Spook

Bada bump

Bump

A fair assessment. For the game in lump sum, I'm certainly closer to FFG than BBG.

That quote from Cribtop Gamer is my present impression too, at least of scenarios set at 25 turns or less. But it depends of course on the map size.

Ah hah!! So Steve has come out with his own topic to take a contentious CMBB issue head-on. Excellent, sir. Let's start off...... I wouldn't put odds on the former, Steve. As long as new CM gamers come into the fold (or truant CMBO vets to CMBB), the issue will likely stay around as long as the PERCEPTION remains of sumfink being "busted." Now to the three issues, where I will reverse the order on one.... IMO, while sneaking is certainly applied on an increased level than experienced in CMBO, I don't presently fault its execution or its overall level of occurence. To an "infantry grog," the central frame of reference could well be as to how "loaded" the infantry in a CM scenario are presumed to be in terms of field kit. But those who pursue the "tires too easily" argument can resort to a real-life test. Strap on some equipment like a backpack or other sundries, carry something simulating some small arms with the hands, and go to an unused football or soccer field. (Of course, this doesn't also test sloping effects.) And then run, drop down, get up, run, drop down, get up, and keep doing so while measuring distance and time before becoming tired or even more exhausted. It's something as that most any CM gamer can test out in their locality, concerning their perception of troops "tiring too easily." Well, here's where there's inevitably going to be more contention or subjective thinking as to what can or can't be done by troops under fire. What you have to allow upfront, Steve, is that by representing infantrymen as squads or half-squads, an element of abstraction is inescapable. I don't think as that anyone here claims that any one soldier or group of soldiers is 100% impervious to some "negative" reaction to being fired on. But the thing here is that the CM system, contrary to something like the CC/GIC series, is not trying to represent individual soldiers. So the debate is better framed if what happens to SQUAD-level units in CMBB seems to follow fairly consistent, historic, and realistic trends of actual squad-level units. At present, in all honesty, I'm not altogether certain as that CMBB "has it right or wrong" to some noteworthy level. But that's presently my unsubstantiated perception, which I must also state as a disclaimer. I will note that troops with higher experience levels, and with better leaders in terms of morale, have been seen by me in CMBB to still be willing to press forward in the face of enemy small arms fire, yes, even MG's. So I am definitely a part of the "in-between" camp in this regard. And per your note, central to any continuing debate on this matter should be an earnest study by CMBB gamers on how they are applying their tactics and the new movement commands. Concerning the matter of squads "panicking too easily," I do have an alternate suggestion for you to consider for the future CM engine, if you are so inclined to hear it from me later. Great topic, though. Perhaps now you've institutionalized the acronyms "FFG" and "BBG."

The patch history of CMBO is testament to the above. Mind you, that's not stated as a critique. Nor does it mean that CMBB has to evolve to a comparable "version 1.12." Rather, that for the scope of this game and what all it attempts to do, it's inevitable for little odds & ends to show up in the game's nooks & crannies that weren't that obvious to find earlier on. But through all of CMBO's evolution, it never existed in a state as to be relatively unplayable or having gamekiller errors. CMBO gamers for the most part were able to play on right through to the next patch version. Does anyone else here remember the TV ad of Orson Welles hawking Paul Masson wines? "We will sell no wine... before its time." Such as it should be with the CMBB patch, of course, as the Mattster has now pointed out. [ November 18, 2002, 08:56 AM: Message edited by: Spook ]

Dang. It must be in the CM code that a late-war German tank isn't using "zimmerit" anti-magnetic paste --- unless a CM gamer creates and applies a graphics mod showing otherwise.

Seek out the following Usenet newsgroup, merkava: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical Post your sales notice there, and you'll likely get a few offers or more in a short while.

Try Viagra next time. So, with the next bump, let's all hum along the Viagra theme: "When you're down between the legs, use Viagra, it'll get you flowing out like Niagra...."

