chrisl

Not an offensive...but a defense that will grind down Russian units faster than they can be replaced, to the degree that they cannot be rotated or such that they will be make reinforcing Kharkiv or Zaporizhzhia less likely. A corrosive defense you might say. 

This has been on my mind also. If UKR can squanch Wagner (who in no bloody way are all they crack themselves up to be) then RUS has a real crisis on their hands, and not just military. The political side goes off the wall. 
How will Prig "The Prig" react militarily to his up-gunned Dillinger Gang getting slobbered by HIMARS every night? What will he demand in the political sphere? How will RUS MOD react if Wagner begins to collapse, eating up resources and units?  Does RUS even have the capacity to take over the Wagner front, if need be? What kind of morale hit would the RUS military suffer if Wagner is visibly defeated? What about the home front?  All that said, 2nd-string TDs plus stiffening SOFs doesn't seem to presage an offensive. 

Hertling is a legit nice guy. If you reach out to him Capt I’d bet there’d be a fruitful conversation. 
Also…looks like Ukraine may have decided to break Wagner in Bakhmut: 
 

He is still seeing this war through a western lens.  He makes a lot of very good points, however, appears stuck on “winning through manoeuvre”, which we have seen little of in the prosecution of this war.  A deliberate assault - frankly, I disagree with him here, as the RA proved back this spring the opposed water xing is probably harder - to break through and then exploit is employing western biased metrics.
Corrosive warfare does not do this, or at least it is not on the critical path.  As we saw in quick time at Kharkiv and slower time at Kherson, the aim is to employ precision strike to erode an opponent to the point their operational system fails. This has happened three times to the RA - northern advances in Ph I, Kharkiv and Kherson.  This was all done by merciless corrosion until the RA failed and was forced to withdraw, while taking casualties on high value systems they cannot replace.
South and east of Kherson will be the same story.  If the UA can continue to erode RA logistics, ISR and longe range fires - with the added pressure of the weather, the RA system will likely buckle again.  They can dig all the trenches they want, once the ammo, food and ability to rotate troops all cease it is simply a matter of time.  Why the UA would want to risk valuable assets and people on reckless direct assaults the make no sense?  Infiltrate-Isolate-Eliminate-Repeat : Fog eating snow but now with winter on their side it is “fog eating Russian soldier-popsicles”.
Fundamentally the good general is describing the employment of fast-mass to beat defensive mass which is exactly what our dogma…er, “doctrine” says. The UA has been employing anti-mass far more effectively on both defence and offence - which links back to that Finnish approach post.  It would appear that it is anti-mass’s time to shine

The Finns have looked at this in detail and have passed ideas along to NATO over the years. Too much to copy-paste so here is the article and one passage below. Sounds a bit familiar to the war at hand. It will be interesting to see what new forms the UA comes up with the next 4-5 months. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/lessons-from-the-winter-war-frozen-grit-and-finlands-fabian-defense/
Perhaps some of the most useful insights into this unique way of war can be gleaned by perusing the writings of Finnish veterans later recruited as winter warfare advisors for the U.S. Army. In their view, it was not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe. ....
Strategists in Helsinki still plan for an in-depth defense of their homeland, with the aim of drawing any potential invader into the hinterlands where they would be ground down by small units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), lightweight artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While American strategists have only just begun to rediscover concepts of archipelagic defense, Finnish planners have long developed sophisticated operational concepts around the defense of their many narrow inlets and small islands that incorporate a mixture of mine warfare assets, underwater listening posts, fast attack craft, and coastal jaeger units armed with anti-ship missiles and mortars.
With almost the entirety of its territory falling under the coverage of advanced Russian air defense systems, Helsinki has adopted an equally pragmatic attitude toward the defense of its airspace. Rather than choosing to engage in a fruitless competition for air dominance, the Finnish Air Force focuses on redundancy and survivability: dispersing air strips, practicing emergency highway landings, and erecting a highly mobile air defense grid.

