Spook

I think it's past due of me to visit there (heard of that NG earlier), so I'll have to do that soon, thanks. As to Genna, you may well have pegged it about the e-mail. It's a bit like "Waiting for Godot." I've also tried calling his office on occasion too, which I've gotten his message voice, but no more.

(OT: BTW, Michael, you ever hear from Chris Genna? No luck on my end.)

Yes, and in multiple ways. Not only did Germany lack in reserves of aircraft and trained pilots to press on the Battle of Britain in 1940, but also lacked in available submarines. Adm Donitz said he needed about 300 U-boats to "isolate" Britain at war's start, which MIGHT have been an overestimation. Regardless, he started the war with less than 60.

Er, no. In order to feed people, the grain, produce, meat, etc. has to move from where it's grown to where the people are. That requires logistical resources that the Germans simply didn't have. </font>

Noteworthy, Michael, but the fallacy harbored here is of the Germans having to feed all of the occupied peoples. Was not the Ukraine the USSR's "breadbasket"? Could not the Ukranians feed themselves, as well as perhaps others like the Belorussians if left to their own devices? Did the occupation of France, Norway, Denmark, the Balkans and the Low Countries significantly detract from Germany's overall logistics because the Germans ended up having to feed the peoples of the noted occupied countries? (Perhaps it might've in some cases.) No, Michael, I'm rather more of the mind that it was Germany's inclination to take from instead of dole out to the occupied regions, including the USSR's seized provinces. And by doing that, perhaps that helped augment German ground force supplies in the short term. But in the long term, it only fomented extensive partisan activity which probably ranged wide, which in turn required no small measure of German security to provide cover against. Thus the "brutal, ugly, inhumane answer" was likely far more self-defeating in the end. As it was for Napoleon's efforts in Spain, even if not directly comparable. Would instead a German stance of "leave alone", neither taking nor giving in the USSR's occupied regions, been also an unacceptable logistical burden to allow? If it was, then instead that just adds to an argument of a major attack on the USSR truly being ill-conceived until warmaking resources were better marshalled. Germany certainly wasn't nearly as geared up for attritional war as it could've been in 1941. To say nothing of the German failure to wage strategic air war in the East Front in a way as would've mattered, or isolating the USSR from Lend Lease. I'm still of the mind that IF the Germans kept the occupied peoples of the East Front relatively "indifferent" (if not receptive), then for the long term German military fortunes there would not have been any worse.

This part of Jason's initial post is what I consider as the most intriguing: A "traditional" view of the inevitable German defeat on the East often seems that by Germany not taking Moscow and its rail net in 1941, from there onwards it was but a matter of time. However, the above quotes provide the alternate postulation that if, instead, Germany was able to hold the majority of its Soviet territorial gains while also avoiding large operational disasters like for Stalingrad in 1942-43, then perhaps even then it was really not such a foregone conclusion. But even on the basis of attempting a "static front" that would impede the Soviets worse than the Germans on a strategic scale (due to minimal Soviet agricultural resources), there are still some added factors as what could have tipped the scales one way or the other: 1) Soviet leadership. The Soviets, while not yet having comparable tactical and grand-tactical prowness as their German counterparts in 1942, still had generals who could make things "interesting" at the operational level. Even here, no guarantees at Soviet success as evidenced by Zhukov's failure at Rzhev 1942, but regardless a potent card to play if opportunities presented themselves. That the Soviets weren't shabby at gathering battlefield intel is also an intangible. 2) Impeding Soviet resettled industries and logistics. That the Soviets extracted as much industries as it did and moved them to the Urals was certainly epic. The unanswered question then remains: could the German Luftwaffe "interdicted" this more effectively than the actual case? The Germans didn't have a strategic air arm per se, but could the Germans still had marshalled enough air striking power with what it did have to seriously disrupt the remaining Soviet rail net or hamper at least a few of the resettled weapons productions factories? 3) Lend Lease. As noted earlier, Lend Lease was critical in providing some key logistics, foodstuffs to feed the Soviet armies, and keeping the overall Soviet populace from sum starvation. Could German interdiction efforts been more effective or reinforced, like a greater concentration of U-boats in the Barents Sea? Would Allied naval abilities still been enough to counter even this in the 1942-43 period? 4) Winning over the occupied regions. What if, instead of pursuing the brutal "lebensraum" policies that alienated the occupied non-Russian peoples, the Germans instead applied more "hearts & minds", at least for a longer initial period? The Ukranians strike me as one such massive lost opportunity as a people who, having no particular love for Stalin, could've been tapped to provide much more added manpower for ground forces arrayed against the Soviets than actually the case. That Hitler would have reconsidered on his wasteful outlook is EXTREMELY unlikely, regardless it still remains a tantalizing "what if." Anyway, the above again are some factors as could've played into Germany's chances to maintain a static front and wear out Stalin's will, though their individual impacts could be quite variable. And there certainly could be other factors to consider beyond these. [ October 03, 2003, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Spook ]

