"time to declare victory and go home"

[Sgt Joch]

Colonel T.Reese, U.S.Army, an adviser to the Iraqi military has written a very blunt memo on the current capabilities of the Iraqi Government and military forces which has made its way to the net:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/world/middleeast/31advtext.html?ref=middleeast

some excerpts:

On the Government of Iraq (GOI):

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

On the Iraqi military/security forces (ISF):

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions

They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

[Runyan99]

It has been a good try. Really it was. But Iraq will never be Japan or Germany, and the idea that we could invade and reconstruct the country in the same way was always based on blind optimism and ignorance of Arab culture. Our goals were never realistic. All the work of the US and coalition forces may well be undone quickly.

Afghanistan is even more hopless of a project, as I see it, than Iraq.

If there were a Land of Cats, you could invade the country and try to get the cats to form a democracy and police force, but I suspect you would fail. The cats just won't fall in line, and they probably don't want to.

[Kugel]

Financially and politically, could these democracy adventures ever really happen again? The Iraq and Afghanistan wars will be oddities in U.S. History a hundred years from now.

Just like how today it would be impossible for a Vietnam type of war to happen in our culture, it will be impossible for an Iraq type of war of war to happen 30 years from now. People simply wise up.

[Sgt Joch]

Just like how today it would be impossible for a Vietnam type of war to happen in our culture, it will be impossible for an Iraq type of war of war to happen 30 years from now. People simply wise up.

well, I would not underestimate the ability of politicians to keep making the same mistakes.....

[costard]

Financially and politically, could these democracy adventures ever really happen again? The Iraq and Afghanistan wars will be oddities in U.S. History a hundred years from now.

Just like how today it would be impossible for a Vietnam type of war to happen in our culture, it will be impossible for an Iraq type of war of war to happen 30 years from now. People simply wise up.

ROFL - brillliant.

[JonS]

It has been a good try. Really it was.

At the individual and unit level I'm sure people tried hard to get on with things, and - when that failed - tried hard to stay alive. Certainly there hasn't been any lack of money or ammunition.

But I wouldn't call it 'a good try'. That implies some sort of overarching plan, with broad based agreement of objectives and adequate resources applied across the spectrum (military and civil). That never appears to have been the case.

[Affentitten]

What JonS said.

It was a crap try at a crap idea for crap reasons. Most of the world said in 2003 that it was doomed to failure for all of the above. But then, we all hated freedom.

[Stalins Organ]

the points posted above are seelctive quoting of hte article & give an entirely false imrpesion of what hte Colonel was saying IMO.

Here's something else from it:

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.

Give a different picture to that painted above IMO.

His point is neatly encapsulated by that paragraph - for all the shortcomings and limitations of the GOI & ISF, US presence there is no longer useful - it doesn't actually help any more.

[Sgt Joch]

SO,

my aim was not to misrepresent the Colonel's viewpoint since he does state that the Iraqi army, despite its shortcomings, should be able to handle the current threats.

I thought his memo was very interesting since if you check up on him on the web, he does have a solid CV and he has been in a perfect position, as an advisor, to examine the Iraqi Army closely. In addition, Gen. Odierno is not very pleased that this memo has become public, which to me only lends credibility to its conclusions.

Irrespective of how one feels about whether the US should have invaded Iraq, which is academic at this point, he does make a good point that the US has nothing to gain at this point by sticking around.

The larger question for me, given his findings about the poor state of the Iraqi Army is whether this is Korea, 1953 or Vietnam, 1973. A lot of his comments about the Iraqi army could have been made about the South Vietnamese Army.

[gunnergoz]

IIRC The Korean and Vietnamese armies held their own; the Vietnamese had some good main line forces and when properly led and supported, proved themselves a number of times. And the toughness of the Korean fighting man was demonstrated many times over. In the case of the Vietnamese, we were supporting a corrupt, inefficient and self-absorbed regime which let down the troops with constant meddling and politicized officer appointments/promotions. A regime we backed to the bitter end, as it happens. The Koreans' regime was not too much better but had the sense to let the military fight and stay out of their way for the most part.

