Spook

Ruthless..... If you think as that continued posting from you is going to kick up shared animosity, then perhaps you're indeed doing best to bow out. But I think that the various disagreements are but a matter of degrees in many (not all) cases. And I must affirm in turn that I don't regard Andreas as a "nationalist" Russia-worshiper. Why it seems so to you is because Andreas has made the study of East Front operations one such focal subject in recent times, thus why it is of no surprise to me that he cites the examples as he does. We all have our focal subjects. From my end, I'm prepared to go bare-knuckled, knock-down drag-out if anyone wanted to debate with me on details about some IJN destroyers in WWII or the Battle of Gettysburg as a couple of examples. In regards to the former, someone can link over to the recent self-authored article for the Wargamer if so inclined: Pacific Lancers Now.... If Andreas was a nationalist per se, he'd probably be more inclined to argue that the two greatest commanders of WWII were von Manstein and Montgomery, than argue that Soviet leadership eventually got the measure (and then some) of their German counterparts in most late-war cases. To be continued...... [ October 19, 2003, 08:31 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

I didn't expect to interject again in this thread, but I am compelled to do so because there is still a bit of "talking past each other" in regards to the hypothetical situation of a new war between the Soviets and the WA after Germany's defeat. Part of that, inevitably, is due to never really pinning down WHEN such a war would start, or WHAT would be the causus belli, applied by who. That alone throws in wide variations to available forces, combat effectiveness of same, and relative states of alert. AEB did make one such attempt on this much earlier on, but that hasn't been used in earnest to establish operational & strategic probabilities in the more recent discussion. I will post a follow-up later tonight. But for now, I will declare that the typical scenario I presume in here will be that of a Soviet attack happening within 4-12 months after Germany's surrender, where some "event" or another encouraged Stalin to go for broke. That needn't be the only case, only just a modicum more probable IMO than of Atlee (UK) & Truman (US)wanting to pick a fight in Germany & Europe so soon again after WWII's end.

This is perhaps a bit presumptuous of me, but checking on Grisha's RAS site link in his sig, this one disclaimer statement is what I regard as useful to requote in this topic thread for reference: At the least, a noteworthy comment of perspective IMO.

At present, all soldiers are human, are they not? Thus all susceptible to the same potential strengths and weaknesses that can surface in any humany being? No, all soldiers are "not" equal; their ultimate combat effectiveness is defined by a host of external factors, such as doctrine, overall training & discipline, tactics, weapons, leadership, motivation, and so on and so forth, discussed priorhand in these BF forums so MANY times before. But national borders alone certainly do not convey a special advantage or disadvantage. For those with historical eyes, they can also see as that the allowance and application of ADAPTATIONS to the lessons of war -- along with the "external factors" I noted above -- played a lot bigger role to a soldier's combat effectiveness than did borders or cultural upbringings. Pick up and read a copy of Michael Doubler's "Closing with the Enemy" as a compelling case study on this, among others. Material is a factor to a given point. Soldiers' motivation is a factor to a given point. But if you studied the US Vietnam War in earnest, it might surprise you as to how many small unit actions the US soldier accorded himself well in, allowing for the less distinguished moments too. The same for both cases in Iraq too. Jessica Lynch may have become the far bigger household word in the USA afterwards, but Patrick Miller certainly showed from the same ambush what one such US soldier was capable of accomplishing in a heartbeat-FUBAR situation. Just comparing the Vietnam and Iraq wars by name alone is meaningless for assessing soldiers' effectiveness.

<big>ACHTUNG!</big>, Peng-pucks!! You off-sods, you wankers, you epic epitomes of GOT-NO-LIFE..... As your lame-o justicar, Joe Shaw, will attest, I am only an exceedingly rare infestation to your fetid forum -- only once every six or seven blue moons, which still isn't nearly enough. A perpetual SSN to your "society," and happily so. So what brings me back to your putrid pile of Cess? Especially one so pathetic to banter on & on over a game that hasn't even released yet? It because your patron saint/demon of induced hatred, Auntie Seanachai, has dared, DARED I say, to issue the following THREAT within the General Forum: It matters not as to how deserving is Agua to such a fate. The fact that WMD (wild mimes, deranged) have been threatened within the GF can NOT be allowed to stand. Thus, in the true American spirit of pre-emptive action on the slightest and least justifiable pretext, there is no other recourse: Now..... I will allow that the site of mimes bearing down on you nongs with SMG's might be a bit much for your feeble minds to endure without sleepless nights. So for this ONE occasion, I am posting a follow-up that should be more calming to your "souls": (from the upcoming Tarantino flick, "Maim Mime") Now..... if you do not want this Mutha-Bullocks Thread of yours to be further spammed with mime images, you WILL do more to keep your übergnome hate-magnet on a shorter leash. Now, go die a lot. Ausgang. (edited because I misspelled Seanachai's name earlier. The guilty should be properly ID'ed, sorry 'bout that.) [ October 17, 2003, 10:41 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

