Bullethead

I dunno, I still prefer www.stickdeath.com. Tried and true classic for many years

Michael emrys said: Actually, that was footage of a mass execution of captured Russian hamster partisans, commissars, and other "undesirables". You can view the carnage at: http://www.newgrounds.com/assassin/hamster/ There is also some utterly shocking footage from the special concentration camps for Osthamsters showing diabolical tortures and medical experiments: http://members.tripod.com/LlMPBlZKlT/devilhamster.html

Change the models, change the models!! At least the ones for winter. That way you can have the troops in their greatcoats and fur hats Besides, the Russian troops need a diagonal lump across them for their rolled coats/cloaks/whatever over their shoulders.

SpazManOught: What qualifies as "the best maps" ? Certainly, some maps will become standards: historical terrain of famous battles, mirror-image maps for ladders or whatever. But what's to stop you from auto-generating and maybe then tweaking a map, sending it to your opponent for approval, and then incorporating it into your game? That way, you both have a peek at the terrain and it's still not something you've played before.

Thanks so much for omitting the real reason they left the paint off. </font>

Talk to a rabid armor penetration grog here who goes by the handle of rexford. Do a search for any of his posts--he's member #4402. When you find one, get his email address off his profile.

Fowler said: I heard rumors of some PTO mods in work but that was a year or so back and I don't think they ever got finished. I don't know about operations, but I have made a PTO (well, actually CBI) scenario of the initial stages of the Battle of Kohima Ridge. It uses stock Brits vs. the "Gerpanese". It's large, extremely bloody, and is best played as the Brits vs. the AI. If you're interested in trying it, drop me a line.

