argie

Try mine. "Old" are the default keys. hotkeys.txt hotkeysold.txt

I've just downloaded and started a QB with it. I found the same problems with the arrow keys. So, I checked the date of the package and it said 7/20/11, the date the first version was launched. Is that ok? If not, from where I have to d'load the right version? (Could be helpful to name even small changes with a number, 1.01.01, just to be sure everything is ok).

I think so too. Not being part of the Panzers, but Artillery, the StuG had a pretty good optic and range finding system in its top.

Well, the left, right and down arrow aren't working. The up arrow works as always did.

Disregard it. It was my fault: the patch didn't overwrite the file I've created with the previous version, so I had two Alt Keys, one with the regular keys and the real one. The patch only overwrote my hotkeys.txt file.

Could it be that after patching, both archives, hotkeys.txt and hotkeysalt.txt, have the same data?

99.99% of motivation to post on internet is to complain for something. I bet the same was true in the times of letters to the newspapers too.

I found in "Platoon Patrol" a good start. Do it first as American.

Well, I came to the "CAS, a primer" following recommendation from a page on CAS of the Australian Air Force... hehehe. Last time I've checked, the AAF page still pointed to that article, though it was removed from the original source. You are working in a few misconception on what could effectively happens on what you correctly describe as "Close Air Support are air operations that are directly integrated with ground ops." Why do you think that helos like the Tiger has added an AA role on top of the AT role? Self defense is one, but also because only helos are good for anti helo tasks (that is, local air superiority), except for light turboprops. So, local air superiority, in missions that otherwise aren't cost effective for multirol a/c, are done by purely CAS assets. And a recon made by helos, giving intel "over the hill" directly to the troops beneath them, aren't "air operations that are directly integrated with ground ops". And many more missions are and can be assigned inside the label of CAS, as far as they include a direct integration with the ground maneuver. Helicopters are better suited for some, multirol aircrafts for others, beasts like the A-10 for almost all (but it fails in other aspects, related with logistic tail, front line operations, and the like: you need a great deal of effort to keep it running in the excellent level it reach). I have to go. It's always a pleasure to discuss CAS with someone at least better informed in the issue than the average.

Well, you seems to be confusing my criteria with someone's else. Today, CAS can be done with anything, from a F-22 to a B-52, because PGMs of the most varied kinds can be used effectively from any conceivable distance and attitude. I pointed a few times that the helicopters works with other arms, inside the C2 of the parental formation, as you stated, and that makes it effective in its role. The role in which it is more effective is in the AT role. You are referring to different "fast movers" than I am. You are assuming that I'm talking on zoom and boom jets, when I'm thinking on cheaper turboprops, which for a fraction of the cost of an helicopter, compensates for all its fails with better speed, more simplicity, more robustness and more range, keeping the ability of really low speed and low altitude fly, ideal for CAS missions. Not taking in account the only two truly CAS jets in service, the A-10 and the Su-25 and derivatives (the Harrier could be added here, if you like). On CAS missions, there are many more than the usual direct support (arty from the air). Air armed recon (you can have it unarmed), close range interdiction (the one you make to get a direct result in a local area, not the one you need a F-15E at top payload to work), local air superiority (especially, counter helicopter), offensive patrol (seek and destroy opportunity targets in the contact line), anti tank AND direct support for ground troops, all of it in close proximity of friendly forces, are all missions a CAS aircraft should be able to do, because all of it is supporting directly the troops in contact with the enemy. As most armies only get helicopters, the only integrated asset to do all these they have is not suited for all kind of CAS missions, plus the Air Forces are unlikely, unless they have very specialized airplanes and trained crews, to risk their assets in things they feel aren't cost/effective for their own criteria (heck!, almost every 5 years the USAF is looking for excuses to ditch the A-10s! Then another war arose and the troops save them). Then, most of the missions are neglected or given inadequate assets. My favorite "what if" on the issue is, as USAF tends to generate doctrine that is spread all around the world, what could have happened if the idea of the 80s of using the Piper Enforcer as tank killer and low end CAS airplane, coupled with the A-7F for the high end of CAS has been realized. But I digress. There was a very nice paper on the web, I think from Navy Proceedings, on CAS, called "CAS, a primer", which I think is no longer available, with all these points clearly exposed. But with a bit more patience you can find lots of articles from many sources on the web, not so well resumed, but on the issue. And if you read Spanish, I hope an article I wrote on CAS will be up soon (as soon as the webmaster has the time, in fact, so it could be never).

Maybe "suck" was a bit strong. I think that the helicopters, of all possible CAS missions, are the best suited for AT role, integrated with the maneuver of the unit they belong to. In other CAS missions, from armed recon to close interdiction, they tend to lack in something (range, speed, loitering time, robustness, weapon load, etc.). In AT role, with a bunch of ATGMs, firing from 4 to 10 kms, hovering over safe or at least not hostile territory, they really rock. As things come closer, like chasing infantry over enemy territory, they tend to become very vulnerable, even the best armored of them, as they are very complex machines, lacking the speed to compensate for it when they need to get out fast.

Well, AT helicopters aren't exactly suited for any other "role" than to kill tanks. They even tend to suck in almost any other CAS mission (though they are far, far better than nothing, of course). I never talked on "aviation" in general.