One would think a commentary on the war being due to some kind of RU laundry culture that included phrases like "soiled peaceful relations" and the "stain of tyranny" would suffice to show it was parody.  But next time I will just preface with a sledge hammer emoji marked "THIS IS COMEDY".    😀🤪😆😛
And no, I don't work in a f-ing DMV.  I am actually the Head Goblin at Gringott's Bank and the LOTR name is a cover.  Or maybe my actual name actually sounds something like 'danfrodo' and it really has not greater meaning than that.

On a similar note, an interesting interview with someone from the Russian side.
__________
There is a thesis that the lion's share of drones used by soldiers are supplied by humanitarian orgs. Is that true? Many experts say that our military-industrial complex has "missed" small drones. Yes - the bulk of small UAVs are supplied by volunteers, including our org. The problem with the (quadcopter) drone is the fact that these are consumable products, and the life of a drone on the front line is very short - literally a few weeks from the first flight to its destruction. This is true even if the drone is piloted by a trained operator. And if the operator has not had the appropriate training, does not have relevant combat experience, then this is 1-2 sorties - and the drone will be lost. But at the same time, it is necessary to clearly understand the whole story with drones, and its not exactly true that our Armed Forces were not ready for the very appearance of this type of weapon.
We are witnessing a unique situation - the first mass use of small drones in history. I agree that up to this point, small drones have been used in various military conflicts, for example, in Syria, Yemen, and during the military conflict of 2014-2022 in the Donbass. Our military-industrial complex periodically paid attention to this, but it either did not have resources, or did not have direct orders from the government (to mass produce small drones). As a result, our military-industrial complex was engaged in the production of heavier drones with a narrower specialization, such as Orlans, Zala Aero products and the like. They (Russian military drones) just have a different purpose, are more narrowly specialized, are more expensive and require a different attitude to their use. Do small drones exist in the US Army? No, they don't exist there in larger numbers either. Their (American) military-industrial complex missed this (drone) moment in the same way, and by and large, none of the modern armies of the world was ready for the Mavic phenomenon. To say that only we missed that is fundamentally wrong. The bottom line is that there was no such massive drone as the Mavic in any army, and not a single military even imagined that it would be needed in such volumes.
To what extent has this war changed the idea of small drones - should we expect them to appear in all armies now? Speaking philosophically, this war has changed many views on the Armed Forces, not only in terms of drones, but also in terms of command and control. Flaws in the organization of communications, high-precision weapons became visible. I'll give you an example. For example, the American HIMARS themselves are rather mediocre multiple launch rocket systems, they don’t shoot well, they don’t hit so far, but when satellite-guided precision munitions are used in this system, it turns from mediocrity into a first-class tool for suppressing and destroying enemy rear lines. All this works when it can hit the given targets with high accuracy. We also have similar systems, like Uragan and Smerch, which have precision-guided munitions, satellite guidance, and so on. The problem is that the Americans, in addition to high-precision guidance, have a satellite reconnaissance complex. It allows real-time tracking of targets on the surface of the earth. We have the components of multi-domain integration, communications and control, but, unfortunately, the components of multi-spectral spatial reconnaissance have not been given due attention. We thought that the Americans were spending crazy money, sawing the budgets into some kind of meaningless toys. But we proudly open the 1980s ground force combat manual and everything is "fine" with us. But it turned out that these gadgets actually work.
It suddenly became obvious that our army also needed them. This is also a matter of worldview. It is necessary that generations of officers, generals, those who promote military science, change their worldview in terms of applying new modern technologies. We need gadgets that allow us to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons, the speed of information processing, and combat control. Old weapons that could no longer be upgraded and effectively used, once equipped with "gadgets", can be very effective. In this sense, the war made it possible to look at these approaches with different eyes, to show that those approaches that dominated military science and the military-industrial complex for decades turned out to be outdated and inappropriate. Now it is necessary to develop new solutions that will allow Russian Armed Forces, our military-industrial complex to come together, and to rethink the national security...
...I would advise you to pay attention to communications, because traditionally (I can’t say why) our army is always bad with them. Buying some kind of radio station, albeit an analog one, is probably helpful in this conflict.
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024
 