The ol one eye said: It is amazing. The infantry, cavalry, and arty formations went through similar amounts of changes at the same time, too. You should really get that Zaloga book The thing that strikes me is that after the big pre-war formations were swept away in the disasters of 1941, the new formations' names become rather misleading. Tank brigades had a strength analogous to a US tank battalion, a tank corps was about like a weak armored division, and so on. Also, the mechanized corps had more tanks than the tank corps. Again going from Zaloga, the Russians didn't have that much specialized recon. The size of recon units, like that of other Russian formations, took a nosedive early in the war and wasn't really built back up that much. Also, brigades of whatever type (infantry, tank, mechanized, assault gun) usually didn't have their own recon unit. You found what recon there was in rifle divisions and in tank/mechanized corps. There were also few independent recon units. OTOH, the Russians had a large force of horsed cavalry brigades, divisions, and corps for most of the war. However, these were more often used for exploitation forces or for providing mobility in very difficult terrain instead of as recon for other forces. The structure of recon forces changed a lot as well, just like other types of formation. At different times and in different formations, recon units varied between company and battalion in size, and were equipped with 1 or more of the following types of things: armored cars, light tanks, medium tanks, motorcycles, scout cars, cavalry, and grunts on foot or in trucks. Recon in rifle divisions was 2 recon platoons in each regiment, 1 of grunts on foot or in trucks, and 1 of horsed cavalry. At the division level, at the start of the war there was recon battalion as follows: </font> 1 motorized rifle company (grunts in trucks)</font>1 armored car company (1 + 3x3)</font>1 light tank company (1 + 3x5 T-38) </font>By August 1941, along with other massive reductions in TO&E rifle division strength, division recon was reduced to a single motorized rifle company in trucks (when available--walking otherwise). And that seems to be how things stayed for the rest of the war. Independent rifle brigades started with a recon company of 2 platoons of foot grunts, and seem to have kept this structure the whole war. Mountain divisions had a horse cav squadron (about 1 company). On the armored/mech side, the short-lived pre-war 1941 motorized and tank divisions both were supposed to have had recon battalions consisting of: </font> 1 armored car company (15 ACs)</font>1 light tank company (17 T-40)</font>1 motorcycle company </font>but few if any of these units reached full strength before destruction or reorganization. In the July 41 tank divisions, the recon battalion changed to 10 T-40s, 26 armored cars, and 1 motorcycle company. The original tank brigades of August 1941 had a recon company of: </font> 1 heavy armored car platoon (5 heavy ACs)</font>1 light armored car platoon (5 light ACs)</font>1 motorcycle platoon (49 guys but only 23 MCs) </font>This recon company disappeared in the December 41 TO&E, however. Also, the tank corps formed in early 42 from such brigades didn't have corps-level recon units, either. However, these tank corps included 1 motorized rifle brigade that had a recon company of trucked grunts. These trucks were reportedly armored to some extent. From April - September 1942, the Russians formed 25 more tank corps with brigades on a new pattern discussed in my last post. As before, these brigades lacked recon elements but the corps were supposed to have a motorcycle battalion. However, only 5 such battalions were formed by the end of 1942, leaving the other corps still without recon. But starting in December 42, the Russians formed more recon units for the tank corps. These apparently were battalions with 1 motorcycle and 1 armored car company (20 armored cars). The armored cars faded away as the war went on and motorcycles proliferated, so by the end of the war tank corps recon was performed only by a motorcycle battalion. The mechanized corps started forming in the fall of 42. Each of corps' 3 mechanized brigades had a recon company of grunts in armored trucks (this was also present in the mechanized brigade in the contemporary tank corps). The corps recon asset was, like in the tank corps, a motorcycle battalion, although these were rare at until the start of 43. During 1943, some mechanized corps were authorized to have an armored car battalion as well, but only 1 such battalion ever seems to have been provided, and it only for the latter 1/2 of 1943. As noted previously, there weren't many independent recon units. A number of independent battalions were formed, but they were incorporated into new tank and mechanized corps soon after formation. The pre-war mechanized corps had motorcycle regiments, which became independent when these corps broke up shortly after the start of Barbarosa. These motorcycle regiments contained: </font> 3 motorcycle companies</font>1 mortar company (18 50mm)</font>1 ATG battery (4 45mm)</font>1 armored car company (4 ACs and 4 T-27A tankettes) </font>In March 1943, 3 new motorcycle regiments were raised under a different organization: </font> 1 motorcycle battalion (3 companies as before, only the HQ is new)</font>1 ATG battalion (2 batteries of 4 45mm and 1 battery of 4 76mm)</font>1 tank company (originally 16 T-70s, later 10 T-34s)</font>1 pioneer company</font>1 mechanized company in M3A1 scout cars </font>In March - September 42, the Russians also formed 19 independent motorcycle battalions, but all but 6 of these wound up in tank and mechanized corps during 1943. The few that remained independent were organized as followed: </font> 2 motorcycle companies</font>1 armored car company </font>In mid-43, these battalions were reorganized as follows: </font> 1 motorcycle company</font>1 mechanized compay (in APCs of some sort)</font>1 tank company (10 T-34s) </font>

