Spook

All true to form then. Sounds a bit like the explanation why the Germans lost in the east. According to some schools, it appears the Red Army had little to do with it - those Uebergermans did it all by themselves </font>

I know of that too, but I don't know if there are similar days of commemoration for the anniversaries of raids like for Leipzig or Nuremburg or for the "Battle of Berlin." The "Fabled Few" of RAF Fighter Command are always revered for their efforts in 1940, but of the 79,000 RAF crewmen who did not return, 55,000 came from BC. Of course the BC veterans would step forward, as they are justified to do so. I don't really debate the notion of BC crewmen being heroes, Mike. They were. In fact, their kind of war, flying at night, throughout the year, in typically inclement European weather, and against a determined and capable Luftwaffe opposition, probably took a toll on human nerves in no less way as what beset a typical combat infantryman. And after a 30-mission tour, it was sometimes "expected" of many BC crewmen to "volunteer" to do another such hellish tour. They were a special kind of "army" in their own way (as was the USAAF), and the story of BC could deserve better telling than seems the typical case even today. The choice of city-bombing at night was not that made by the BC crewmen, it was made by the British leadership, and that's where any debate over its "morality" should be directed. EDIT: On that last note, I personally understand the rationales as to why RAF opted for area-bombing as it did. But further discussion on same, by those inclined, would be better done in a separate topic thread than in here. [ May 06, 2003, 03:32 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

Off on a tangent, but anyway....... "We"? Mind you, Mike, I've plowed through a few odds-and-sods references related to BC's campaigns that I too have developed no small amount of respect for the BC crewmen for what they accomplished under the hazards that they faced. But on a larger scale, it seems a mixed verdict as to how well the "we," in the postwar allied nations' populations, "revered" BC's efforts. It's my understanding that contrary to other services' veterans, BC crewmen were not awarded their own postwar campaign medal, and "Bomber" Harris was snubbed at being granted peerage. Even Churchill made one attempt to distance himself from the application of "terror bombing" in the waning war months when he thought it in his political interests to do so. And in more recent times, in other forums, I've frequently seen some posters openly talk of the sum Allied (UK/US) bombing campaigns being in the same vein of war crimes as typically held against Nazism. That is heavily debated when brought up, of course, but some do broach it in that way all the same.

Tch. Ya know, I just remembered that I submitted a CMBB scenario earlier to the Scenario Depot. Last I checked, it hasn't been reviewed. It's called "Into Kurovitsy." Alternately, you can download from the link below: Into Kurovitsy Just right-click on the link, choose "Save target as....", and that'll download the file. It's about 34(+) turns, and pits a Soviet Guards force to the job of clearing out a fair-sized town bisected by a small river. Best done in multiplayer, as it provides little "surprises" to both sides, but alternately playable as Soviets. (mirrored comments in BF General Forum)

Hate to break this to you, MG 42, but..... The CM game system is still that; a game. Just a damn sight more realistic on so many elements of WWII tactical warfare than all of the other contenders out there. If it were to be a true die-in-the-wool sim, then "Franko's True Combat Rules" (or somefink) would have to be coded in as mandatory settings. Artillery plotting would jump to about three or four magnitudes of complexity to perform. And so forth. I'm glad that BF has demonstrated how to walk the fine line in the CM evolution. Where it can improve realism while also maintaining playability, it does so, but doesn't sacrifice one on the altar of the other as often the case in so many other games.

I'm sure at least the Firefly IIc did.

Boot.

No, the long-feared Cold War era WPO conventional assault never did happen. But I think you would acknowledge that this isn't an apples-to-apples comparison given that Stalin wasn't in charge throughout that entire timeframe. As I've noted above, I don't buy the "pre-emptive" argument. But I think the "1942" scenario, of the Soviets striking first then if the Germans still hadn't attacked, remains valid. The devil in the details IMO is of projecting some probability beyond just the validity point, to which again I regard as very speculative for now. Thanks. On my end for now, I can review Werth again, and now finally have the Glantz/House "When Titans Clashed" for potential correlation to the above. I think you mean "if imperfectly executed". From the occasions that I've looked at Barbarossa Soviet army dispositions, I would concur that a "defense in depth" plan was being applied. Actually quite sensible, in hindsight. But I think it was more the case of contingency planning (after all, you noted it being considered since 1940) than it was of Stalin expecting a German attack at a very specific timeframe.