A "draw" as a Soviet player, 55 to 45 in my favor. I killed 35 tanks while losing 33. I suppose I could've gotten a tactical by putting more attention to keep various VL positions flagged in my favor, but in the last turns, I got down & dirty focused on some close engagements. I don't know if the map is laid out historically, but it sure was fascinating to use as a "tank playground."

The US Army shortfall in dealing with trenchfoot in late 1944 is undeniable, tero. However, it must be taken in perspective. First off, the US Army experience of extended wartime campaigning in combined cold and wet weather was very limited. The only prior experience was for soldiers who served in Italy in the 1943-44 winter, and these were in the extreme minority (the US 3rd, 36th, & 45th Divisions) of divisions deployed on the NW European front. It might seem straightforward in hindsight that the US Army planners should have paid attention to the East Front experience, or more to the Italian front. But in hindsight, "should" and "did" don't seem to match here. Further consider that even in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, German Tiger I tanks (and Panthers in Italy) had been encountered in battle by US forces. In theory, such prior engagements should have accelerated US armor development and "doctrines" to counter, but again, the lessons were learned the hard way. As to the presumed abundance of supply, here again, one must remember that the sudden expansion of theater operations from Normandy to the West Wall, and with limited availability of high-capacity ports in France and Belgium until after October, challenged the delivery of supplies more than what otherwise might be assumed. And in the early fall of 1944, within 12th Army Group, it was the "judgement call" of Gen. Bradley that winter clothing & shoes take lower priority in delivery than the standards of "bullets, beans, and gas." Because at that pre-winter timeframe, hope still remained with Bradley and other higher Allied commanders that the German army on the West Front was only a few weeks from total collapse. As to the Finnish example, why should one be surprised about the development of methods to combat trenchfoot being more extensive and in place by wartime? The winters are typically longer in Finland, with heavier snows and colder temperatures. Even in the preceding prewar years, how could this had been missed by the Finnish high command? In effect, for a nation like Finland, cold-weather wartime preparations were far more "institutional" than for a nation like the USA. Certainly, parts of the USA (the 48 states) get cold too in winter, but in northern army stations, I rather doubt that troops were put through exercises that kept them out in the field in severe cold for any more than a few days. That doesn't equate to what was going to be experienced with soldiers put on the line for weeks on end in the West Front in 1944-45. So in sum, tero, while the Finns could outperform most others in checking the ill effects of cold weather to its soldiers, this was in response to geographic and climatic conditions that would almost always ensure severely cold winters within Finland. Were the USA in sum total subjected to the same kinds of prewar climates on a consistent basis, without regional "gradation" of the winter weather, the prewar US response would have probably been comparable.

It ultimately depends on what period you wish to play CMBB as the Soviets. If you're trying to play the Soviets in the 1941-42 timeframe, such as through Quick-Battle generation, then right away, you have to allow that overall Soviet infantry experience and commander abilities are going to be a bit handicapped. But it terms of anti-tank (AT) ability, I don't think the Soviets are inherently that much more crippled than German infantry of the same timeframe. In fact, Soviet armor on a tank-by-tank basis is more daunting, except for the platoon-command constraints due to typical lack of radios. My driving recommendation for playing earlier-war Soviet infantry is this: don't try to maneuver or fight on open ground. Seek cover, seek the close fight, and be prepared to mass your forces a bit more for better "control." Against armor, many Soviet squads will carry molotov cocktails, and I've taken out German tanks in CMBB with these. It's the same facing German infantry. Out in the open, their machinegun capabilities are better on average. Get the Germans in closer, and firepower evens out more. And the Soviet SMG's are far better than German SMG's. A Soviet full-SMG squad is especially daunting at less than 100 meters range, if you're able to acquire this type of infantry. And to AT guns, the Soviet 45mm isn't much to crow about, but neither is the German 37mm "door-knocker." Again, seek cover, and seek to shoot German armor in the flanks, of which most German vehicles in the 1941-42 timeframe aren't imposing at this aspect.

