US shortcommings and how did they win.

[teamgene]

How tough a fight the west would have had if germany had not invaded ussr is dependant on when they would have gone into full war production. They were not in full war production in 41 which was a key year either way you play it.

The brits still break the enigma code, so germany loses either way, just a matter of how hard of a fight.

[winkelried]

The RAF and the USAAF smashed the GAF all on their own. They needed no help from the Russians for that. From quite early in the war (1943?) the bulk of the GAF was either in Germany or in Western or Southern Europe.

The soviets helped a bit by occupying Ploesti in August 1944 and reducing aircraft fuel availability even more - only a very small percentage of the GAF planes produced in 1944 ever flew ... and without fuel no pilot training.

[winkelried]

People seem to be confusing tactical air power being effective at restricting the mobility and combat capability of armored formations with tactical air power being effective at directly knocking out heavy armor. These are two different things.

One is called close air support (like knocking out a tank in front of own troops) - here you need good forward observers and radio connections to hit the right target.

The other is called battlefield interdiction (so the fuel, ammo etc can't move) - this can be done in free chase in a well defined area without big coordination - just shoot at everthing that moves.

[teamgene]

The soviets helped a bit by occupying Ploesti in August 1944 and reducing aircraft fuel availability even more - only a very small percentage of the GAF planes produced in 1944 ever flew ... and without fuel no pilot training.

The problem wasn't fuel, germany had it in 44 and 45. The problem was they couldn't move it as anything on rail or road was dead from the air.

[Magpie_Oz]

An excellent service rifle... BUT

1) The eight round capacity was too small and...

2) When the eighth round is fired, the clip is ejected with a very audible TINGGGG noise announcing to all and sundry that your weapon is empty.

Both of these problems were addressed with the M14, which in this writer's opinion is the best service rifle that the U.S. has EVER produced, and is still in the top rankings today.

SLR

The German Kar98K had a 5 round magazine, Russian Mosin-Nagant 5 round magazine, British SMLE had 10 rounds so really 8 rounds isn't that bad.

Much is made of "the ting" but really in close quarters stuff it might be a drama but I can't imagine it making much difference in most situations. I know the Aussie Army and I believe the UK as well train their troops to shout to their oppo that they are reloading which is more of a give away than a ting.

Don't forget too that the rifle only goes "ting" milliseconds after it has made a colossal BANG!!!!!!! so it is a good ear that would pick out the subtle harmony.

I'm with Yankee Dog that the inability to top off the magazine is more cumbersome.

[JonS]

If allied CAS really was that pants why did the German planners fear it so?

Because you aren't quite understanding the points that've been made here.

CAS is a specific term, which cannot be loosely translated as 'dropping bombs on some target on the ground.' CAS is - usually - used to refer to air support being used to influence the course of a battle in progress. That is, using it as part of the comnined arms team to solve tactical problems on the battlefield. The problem is that air-to-ground weapons in WWII didn't have the accuracy requried for that role, and sensors in WWII (i.e., the pilot's eyeballs) weren't up to the task of identifying targets on the ground that were trying to hide.

CAS did have the potential to have major morale effects, for both attacks and defenders. Attacking troops loved seeing Typhoons swooping in and smothering a position they'd have to attack shortly with rockets. And it was largely morale effects caused by the airpower used at Sedan in 1940 that lead to the breakthrough there - the Stukas caused very little material damage.

But the morale effect was quite transitory - if it wasn't promptly followed up it was wasted. And 'promptly' here means within minutes. Lot's of really high profile air attacks weren't followed up for hours, or even until the following day, by which time any morale damage - and even most material damage - had been fixed.

However, attacks on logistics and other targets beyond the battlefront had a much greater material impact. For starters those targets tended to be moving and/or larger and/or softer and/or less well defended, all of which made it much easier for aircraft to attack with a definite material effect. As a further bonus, attacks beyond the battlefront tended to affect large chunks of the battlefront itself. For example, in May 1944 the USAAF discovered that they could reliably drop bridges across the Seine with just eight (8) P-47s. And by dropping all the bridges across the Seine they seriously hampered the movement of reinforcements to Normandy, and seriously degraded the German's ability to move supplies to Normandy throughout the campaign. However, if those eight P-47s had for example been sent to attack some tanks, and assuming they had been uncommonly accurate and destroyed one tank each, then the Germans are down a total of eight tanks. Big whoop.

Yes, this example is a bit contrived, not least because the beauty of airpower is that it can be used to attack both the bridges and the tanks, even on the same day. The key point, though, is that attacks on supply lines add Clausewitzian friction to the entire fielded force, while attacks on frontline forces cause transitory morale effects and trivial attrition.

Furthermore because the Allies had so much air available in NWE in 1944, they could cast a blanket over the entire hinterland behind the Normandy frontline and back across Northern France and the Low Countries. This blanket effectively stopped movement of German units and supplies by day whenever the weather was good enough to fly. The majority of movement had to occur by night, which in summer in that area is very short. This, in turn, meant the Allied ground forces were effectively twice as mobile aty the operational - and to some extent tactical - level as the Germans, without even factoring in that German forces were predominantly horse-drawn.