<big>ACHTUNG!</big>, Peng-pucks!! You off-sods, you wankers, you epic epitomes of GOT-NO-LIFE..... As your lame-o justicar, Joe Shaw, will attest, I am only an exceedingly rare infestation to your fetid forum -- only once every six or seven blue moons, which still isn't nearly enough. A perpetual SSN to your "society," and happily so. So what brings me back to your putrid pile of Cess? Especially one so pathetic to banter on & on over a game that hasn't even released yet? It because your patron saint/demon of induced hatred, Auntie Seanachai, has dared, DARED I say, to issue the following THREAT within the General Forum: It matters not as to how deserving is Agua to such a fate. The fact that WMD (wild mimes, deranged) have been threatened within the GF can NOT be allowed to stand. Thus, in the true American spirit of pre-emptive action on the slightest and least justifiable pretext, there is no other recourse: Now..... I will allow that the site of mimes bearing down on you nongs with SMG's might be a bit much for your feeble minds to endure without sleepless nights. So for this ONE occasion, I am posting a follow-up that should be more calming to your "souls": (from the upcoming Tarantino flick, "Maim Mime") Now..... if you do not want this Mutha-Bullocks Thread of yours to be further spammed with mime images, you WILL do more to keep your übergnome hate-magnet on a shorter leash. Now, go die a lot. Ausgang. (edited because I misspelled Seanachai's name earlier. The guilty should be properly ID'ed, sorry 'bout that.) [ October 17, 2003, 10:41 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

The Four Horsemen revealed!!! Well, four...... something. (Thanks to "younger Boris", mididoctors, for dumping this into another thread elsewhere.)

Good catch on the Soviet general, I had forgotten his name. Actually, the earlier reference I had on the incident stated that in the immediate aftermath, the Soviets wanted the 82nd's CO to be executed instead!! If true, the reaction from the Soviets was understandable when a high-ranking commander falls to "friendly fire." But indeed, to ratchet things down, the noted CO was relieved or transferred. (It was because of incidents like these in the Balkans as that encouraged the Soviets to argue for a "bomb line" in early 1945 which Allied bombing sorties east of it were disallowed, a line along which Dresden lay and MIGHT have helped lead to Dresden being firebombed later. But that's taken up in earnest in another topic thread in the GF.) Up until 1943, CAS was for all intents a non-existent "doctrine" for the USAAF; much had to be learned first in Italy, and by the RAF too, which germinated more in the Normandy campaign. But by early 1945, 9th AF did have comparable numbers in fighter-bomber aircraft as did 8th AF providing fighters for long-range escort. As to how many were interdiction vs. CAS, it's worthy to consider in balance, but tactical interdiction if helping to "isolate" the battlefield could actually provide more sum payoff. The trick of course is to be able to penetrate more behind the FEBA, where Soviet fighters and other air defenses would recognizably been a challenge too. To which could also be added that the Soviets certainly had their own share of stellar pilots, like Kozhedub(?). Again, though, relative proficiencies and tactics on unit-level would've had no small part to dictate the air combat arena. I think the likely air battle, even over Germany, would've ranged at all altitudes, as US/RAF heavies would've been pressed to help in here too (to least "disrupt" to some degree, if not flexible enough to target accurately mobile formations). But yes, I would concur that the sum air battle would not had been an easy matter for either side. Also concur here.