This is pretty much my sum outlook at present too. There was SOME mobilisation and reorganization, but hardly consistent in application, and notional at best for those forces expected to first contact the Germans. I am similarly not convinced yet that Stalin fully expected a German attack in 1941. If that was the case, the materials shipments could've been stopped sooner. The "defense in depth" planning was IMO an effort to cover the bases. Unless, Steve, you'd like to point out some key references as could help indicate otherwise.

I wasn't arguing earlier that Hitler was seeking to "pre-empt." Whatever all Stalin could have done bending over backwards to avoid war even on into the following years, I believe Hitler still would've attacked. The role of aggressor meant nothing to him. Rather, my comments were intended to highlight if Stalin entertained comparable notions of aggression against Germany as did Hitler vs. the USSR, after 1941. At present, I think this is valid to argue. There's an irony to Hitler's "lebensraum" goal; in an indirect way, he succeeded. Even allowing the postwar German border shifts to the east, it could be reasonably argued that those Germans who survived did have more "lebensraum" by war's end, after losing millions.

In absolute --- no. Maybe Stalin would've concerned himself more on other matters, or changed his mind about attacking in 1942 or in later years. Much can happen in a year to bring on a change in view. But neither can it be "absolutely, positively" argued that Stalin would have NEVER attacked first. If events and circumstances existed as that Stalin thought a successful offensive could be done, I think it entirely valid that he would've considered same. But because Hitler attacked first in 1941, and 1942's setting was radically different from one with the USSR still at peace, what Stalin would have done instead remains forever in the realm of the speculative.

Was it really so obvious? I mean, is there historical evidences of that? </font>

Sorry to break your streak.

I'm kind of behind the curve keeping up with CMMOS (heck, even keeping up with the CMBB forum), but I'm popping in to add my voice to all the others, MikeT, to give you, and those others (including the modders) who helped you, a big THANK YOU for all your efforts .

Splendid!!

To Jeanne & Battlefront: Many thanks, Jeanne, for your coverage, which I unfortunately missed. The historical wargame market is about as "niche" as it can get in computer game categories, and good publicity can therefore be hard to come by. Would it be possible for you & Battlefront to arrange that a video clip file of the news coverage be provided for download or viewing from the Battlefront site later on? Or is there a CNN news archive link as an alternate?

So, what will be the title of MrSpkr's next thread for a scenario review call-to-arms? "Anna Kournikova provides her e-mail address here ... while she does CM scenario reviews" "Winning Powerball Lottery numbers ... hidden within the CM scenario ratings." " 'Pulp Fiction' ... the essence of CM scenario review text." "Final Fantasy ... the good scenario reviews within."

So far, I think that I'm holding up that end for my submitted reviews; at least for the ones I've done for yours & MrSpkr's scenarios that I've played. When time avails to finish the game, it'll be Andreas as my next "victim." My GUIDING RULES offered to those who download scenarios from the Scenario Depot and other sites: 1) On AVERAGE, a scenario review is NOT going to take as long to do as it will to play the scenario; let alone the time spent by the scenario designer to put it together in the first place. 2) EACH scenario that I download AND play from the Depot gets reviewed.

You're welcome, for whatever they're worth. Unimpeaceable references fail me now, but my initial recollection of the practice was while inspecting TO&E's of brigade-level formations in the earlier TalonSoft "East Front" game, varying by year of course. It was also read by me from occasional articles much earlier that the Soviet tank riders (among the first to apply this concept) were primarily armed with SMG's. My follow-up web search availed the following as the closest I could find to Soviet tank brigade TO&E: Nov '42 Soviet Tank Brigade TO&E And, as noted at that site, the TO&E is drawn from "German intelligence documents," let alone being a TO&E not of 1944. Regardless, this, and a more sketchy reference at another site, infer that at within the tank brigade's attached infantry battalion, a SMG company was organic to this. I agree -- I'm not altogether firm on the notion of changing out some T-34/43's for T-34/85's, as the latter started entering service in Feb. 1944. So it is quite possible that the GD's Soviet opposition in May '44 hadn't gotten some of these yet. But if some "swapping" was done, it would indeed be best on a platoon basis. And I couldn't recommend changing out to provide an entire company of T-34/85's, given that the scenario's German defenders don't include "killer tanks." (Some net references suggested that Soviet tank companies had drifted down to seven tanks typical by 1944, with three platoons of two each, but I couldn't confirm this for now.) Definitely, the German defense's chances are GREATLY enhanced by the air support. (Your having both kinds of Stukas buzzing around also keeps the battle stirred up!) So those cetainly need to show SOME time within the scenario, and not in the later turns. Instead of "100% arrival at turn 6" as an example, I was thinking of something like "45% at turn 5" as a counter-example. After five turns, each turn checking at 45%, it's only a 5.03% chance of the aircraft STILL not having shown up after the fifth turn. Just makes the specific entry turn less predictable. Most of the trenches can remain padlocked, but I thought that perhaps the pair of trench markers close to the woods, as a minor example, could be reset freely. I'll say one thing --- some on the CMBB forum have complained that the "Shoot & Scoot" command doesn't "work well enough." I used it for the German Marder's which came in as reinforcements, which I kept back behind a crest near the exit edge. That S&S command proved a lifesaver to those TD's, who certainly would've been killed otherwise by the T-34's. I suppose the T-34/85 suggestion could just be punted then. The present Soviet tanks in the game are capable enough for the job on hand. SPG's might be another matter though.

