics-of-doctrine.pdf
This plus a the UK 1914 infantry manual (I will keep digging), spell out that European militaries 1) did not totally ignore all the lessons of the previous wars, 2) did not evolve anywhere near as far as they had to by the beginning of WW1.  Meeting a century old system "half way" and leaving it embedded into military culture is how the Somme happened. 
So why did they not evolve far enough?  This is a major question that had enormous consequences.  Military theory and doctrine drive force development, which drives money.  That money pays for innovation and sparks further innovation.  Technology does not spontaneously happen in a vacuum.  If European militaries were still interested in firepower thinking it was for offensive uses, then industry is going to privilege this...why?  Because that is where the money is. By failing to push far forward enough, European militaries simply created a self-reinforcing box.  
Or one could really pay attention to the smaller wars that proceeded them.  Here I disagree.  There was plenty of opportunity and evidence to rethink the box. War of colonization offered a myriad of different ways of fighting...but none were European (read: civilized) enough.  The trend lines were all pointing in a direction that led out of the Age of Rifles directly to the Age of Firepower.  Much in the same way the current trends point to moving from an Age of Steel to one of Information/Unmanned. 
How much actual experimentation or force development on trench warfare was done prior to WWI?  We can see from the UK training manual that "Entrenchment" was a known thing; however, appears to have been treated as an inconvenience.  Trench warfare was known and demonstrated back in the US Civil War.  There is "unknowable" and then there is "failing to look, because we do not want to."  The European militaries were absolutely trapped in a box, my argument is that they could see the walls of that box if they looked harder - the evidence of failure to do so is fairly well established.
I do not believe that European militaries blindly marched into slaughter.  I believe that the professionals all had a sense that something was changing and made stuttering steps to try and stay abreast of it.  I also believed their failure is a cautionary tale for modern military thinkers.  I think historical revision can be healthy and add nuance to what was no doubt a highly complex and uncertain time.  However, I think broad scale forgiveness and apologist narratives let both them and us off the hook, which is extremely dangerous.  I mean if the evolution of war is so undecipherable, then our doctrine should be to stick with what worked...until is doesn't?  That to my mind is as dangerous now as it was then.

The major problem being hindsight is 20/20 and a full picture of events that unfolded 200 years ago is never going to be complete.  One also has to keep in mind (and here I point to myself) that all of these militaries largely lacked centralized bureaucracies for force development.  Things like lessons learned and doctrine were largely decentralized or buried deep in largely powerless structures.  Military doctrines were largely left to generals who tended to groom from their own internal cliques and clubs.  Unlike the open information spheres of today, these military institutions largely lacked challenge functions or deliberate experimentation institutions.  So your point on “reasonable” is heavily caveated by reasonable for the time, place and context.  In reality given the context, without some highly visionary and powerful Alexander type it was very hard to break out of those boxes.
I too continue to search.  The conversation has me wondering about the naval forces in the same era.  Unlike land forces, navies of the world appear to have evolved apace with the times.  What functions allowed them to do this?  In fact one could argue that naval power development and evolution allowed the Entente to ultimately win the war.  Nor does naval power appear to have the same offence/defence dynamics over time despite also having vast increases to range and lethal in the same time periods.  In many ways land warfare was a poor cousin to the efforts in naval power and I am curious if the priority may have also made a difference.

So if Putin ran to St Petersburg, anyone think it is weird he is running toward NATO borders?  Aren’t we supposed to be the root of all evils?

I guess you can't make this up, can you?
 
 

Thanks for your sterling service in keeping is udated on the craziness!

12:30
https://telesco.pe/bolshiepushki/4397
Claim - another Wagnerite units is crossing the border
12:39
https://t.me/dva_majors/18924
Claim - Video Tanks are moving toward Moscow [probably RU MOD]. Tanks in Moscow is a very sensitive topic for RU.
12:40
https://t.me/horevica/12823
Claim Voronezh Oil depot was attacked by KA-52
12:42
https://t.me/elite_rezerve/21856
Claim exchange rate for dollar 1 to 90, Euro 1 to 100 (exchange rate with three digits  is very sensitive topic for RU)
12:46
RU Nats are discussing that both Prig and Putin live in their own realities
12:50
https://t.me/juchkovsky/3705
Claim  that kadirovci indeed started to move toward Rostov. Not very smart move for Kremlin
.https://t.me/natalia_maximus_ZOV/17528
Claim - Rostov support Wagnerites. They help Wagnerites with water nad food
 
I am off for some time

What a strange thing, I suddenly feel I should take a train to Vladivostok. Is it because I'm Czech?

Ukrainian strategy seems more reminiscent of the "bite and hold" strategy used by the Entente in the latter half of WW1 than it does of the sweeping armored maneuvers of WW2.

I know Latvia's military does not have many helicopters. But they still try to help however they can. 🇱🇻

I think at one time that was how the Harrier was expected to be used.

Let's talk about Maryinka and that video from 79th Brigade
I prepared a draft transcript of the first ten minutes, which covered one battle. But, in order for you to understand what is going on, I created a map and a brief summary. Obviously, despite my best efforts, I could easily misunderstand something.