Whoa. Smile when you say that. Let's see those dull yellow bicuspids real good, Sparky. </font>

The US/UK tactical aircraft would have been certainly at risk of higher losses at lower altitudes, especially from ground fire, as borne out from actual experience. But regarding air-to-air, the disadvantages might not had been so "distinct." Soviet fighters were likely more maneuverable at lower altitudes in balance, but this was the case for many Italian fighters too. It still ultimately depended on pilot proficiencies & tactics where the edge would lie. On one such occasion in mid-1944, US P-38's of the 82nd Group accidentally strafed an advancing Soviet column, and Soviet fighters jumped in. It was close-quarters on the deck for several minutes before the 82nd's flight CO realized they were fighting Soviet planes and called a disengagement, but up to then, the P-38's were getting the better of the duel. Who would remain dominant at lower altitudes would have been fairly intangible. Save the US 5th, 7th, 9th, and 12th AF's as primary tactical air forces, to name a few, along with added air forces like RAF 2nd TAF. Um, that all was already ironed out in 1943-44 quite effectively by both the US and RAF tactical air forces. During Operation Cobra, a central means of added support for the leading US armored columns was rotating flights of fighter-bombers helping to provide cover, controlled by an observer within one of the forward tanks. And the IXth TAC's commander, Quesada, did much in Normandy (in concert with RAF Gen. Broadhurst of 83rd Group) to reduce turnover times of CAS missions as well as improve target-marking. Other innovations like P-38 "droop snoot" bombadier guidance helped Allied fighters to function even as level bombers with greater levels of accuracy, even as to take out bridges this way. The RAF and USAAF didn't have to play "catch-up" in tactical operations by 1945; if anything, they paced it, further enhanced by improved flexibilities in their ground control communications. Doubler's "Closing with The Enemy" is one such reference useful for further details on this matter, although references on larger formations like the US 9th AF would also avail a good bit too.

Do take care of yourself then, Bastables, and report in when you can.

Yes, as I noted earlier, the carpet-bomb tactic, whether for destructive or shock effect, was not likely to work against a "moving" target, and was limited in effect even against static targets. Only when the front became more static (a later possibility regardless of Soviet doctrines) was it an option to ponder over. Well, as compared to a later WestWall carpet-bombing of late-'44 which did much better at least in minimizing unintended Allied casualties, three things must be added to consider here: 1) The short-bombings resulted from the drift of earlier bomb-smoke & dust drift towards American postions. Thus the following waves "crept" their release point back from what it was for the first waves. It was concern over this that Gen. Bradley insisted that the bomber groups fly PARALLEL (west-east) instead of perpendicular to the front line for the bomb run. But the US bomber groups counter-argued that flying parallel to the German front put them at greater risk of losses to anti-aircraft fire. The bomber forces ultimately trumped in the decision that the bombers would fly in. 2) The US bomber forces, also recognizing the risk of short falls (it was a common incident in strategic bombing of German "point" targets) argued in turn that the US lead troops should have been deployed no closer than 3,000 yards from the bomb zones. Bradley and the ground commanders countered that pulling back that far (they were about 1,000-1,500 yds back instead) risked giving the Germans enough time to sort themselves out or to even move forward and grab earlier lost terrain. 3) The altitude at which the heavy bombers came in at made it such that the applied friendly warning markers on ground level could not be effectively seen or discerned. Thus it was a friction of priorities. Perhaps the bombers could've flown parallel instead of perpendicular without undue loss & damage, or perhaps the US first-wave troops could've been deployed further back. Or both. The improved methods for marking friendly lines came later.

Exactly. I shouldn't imply as that the bookkeepers of Panzer Lehr were intentionally trying to fudge the numbers, I have no evidence of that in either direction. But in that time of 25-31 July, under heavy attack and later tactical air interdiction, and the likely effect of the bombing to the division's communications added in, I think it was probably a supreme challenge to that division's HQ just to maintain contact with its subordinate units and to extract out what could be withdrawn. The premise would have certainly been the same for Allied units if the roles were reversed. The earlier vehicle tallies are pretty close to what Zaloga also reports, however.

True, and a similar premise for the western Allies' divisions too. As one such example, I recall that the British 50th Division had lost over 6,000 in sum casualties for the Normany campaign, where the vast majority would fall on the infantry troops and their later replacements. I guess that's what's needed with the 1st August estimate for which I contend with; what from the 11,000 are "teeth" combat troops. Ah. Yes, the Cassino bombing was another such which fell far short of what was expected of it. Again, part of the limitation to carpet bombing as a means of concentrated firepower was its time requirement in planning; The GOODWOOD bombing needed at least two days' notice for planning purposes. Which could still be enough on a static front, but the bombing was not easy to call off if the situation changed in the interim.