Supporting a military is only part of what we have to do and in Iraq, we were in the doo-doo from the beginning, having made very poor planning for the post-invasion nation building phase, other than to let politically-well-connected contractors get filthy rich on tax dollars.

[Stalins Organ]

Sgt Joch - point taken.

I dont' think the comparisons with SK or SV are relevant tho - the proximate threat is not military - Iraq is not facing invasion/war with another sovereign state supported by a rival superpower - it is facing internal political disord.

[costard]

Between the lines - the Iraqi army wouldn't be able to cope with an invasion from, say, Iran (certainly Saddam viewed the threat from Iran as real - its the reason he gave for not letting the IAEA view his dismantled nuclear weapons research facilities). It's possible that if the US Army wasn't actually present at the time such an event went down, a more reliable relationship between the US Army and the Iraqi could be forged, but unless such circumstances dictated, nothing will improve. It doesn't make sense to withdraw piecemeal as you give the opposition the information they need to hurt you on the way out in terms of men, materiel and morale. My take.

[Affentitten]

Would Iran invade Iraq? I doubt it. Could they win? Probably.

But perhaps they have more sense. Thier work has been done for them.

[Sgt Joch]

The Iraqi Army can probably handle current threats, not because of its capablity, which is poor, but because the opposition is also very weak. As long as the situation continues as is, Iraq could putter along, which is what everyone hopes. This would be similar to Korea, which went through a long rebuilding period after the Korean war.

If the opposition forces become more of a threat however, it would pose a problem. External threats are probably not a major concern at this point, since Iran appears to be content with the current Iraqi government.

The Sunnis, however, could be a problem. The US did a good job of co-opting and bringing Sunni opposition groups back to its camp which certainly helped in bringing about the current relative stability. However, the Iraqi government appears more interested in making sure the Shiites control everything rather than forging a more permanent partnership with the Sunnis.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

Depending on how that situation evolves, it raises the specter of civil war and another failed state, which no one wants. Only time will tell...

[Dietrich]

In the case of the Vietnamese, we were supporting a corrupt, inefficient and self-absorbed regime which let down the troops with constant meddling and politicized officer appointments/promotions. A regime we backed to the bitter end, as it happens. The Koreans' regime was not too much better but had the sense to let the military fight and stay out of their way for the most part.

Corrupt, inefficient and self-absorbed regimes which were, if nothing else, not Communist, correct? The impression I get is that so much of what the US did between the end of World War II and the fall of the Iron Curtain -- from the House Un-American Activities Committee all the way to the Vietnam War -- was basically fighting tooth and nail with all available means against anything which even smelled of Communism.

[Michael Emrys]

Corrupt, inefficient and self-absorbed regimes which were, if nothing else, not Communist, correct? The impression I get is that so much of what the US did between the end of World War II and the fall of the Iron Curtain -- from the House Un-American Activities Committee all the way to the Vietnam War -- was basically fighting tooth and nail with all available means against anything which even smelled of Communism.

I would tend to agree with that. American policy makers viewed communist states as forming a cohesive monolithic bloc, a view which was unsubtle at best. A major failing of the CIA lay in not pointing that fact out. There was great distrust that ran through that amalgamation, and at least a part of the reason that it held together at all was the pressure that the West, following Washington's lead, applied on it to do so.

Remember that this was also the great period of de-colonialization, and often the only place that new states, or states still struggling to gain their independence, could turn to for support was the USSR and its allies.

Michael

[gautrek]

We can finally show this picture with no embarrassment at all.

[gunnergoz]

Corrupt, inefficient and self-absorbed regimes which were, if nothing else, not Communist, correct? The impression I get is that so much of what the US did between the end of World War II and the fall of the Iron Curtain -- from the House Un-American Activities Committee all the way to the Vietnam War -- was basically fighting tooth and nail with all available means against anything which even smelled of Communism.