This is interesting relative to what I was thinking about on dog walk in the woods today.  Heavy fog, temperature around 37F (3C).  Living & sleeping out in the cold, damp, even at this relatively 'mild' temperature would be quite draining over time.  But along w the post above it did clarify something I was wondering about:  will the mud-caused break in major operations create stronger or weaker RU defense lines? 
On the plus side, RU has time to bring in & train mobiks, get supplies, dig in, fortify, pre-target artillery, etc.
On the negative side mobiks are often older, out of shape, and very angry about being kidnapped by Putin's army.  We know that RU commanders typically have very little concern for the welfare of the men in the trenches.  We know that RU troops are often seen without adequate food, clothing and shelter.  And many have old (really old!) weapons.  Seems like there will be many sections of the line filled w troops with rock bottom morale and physical endurance.  Fertile ground for fleeing, surrendering or even mutiny under pressure from UKR troops.
So by the time the ground freezes, some sectors will have gotten stronger but some will be brittle and weak.  This is my hope for the next offensive.   Lots of weak sectors to exploit, leaving the strong portions of the line isolated and useless while UKR drives around them.

The Peng challenge is dead, long live the Peng challenge.
 
Or somefink like that.

Are we talking the grenade tossing episode or combat coming from outside the incident?
“The LOAC states that as soon as those RA troops came “into the hands” or “under the power” of then UA troops the combat between these two parties was over because the RA troops were legally POWs.  Once the grenade was tossed the central question to be answered is whether that lone soldier was re engaging in combat in an act of perfidy? And/or was the rest of that RA soldiers unit also re engaging or had the intent to re-engage.
If the UA unit were to come under fire from a third RA unit, they actually have the obligation to protect and extract the RA POWs. And nothing in LOAC says they can mow them down because a third party is shooting at them.
Look, I get it.  Ukrainian members on the forum really want to promote that the UA kept its hands clean. However, unrighteous shoots happen in warfare all the time - this the a harsh reality of combat.  How a nation is judged is by how it responds to and ensures that any party who engages in these actions is prosecuted under a military legal system.  Here they are afforded full legal protections under domestic law and a fair trial that will take into account all factors.  
Now if the UA is smart - and frankly I really think they very much are, far smarter than a few posters on this board - they will conduct an investigation etc with transparency etc, and the news cycle will move on with the footnote “Ukrainian authorities are investigating the incident in full and will share the results with its western partners”.  These sorts of investigations can take freakin months or years so we will be on to a new crisis before long while whatever this is fades to the background.
Or you can make a ton of counter-productive noise, bite the hand that is trying very hard - against some it it’s own electorates - to keep you from becoming a Russian province and provide a steady stream of sound bites for the pro-Russian crowd who are circling.