UKR appears to have discovered an enemy force moving from Donetsk via road using a drone equipped with infrared imaging. There were four vehicles: one or two tanks and two or three BMPs. It's unknown where the infantry force came from; they might have dismounted from the BMPs. It appears to be an Assault group, which is usually approximately squad size, but this varies. It may begin with a strengthened squad of up to 15 soldiers, but by the time it reaches the target, there may only be 5-6 men left.
The defending UKR troops waited among the ruins. According to radio traffic, there were two to three fire teams stretched out in front. The UKR HQ directed fire teams at RU AFVs. The fire teams used RPGs to disable at least two AFVs; the remainder fled; however one fire team was hit (at least one killed, one injured). Meanwhile, an RU assault group assaulted the corner. One fire team used small arms in an attempt to pin them down, while a second fire team guided by HQ moved to assist the first and showered RU soldiers with GP-25s. After that, the UKR arty finished the job, and the lone RU survivor fled.
There are mostly three guys at HQ -  skinny bearded guy [at 00:57]. I suspect he is CO. Bulkier bearded guy [at 02:11] I suspect he is XO. He is guiding fire teams. And cleanly shaved guy [06:42] I suspect he is FIST guy.
Some observations:
Unlike the RU army, the UKR HQ does not appear to command and control fire squads. It's more like they guide and advise fire teams, although there is some degree of micromanagement - at one point, XO explicitly tells one fire team to grab AK and made aim shots like we do in CM with target order at something a unit hasn't seen yet. Both sides do not function in the traditional military configuration of platoon-company (I believe this is company headquarters). There are distributed attack teams/groups with radio links to HQ, and that's all there is to it. There is no reserve or another echelon nearby to continue the fight. This, I suppose, is due to the enormous threat of drone-adjusted arty. So, all help is a few kilometers away, and no one can come fast to help except a nearby team. Now the transcript. Please keep in mind the footage is not strictly chronological:
 

Miss Spelled? Is she pretty? 

Muphry's Law is alive and well!

Sorry, but my inner grammar Nazi won't shut up. This has been misspelled too often!
It's 'Balkenkreuz' (a cross made with beams). Not 'Balkankreuz' (which means cross of the Balkans).

Yes, we memory holed our failures in the War of 1812 utterly. I will simply point out that that the rather thorough forgetting has led to two hundred years of extraordinarily harmonious relations between the two countries, which probably makes it the most successful propaganda campaign in written history.  

That was to be expected. Its their best bet to get hockey gold any time soon. 

Again?!  I mean how did Operation Canuck Freedom go last time?  https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-of-1812
 
Of course the old adage “History is written by the losers who only remember New Orleans, and left unchallenged by the winners who are too polite to bring it up and still feel bad about burning the White House” applies here.

It is very hard to knock a small hole in a dam and not have that small hole become a very big hole in very short order.
Also, this whole episode is reminiscent of the shenanigans with the Roer River dams.

Ahem.

This is 2023, if the RA bagged that much UA hardware there would be video of it all over the internet.  It is pretty clear the RA has not established fully effective ISR as they are seeing “the offensive” all over the place right now.  More likely these are UA probes designed to keep them guessing where the main effort will fall - Interestingly all quiet at Kherson/Dnipro sector.

Khodakovskiy wrote UKR troops shifted own efforts on other side of Velyka Novosilka salient and enterd to Novodonetske village. 

On this post he writes UKR troops at the second half of the night @kevinkin imitated continue of attack on yesterday direction. Russian UAV air recon could spot about 30 of armor moving somewhere, but lost them in the night (due limited capabilities) and this group suddenly appeared on oppositre flank attacking Novodonetske from Zolota Nyva. Reportedly UKR troops, suppressing Russian communication with EW assets could entered to the village, but havn't control over it yet. Battle is continuing. 
Episode of yesterday fight - UKR 47th arty brigade strikes on enemy positions in close rear of Velyka Novosilka salient in the Zavitne Bazhannia village (in eng. it means "cherished desire") in 12 km south from Velyka Novosilka
 

July 10th of last year, regarding why parking garages are unsuitable for ammunition storage. I managed to search it because I recalled the bon mot about a "slapdash Soviet era Trabbie hutch."

I must admit, after 30 years in the business it was the first time I had to think about the practical problems of creating a firing position for a tank on level B2 of a garage.

I don’t think the age or capabilities of the platforms are deterministic. They need to hook into the Ukrainian C4ISR and carry the AIM 120, as such they are a threat the RuAF cannot discount.  This will reinforce the air denial situation which is about as good as it gets in this war with respect to AirPower.  There is already a lot of noise on dogfight capability but in reality Ukraine just needs a missile carrier that can move quickly and go where the ISR network tells it to.  This, along with other capability stacks up and keeps Russian air power at stand off, which will be critical in a ground offensive.  The F16 is a capable module in a much broader air denial system, so it is good news.

So this is what shaping looks like.  If true, this would be a very effective way to get Russian forces moving away from the areas of a planned major offensive.  Indirect approach of employing Russian insurgents is a brilliant stroke, a proxy war within a proxy war.  Not sure if this is just hopeful rumor but we could be seeing the start of the offensive.