JonS

The one thing that the US is indisputably great at is logistics. I would say "days".

The one thing that the US is indisputably great at is logistics. I would say "days".

The one thing that the US is indisputably great at is logistics. I would say "days".

I appreciate the challenge but their utility doesn't have to be in question any more than any other weapon system.  It's their deterministic necessity that undeniably will, one day, be questioned.  Not all unmanned systems - I am not saying we try to "go back to the way things were" - but the most egregiously dangerous and offensive ones.
My very first point was a reflection of the fact that C-UAS will absolutely be highly competitive, dynamic, and ever changing.  So I mentioned that it might be an idea for forward-thinking nations to focus on autonomous C-UAS now, even more than on autonomous ground-attack drones.  Get ahead of the game.  Establish and then try to maintain C-UAS superiority.  Lead everyone to question the deterministic necessity of these things as soon as possible.  Once you do that the imperative to develop and use them is weakened and maybe people will fear the systems more than they will the consequences of not having them.  Because, let's be honest, fear is always the arbiter of this kind of thing.
 
I understand that this has been and still occasionally is challenged, even on this thread.  It is not the target of my argument, though.  Please, yes, let's navigate this new reality.  As a starter for 10, how about we give absolute priority to autonomous C-UAS?

This is true of absolutely everything.  If you want to you can argue against trying to control any hazardous substance or unethical weapon based on the argument that ‘the North Koreans won’t listen’.  It gets the rest of the world nowhere. 

You mean like a strike package? With some flying CAP, others on EW, some clearing the route in, a couple providing oversight and a comms rebro and BDA, some SEAD, and of course some bearing warheads and payloads?
Yeah, of course. That all sounds clever and sensible, especially since it's already proven doctrinal approach to getting aerial effects delivery systems into an AO.
It doesn't sound simple or cheap though.

Unjustified? Like the assassination of an Iranian general?

You do realize that this is basically the same propaganda that Putin uses?
And that is the seed of how war crimes happen.

Children are always innocent. Simple.
Not their fault where they are born.
I strongly suggest you pause your posts on this topic.. 
I have deep respect for you and understand your pov but IMO it's not something for this thread.
I will PM you tomorrow.
 

We are often lamenting the pendulum swinging this way these days. On the other hand, not long ago a woman had to be given permission by her husband to take a job, had to have sex with him whenever he felt like it and could be beaten by him - legally. (In Germany, don't know about other countries)
If you were anything but strictly heterosexual you faced going to jail or get electro shock therapy.
So not being allowed to use certain words is annoying, true, but on a different level, I think.
But we are straying off topic, I guess.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

You mean like a strike package? With some flying CAP, others on EW, some clearing the route in, a couple providing oversight and a comms rebro and BDA, some SEAD, and of course some bearing warheads and payloads?
Yeah, of course. That all sounds clever and sensible, especially since it's already proven doctrinal approach to getting aerial effects delivery systems into an AO.
It doesn't sound simple or cheap though.

You mean like a strike package? With some flying CAP, others on EW, some clearing the route in, a couple providing oversight and a comms rebro and BDA, some SEAD, and of course some bearing warheads and payloads?
Yeah, of course. That all sounds clever and sensible, especially since it's already proven doctrinal approach to getting aerial effects delivery systems into an AO.
It doesn't sound simple or cheap though.

Yes, but there is no feedback loop between one autonomous drone and the next, in the way that there is between subsequent rounds from a rifle.

@The_Capt take it up with chrisl. I already halved the size of his 22kg drone and you're quibbling with *me*?
Also, those cute little whirrwhirrs you keep referring to are *extremely* handy at the tactical edge as mobile mines and for battlefield assassination, but I believe (because physics) they lack the payload, range, and endurance to be much use as part of a fire plan supporting go-forward combined arms maneauvre.

Yeah, weird, right? Now, why would I do that? Oh, right, because Steve seems to think that micro drones are a useful proxy for large drones that can carry a reasonable HE payload.
Small things pack small. Micro drones and small arms ammo are examples of this.
Heavy things pack heavy. Artillery ammunition is the canonical example of this.
Bulky things pack bulky. Load carrying drones are an example of this.
Load carrying drones are a lot lighter than artillery ammunition, but they are also bulkier. Ignoring that doesnt make the arguments in favour of drones more compelling.

Yeah, weird, right? Now, why would I do that? Oh, right, because Steve seems to think that micro drones are a useful proxy for large drones that can carry a reasonable HE payload.
Small things pack small. Micro drones and small arms ammo are examples of this.
Heavy things pack heavy. Artillery ammunition is the canonical example of this.
Bulky things pack bulky. Load carrying drones are an example of this.
Load carrying drones are a lot lighter than artillery ammunition, but they are also bulkier. Ignoring that doesnt make the arguments in favour of drones more compelling.

Echolocation? Bats use it to track small, fast moving objects.
Granted, not something we're likely to see soon, but possibly something worth looking into.

You do realise we're arguing the same side here?
A lot of traditional systems seem broken (or wounded, or at least a bit lame due to a gammy knee) right now; navy, fast air, attack aviation, infantry, armour, engineers, logistics, and yes artillery. That's due to a bunch of things; prolific atgms, prolific pgms, lagging mil industrial capability and production, prolific isr, and yes drones.
The way through this dark wood isn't going to be ditching everything and betting the farm on the whirrwhirr.
We *know* that artillery is an important part of the combined arms team. We *know* that artillery is crucial to enabling go-forward offensive maneauvre. It isnt working right now, but as always it'll evolve and indirect fires will resume their place in the go-forward team.

Defensively; yes it is. Absolutely.
Offensively; it seems to be a dead end street

Kofman in his latest podcast which is focused on drones proposed a reason, why it is significantly more difficult to use drones in support of a go forward maneouvre. He says that Russian ECM is effective and droning Russian defensive positions requires operating within the umbrella of ECM emitters emplaced in the RUS  trenches, where drones will work significantly worse. He says that the drones really can shine when engaging units which are on the offensive and have left the ECM cover.
Kofman in general praises Russian ECM and for example, he says that GPS guided munitions have been generally degraded. Excaliburs are left unused in some units, and Ukrainians are asking for GMLRS with DPICM warheads which may still do damage despite the missile being spoofed by ECM and going off course.

I take it that the truck in this example is basically the tardis? Ie, despite external appearances it has the internal volume to hold 200 drones plus the crews and equipment required to assemble, target, and launch them, as well as being invulnerable to all types of attack.

Quite a bit. I havent yet seen a lot of evidence of drones being used offensively as part of go-forward combined arms maneauvre.
Instead we see they're being used as mobile mines or battlefield assassination tools. Which is genuinely really problematic, but also kind of a dead end street.
Edit: I'm excluding ISR above. That's already generally integrated and supplementing other systems

Drones are part of a system - the whirrwhirr flying thing is just the end point of that system. The system can be attacked anywhere along its chain, and different points in the chain will need different combinations of things to effect an attack.
At the moment everyone seems exclusively focussed on knocking down the whirrwhirr. Thats part of it, but so is camouflage, dispersion, armouring up, supply chains, intelligence in its myriad forms, attacking the operators, disrupting comms, deception, etc.

WWI? WWII? Korea? Falklands? GWI?