American Replacements vs British Unit Cohesion

[Lt Belenko]

Off and on I've read the comments about how the American replacement system sucked because the vets couldn't trust the green replacements etc.

My question is more regarding the British and German units. I understand that a division would enter a battle then when it was reduced it would be pulled off the line and rebuilt.

1. At what point was a unit pulled off the line, with regards to percentage of fighting capability left. Or was there a plan like combat for 60 days then to the rear?

2. What if they needed to stay around longer (particularly the Germans). Were severly reduced units used as a lower level unit? Such as a decimated battalion used like a company?

3. What went on during the rebuilding phase? All new equipment? Were the corporals all made sargents and some top sgts made lieutenants? Just overall promotions? And all the newbies were the privates ? How long did a unit stay out of combat?

[sburke]

Off and on I've read the comments about how the American replacement system sucked because the vets couldn't trust the green replacements etc.

My question is more regarding the British and German units. I understand that a division would enter a battle then when it was reduced it would be pulled off the line and rebuilt.

1. At what point was a unit pulled off the line, with regards to percentage of fighting capability left. Or was there a plan like combat for 60 days then to the rear?

2. What if they needed to stay around longer (particularly the Germans). Were severly reduced units used as a lower level unit? Such as a decimated battalion used like a company?

3. What went on during the rebuilding phase? All new equipment? Were the corporals all made sargents and some top sgts made lieutenants? Just overall promotions? And all the newbies were the privates ? How long did a unit stay out of combat?

I was recently directed to Normandiefront and in turn highly recommend it. The German army theoretically had a policy of directing replacements from the area a division was raised to the training battalion of a division where they would then be dispersed where needed. That system was certainly better than the US army policy and probably served Germany well in the early years. By 1944 however it was no longer able to keep up with the demands of the war. To read the story of the 352nd ID is a fairly sad tale. The unit fought with distinction but by the time of the breakout was a shell made up of stragglers from the SS, FJ, other divisions, artillery personnel whose batteries had been destroyed, RAD personnel etc It had incorporated the better part of 3 other regiments, the Schnell brigade and a few other units until eventually being disbanded as even that couldn't maintain it's ability to be effective. In a microcosm it is kind of the story of the entire German army. The German Army was able on occasion to rest and refit units, particularly in preparation for Wacht am Rhein, but it was the exception rather than the rule. Generally if a unit was pulled out of the line it was already so battered that the replecements were just more cannon fodder as the unit wouldn't have time to become truly battle effective before being thrown into combat again.

[wokelly]

It really wasn't a much different story with the brits. The british had pretty heavy manpower shortages by late 1944, so when divisions got badly chopped up it was quite possible the unit would be broken up and the men sent as reinforcements to other units (happened a few times). The British system worked well when it worked, and was certainly better than the US system. However, like the Germans, it broke down when the twin problems of heavy losses and limited manpower appeared and probably was no better than the US reinforcement system when that happened.

The British, much like the Germans, really did not have enough divisions to rotate them around for rest and refit. Even the 6th Airborn division was kept in Normandy for the entire battle because the British didn't have a spare division to replace it with, where as the US 101st and 82nd were withdrawn by the end of June. The inability to rest divisions was actually a big issue during the race across France after Normandy, even a few of the Armour divisions had to stop their headlong rush into the open because the men were simply too exhausted. The only sustained rest the British divisions got in NW Europe was when winter rolled in.

Ironically the British solders in WWI got more time in the rear than your average WWII British solder. In WWI it was 33% in the front line trenches, 33% in the secondary trenches, and 33% in the rear. In WWII there was often no men to spare to let others into the rear.

[Stolly]

Lack of manpower manifested itself in other ways in the British Army. By 1944 it was armour heavy, since armoured units were not quite so manpower intensive. This often caused large armour losses such as during Goodwood since the armour was insufficiently supported.

[Michael Emrys]

The British, much like the Germans, really did not have enough divisions to rotate them around for rest and refit.

I read somewhere not really long ago that the British had several complete fresh divisions that they held back in Britain throughout 1944 and '45. Does anybody know any more about that?

Michael

[Statisoris]

I read somewhere not really long ago that the British had several complete fresh divisions that they held back in Britain throughout 1944 and '45. Does anybody know any more about that?

Michael

Do you remember if it had anything to do with a backup plan in case of war with the Soviets broke out after Germany capitulated?

[Georgie]

Is the supposedly faulty US repacement system just another myth? What kind of replacement system would work? Men are killed and there is no way around that. Either the core of old timers remain to build upon or a new unit is built. Which one is better? Do you pull the unit out of line or leave it in line in reserve to train new replacements or just feed in the replacements as needed and train as the battle goes on?What was wrong with the US replacement system?

[gunnergoz]

Do you remember if it had anything to do with a backup plan in case of war with the Soviets broke out after Germany capitulated?

Say what? Backup plan? What sort of books are you reading this stuff in?

[gunnergoz]

Is the supposedly faulty US repacement system just another myth? What kind of replacement system would work? Men are killed and there is no way around that. Either the core of old timers remain to build upon or a new unit is built. Which one is better? Do you pull the unit out of line or leave it in line in reserve to train new replacements or just feed in the replacements as needed and train as the battle goes on?What was wrong with the US replacement system?

It did not in any way respect unit cohesion and treated individual GI's as numbers to be plugged in to any unit that needed bodies. So you might train in the US with one unit, gain combat experience overseas, bond with your unit buddies, be hit, recuperate and be sent to an entirely different unit, even though your original unit might need replacements too.

Also, it threw replacements into combat with almost no training or preparation in the units that they joined. You might just be trucked up and thrown into the foxholes with complete strangers. In the stress of combat, the veterans tended to look after each other and let the new replacements either make it or not, on their own. A lot of replacements died without squad mates not even bothering to learn their names.