I made some minor edits to my earlier post, Schoerner, at the same time while you posted, although I wasn't modifying the content. Anyway, Andreas's follow-up post helps magnify the points I was making earlier. And you're going out on a limb again with this statement. Certainly, some US units fared poorly in combat, particularly in their initial engagements. But that is far more readily traced to shortfalls in prior training, lack of initial overall combat experience, and to erroneous doctrines, than to "societal impact" on the ability of a nation's soldiers to be effective in combat. And there were a vast host of occasions in WWII, both in the Pacific and in Europe, were US military personnel could perform well enough, even with "elan," without having overwhelming land, air, and sea superiority. It would be idle to pretend that US forces in WWII always performed well, because that isn't true. It is similarly a fallacy to presume that US forces were effective through overwhelming resources alone. I would recommend Michael Doubler's "Closing With the Enemy" as a good basic reference describing the ways on how US soldiers improved their combat performance in the NW European campaigns. Anyway, to your main counterpoint: where I would concur with your expressed concerns is of letting any one study become the "authority" to account for the performance of any and all soldiers & units in WWII. But then, I don't think that John's originally cited study intended that. Instead, such a study instead becomes the basis or "foundation" of looking for trends in combat behavior. And we can always allow for exceptions, as again, the circumstances affecting a soldier's behavior in combat can vary greatly. [ November 07, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

We don't have to define it to that level of extreme. Merely to note that while some of the things you've mentioned could be valid, others are perhaps less than compelling when we're talking about a host of "soft factors" to the psychological behavior of soldiers in combat. It doesn't have to be explained, because I didn't have contention with the notion of a soldier wanting to return to a unit that he is familiar with. However, your statement infers that a German soldier, throughout WWII, had the latitude to "opt out" from being returned to combat duty; that he could be reassigned to noncombat duty, or even sent home, if he asked for it? Is that correct? Yes, you've reeled out some examples of where some soldiers on the East Front, in a given set of circumstances, can continue to fight on beyond the theoretical "burnout" of John Salt's referenced studies. Now --- can you say with unimpeachable authority that this all applies in stock to all units serving on all theaters in WWII? Even the Germans? No. I didn't assert for it to be "common" in the US armies, and I don't believe you have the authority to do so either. I noted that it HAPPENED. And I consider it a complete 100% POSSIBILITY that it happened in other armies too, even the Germans. "Possibility" and "commonality" are not the same. You may assert this from the specific anectodal stories related to you. The trap here is that you are attempting to further extrapolate that the stories of a select group of veterans apply in absolute throughout the German army. IIRC, several million Germans served in the German armed forces in WWII. Can we speak of this entire body of soldiery in terms of absolutes? And I didn't contend that aspect, nor asserted that other nations' armies didn't apply this too at some degree or another. But the "model" of contention isn't of NCO experience & conduct. It's of the behavior of any individual soldier under any given set of circumstances, which is quite far-reaching in latitude; and not all of which will be addressed by "NCO control." Sure --- in theory. But how things evolve in the field can be a rather different matter, again not all of which can accounted for in military education or training. Probably true to a point, at least in the definition of "doctrines"...... Now you're out on a limb, and cutting it off behind you. "European" soldiers didn't have "big" psychological problems? BULLOCKS, with a capital B. You have zero-percent authority to make such a stock assertion. What's more, the study referenced by John Salt didn't assert that just US soldiers were being studied. It gave me every impression as that "soldiers in general" were being studied, without some arbitrary focus on nationality. However, John, or whoever else has read the specific study (I haven't), could elaborate otherwise. If soldiers' behavior on the East Front wasn't studied or analyzed, then what basis or authority do any of us have to assert one thing or the other? "Studies" aren't necessarily the final authority either. But they are a point of reference to seek trends from. Again, you're out on a limb, with no authority to assert that "US soldiers are not part of the ideals of US society." Besides, all of this is not directly linked to the psychological behavior of soldiers seeing extended combat. Something like the above has been issued by "uber-Deutsch" disciples on this forum for years, never gaining ground throughout. One might next argue that it's reprehensible that German soldiers in CMBO and CMBB are subject to ANY kind of "morale" rules. After all, shouldn't their "comradeship," Unteroffizierkorps, and "societal expectations" make it impossible for Germans to even break or rout in the CM system? I may seem a bit harsh in my response to you, Schoerner, and I don't mean to leave the impression that what all you're asserting is "wrong." Some of what you argue can have a basis of validity, excepting those points which I've retorted to more firmly. But on this issue of "combat exhaustion," you are overreaching at times, and attempting to apply a series of extraneous factors to same. It's like when the late Stephen Ambrose asserted, in "Citizen Soldiers," that soldiers coming out from a USA-like democracy were going to inherently make better soldiers than the European "automatons." He attempted to argue the point persuasively, but I also accord his viewpoint as invalid in sum. [ November 07, 2002, 04:35 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