"A rose by any other name....." Just so that you remain prolific as always, Bill, not only in your contributions to wargaming but also to military history. Your article on the Chosin Reservoir battle, in Gamers Net days, is one such that has always impressed upon me in telling a story of a harrowing feat of arms. But what impressed more is the favorable reception a USMC veteran of the "Frozen Chosin" had when I later provided him a copy of the same article.

Just to clear the air on one note..... von Nev, Andreas has opted not to mention this in his reply, but he HAS served earlier in the (German) military. Not that this is of real issue to the specific debating points, but his past military experience is certainly more than that of just "ordering around CMBB pixel soldiers." (For that matter, CM soldiers are 3D polygons, to be fair to those cyber-grunts. )

Air combat and ground combat are somewhat like apples and oranges. I believe the 10% threshold existed because pilots (and possibly other crew) couldn’t be trained fast enough to make up for the losses (it takes a lot more than 3 months to train a combat pilot). Also, this threshold was well known among the public, and given that a bomber tour comprised of 25 sorties, the odds were against any bomber crew not losing their aircraft (and most likely their own lives). This was a very demoralizing statistic for the home front. Such a statistic wasn’t so easily calculated for the average infantryman. Besides, when a B-17 went down you could pretty much write-off the crew as either dead or captured. </font>

Not seeing it at CMHQ, what are some of the sites for the Nightcrawler CMBB sound mods?

I'm not. Maybe someone altogether new concept can give the "holy grail" of a compelling Napoleonic tactical game that can also provide PLAYABLE major battles. But IF weighing between CM and the Sid spinoffs --- CM is much farther removed. First of all, BF has not expressed an interest in Napoleonics, nor to adapt even their CMX2 game engine for same. That's asking BF to crank out a "universal" tactical game engine, and they've stated their views about this earlier. Second, I don't consider the CM 3D system as compelling to utilize. Maybe some want to zoom down to count uniform buttons, but I'll pass. YMMV, although I really do not see a groundswell of Naps gamers wanting this as a first-order priority anyway. Actually, if instead still wanting a truer 3D view, but comparing the CM scales/zoom to that of the "Total War" series (Shogun & Medieval), the latter would also do much better than CM. I still believe that a revision of "what we have" in the Sid sequels --- so for it to provide WE-GO and a better C&C system, as well as some updated graphics --- would do the trick for many Nap gamers, with the following added hook: it would allow real-time resolution of a major Naps battle through PBEM. Thus greater game access altogether.

As for adapting CM to Napoleonic battlefield combat --- FORGET IT. That's asking BF to bend the game engine to cover more than for what it was optimized for. It might seem alluring to be able to "zoom down" and see all the soldiers arrayed of a Napoleonic army as for CM, but the video 3D load would be horrific. And playing out historical major battles (some running several hours) in 1-minute time increments would be TEDIOUS to plot orders for. Don't force CM to be other than it was designed for. I argue this emphatically. Now, others have noted the Breakaway sequels to the Sid Meier tactical battle games (Waterloo & Austerlitz). While the graphics for the unit & terrain could stand some MAJOR improvements, the scale and fields of view are right to me. I don't need to zoom down to look an Imperial Guardsman in the face, I just want to go down low enough to pick out the units and recognize how they differ in appearance. The Breakaway games already accomplish this. But the Breakaway games have two fundamental problems: 1) As from the Sid Meier system, the "command and control" aspect is just plain crap. The later Napoleonic sequels did provide "activation" as a new feature, but once units are activated, they have no time-contraint limits to react to orders. CM in contrast has been doing this for years. Leaders just serve mainly for rallying purposes. 2) The real-time game clock does indeed make playing a FULL battle problematic. Now --- apply a viable command & control system (as would truly distinguish a Davout from a Bernadotte) AND also apply WE-GO with about 5-15 minutes worth of execution between giving orders... NOW we're talking. Probably never happen, though, unless both Sid Meier & Breakaway see fit to sell the game engine to BF.