The system basically neither respected unit cohesion nor individual experience (or inexperience) with the result that there was a lot of needless wastage (i.e. deaths) in new replacements.

The only place it seemed to work somewhat was with US airborne units, which to some degree had time to withdraw and absorb new replacements before going into combat.

After the war the US Army came up with other systems (e.g. Cohort) that trained units as units, and replaced casualties in a more methodical and rational manner, while the unit was not in the thick of fighting. No replacement system can be absolutely fool proof in wartime but the US WW2 system was positively inhumane and insensitive to the GI's subjected to it.

[PLM2]

Inhumane as opposed to what? The Union soldiers at Fredericksburg? The Soviets at Stalingrad? The Volkssturm deserters swinging from lamp posts? At least the US had the capability and forebearing to remove psycholigical casualties from the frontlines when they possibly could, and there were lots of them. I'm not aware of any of the other major players who operated similarly

[wokelly]

I read somewhere not really long ago that the British had several complete fresh divisions that they held back in Britain throughout 1944 and '45. Does anybody know any more about that?

Michael

You may be thinking of Hastings (or D'Este?) who claimed the Brits had over 100k troops in England. None of those men were ranked as fit for front line service though. The British stripped everything they could for the 1944 campaign, even the divisions meant to protect England. Had the british been as ruthless as the Germans, certainly they could have found probably a few 100,000 low quality recruits and made their own ulcer units and what not. They didn't go that route though.

Inhumane as opposed to what? The Union soldiers at Fredericksburg? The Soviets at Stalingrad? The Volkssturm deserters swinging from lamp posts? At least the US had the capability and forebearing to remove psycholigical casualties from the frontlines when they possibly could, and there were lots of them. I'm not aware of any of the other major players who operated similarly

The US system was poor even when it worked, where as the German and British systems were quite good when they worked. No system is perfect, but a system that would send a wounded vet to a new unit rather than his old one was awful. The US Army certainly came to that conclusion, they abandoned it shortly after the war.

As for battle exhaustion casualties, the British/Commonwealth armies recognized the problem and treated it. The German and Soviets however did not believe it though.

German executions in WWI = 60 men

German executions in WWII = ~20,000 men.

[Michael Emrys]

You may be thinking of Hastings (or D'Este?) who claimed the Brits had over 100k troops in England.

I don't know where the story started, which is why I was asking about it. ISTR 11 whole divisions being mentioned, but that strikes me as unlikely. There is considerable room for confusion here (for instance, under the regimental system one battalion was usually at home training new recruits while the other(s) were in action) and I would like to get the matter cleared up.

Michael

[sburke]

I don't know where the story started, which is why I was asking about it. ISTR 11 whole divisions being mentioned, but that strikes me as unlikely. There is considerable room for confusion here (for instance, under the regimental system one battalion was usually at home training new recruits while the other(s) were in action) and I would like to get the matter cleared up.

Michael

Not exactly the font of all verified knowledge, but there is some info here.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_British_Divisions_in_World_War_II

Seems there were at least 4 divisions disbanded in Sept 1944 and one territorial division that never left Britain, but nothing here about 11 divisions being held in reserve. I expect the divisions disbanded had never actually been filled out either.

[gunnergoz]

Inhumane as opposed to what? The Union soldiers at Fredericksburg? The Soviets at Stalingrad? The Volkssturm deserters swinging from lamp posts? At least the US had the capability and forebearing to remove psycholigical casualties from the frontlines when they possibly could, and there were lots of them. I'm not aware of any of the other major players who operated similarly

Thanks for the hyperbolic and irrelevant comparisons. Inhumane compared as to what could and should have been done if the army was not enamored of the corporate production line model of management. Inhumane as in sticking unprepared green replacements in the front line with no attempt to integrate them and leaving the integration, if any, up to the squad and platoon leaders that were at that point likely just trying to survive themselves.

Sure, the US psychological treatment of "shell shock" victims, then in its infancy, was better than in other countries, but that is not the same as the subject we are talking about - the replacement system.

[winkelried]

I don't think that there is a silver bullet for a replacement system. every system has its plusses and its minuses. the germans e.g. had the drawback that sometimes the Feldersatzbatallion (FEB) were used as a normal fighting unit to plug holes or to give an additional batallion - which then drew the (small) reserves up to the front into the meatgrinder too.

another interesting effect i read about once (don't ask me where) was that Heeresgruppe Nord (Leningrad etc) was in pretty good shape in 1944 since the home base of its units were pretty close to the front and the transport distance pretty short compared to HGr Mitte and HGr Süd so the FEB were filled up relatively quickly.

[winkelried]

in addition every nation involved in WW2 was scratching in some way the bottom of the pot. the soviets had rifle divisions at ridicule levels of effectives. the french turned FFI resistance fighters into regular fighting units within months if not weeks.

[JonS]

The British had a truckload of 'divisions' in the UK that were never intended to be deployed overseas. They were either home defence or replacement training and holding units, all of which had much lower establishments and equipment holdings than 'real' divisions. D'Este in his Normandy book got totally the wrong end of that stick and wrote a thoroughly slanderous chapter as a result. Hart, in Collosal Cracks, definitively refutes D'Este.

During the Normandy campaign the only reserves the British had in the UK were 52nd Div and 1st A/B Div. Both were involved in Op MG, where 1 A/B was essentially destroyed. 52nds role in that op never came to pass, so it was xferred to the continent in late Sept(?) and introdued to combat in the Walcheren fighting. From that point on the UK had no strategic reserve.

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks, Jon. That's pretty much what I had suspected but wanted to make sure. Hart is on my "to read" list.

Michael