The ol one eye said: The Germans are a bit beyond my grasp, but I can tell you about the Russians. All Russian info taken from The Red Army Handbook 1939-1945 by Steven J. Zaloga and Leland S. Ness, which I highly recommend. The Russians started the war with tank corps. These were composed of 2 light tank brigades, each of which had 4 battalions of T-26 or BT-5/7 light tanks. Each such battalion had 3 companies consisting of 2 command tanks and 3 platoons of 5 tanks each, plus 3 more tanks at battalion HQ. Thus, each battalion had 54 light tanks. There were also pre-war independent light and heavy tank brigades. Independent BT brigades had 3 battalions but independent T-26 brigades had 4, just like those in tank corps. Heavy brigades had 3 battalions but only had 3 tanks per platoon (plus 1 for company HQ but none at battalion), either T-28 or T-35, plus some BT tanks for recon. But it seems neither of these multi-turret heavies will be in CMBB, so it really doesn't matter. After the Winter War and Poland, the Russians decided large tank formations weren't worth having so broke them up and distributed the tanks for infantry support. But the Blitzkrieg made them reconsider so in 1941 they created motorized divisions and tank divisions: </font> A motorized division had a light tank regiment, which had 5 battalions of 54 BT tanks organized as in the original tank corps above. </font>A tank division of this era is a bit shadowy but the best guess is had 2 tank regiments, each of which contained 1 heavy battalion, 2 medium battalions, and 1 flamethrower battalion. The heavy battalion was 31 KVs: 1 at BN HQ and 3 companies of 3x3-tank platoons plus 1 more at company HQ. The 2 medium battalions each had 52 T-34s (1 at BN HQ and 3 companies of 1 HQ and 3x5-tank platoons). The flamethrower battalion had 1 T-26 at the BN HQ and 3 companies each of 1 T-26 HQ and 3 platoons each of 3 OT-26 flame tanks. </font>The Russians didn't have enough tanks to fill these out and what they'd accomplished by 1941 was quickly snuffed out, so the above formations aren't really important. In July 1941, mechanized divisions were converted to rifle divisions and tank divisions reorganized as follows: 2 tank regiments, each having 1 medium and 2 light battalions. The medium battalion had: </font> 1 heavy company of 10 KVs (1 HQ and 3x3-tank platoons)</font>2 medium companies of 10 T-34s (1 HQ and 3x3-tank platoons) </font>The 2 light battalions had 3 light companies each of 10 T-26 or BT tanks organized as above. But these new tank divisions didn't last long, either. 10 were formed but only 23 remained by October 1941. In August 1941 the Russians went back to tank brigades. At this point, organization becomes easier to track thanks to having real TO&Es on hand, plus the Russians were usually able to fully equip these units as they formed them. An August 1941 tank brigade was as follows: 1 medium/heavy battalion, including </font> 1 heavy company of 7 KVs (1 HQ plus 3x2-tank platoons)</font>2 medium companies each of 10 T-34s as above </font>2 light battalions, each of 3 light companies, each of 10 tanks. In December 1941, new tank brigade TO&Es came out that further reduced the strength of the unit. It now contained 2 battalions, each containing: </font> 1 light company (8 T-60/T-70: 2 HQ and 2x3-tank platoons)</font>1 medium company (10 T-34s: 1 HQ and 3x3-tank platoons)</font>1 heavy company (5 KVs: 1 HQ and 2x2-tank platoons) </font>These brigades also had an infantry battalion and an SMG company of dedicated tank-riders. In the spring of 1942, the Russians started grouping these types of tank brigades into tank corps, which contained 2 and later 3 tank brigades plus more infantry and some arty, recon, etc. But having 3 different types of tank in each battalion was a pain, so in July 1942 a new tank brigade TO&E came out. These brigades had 1 medium and 1 light battalion, plus an infantry battalion. The heavy tanks at this time were all put in independent units for infantry support. The medium battalion had 3 T-34 companies of 10 each, plus 1 in BN HQ. The light battalions had 2 T-60/70 companies of 10 each, plus 1 in Coy HQ. Thus, the brigade had a total of 32 T-34s (including 1 in brigade HQ) and 21 light tanks. Tank brigades of this type were also grouped into tank corps, which contained 3 tank bridages and 1 motorized infantry brigade. As 1943 went along, these corps got other attachments, notably a regiment of SP guns. Originally this regiment had 1 SU-76 in the HQ, 4 batteries of 4 SU-76, and 2 batteries of 4 SU-122 (total 17 SU-76 and 8 SU-122), but in May 43 it converted to 12 SU-152s. Then in August 43, the corps' 2 attached heavy ATG units were replaced