What you are all saying here, Schoerner, is potentially 180 degrees in full opposition to to what all that John D Salt laid out earlier. Certainly, it can be argued as that a soldier who gains experience with a unit is going to desire to "mesh in" with the unit instead of "acting the individual." But that doesn't necessarily counteract as that base human emotion and mental states may still have an increasing toll taken from them after surviving extended combat experiences. The late Stephen Ambrose, in his "Citizen Soldiers," related at least a couple of occasions of veteran soldiers in 1945 basically just "snapping." In the first case, one veteran is asked by his sergeant to scout ahead and see if a machinegun nest is still deployed in some hidden terrain. The soldier froze, and finally said, "F--- you, sarge, I ain't doing it." So the sargeant went instead, found that there were no German soldiers deployed anymore where they were earlier. In the second case, a veteran soldier who had been with the 1st Infantry Division since D-Day suddenly curled up one day in 1945 and couldn't stop sobbing. And he wasn't under fire or other "duress," he just couldn't go on from that very point in time for some reason or another. Comradeship is certainly a factor, but it isn't a blank check, and any attempts to assess nationality to inherent "resistance to combat exhaustion" is going to gain the same ground with BF as it has before --- zero. What's more, one has to maintain a critical eye even to first-person veteran's stories when trying to draw the experience of one, two, or even a few other veterans as "consistent" experience for all soldiers of a nation's armed force. Such stories are invaluable, of course, but should be kept in perspective. Comradeship is a factor, and yes, the reasons for war can play some role too. By example of the Finns, it's little surprise to their tenacity in wanting to defend their country from Soviet invasion in 1939-40. But would the Finns had shown the very same level of tenacity if deployed to fight out in the North African desert or in the jungles of Burma, without knowing why they were being sent to such places priorhand? One can only speculate, but never presume with certainty. It is similarly a tricky thing to assess "comradeship." As you argue, "It's becoming a fully-automated job and the center of the thoughts is comradeship." But isn't comradeship enhanced by fighting alongside familiar faces in a unit? What if the unit takes severe losses in a short period of time, on a repeat basis, such that within a platoon, there's no more than one or two familiar faces not only amongst the original unit members, but even amongst the first round of replacements? Could an "old hand" veteran who's still around truly maintain the same level of "comradeship" as before? That can't be assumed as absolute.

Just to note, tero, that my "Finns being wimps" lead-off note in my previous post was tongue-in-cheek. There are no sources, of course, because I wasn't serious about it. Anyway, you've provided some interesting feedback. And I will expand to comment on the US replacement system that it was probably one of the worst elements of the US Army in WWII Europe. The USA "repple-depples" (replacement depots) could at least had made a minimal effort to put the incoming replacements through various combat training before shipping them off to units at indeterminate times. But as the depots weren't directly instructed to do so (a shortfall on the US higher commanders' end), they didn't. Anyway, your final note, about if the streak of intense combat was continuous enough, is certainly worthy for CM scenario designers to weigh when trying to simulate a historical action for an "exhausted" unit. Furthermore, it's a completely valid question if the "60 days" makes enough consideration for "background factors" that may drive soldiers on, especially on the East Front where hardship was an extremely common currency.