The numbers are for aircraft in theatre. You are assuming: a) a prolonged war that the Japan war had ended That changes the picture somewhat. I am assuming that the Soviets would have applied the same sort of action that brought them 500km in 14 days in the Vistula Oder offensive. We are talking at least Dutch border and on/across the Rhine in most cases from the jump-off points. </font>

If you'll pardon, Bast, the above number is a bit of an exercise in "histrionics" too. Whatever the full number of US troops committed to Cobra overall, it wasn't "140,000" combat troops as that defeated Panzer Lehr by 26th July. It was instead the combat troops of the 30th and the 9th Divisions (both of which were bloodied in turn by short-drop bombing) on the 25th, with the US 2nd Armored added in late on the 26th. That's what Panzer Lehr proved unable to stop, and that doesn't approach 140,000 combat troops by any imaginable stretch. You first have to answer the relevant question: what all did Panzer Lehr have in combat troops on the front line on 25th July? And how many were still availabe by the end of 26th July when US 2nd Armored started tearing through? If Panzer Lehr was still a relatively intact unit after 25th July, why could it not had done more to prevent the breakthroughs of the US armored columns, instead limiting the US advance overall to more modest gains? If one looks at what the unit positions of the US forces in the breakthrough period, it was of the two main US armored divisions (2nd & 3rd) running their combat commands onto separate routes and running ahead of the main body of US divisions following afterwards. Could not Panzer Lehr had better blunted any ONE such of 2nd Armored's columns if it had the number of troops asserted in the reports? No one column numbered 140,000 US troops. Anyway, yes, the carpet bombing, by tearing up the battle zone and making the ground less mobile, certainly conveyed a disadvantage in that regard. However, I wouldn't be quite so dismissive of Baylerein's assertions. He was a long-running veteran combat commander, and if he was saying that his command was in danger of "evaporating," I'm inclined to believe that he would have stated so on the basis of what was REPORTED to him instead of his "losing his head" per se. And if the Panzer Lehr didn't really have much infantry on foot prior to the bombing, it then begs to be asked as to why it was still kept on the front line instead of rotated to the rear. Thus what it comes back to is if the carpet bombing still achieved its desired "shock" to ultimately crack the German defense. Might the Germans of Panzer Lehr (and 353rd Division in reserve) otherwise held, or at least held long through delaying actions and orderly retreats to prevent a breakthrough? Again, due to the limited gains of 25th July, I think it entirely possible, certainly with the 353rd brought up to fill some holes. I appreciate your references, Bast, and allow that the noted "reports" may well indeed be correct. But they leave too much unanswered IMO, and again I am still very, very suspect of a RELIABLE "accounting" being able to be accomplished immediately after the events of 25th -- 31st July. To be quite blunt, something's just not adding up here. Anyway, carpet-bombing can certainly be overrated. But it's not due to lack of potential; if the bombing is properly concentrated on the target, its effect would not be dissimilar to concentrated heavy artillery or rocket barrages. Only that the ability to turn around and coordinate a timely concentrated bombing on an obvious target would more difficult than to instead work up a concentrated artillery fire plan per example.

Zaloga's reference, "Cobra 1944," states that Baylerein tallied only "3,600 men in Panzer Lehr's immediate control" while the bombing resulted in about 1,000 of these being killed. The noted reference further states as that by the end of the day, "Baylerein reported to Hausser that he had no infantry left and his division was on the verge of evaporating." (As to the tanks, Panzer Lehr apparently had only 16 Panthers before the bombing, and its PIV's were indeed further back to recuperate as you noted, and thus weren't hit by the bombs.) Not that the US forces steamrollered right away. In fact, by first day's end, most penetrations weren't more than a mile. But by the next evening, 24 hours later, it changed very dramatically when US 2nd Armored was sent in. The core question here is if the US forces would have been able to eventually break through in the same way without the bombing attack. Given the limited results of 25th July as it was, it is of some doubt. Panzer Lehr failed to block the advance, but the figures in your above comments could infer that it was still an "intact unit" by 1st August. Thus it would be of more meaning to distinguish as to how many in the "11,000 reported in" to be as combat-capable troops. In a way, you do hint at this by stating how the grenadier battalions were already attrited from earlier fighting. Considering as that the time between 25th July an 1st August was regarded by the German command to be a relative "madhouse" due to rapidly changing events, thus a challenge in making a reliable headcount while trying to avoid the US advances at that same time, I'll sum to say as that, for now, I view the 2000 Zetterling tally with a bit of skepticism. Correlating references would be appreciated if available. [ October 14, 2003, 11:27 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