Sorry, where I said otherwise? I'm not comparing MBTs to helicopters, I'm comparing TD doctrine. Exactly part of my point when I mentioned "combined arms". Nor MBTs, nor TDs, nor helicopters' mission to hold ground. Change "Army Aviation" for the more specific "AT helicopters", "enemy" for "enemy tanks" and it is pretty close to the mission of TDs as established by the doctrine being discussed, isn't? No idea why you come after me, if you are virtually arguing the same that I am.

Well, if you consider that an AT helicopter can have, in a good scenario, a 20 to 1 kill ratio against tanks, just having a few helos rotating at the chosen area could be far more effective than an equal force of tanks to stop a mechanized force. A destroyed TD or tank is as ineffective as an helo to hold any ground.

I think you confuses many things. I talked combined arms because it was you who made a few questions on limitations of AT helicopters (not M10s) in an operational vacuum, like if the only tool in the Army tool set was just the helo. Then you go to point limitations on M-10 design which are more evident if used "against" TD doctrine (if you were seeking offensively for enemy armor, being open topped is not, theoretically, a limitation, because you are the one pacing the operations, and if speed is everything, there were very few chances that German or Soviet army could react with arty on time). That is, those limitations are quite evident when on defense, with the enemy's initiative and his arty falling down on your troops. And even more convoluted, instead of keeping coherent your criticism to the core of the doctrine, we end with you criticizing the AT helos (and TDs) for being ineffective at something they weren't designed for: to hold (not defend, because any instrument could collaborate to defense) a location. I personally think that the whole idea of TDs was stupid at WWII, as the instrument was too similar to a tank as to be meaningful to have other than a tank doing the task, plus taking out resources from them. But the doctrine itself evolved after WWII when instruments better fitted were developed, like the AT helicopter, or even, in some cases, light utilitarian vehicles with heavy AT punch.

Similarities between CAS and arty aren't the same than effective pursuit of similar goals and doctrine. You may have CAS included in a preplanned artillery plan, but you, the Army commander, don't have command on those assets as part of your combined arms formation. OTOH, you have command and control on the AT helicopters and they are part of your formation. The TDs, as per the doctrine you stated, weren't meant to hold a locality. The ability of doing so is just a side effect of the characteristics of the machine. To the doctrinal effects that you specifically signaled: offensive operations against enemy armor (not holding terrain) wherever it is, the AT helicopters are the today's main instrument inside the Army force. Of course, you can eventually use tanks for that, risking a 1 to 1 odd (assuming equally capable opponents), instead of the near 10 to 1 you got with a AT helicopter. It has nothing to do with "freeing" tanks from their "needs" or tasks. You stated that the stop in the developing of mechanized TDs was a result of bad doctrine. I say that there are now far better ways of doing which that doctrine establish than a mechanized TD, at least in some armies. Others, like Austrian military industry, just keep coming with mechanized TDs, like the Kürassier, for those who can't afford enough AT helicopters, nor have the luxury on tank numbers as to use them as AT asset exclusively.

I'm not talking of "airpower" (CAS, in this specific situation), which existed from 1920 on as is. I'm talking of AT assets under Army command, which follow, point by point, the tenets for TD doctrine as exposed: higher maneuverability and speed than tanks, capability of offensive concentration of AT assets against enemy tanks. This is done today by helicopters. The instrument is radically different, but the basic doctrine is the same. It is meant to work as a combined arms system, as TDs were supposed to do, so, your final two questions lack sense in that context.

I could argue that such brigade units, "organized and equipped to strike and strike hard at tanks with great fire power and great maneuverability", actually exist, just that they fly now instead to run to achieve its objective of concentrating AT firepower.

Not affirming it was the case, but it could be doctrinal. There were two doctrinal approaches to airborne operations in WWII: to land over the objective and to land at safe distance from the objective, regroup and march over it. The latter was the one used by the 1 AD, the former by the 101th, IIRC. Now that this discussion arose, I'm not sure what doctrine the 82nd used, but my bet is on the same as the other US division, which makes your question a valid one on the importance the bridge had as objective in the plans.

Edited, just for accuracy. Thanks.

Absolutely. I try to not micromanage, until I get some people injured. Then, I find myself planning a little operation to have them safe.

As an absolute ignorant on the details of the things are discussed here, I grasp this: - IF you can field it (that is, if the battle isn't more than 150 km from your assembly area) - IF you are defending (what happened with the doctrine of armored forces spearheading attacks?) - IF you are confident that your flanks aren't exposed, even if you have to reposition - IF the battle is short enough as to be sure to not run out of gas, or to lose a track - IF the terrain and infrastructure is capable to handle a 45 ton vehicle stumbling around - IF you have an earlier version, so it doesn't have the bad armor of late days, but not so early as to have the engine problems, the bullet traps and other teething issues. - IF you have over 2 km LOS, but no enemy air activity - IF the enemy doesn't have, lets say, a Sherman Jumbo with 76mm gun or a Firefly THEN, 1 on 1, the Panther is far better than the Sherman. I got it?

To expand a little: I started a QB with almost everything in random, Strict Rarity and when I entered the Setup, I found that I had no troops. The Savegame seemed to me eloquent enough, avoiding me to write a post in bad English.

Where are my troops at? QB File

I clearly remember that was Jerry Lewis who lost the war.