Well I am not a lawyer in LOAC but can take a shot.  In all those links I provided the first one goes fairly deeply in who constitutes a POW.  Basically the definition is “a combatant who fall into the hands (or under the “power”) of their opponent.  Practically POW designation is afforded to anyone who either declares it and/or is clearly incapable of continuing in their role as a combatant - e.g. wounded or disarmed.
So if we have say 10 RA soldiers coming out of a building with no visible weapons and their hands raised (there is a list of recognized non-verbal signals) then by LOAC everyone of them is likely to be considered a POW.  Revocation of that status is actually supposed to be done by a military legal body and here we get into spies and unlawful combatants.  However, none of this denies the UA soldiers right to self-defence in the event that one or all of the RA soldiers are exercising perfidy - or an unlawful ruse that exploits the LOAC.
So one of those RA soldiers has a grenade and tosses it - clearly exercising perfidy - and a frankly bafflingly dedicated/fanatic level of commitment because he had to know how this would end.  Well under the rules of LOAC there could be a case that the individual forfeited his POW status and could be re-designated as a lawful combatant and therefore a target.  Further, the RA individual clearly demonstrated intent by tossing a grenade and an easy case for self-defence could be made by whoever takes him out.  All good.
Now as to the other 9 RA troops, nothing in LOAC removes their status as POWs based on the actions of Mr “I will die for Putin because reasons!”  In fact they would each have to assessed by their actions as to whether or not they too were exercising perfidy.  So we are talking the right to self defence and here the slope get really slippery.  An investigation would have to show that as a group the other 9 RA soldiers demonstrated intent and capability to pose a lethal threat to the UA soldiers - who all still had there issued weapons.  Here I expect the legal threshold is higher than “well they may have all had grenades in there undies”.  Even if that were true they would need to all be reaching for those grenades to justify the love they received from that MG.  In short, it appears - and here we can only see pictures and a video on social media - that some of those RA may have been legal POWs who got caught up in a self-defence response.  This is not crime in itself if it can be proven that the shooter was trying to restrict fire to the offending RA troops but collateral happens.
Either way a far more detailed investigation- eg one that looks at ballistics, eye witness accounts and wound patterns, will be required to determine what actually happened with enough resolution to hand this over to a legal proceeding.  The important thing now is for Ukraine to declare that investigation and make it transparent enough to pass the sniff test from their international supporters.  We get that bad things happen in war, we just want to make sure we are backing the team that fights and looks like us in all this.
 

And a little info on Kropyva
 

Well the first problem - that this is not solving - is that the lowest tier UAS/loitering munitions can see out to 2+ kms and feed that back to a targeting system.  They are too small for MANPAD or VSHORADs.  Hell they even have commercially available thermal/IR versions - https://www.digitalcameraworld.com/buying-guides/best-thermal-drone  These are class I drones that will be able to see ground based 30mm chain guns blasting away at the clouds from kms away.
Attacking an opponents recon assets is the first basic step in what should be a systemic attacking system, but thinking it is the solution is draining the ocean with a spoon.  Off the top 'o' the old noggin, for an initial start:
- Effective hunter-killer UAS designed to go out and kill other UAS.  This is the beginning of re-establishing symmetry within the unmanned aerial space.  Here we can scratch that recon asset elimination itch but it is a far bigger problem than this. 
- That first one up there needs to be linked into a ground based system to do the same on surface/sub-surface.  This will in effect shift the calculus of warfare to where the comparative knife edge unmanned systems envelop will be as critical to warfare as airpower ever was.
- Then you need a c-space system to deny and disrupt your opponents space based capability and resources (data/GPS) while preserving your own.
- Add to this a healthy offensive cyber capability able to attack and degrade an opponents field C4ISR systems.  This is more than hitting their networks, this is gen 2 information/data warfare where you are able to essentially hijack an opponents C4ISR central nervous system and feed it the wrong data.  This will require physical infiltration/exploitation in addition to the standard cyber-at-range effects.  Nano will likely start within this space about mid-century and expand outward from there - e.g. you physically re-wire an opponents C4ISR.  This will also extend from the frontline all the way back to strategic industry.
- C4ISR overmatch - you need an integrated system that is able to learn faster and better than an opponents...while in motion.  This goes beyond a different technological approach and platforms, it hits at the heart of "how we think  and make decisions about fighting" and operational planning processes.  This is the AI/ML integration space and how we pair these new technologies with people based warfighting systems to develop new theories of cause and effect over an opponent.
- Integrated Precision Deep Strike - land battles are likely to occur more and more decisively over the horizon where the side that can see, fix and strike with long range precision fires will gain advantage.  This will mean unconventional targeting and munitions able to hit an opponents C4ISR system - so long range EM/EW systems, long range unmanned sub-munition swarms able to hit an opponents nerve centers (nodes), networks (connectors) and cognitive centers of gravity (processors).
- People.  We will likely re-think how we select, train and employ people dramatically to gain advantage within this environment.  The internal military cultural issues aside (and they are legion) - occupations and trades, leadership skillsets and decision making within human dimensions will all need an overhaul as we are all working on 20th century models.  Western governments are going to insist on keeping humans in the loop, and if we think we can stick the same humans we have been using for decades into that loop it will very likely cause serious problems. 
Advantage will go to the side that can collect, process and weaponize data faster, better and at greater overall scales - just as we have seen repeatedly in this war.
So, no, I am sorry but NG does not get a participant medal for bilking the military contracting and acquisition process for billions cause "at least they are trying something".  Lord we have been here before with IEDs back in the '00s.  We got sold a lot of "up armored Mad Max vehicles" that we are dumping now and a bunch of c-IED robots/ detection systems.  The reality is that C-IED was a counter system requirement that spanned from finance/logistics-planning/targeting-production-employment-exploitation, all looped within COIN.
In war it is almost never simply countering the thing. It is about countering the things that made the thing, a thing, in the first place.