I will add, however, that I did apply the "old lag" factor in a personal edit of the "Juggernaut" scenario for the game Airborne Assault. And truth be told, I do like how certain factors like training, experience, leadership, and morale are all seperable to be modified individually in that game for each unit. In the "Juggernaut" scenario, this features a full-strength British 30th Corps facing off against German II SS Panzer Corps. Included in the UK formations are the 43rd, 50th, and 52nd Infantry divisions, and the Guards Armoured. By my editing, I modified so that the 50th Division had relatively greater overall experience and leadership efficiency than for the other units. However, allowing that enough "old hands" are in the combat units that could trace back from fighting since in North Africa and onwards, I also made the 50th's units to have marginally lower morale than for the other units. But again, this presupposes that enough veterans are around in the 50th Division, as survivors, to make it more "sticky" unit.

Well, I'm compelled to monkey-wrench your monkey wrench, tero, and say that "105 days of front line action" is not sufficiently compelling. In fact, as will be related further below, one could even speculate that the Finns were actually wimps. How so? Please bear with me later on below. But first, I must return to one of John's original quotes: You see, there is the key, which has been little broached in prior discussion: what do we all mean by "60 days of combat" or even of "intense combat"? I don't even think as that "front line action" can be equated to this term, because, as tero noted in his above post, being in the lines doesn't necessarily mean being directly in battle all the time. The "60 days" figure seems rather small, when compared against the length of WWII overall. To combat veterans, however, it would of course seem an eternity if they were keeping track. In my own opinion (subject to correction), intense combat would represent any combat situation in which a soldier came under fire that impressed upon him that he had a chance of becoming a casualty from that engagement. He walks away from the battle unhurt, but it's added on along with the memories of other earlier battles and making him ponder more on his odds of coming through by war's end or being taken off the line. Consider, by added example, the typical tour of US and British bomber aircrews flying over western Europe. The USAAF tour was 25 missions (increased to 35 by 1944), and 30 for the RAF. In the timeframe of 1942-43, loss percentages per mission were projected in Allied planning to "average" at about 5% or so. This might even had been conveyed to the bomber crews at one time or another. So, assuming the early USAAF case of 25 missions (with no more than one mission a day), a bomber crewman might not cringe at a 95% survival chance for any one mission. But thinking on 95% taken over 25 missions --- that means a survival chance for the whole tour of just under 28%. Now getting back to the soldier on the line, assume that for each battle he was in, casualties in killed & wounded were also only 5%. (EXTREMELY unlikely for combat units!!) Further assuming no more than one engagement in a day, then after 60 days (engagements), his survival chance goes down to less than 5% overall. So, it's probably little surprise about combat exhaustion setting in after about 60 engagements of "intense combat." Not that the combat soldiers were all busy calculating odds between engagements, but most could intuitively sense that after 60 days of close battle, the odds were so heavily stacked against them. And this is just of the surviving soldiers who made it through those many days of close fighting, without further considering the effect of seeing everyone else who started out with them already being killed or maimed. But the central intangible is how those "60 days" play out. Here again, how of the days of front line action add to the "intense combat" toll? And how are they distributed? I vaguely recall one postwar study of British WWII soldiers being able to "stay on the line" about 300 or 400 days average, but don't recall the source. That's quite a larger figure than the "60 days," but here again, the issue is of how many of those days (again averaged) featured intense combat. This is what I was teasing about on the "105 days of front line action" for the Finns, tero. That seems low as compared to UK or Commonwealth soldiers. Of course, the whole issue is what exactly is being compared here in terms of "front line action." In sum, it's immensely variable from unit to unit as to how many soldiers in that unit have seen 40-60 days of intense combat, and thus are becoming "old lags" on a significant scale, even within just one squad. Chances are nonetheless VERY low that a WWII squad is going to have a majority of its soldiers, as having come through enough days of combat as survivors, as to make "combat exhaustion" something to easily scale for.