by 2 more SP regiments, 1 with 21 SU-76s and the other with 16 SU-122. In November 43, the tank brigade TO&E changed again to become an homogenous T-34 unit, without any light tanks. It now had 3 battalions, each with 1 T-34 in BH HQ and 2 companies of 10 T-34s (1 + 3x3), plus 2 in brigade HQ, for a total of 65 T-34s. This organization remained in effect for the rest of the war. Tank corps of this period contained 3 such T-34 brigades, plus 1 regiment each of heavy (12 SU/ISU-152), medium (12 SU-85), and light (21 SU-76) assault guns. But by February 1944, all assault gun regiments went to 21 AFVs each, and by the end of the war the SU-85s were being replaced by SU-100s. Starting in the fall of 1942, the Russians also started created in mechanized brigades. These had 3 motorized rifle battalions and a small tank regiment of 39 tanks. This had 1 light compamy of 16 T-60/70 (1 + 3x5) and 2 medium companies of 11 T-34s (1 + 3x3), plus 1 regiment HQ T-34. 3 such mechanized brigades, plus a tank brigade, plus other attachments, formed a mechanized corps. In January 1943, the mechanized brigade's tank regiment was reorganized into 3 medium companies (1 + 3x3 T-34s) and 1 light company (1 + 2x3 T-60/70). At the same time, an SP regiment was added to the mechanized corps, which was either light (25 SU-76) or mixed (17 SU-76 and 8 SU-122). By August 1943, mechanized corps got 3 SP regiments: 1 light (21 SU-76), 1 medium (16 SU-85), and 1 heavy (12 SU-152). As with tank corps, all these SP regiments went to 21 AFVs by early 1944. And this isn't the end of the line, either. There were also independent tank battalions and regiments, plus independent assault gun units. Independent tank battalions from August 1941 had: 2 T-34s in BN HQ, 1 medium company of 7 T-34s (1 + 2x3) and 2 light companies each of 10 T-60s (1 + 3x3), for a total of 9 T-34s and 20 T-60s. This was beefed up in November 1941: 1 T-34 in BN HQ, 1 heavy company of 5 KVs (1 + 2x2), 1 medium company of 10 T-34s (1 + 3x3), and 2 light companies each of 10 T-40 or T-60 tanks (1 + 3x3), for a total of 5 heavy, 11 medium, and 20 light tanks. Independent tank regiments followed the organization of the tank regiments in mechanized corps, discussed above. When the heavy tanks were removed from tank brigades in late 1942, they got put into separate units called guards heavy breakthrough tank regiments. These began with 21 KVs (1 in Regt HQ and 4 companies of 1 + 2x2) and later got a submachinegun company as well. 2 such heavy regiments had Churchills instead of KVs. In February 1944, these units started switching to IS-2 tanks and the word "breakthrough" was dropped from their title. Independent assault gun regiments appeared in the first few months of 1943. These were of 2 types. The most common had 1 SU-76 in the Regt HQ, 4 batteries of 4 SU-76, and 2 batteries of 4 SU-122, for a total of 17 SU-76 and 8 SU-122. At the same time, some heavy assault gun regiments were formed with 1 KV for the Regt HQ and 6 batteries of 2 SU-152s each (total 1 KV and 12 SU-152). The mixed assault gun regiments were a pain so in April 1943 they were split up into light and medium regiments. The light regiments had 1 SU-76 in HQ and 4 batteries of 5 SU-76 each, for a total of 21. The medium regiments had 1 T-34 for the Regt HQ and 4 batteries each of 4 SU-122s (total 1 T-34 and 16 SU-122). In August 1943, the SU-122s began to be replaced by the SU-85, which was itself replaced by the SU-100 starting in late 1944. In September 1943, the SU-152 began to be replaced by the ISU-152 (and also by the ISU-122 in December). In October 1943, the heavy regiments were reorganized into 4 batteries like the light and medium regiments. It thus had 1 KV or IS-2 in the Regt HQ, and 4 batteries each of 3 SU/ISU-152s. And starting in February 1944, all types of assault gun regiments were brought up to 21 AFVs in 4 batteries of 5 each, plus 1 for the HQ. Towards the end of the war, there were also assault gun brigades. Light brigades (begun in 1944) had 3 light battalions, each of which had 1 T-70 BN HQ and 5 batteries of 4 SU-76s, plus attachments. Medium brigades (from January 1945) had 3 medium regiments (total 65 SU-100s and 3 SU-76). 1 heavy assault gun brigade was formed in March 45, with the same organization but 65 ISU-122s and 3 SU-76s. Whew!! That's certainly enough typing for tonight . The thing is, except for the pre-war stuff and the assault gun brigades, the Russians made dozens or even hundreds of formations of these types. Also, many of these TO&Es overlapped to some extent, so at any given time (particularly in 1942-43) there were often many units of the same nominal type organized on several different TO&Es.