If you're talking about 130th "Panzer Lehr" Division as that was the primary recipient of the carpet bombing on 25th July, it has to be remembered as that the front had stagnated enough along a recognizable land feature (a highway) as to allow a coordinated targeting. Even then, the short drops still tore up some of the US troops on the jump-off line. It is also worth noting that Panzer Lehr was already heavily attrited from over a month's worth of earlier fighting in Normandy. It was basically the "shell" that was shattered. Carpet-bombing was a potential weapon, but it had its limits. In the bombing of Caen, there was no real benefit accrued, as the areas bombed were already evacuated by the Germans. The bombing to preclude "Goodwood" also was less than decisive. Of course, tactical bombing techniques did improve. Michael Doubler, in "Closing with the Enemy", noted how another carpet-bombing done in late 1944 along the West Wall line had improved over earlier bombing runs. The results weren't decisive, but greater efforts were done to prevent short bombings again. The whole trick of the matter is that the enemy target formation must "sit still" long enough to take the hit.

I can measure off later on if B-29's, B-24's, and Lancasters (the more far-ranging heavy bombers) could have staged from Iran/Iraq bases to threaten Soviet industries, but my initial guess for now is that, in the least, the Soviet oil production near the Caspian Sea would have been at hazard. Similar for the Romanian oil fields as was already the case in 1943-44. The remaining industries in central/northern Russia & the Urals would certainly had been more problematic to reach or to attack without undue attrition. But foremost in the postwar strategic bombing surveys were that attacking oil, electric power, and rail/transportation centers had greater payoff than attacking specific industries. "Infrastructure" and all that. Good question, qualified further of course as to how many on each side were combat-capable troops, which likely would tilt the scales to the Soviets even more in this regard. Undoubtably. Further it must be remembered as that the Soviets certainly weren't lacking in experienced aircrews and fighter pilots. After all, the top-scoring Soviet pilots like Kozhedub (?) outpaced the UK/US top aces too. However, this is a matter for which raw numbers alone is not going to provide an easy answer; relative capabilities, organization, and combat tactics were going to play a role too. By example, would the Soviets had known in the get-go how to attack US bomber formations in the ways as that the Germans had to learn over months' time first? Would the Soviets been able to properly counter what a reformed RAF Bomber Command could accomplish in 1945-level targeting proficiencies, even at night? Would some Soviet fighters had the similar problem as many German fighters in that fighting over 20K-ft altitude would have shed off too much aircraft performance, as compared to US fighters? Or what of the high-speed "strike" aircraft like the "Mossie" or the A-26 performing intruder raids at a high level? I think as that a concentrated strategic bombing effort (even from the Mideast) against Russia would certainly had been problematic to keep up. The Soviets certainly had sufficient "depth" to their air defenses in this regard. But concerning an air battle over a German battle zone and Allied efforts at air interdiction, I'm inclined to believe that the Soviets would've been more hard-pressed to keep interdiction "impedance" from reaching critical levels. It certainly would've been a challenge to both sides. It actually surprised me, Andreas, that the relative abilities of the Soviet leaders at operational art hadn't been broached until your initial post earlier on. (But then, maybe I'm not all that surprised; operational skills just aren't very "sexy" for what-if wargamers to talk about. ) Anyway, though, I vaguely recall one such operational example you cited in 1944 that made an impression on me. It was of a Soviet offensive that, once a breakthrough was accomplished, was quickly followed up by pushing a Soviet tank army through a 5-km frontage. Another such is the Korsun Pocket. Reading the background history in the Matrix KP game laid it to me out as that the Soviets performing the encirclement were not that overwhelming in total numbers; only overwhelming where they needed to be, in manpower, tanks, and artillery. To help achieve this was further augmented by large-scale deception methods. To say nothing of Bagration as an even bigger example. Indeed, if the western allies had gotten into a follow-up war with the Soviets, I also believe as that Soviet practice & experience at operational art would have been a VERY daunting factor to face. Instead of just stating "Patton vs. Zhukov," I also think that "Monty vs. Rokossovksy" would also merit some pondering, as well as Koniev and Yeremenko among others. So, indeed, the "Patton dream" is of some amusement to think over, but the end result would've indeed been a stalemate as the best possible that the western Allies would've gained (as AEB also suggested earlier in a compelling review). The worst would have been to lose the rest of Germany. But Patton was never more than the commander of one army. He was never in the position to directly affect US policy, and was never going to have control over the whole German theater. And what would have been the domestic backlash in the USA to end one war only to start up another, this time against a former ally where $billions in Lend Lease had been shipped to earlier? It probably would have been even worse in the UK, they had already endured six years and the prospects of new severe attrition against the Soviets would not had been lightly brooked. If a new war would've been started, I think that Stalin would've been more inclined to kick it off. But even he probably had a bellyful, given what all was needed in manpower to revitalize and relocate the damaged Soviet industrial base.