Close, but not quite. Dorosh is certainly perverse in his pursued grogginess , but he's not in Battlefront's direct employ.

Did that suffice to get your attention? Anyway, this regards the recent "FAQ" thread for CMBB, posted here in the BF CMBB forum: Frequently Asked Questions -- CMBB Now, Soddball, the originator of the thread, has been supportive not only in kicking it off, but in giving it a typical bump. Earlier this morning, however, I speculated as to whether or not a more appropriate "home" for a CMBB can be had later on. later searching around, I did find a FAQ for CMBO in the "Support" section. It thus probably stands to reason that a later FAQ list for CMBB may come to reside here also. Although I would recommend that a link also be listed on the products home page for CMBB to help newcomers find this. Anyway, to whoever in Battlefront reads this, you may proceed at your own discretion about this, of course, but I personally would be appreciative if some notice be made within Soddball's thread soon as to how you may later proceed. OK, now slap on the padlock. (P.S. to BF gamers in the USA: make sure to get out today & vote, if you are able to!)

.....Flips a coin as to cast a vote as to which forum exercise is more pathetic: trying to keeping this thread "bumped up" in the CMBB forum morass, or the recent "Agony Aunt" Seanachai attempt to morph into the late Ann Landers. Anyway...... Now hopefully getting the attention of the right Hon. Soddball, who is proving to be an added BF bulwark of support with his desire to preserve a CMBB "FAQ" for the newcomers, I must advise this: it's an exercise that will eventually grow tedious. Sure, the FAQ post with the useful content leads off, as with some other good following tidbits. But in a forum where so many other random subjects pop up as topic threads due to high forum participation, the greater likelihood is for the FAQ to "get lost in the shuffle" from the less attentive. So......proposed are the following two as options: 1) Ask if the forum moderator (Kwazydog or whoever) can "sticky" the thread to the top of the first page. This is done in other forums for strategy games like CivIII or the EU series. I don't know if UBB allows this option, however. 2) Ask that a "FAQ" link and FAQ page be imbedded as part of the home page for CMBB. Sure, it's a bit of added work in web site design, but it's good business. Many game sites I've visited in the past will have a FAQ link on the home page, recognizing that many prospective customers are going to look there first to seek some added background info. Anyway, Soddball, good spirit in trying to keep up a FAQ spot for the newcomers. But this is one thing (IMO) for which BF should make some added consideration to "host" somewhere in a more obvious way.

Couldn't resist a bit of going for the jugular? But basically true. Changes to the game system necessitate a review of earlier tactics. In one scenario I've created that involves Russian infantry having to dig out Germans in trenchworks, the key tactic is that a greater number of units have to apply suppressive fire to allow a smaller number of units to close up. But even this was advocated as a basic tactic in the original Squad Leader manual of the 1970's.