Using flak vehicles is considered rather gamey because of the way CMBO handles fire against soft vehicles. This is hopefully going to be changed in CMBB

In CMBB, it will probably be possible to do the same team vs. team PBEM play as you can do now in CMBO. But it doesn't look like team vs. team TCP/IP will work any more than it does now. In case you don't know how to do team vs. team PBEM, it works like this: 1. Each team divides up its units between its players. 2. Each orders turn, the 1st member of a team to get the file inputs his orders to his units and then saves the game as if he were taking a break in a solo game vs. the AI (ALT-S on the PC). This saves the game in regular saved game format. 3. 1st player then emails this file to the 2nd member of his team. 2nd player opens the game like it was a saved solo game. 3. Repeat 1-2 for all other team members except the last. 4. Last member of the team opens the file as before, but hits the GO button to saves the game as a regular PBEM file, and sends it to a member of the opposing team.

My own favorite is the gridded version of the "Velvet Grass". I use the grids because I do a lot of testing of various weapons effects and speed comparisons, so it's nice to have the grid lines. Of the gridded grass mods out there, IMHO the velvet version looks the best.

I've read of many instances where the Germans used 88s at very long range, but this was always direct fire from commanding terrain. At the ranges involved (several thousand meters) pinpoint accuracy wasn't possible. However, the guns were quite capable of getting shells close enough for HE work against soft targets. So the net effect was very similar to indirect fire, even though it was direct fire. A good example is the Heurtgen Forest battles. In that mess, the villages were on bald hilltops so it was possible to shoot from one to another, even though the range could be 3-5000m. Also, in some areas guns on hilltops commanded long stretches of creekbeds below, so could effectively interdict units attempting to cross them several miles away.

Panzer Leader said: In accounts of East Front fighting, I think a fairly high percentage of aerial Russian turrets is accurate. This is for 3 main reasons: 1) what I saw in the Gulf War, 2) the typical ammo load of Russian tanks, and 3) anecdotal evidence by a Russian TC interviewed at The Russian Battlefield(http://www.battlefield.ru/) In the Gulf War, I saw dozens of AFVs die and dozens more post mortem. What I saw indicates the following: To pop a turret off, you need to have a large load of HE or HEAT shells aboard. Only that provides the power necessary to completely remove a turret or break the hull up. Fuel just burns out through hatches and louvres. Propellant fires can lift the turret a few inches, but that relieves the pressure and the turret drops back down slightly askew as in dead CM tanks. Russian tanks carried a large percentage of HE to AP. This was usually on the order of 2 HE for 1 AP, sometimes even more skewed in HE's favor. This reflects their primary role as killers of soft targets, both in breaking through the lines and in rampaging in the German rear. Thus, most Russian tanks had enough HE aboard to do the job. The Russian tanker mentioned above was in a unit equipped with Shermans. His tank got knocked out and burned, while he and his crew were pinned underneath due to MG fire. He heard the HE shells cooking off in the racks and thumping against the interior walls, and mentioned that he'd have died if he'd been a T34 jock, because for some reason Russian HE shells usually exploded when that happened. At least the Russian shells did more so than German and US. So, I figure a fairly common Russian tank death scenario was as follows: The hit starts a fire, either in the propellant from broken cases or somewhere else that eventually cooks off the propellant. This fires a few shells into the hull sides and they explode, popping off the turret. Not enough shells go off at once to rip the hull apart, and subsequent detonations vent through the hole where the turret used to be. Either that or Russian HE was a lot more heat-sensitive than that used by other countries, and the HE itself would explode just from exposure to fire. But I doubt this. Note however that tanks can explode several minutes after they are knocked out. It might take that long for the fire to reach the ammo.