"Shoot & Scoot" works well for many AFV's, but best IMO for those TD's with potent long-range guns and poor armor, like a Marder or Nashorn. Such vehicles with good long-range guns have a reasonable chance at a one-off shot. But if they hang around too long in exposed position, like through hunt/reverse, the follow-on enemy return fire (multiple shots) get a better chance to hit.

Correct, which is why I only cited "width" and not "depth" in my earlier post. To which yes, one should delve into specific battalion/regimental accounts if one truly wanted to do a CMBB historical scenario of the northern attack on the Kursk salient, instead of "frontal averages". But it's my GENERAL impression that very few present CMBB scenarios attempt to approach the kind of noted "density" for a 1-km map width, even allowing to 5-km depth. It was similar with the earlier TalonSoft game "East Front." With some notable exceptions, most original scenarios were devised as to provide fast-paced games than to attempt historical unit concentrations.

It could just suffice to provide a link to the Scenario Depot in your web site. Having downloadable scenario files resident to your site in specific is not the only way to help expand attention to the CM gamer/designer community. But if you want to host certain scenario files, then e-mail the designers and ask their permission. Some will probably grant your request. To get you started, click below. I'm not particular at keeping it at the Depot alone, but be mindful that this scenario is a "draft" and is subject to later revision by me. Into Kurovitsy [ January 20, 2003, 03:32 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

Just for record, the USAAF didn't go after the Romanian oil targets until the Ploesti raid of Aug. 1943. Follow-up raids on Ploesti and other nearby oil targets were flown mainly in 1944, within a few months of the Soviets taking control.

Yes, the invasion "impeded" Soviet industry, but many Soviet industries still were successfully dismantled, moved to the Urals, and set up there instead. What then of overall Soviet production during the critical time of the East Front if these could have been attacked too? Speculative, of course, but valid speculation with all else. Not quite correct. As you noted, the RAF Bomber Command focus prior to 1944 was to impede industry the indirect way by targeting cities. If it hit the factories, all the better, but "disrupting" production by targeting civilian homes was the more tangible (if overoptimistic) expectation. But bomb-marking techniques, even at night, had progressed such that "point" targets could be hit too. The pre-Normandy rail campaign is one such example, and the RAF contributed to bombing the synthetic oil refineries too with a measure of success. The British desired aircraft production targets very early in the war, but after the results of 1941, had long since shifted focus. Communications (rail), oil, and the continuance of city-bombing were rather more the primaries of Bomber Command targeting in the last year.

If you can latch onto a copy of Roger Freeman's "The Mighty Eighth," Combined Arms, that would be one source looking at the effect of one strategic air force. Or, the out-of-print "Mighty Eighth War Diary" will detail each mission as well as losses & kills during same. The latter book is harder to find, however (usually in specialty military bookstores), and thus will carry a bit more of a price tag. This doesn't consider the added losses to the RAF, the US 9th, 12th, & 15th Air Forces, and the Soviet air forces, of course. A more far-reaching source for this, looking instead from the German perspective of all air campaigns and their effect, is "Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-45" by Williamson Murray. I tend to regard the effect of P-51 escort in 1944-45 on a "last straw" basis. Prior attrition took a greater sum toll (P-51's accounted for just less than 5,000 air kills in the ETO/MTO), but the presence of the P-51's along with the other fighters pressed the Luftwaffe into the "air superiority battle" that was considered critical to win before the Normandy invasion. [ January 19, 2003, 10:17 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]