Reviving these earlier comments.... Hilarious . </font>

Best I can do for you, Andreas, is give you this Googled link to a forum with a related discussion of the L'vov campaigns. A few references are cited within. But Glantz shows in the discussion, perhaps he has a valid e-mail addy to reach in that. Link (First post I've done on CMBB for some time!!)

The pictured APU above (the Garrett GTCP 85) isn't a propulsion (thrust) engine. It provides pneumatic air supply and mechanical power to drive some accessories. One such application is in the C-130 Hercules transport, though the 85 is used in a few other aircraft too. It's a late-1950's era design. Most airliners have one version or another of an APU onboard. It's what is used to help start up the main engines on the ground.

We're talking the turbomachinery in specific, the compressor and turbine stage. A turbine-powered THRUST engine will typically have its inlet and exhaust flows on the same axis. But for RADIAL-flow compressors & turbines in-between, the flow will be re-directed perpendicular. Example: I'm not sure what you mean here. Are you talking of thrust (a force term) or power (energy rate), which are not directly equivalent? And strictly speaking, yes, pumps don't generate power. They put work INTO a fluid instead of get work out of it. Turbine engines with radial-flow compressors and turbines, however, can most certainly generate power or provide thrust. Auxiliary power units (APU's) are a prominent example of turbine engines, using radial-flow turbomachinery, that serve as power generators. For thrust, however, engines with axial-flow turbomachinery are typically more efficient. I'm being really nitnoid over this, but APU's are among what I've worked in government research projects for 16 years. [ May 10, 2003, 09:49 AM: Message edited by: Spook ]

The Junkers Jumo 004 was indeed axial-flow. Here's a pic of a cutaway version at the AF Museum.

Don't get so worked up about the exchanges. Heck, I haven't done the basic nor the drill, and still consider myself to be a snot-nosed know-it-all anyway; or at least a know-it-some.

Coming back to an earlier note..... It does give pause for thought if German aircraft development efforts focused instead to deploy aircraft like the Fw190D and He219 (night-fighter) sooner, in greater numbers, and with greater operating range. That would've probably had greater effect than the Me262 and the Komet combined. The Me109G-10 and 109K versions were quite remarkable in their top speed; about as much horsepower as could be packed into the nose was reached about then. But both the range and endurance of these later versions SUCKED. Hard then to position the plane for interception at an advantageous position.

An off-tangent reply, but several 8th AF units that would later convert to the P-51 were still flying the P-47 or P-38 in June. But yes, by that time, the available numbers of P-51's (including those flying with 15th AF from Italy) were still making their presence felt at such a level as that the Luftwaffe couldn't really counter.

That would be another way to put it: the MP-44 could "fill a niche," but couldn't quite "deploy in a vacuum" so much as was the case for other weapons systems.