John Kettler said: Those guys sell a 1/76 scale white metal SU-76i, which is the only kit for that I've found. Hint hint hint

The white thing under the swastika might be some device of heraldry, perhaps from the coat of arms of some city? Maybe looking through German heraldry lists might turn it up. OTOH, it might just be a stylized version of the white circle normally behind the swastika. I must admit, however, that before its snowflake shape became clear, I thought it was the Imperial Chrysanthemum of Japan and figured the flag was made to commemorate the Axis treaty.

Panzer Leader said: That's nothing. You should read Crisp's The Gods were Neutral about his experiences as a Brit tanker in the Greek campaign. His battalion lost all its tanks and only 1 was destroyed by the enemy. The rest just broke down, mostly from thrown tracks, for which there were no replacement pins. In fact, the 1 combat loss had immobilized itself in this way just prior to being bombed, and it was the last tank in existence by that time.

JasonC said: I dunno. Zaloga says the SU-85 was in production before the T-34/85, was a stop-gap, and was primarily used to replace the SU-122. Once T-34/85 production got going, the SU-100 replaced the SU-85. Not having been there myself, I can only go by what I read in books like this. I'm sure there are other books with different opinions, but I don't have them. The Russians had tactical needs for the long-tubed assault gun cum TD, just like the Germans did. That's why they continued building them. There are some issues with wartime Soviet production that just don't make much sense. I mean, even though they could transplant whole factories thousands of miles, simultaneously expand them, and then have them crank out tens of thousands of AFVs a short time thereafter, you hear things like the T-60/T-70/SU-76 story. This story goes that the Russians really didn't want the light tanks, because they knew they were useless by then, but the car factories making them couldn't handle making T-34s. So, to keep these factories making SOMETHING for the war effort, the light tanks continued in production until somebody found a better use for their parts: the SU-76. This wasn't too popular, either, and certainly had its limitations when compared to all other assault guns, but was built in numbers 2nd to none but the T-34. So if the main Russian tank factories go do their big move and expansion, why couldn't these car factories get bigger tooling and start making more capable and useful vehicles? Or, failing that, why not turn these factories into sub-assembly plants for better stuff? Or have them make trucks, jeeps, etc?

JasonC said: Well, they really didn't need to make a turret-less assault gun version of these tanks because they already had turreted "assault gun" versions. They did the same thing the Brits did with their cruiser tanks--they had versions with small-caliber, high velocity guns for anti-tank work and other versions with 76mm howitzers in the turrets for infantry support. The howitzer-armed version of the BT-5 was the BT-5A with a 76.2mm L/16.5. There was also a BT-7A and an AT-26 with the same gun, and a BT-7M (aka BT-8) with a 76.2mm L/26. The Russians soon dropped this idea of turreted assault tanks. The KV-2 was the last of this line for them. The Brits kept at it, however, with 95mm howitzer versions of the Cromwell and Churchill, and the US had the M4(105). From what I can determine, the Russians only built 2050 SU-85s: 750 in 1943 and 1300 in 1944. (NOTE: all production figures herein taken from Zaloga's Red Army Handbook) This was about 3 times as many as T-34/85s built in 1943, but only 1/10 as many as T-34/85s in 1944. So it appears the Russians quickly realized the SU-85 was redundant and didn't spend much time or effort on it once T-34/85 production got going. IOW, the SU-85 was only a stop-gap thing to get 85mm guns up front ASAP. They got into SU-100 production as soon as possible thereafter. The same sort of thing seems to apply to the SU-122, which was built in smaller numbers over a slightly longer timeframe than the SU-85. In 1943, they built 630 SU-122s compared to 705 SU-152s, and in 1944 they built only 493 SU-122s but 2510 ISU-122/152. It seems the Russians felt that in situations where defenses warranted a bigger gun than a 76 or 85mm, defensive fire warranted the armor of a heavy tank chassis. It should also be noted that Russian AFVs, even those with a big anti-tank role, usually carried about 2 HE shells for every 1 AP round. With German AFVs being so out-numbered, each AFV didn't need as many AP rounds to deal with the opposing AFVs. Thus they could carry more HE to deal with the more common soft targets.