This is unsurprising - existing industry trying to re-sell old technology as a solution to a new reality.  Might stop-gap the issue but likely will cost billions for something that will end up doing little. 
Unmanned systems technology's drive to miniaturize, operate with lower ISR profiles and shift to multi-domain (surface, sub-surface and aerospace) capability is moving too fast for old-gun tech to keep up.  Further, none of this solves for what we have seen repeatedly in this war: omni-C4ISR.  UAS can 1) be layer up from the ground to space, and 2) stand back at range with a decent camera and see all those vehicles in hi-res while they blast away at the sky, and 3) feed it back through an integrated C4ISR network so that PGM indirect fires can position and hammer them in seconds.  That is the issue.  The idea that we can somehow "gun-cleanse" the sky so we can get back to older forms of warfare is a fools errand that the western military industrial complex will waste mountains of taxpayers money upon.
True counter-UAS is not c-UAS at all, it is counter-C4ISR which needs to be an integrated system that is capable of eroding on opponents ability to see, communicate, move and shoot from the kinetic tip all the way back to the human decision making brain-in-the-loop (for now). 

I think analysis such as these miss the much bigger points and possible implications of this war.  The easy answer seems to be to blame the BTG concept - “bad BTGs”, “silly BTGs!”.  So go look up the BTG structure and then compare it to the TF or BG structures in the west - we are not talking about a massive difference.  From what I have seen the BTG kinda slides in between the Battlegroup and Combat team.  There is no fundamental flaw nor does “designed for small wars”” track, if, Russia could upscale BTGs into working formation structures.
The issues at play are far larger than “those darn BTGs”:
- ubiquitous and persistent very high resolution ISR - particularly on the UA side.  The RA could optimize BTG all week, or even adopt identical structures as the US and they would still be in trouble because 1) they still need a lot of gas, and 2) the UA can see those supply lines from space via western ISR. “Finding beats flanking”.
- long range precision strike.  The UA can not only see the RA, they can hit them at ranges traditionally the purview of AirPower.  The UA has employed a fraction of the indirect fires compared to the RA and done a lot more damage to the RA operational system proportionally.  “Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, massed precision beats everything.”
- unmanned systems.  We are seeing the dawn of the impact of mass use of unmannned systems on the battlefield which appear to be right on the seam of ISR and strike.  “Swarming beats surging”
- smart long range, man portable.  The impact of next gen ATGMs and MANPADs on the RA has been enormous.  It has dramatically changed the role of light dispersed infantry and their corrosive effects on an opponent.   “Small cheap distributed many, beats few expensive concentrations of large”.
In short, I am becoming more and more convinced that US/western formations may have faired better strategically and even operationally but we would be learning the same lessons tactically that the RA are is we faced a similar scenario.  So, not all about the BTGs.
 

WHOA!  wants to live in an evidence-based reality???  and willing to change his beliefs based on evidence?  Excellent example to those who live in a belief-based reality, where when evidence/reality conflicts w belief one simply denies reality.  