I cannot disagree at all...and the US's almost fanatical anti-communism crusade of the postwar years and through most of the Cold War was laced with the same iron-bound, rigid, ideologically-based and often untrue beliefs that led us into Iraq and our present war with militant Islam. When you pit dogma vs. dogma, be it from left, right or center, there is not much room for reasoned judgment. So in effect we are again repeating the same mistakes, only this time by tarring with the same broad brush all Islamics that we used to tar "commies." When it comes to foreign affairs, the postwar US has been much more like a bulldozer/wrecking crew than a set of hand tools in the hands of a craftsman.

I lay this fact upon the nature of US domestic politics, which places a premium upon snippets of ideological rhetoric and abhors anything approaching reasoned discourse. Americans are not necessarily stupid but their view of the world is truly tunneled, myopic and totally self-centered.

[Stalins Organ]

didn't Iraq think it could invade Iran with impunity during Irans turmoil...only tio find the Iranians dislikes Iraq more than they disliked each other?

I'd suggest that Iraq might find similar attitudes in response.

[Affentitten]

Well the Iraqis were also invading because Iran was generating some pretty serious Shi'ite insurgencies in Iraq. Much like today!

[Stalins Organ]

?? I've never heard that as a reason for the war - certainly the Iranians thought Iraqi's Shi'a were repressed and should rise up (aloong with al the otehr Shi'a in the region of course....).....but I haven't ever seen any actual revolt given as a cause for the war.

Saddam expected Iranian Sunni's to join him too of course, and we all know how successful that idea was....

but what happened when Iranians did start defeating hte Iraqi army, and occupy Iraqi territory? The Iraqi resolve actually stiffened, foreign aid poured in, and we all know the history.

[Affentitten]

There were some bombings and attacks, as well as an attempted assassination of Tariq Azziz. (Of course some of these events may have been Saddam’s doing.) Iran was being pretty strident in its calls for Muslims everywhere to rise against their secular regimes, and Iraq was more sensitive to this than most because of its Shia population and close proximity.

Of course it wasn’t the main reason for the war, but it was definitely one of the justifications Saddam used.

[Boeman]

The sentiments expressed by Colonel Reese have been brewing in the minds of US military personnel on the ground for years. As such, it really should come as no surprise that the imposition of an American administrative model in a region with a history spanning thousands of years of unresolved ethnic conflict could only result in the inevitable collapse of its government and military infrastructure.

The invasion of Iraq was never about liberating it's population nor even locating weapons of mass destruction for that matter. That in itself is quite telling given the planning for the economic assimilation of the country by American firms were far more extensive than the preparations made to enable Iraqi citizens to govern itself post-war.

Part of that could be attributed to the fantastic belief of guaranteed support from the Iraqi civilian population with the overthrow of the Saddam government; people they believed who were all too willing to follow in the footsteps of American democracy. Supposedly, this would allow planners sufficient latitude to conjure up policy as they see fit.

However, the truth is that the Bush administration never truly cared as to whether or not Iraq succeeded as a state. As far as they were concerned, all their aims had already been achieved. These where:

1. Avenging the attempt on Bush Senior's life by Saddam Hussein.

2. Serving the economic interests of the major corporations who bankrolled the then republican ticket and voiced support in favor of the war through rebuilding contracts.

3. Establish a proxy buffer zone with the option of having a permanent American military presence. This could serve as a launchpad for future incursions into the middle east (most notably Iran).

Under such pretenses, any pre-planning phases following the projected outcome of military operations in the Iraq War were sacrificed for the sake of expediency in seizing the "moment" before opposition from the world community stiffened enough to dissuade even America's closest allies from taking part.

The rest, it was assumed, would fall nicely into place. Obviously, that didn't happen.

Quite frankly, it may not even have been a real consideration beyond their original objectives. If it succeeded, great. Icing on the cake for them. If not, leave it to the next president, whomever that may be, to deal with it. If it turned out to be a president from an opposing political party who will suffer due its failure, all the better.

[Field Marshal Blücher]

Unfortunately true. I can recall reading a book that was written several years ago already where it recounted high-echelon Marine officers asking for more orders or guidance from the Pentagon about what to do AFTER they won, and receiving nothing. Just goes to show that there were other concerns on the plate that were apparently more "important."

I'm glad that our men and women in uniform have done as good a job as they have. They were given garbage to work with.