Splinty said: Nope. Think of them as sIGs on tracks. At the time they were invented, arty wasn't flexible or responsive enough to keep up support during a mobile battle over large distances, and mortars light enough to do that weren't powerful enough to deal with serious field fortifications. The Germans has the same gun in the Pz IV, but there were barely enough of these to support the panzergrenadiers. IDs had IG but these were too slow and vulnerable to be much use in mobile warfare. So to make the IDs more effective, the Germans invented StuGs, which they could turn out faster than turreted vehicles. The 1st StuGs came along between the Polish and French campaigns. But in the Russian campaign, it was soon evident that neither they nor the ID's main ATGs were up to the job of dealing with KVs and T34s. So the Germans started putting long 75mm guns on the StuGs to give them a better anti-tank capability. But even then, they were still primarily intended for infantry support.

Yeah. I just got a book by Glantz about Soviet airborne units. At the start of the war, they had like 100,000 trained paratroopers who were considered "elite" in terms of status, but of course don't meet the CM definition, which is YEARS of combat. Still, they had a very high standard of traning, individual initiative was emphasized, etc. Plus some had combat experience as infantry in the Winter War. So I'd rate all these 1941 airborne units as at least regular in CM terms, perhaps with some veterans. This in contrast to the largely conscript and green units forming the bulk of the 1941 Red Army. Despite leading the world in the theory, practice, and size of airborne forces in 1941, however, the Russians didn't do that many large airdrops. The last was in 1943, although they continued with small-scale ops for the whole war. Also, the Russians had to start over from scratch a couple times. Most of the pre-war airborne units got converted to guards rifle divisions and used up defending Moscow. So they raised another batch in late 1942 - early 1942 and spent all that effort training them. So got used in a large op around Viasma but the others were used up as guards rifle divisions to Stalingrad. So then they raised up another batch starting in late 1942 - early 1943 and used them up at Kursk and crossing the Dnepr. It's still noteworthy, however, that the rifle divisions formed from airborne units were specially tagged. They were still considered of "elite" status so could only be used for specific, offensive jobs. IOW, they were distinguished from other guards rifle divisions formed in the usual way. The WW2 history of Russian airborne forces is fascinating, BTW. Before reading this book, I'd never heard of their ops. This is because most failed so the Russians didn't say much about them at the time, even though they were impressive even in failure. They had large airborne forces operating behind German lines for several months on occasion. I recommend this Glantz book, although the maps suck rocks.

Michael Dorosh said: All I've ever seen these things refered to as is "pistol ports", even in Crimson's book. So I really belieave their intended use was close defense with pistols. As for empty cases and calls of nature, I believe Shermans had hatches in the hull floor that worked well for those uses.

Link is up, it just takes about 15 minutes to load at 28.8

Puffdaddy said: Yeah, I find this annoying as well. It has really killed operations for me, both to play and to make for others. The attacker can force the defender back simply by massing his forces in a given area, even if the defender never spots him and thus doesn't know he's there, let alone successfully defending. It seems that once the attacker reaches a certain force ratio with the defender in a given area, that's all that really matters. The attacker retains the ground he massed one and, if no-mans-land is wider than the current gap to the defender's foxholes, the defender is evicted. The only thing that seems to help the defender is live pillboxes, but those only in their immediate areas. Elsewhere, successful defenders will be driven back simply due to the force of unseen, even unsuccessful numbers. Plus operations can't handle encirclements, but that's another story. Oh well. I'm with you, I certainly hope CMBB fixes operations.

Many Shermans and WW2-vintage Pershings had pistol ports in their turrets. I don't think these things did any more than add "penetration at weak spot" chances.