It’s worth remembering as well that Poland isn’t some neutral neighbour who Ukraine have to avoid provoking.  There are few countries in the world who are as supportive of Ukraine’s fight.
In my opinion there’s no need to over-do the excuses, here:  A plain, heartfelt apology and a high-ranking Ukrainian official visiting the bereaved families and willing to attend the funerals of those killed could easily undo the damage caused by yesterday’s premature denials and allow Ukraine to maintain its image as the mature and civilised party in this war.
The Poles know very well why Ukraine had SAMs in the air.  The best Ukrainian response now is to support Poland in their mourning and thank them for their ongoing support.
If it was a Ukrainian missile, of course.
 

Zelensky amazes me.  Here's a guy that only 4 years ago was an actor, comedian and businessman with a law degree and no foreign policy, governmental or military experience.  But yet, he's leading one of the most complex, challenging globally high profile and difficult situations of this century.  And he seems to be making all the right moves time and again.  The way he handles himself, his words and quiet but confident demeanor continue to be on point.  Yes, I'm sure he's getting expertise, coaching and direction from multiple sources---but he's choosing to listen and take advise from seemingly all the right people which is an art unto itself. 
And to think what his life is like on a daily basis, to have to be "on" month after month.  The guy flat out has my respect and I hope to someday read his memoirs on from late 2021 until this ends.  
 
 

https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/election-results-congress-senate-house-11-12-2022/index.html
Bipartisan support or no, the facts of Democratic control of the Senate and a very slim Republican majority in the house absolutely guarantees US support and an inevitable Ukrainian victory. Even a premature death/incapacitation of Biden would do little to affect long term and sustained support. 
For Biden personally, I'd say beating Trump and Putin are too massive legacies he will probably look back on with unending satisfaction. 
Crimea delenda est. 

The line of the Dnieper creates some interesting opportunities as it's obvious that the Russian military is not going to recross. A drive down the east side of the river assisted by artillery and the occasional flanking operation from the west seems like a fruitful set of opportunities.
 

WTF -- someone actually said something this stupid?  LLF, you must've 'bout spit out your beer when you saw this.  RU is gonna come screaming down from Belarus?  In what?  Old Ladas???  Riding horses and cows???
Americans aren't desperate for a deal.  But having negotiations just shows that you're at least trying to end this w/o more bloodshed, even if the UKR demands are something Putin won't accept (as they damn well should be!!)

I can see Ukraine choosing to let the RA slip out the back rather than destroying Kherson.  
Post US election Russia isn't going to be getting much, if any relief from western aid to Ukraine, so they needed to bug out before winter.
The UA could have plastered the shores at the ferry crossings to destroy retreating RA units, but that would have stopped the retreat and pinned them in the city.  Then the choice would be for the UA to go in (bloody) or to drag out the siege into winter (brutal for civilians). All those Russians who slipped out can be HIMARSed later in open, or at least less dense areas, where a major city won't be destroyed in the process.  Or not.  How Ukraine did this is also a message to us in the west: "The UA is about retaking Ukraine, not vengeance, and if Russians leave quietly we can let them live."
Now if Ukraine can finish off the Kerch bridge and get at least fire control over the land bridge, Russia might give up on Crimea.

She was stunned first seconds 😀  Laptop has tough battery - I turned it on and battery showed 40% of charge after several months

Well guys, at last I got this!  Symbolically in the day of Kherson liberation ) 
Thank you @Kinophile for this initiative and enough "family diplomacy" in resolving of sudden obstacle on "last mile" 😀
Thank you @Battlefront.com - Steve, your "bribe" ) will be worked out ))))
Thank you all, who donated anonymously
Thank you, all other, who just have been reading and support our country - first two months were some nervous and psychologically hard, so this my 24/7 "marathone" here was giving me some emotional relief. 
 

It was part of the latest US aid package, sending underemployed crisis actors from Hollywood.