"Modern doctrinal pieties"? My earlier queries are nothing of the sort. I certainly wasn't arguing as that the air war was the primary factor to the East Front's course of events. It's merely that the Soviet rail system wasn't overly "netted" to allow easy bypassing of Moscow IF rail operations might have been better impeded in there. It would thus seem natural for the "if" to be more earnestly discussed than was the case, even if the end conclusion would be that German bomber efforts would have had little to no effect. Further, citing "side show" doesn't alone qualify the sum operations and changing natures of the air war on the East Front. In all honesty, Jason, while you have cited tank ratios in this and previous posts threads, I still regard it to be a questionable metric when used as above. Tank count alone doesn't suffice to describe the relative strategic/operational situation of a war theater in WWII. It's also a matter of the type of tanks, the applied armored tactics and combined arms, firepower support (as in artillery & air), terrain & climater, and of course logistics. (It wasn't just German planes under a supply bind.) Not to mention the sum abilities of the opposition; their types of tanks, how many, added anti-tank measures like AT guns & SP guns, and so on & so forth. Which I know that you are certainly aware of all this, but that still isn't conveyed by the citation of a tank ratio between protagonists, as if it was a "primary factor" in itself.

But AIUI there weren't sufficient supplies on hand. After about August, German logistics were in a mess, and it only got worse the farther east they advanced. This didn't get really better for many months. Also, large portions of the Luftwaffe were withdrawn from the East at this time as they were not deemed to be effective in the severe Russian winter weather and sent to the Mediterranean, where they pummeled Malta and tried to help Rommel cope with Crusader. </font>

Duly noted, Jason, but the above was not the premise I was suggesting earlier. Rather, I pondered on if, during the later "static" situation in front of Moscow, the German bombers (when strength and supplies were sufficiently on hand) could have attempted a concentrated anti-rail campaign in the Moscow vicinity (including nearby bridging, given that Moscow was a critical hub to the remaining rail net still in Soviet hands. Or, if such an effort would have had some measureable effect, like in 1942. But as you note below: To this has to be added for consideration the sum German bomber aircraft as could have supported such a campaign, as well as the depth of Soviet air defenses to rebut it. Again, I don't see the post-blitz air situation in north/central Russia often discussed, but at present, I do suspect that the German bomber forces were still not of sufficient strength in 1942 to bring about an effective strategic anti-rail campaign in the Moscow region.

Well, sure. But what would they have had to have given up to be able to build a strategic air force capable of all those things? Germany, and specifically German industry was capable of only doing so much. That happened to be a fair amount, but still less than several of the other combatants. </font>

Well, Michael, I tracked down and subscribed to the noted soc-wwii NG, thanks for mentioning it earlier. Yes, many interesting historical topics to be mined in there.

I anticipated this to be the East Front Luftwaffe's circumstance, and this really leads to an unspoken point of mine earlier. Recognizing it to be a matter of degrees, I'm not arguing as that the German's standing on the East Front hinged mainly on the air war. However, I would still hold that the German's inabilities to project a strategic air campaign against the Soviets --- at the least, against the rail net, especially the Moscow hub -- made it more difficult to isolate the Soviets on the East Front from industrial replacements, reinforcements, and Lend Lease supplies. Which, in the strategic long-run, slowly undercut the German position. Could the Germans have sufficiently countered in defensive measures to consolidate the 1941 gains? Possible, with much earlier German "tooling up" for attritional war as noted by you earlier. But it would've also helped to keep the Soviets from regaining their strategic "wits" where possible.