Well, I kept punting on my own reply, just mired in other (GASP!) forums beyond the BF ones. Anyway, coming back to the original question, which I will phrase as this: "Could enough MP-44's fielded by the Germans had a noticeable effect on the war's course?" The "sanity check" commentaries provided by Michael, Andreas, and a few others are certainly the most on-target IMO. However, trying to build a corollary argument as that "the types of small arms didn't really matter" is one that should also be approached with reservation. Why so? Well, consider how many other weapons systems, at the tactical level, have been foisted at "could have improved the Germans chances." Examples: A) "What if the Germans could've deployed the Me-262 as early as 1942?" "What the the Germans could've gotten Type XXI submarines operating much sooner?" C) "What if the Germans had more powerful tanks against the Soviets in 1941?" Now, mind you, posting these examples do not argue their viability of application one way or the other (e.g., the Me-262 was NOT going to be ready by 1942). But they are three such cases which I have seen of "tactical weapons" argued by others to have a chance of affecting a change in the war's course. Part of why they are speculated on, like for the MP-44, is just that: their POSSIBLE effect always remains speculative. Now, let us consider instead the case of one such weapons system that DID have a noticeable effect on the course of one aspect of the war. I will call this "The Parable of the P-51." The P-51 fighter is typically recognized, as a tactical weapons system, as fundamentally changing the course of the USAAF daylight bombing campaign. It was reasonably maneuverable, had reasonable firepower, and above all, the range to cover the bombers to most targets in Germany. A fairly "balanced" aircraft. Because it seemed to have such an effect as it did, this helps fuel the speculation on how the Germans could've countered if the Me-262 was flying sooner. After all, if one such Allied weapon could be such an apparent "war-winner," why not certain other German weapons. But there was far more to the story of the P-51's eventual impact than meets the eye. These being: A) Parallel to the P-51 was the development of "subsystems" to enhance the abilities of Allied fighter pilots. The P-51 was among those first to "automate" certain functions like engine cooling settings. Added features were larger "paper" drop tanks, pilot "anti-G" suits, and K-14 gunsights. There was quite a bit more to it than just "the plane." New allied fighter pilots were coming in with much longer training periods than their German counterparts, given the effects of earlier attrition and fuel shortages for the Luftwaffe. C) The overall German fighter pilot experience level was RAPIDLY going down in 1944. The "old hands" to hold together the poorly trained replacements grew fewer & fewer. and.... D) The USAAF fighters, including the P-51, TYPICALLY performed better than most German fighters at higher altitudes (vice-versa at lower regimes); at the altitudes where the US bombers usually flew in at. In effect, the USAAF could more readily define the "combat environment," at least in good weather. In sum, a lot had chainlinked together to create the situation for the P-51 to have the effect as it did. There was much more at work than just "the plane." And this is how a counter-argument for the Me-262 should have certain doubts attached to it. The Me-262 alone wasn't going to win the war or adjust its course just by itself; enough "experten" had to have it in hand, the plane had to be sustained logistically (the logistics infrastructure beginning to collapse in 1944), enough had to be manufactured & deployed, and pilot training & fuel had to also be sufficiently in hand. So now let's get back to the MP-44. Assume, for the moment, that this weapon was produced in the hundreds of thousands (or even over a million) and made available for German troops in 1941 before Barbarossa. Could THAT have made a difference? I wouldn't put odds on it, but let's not be dismissive just yet. I might allow that the odds MIGHT improve IF the following also applied: 1) IF German squad-level training with the MP-44 had adapted to get the most out of the added weapon in MOST tactical situations. 2) IF German logistics could keep up to supply the likely added ammo expenditures. 3) IF the MP-44's availability actually enhanced German infantry's tactical options in those situations where artillery and tank support was NOT available. 4) IF enough battle cases had occured where the MP-44's presence was what made the difference. When we're talking about hundreds of thousands of MP-44's, we're possibly talking of a PERVASIVE enough application where enough tactical events with the MP-44 having some added "tactical effect" MIGHT add up to have a larger effect on the course of an operation or campaign. Case in point: would regular availability of the MP-44 (mixed in with SMG's, K98 rifles, & MG's) had an added effect in the Stalingrad street fighting, at least in its earlier stages? As before, speculative, but I could anticipate that SOME marginal benefit would've been accrued. However...... What ultimately determines how some given weapon COULD effect the war's course is how its contribution and availability affects the COMBAT ENVIRONMENT in enough such battle cases. The MP-44's greater availability could have changed some tactical situations here & there (like urban fighting), but what if the opposition adapts in a similarly pervasive way? And can any one small arm ever trump combined arms and artillery in affecting the combat environment? In WWII and afterwards? Therefore, it's pretty much as pointed out by Michael and others here; a given small arm can change some tactical situations, but it's a bit much to expect that it can change the combat environment to the same degree as other factors like combined arms, irregardless of the unit training and experience in that alterate small arm.

Actually, Andreas, I will be fielding one of your earlier comments later tonight. (Should've done so yesterday instead.)

I liked the way it was executed in Avalon Hill's "The Longest Day." You had supply "units" that would be expended during attacks or if enough subordinate artillery units fired in attack or defense. For the Allies, the challenge in the full campaign was to weigh how much in fresh supplies to bring across the channel in parallel with reinforcing units and replacement troops for earlier losses. Weather could play havoc on how quickly this stuff would come. The Germans on the flip coin had to bring up their units and supplies through a network of "sectors." It came up quicker by rail, of course, and some rail repair units mollified earlier damage, but never enough against persistent Allied air interdiction. It all seemed to balance well in hindsight, but TLD was still a "monster game" with high unit density, thus not easily played without sufficient time.

Granted, the Sicilian campaign was laced with SNAFU's and was by no means a hallmark Allied feat of arms. On the flip side, however, it didn't always reflect well on the Axis either. Sure, the Germans "skinned out" through Messina in the main, but if that was the anticipated strategic end result, why was Sicily even bothered to be defended at all?