Anyway, I'd like to return to Stephen's original comments a bit. (Hey, he's got a member number pretty close to mine! ) This, and the rest of Steve's commentary, is an interesting post. The crux of it to me is this: what is the basis of the perception of increased "brittleness" with the CMBB infantry? Let me say, as a disclaimer, that I am among those who have moved past CMBO, and have no plans to returning to it. It was a superb game for its time, and it gave me excellent gaming mileage. But the sum improvements to CMBB are such that I would sorely miss these in playing CMBO again, such as the improved infantry orders or the revised MG mechanics. And in two years time, it will likely be the same with CMBB. I think that both Charles & Steve would grant allowance to my belief that the CM system is still a "work in progress," and what we see later on is likely to feature a good dosage both of the evolutionary and revolutionary as both CMBO and CMBB have done. (And so far, it's a ride I've been enjoying!....) But to the notion of infantry "brittleness," I guess that while the notion is valid to ponder on, it needs to be qualified to greater detail. What quality of troops seem brittle? Do they all seem that way? What's other gamers' experience with veteran/crack/elite troops? Also similar? It's impossible to relate "brittleness" as a game design factor without doing an extensive playtest survey to see how quickly that troops crack under fire (whether moving or deployed) based on unit experience level. And it becomes a "matrix" of effects to consider when also allowing nearby leaders to apply their bonuses. In this case, the morale bonus (+1/+2) would be the most relevant. Or what of the "fanatic" factor? Perhaps go to the scenario editor, bring up the chosen scenario before playing it, and toggle one (or both) sides to have an increased fanaticism level? That's one thing that could be used to an abusive level, but for those unsatisfied with the present perceived "brittleness," maybe that could close it up a bit and enhance their personal gaming interest. The point here is that there are a multitude of in-game factors that, with enough gamer gumption in using the editor, might help address the subject issue. But --- I will add yet another reason as to the notion why some gamers are seeing increased infantry "brittleness." The reason is that overall, in CMBB, defensive fire effect has been enhanced (at least for MG's), but in comparison, another element has remained "constant." That factor is the unit scale. In the CM system, the base unit it still the squad. Granted, there is also the half-squad, but the half-squad IS acknowledged per CM rules to be more "brittle." Therefore, it is not a base unit. The squad can vary greatly in the CM system to its initial manpower. It could as low as six or even lower, ranging up to twelve or more. And whatever "effect" applies due to fire or other, its applies to the whole squad. It goes to ground altogether, it panics altogether, and so forth. Not that this is "bad" -- merely, that is the end result we see. It could --- COULD --- be argued as that "brittleness" to squads moving under fire, at least for squads of higher quality, COULD be resolved that instead of just going to ground or panicking (or worse), an option is executed to possibly shed off a few more "casualties" as to represent more soldiers panicking and quitting the unit on a finer scale, while leaving what's left of the primary squad a better chance (though not certain) to continue its mission in better order than otherwise. Now, I am NOT advocating this yet. I don't have a basis to do so, because the suggested alternate 1) may not really be necessary, and 2) introduce a host of added problems to coding and AI behavior. And I am also aware that the present CM unit "casualties" represent more than just killed & wounded. But I certainly believe as that some future considerations to revising "squad behavior" are worth mulling over in the future of the CM system. (I still hope that "squad formations" can get into the future CM system as one such fundamental revision.) In the interim, my own verdict of "brittleness" is uncertain. I haven't played nearly enough of CMBB by now to have an opinion yet. I will say, however, that in one play of a CMBB predesigned scenario that utilized veteran Soviet troops along with good platoon CO's, I was generally satisfied with how they behaved when advancing under fire (using the new "advance" and "assault" commmands, of course). This post is probably a lot of ado over nothing. But I just remain a bit cautious to personally closing the book on the "brittleness" issue until I've designed some test scenarios in CMBB to really explore the matter, like I would do easily enough with CMBO.

Heh. Years past, I recall that I jumped into a discussion thread along with Steve G. regarding "grognards." Visual grogs, detail grogs, C&C grogs, realism grogs, whichever. But "mutual grog" with your significant other is a rare thing indeed. It isn't that way yet with my own missus. She has, however, picked up sideline PC games like Tetris or Solitaire, and she's already better than me at those.

While no authority on the slogans and if they are utilizing Russian language with sufficient accuracy, I still wish to express my thanks to Francesco for making the effort. Slogans to put on Soviet vehicles is on my future CMBB mod "to do" list, and I'm bookmarking the link to your site. Good show, sir!!