All of that is wonderful, but CMBN only deals with CAS, and a/c in WWII were only a little better than hopeless at CAS.

EDIT to add: ... and the Airforces kind-of knew they weren't any good at it. They fiercely defended pilot claims regarding the numbers of tanks knocked out at places like Mortain - in the teeth of overwhelming evidence that the a/c actually hit hardly anything - but they also knew that CAS was costly in terms of pilots and a/c (Typhoon losses in the Normandy period were over 100% of establishment), and they knew they were 'better' at going after targets beyond the battlefront. Some of that can be seen as organisational pecker waving, not letting themselves be seen to be the army's handmaiden and instead going off and doing their own thing, but they were actually correct in heavily restricting the army's requests for CAS missions.

EDIT: I see that Yankee and Wink already answered I need to learn to type faster

[JonS]

The soviets helped a bit by occupying Ploesti in August 1944 and reducing aircraft fuel availability even more - only a very small percentage of the GAF planes produced in 1944 ever flew ... and without fuel no pilot training.

By August 1944 the GAF was already done as an effective force.

[winkelried]

By August 1944 the GAF was already done as an effective force.

that's true - the decisive attack started on 12. May 44 against the Leuna-Werke.

[JonS]

No, the decisive attack started in Feb during Big Week. German single-engine pilot losses in the first 6 months of 1944 were over 100%.

EDIT: slight correction;

from W. Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p.240;

Total German fighter pilot losses Jan-May: 2262

Average fighter pilot strength: 2283

% Loss: 99% (with a sharply rising trendline)

[winkelried]

The problem wasn't fuel, germany had it in 44 and 45. The problem was they couldn't move it as anything on rail or road was dead from the air.

That's not correct - you should read the Strategic Bombing Survey. they moved a lot on rail and roads - preferrably at night/fog/cloud cover - interdiction was far from being 100% complete. look at all the units they sent to normandy or they concentrated for the battle of the bulge.

but the attacks against the synthetic fuel production (Leuna Werke) broke the German's back. No fuel to train pilots and send them up - despite the huge number of aircrafts producted. not enough fuel to keep the tanks running everywhere and anytime.

[Vark]

Why fixate on 43 onwards, regarding the Luftwaffe? I think the many hundreds of combat aircraft available, if Russia was not attacked, would have significantly altered the outcome.

[JonS]

Why fixate on 43 onwards, regarding the Luftwaffe? I think the many hundreds of combat aircraft available, if Russia was not attacked, would have significantly altered the outcome.

How? The Germans had a large odds advantage in the second half of 1940, but it didn't help them.

Besides - a Nazi Germany that doesn't invade Russia? So much for lebensraum, I guess.

[winkelried]

No, the decisive attack started in Feb during Big Week. German single-engine pilot losses in the first 6 months of 1944 were over 100%.

EDIT: slight correction;

from W. Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p.240;

Total German fighter pilot losses Jan-May: 2262

Average fighter pilot strength: 2283

% Loss: 99% (with a sharply rising trendline)

From the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey:

From the start of the attacks against fuel production In May 1944, German output declined. The diminishing supply of aviation gasoline resulted at once in serious operational limitations.

Training hours, already drastically limited because of fuel shortages, were cut to the bone.

Instructors and transport and bomber pilots were given short conversion courses in a last-ditch effort to increase the fighter defenses against the Allied air armada (Reference Note 1). Pressure was brought to conserve fuel even on operational flights. Motor transport, essential for GAF repair and supply was reduced nearly to the vanishing point. Thus the attack on oil, made possible through the attainment of air supremacy, was a prime factor in assuring the permanence of that superiority. The GAF, which had once threatened the ability of the RAJ to continue night bombing attacks, was so completely demoralized that the early months of 1945 saw the RAF carrying out daylight bombing operations in great force with a minimum loss.

[winkelried]

No, the decisive attack started in Feb during Big Week. German single-engine pilot losses in the first 6 months of 1944 were over 100%.

EDIT: slight correction;

from W. Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p.240;

Total German fighter pilot losses Jan-May: 2262

Average fighter pilot strength: 2283

% Loss: 99% (with a sharply rising trendline)

But: German fighter losses on the Western Front (Reich etc) in 1944

Q1: 2130

Q2: 3057

Q3: 4043

So the Germans were still able to bring more fighters in the air every quarter in 1944. The main problem was the reduced quality of the pilots with flying hours in training dropping from 170 to 110 hours in Q3/44 due to fuel shortages.

EDIT: as a comparison U.S. pilots had 330 to 400 hours.

Source: US Strategic Bombing Survey.

[Nidan1]

An excellent service rifle... BUT

1) The eight round capacity was too small and...

2) When the eighth round is fired, the clip is ejected with a very audible TINGGGG noise announcing to all and sundry that your weapon is empty.

Both of these problems were addressed with the M14, which in this writer's opinion is the best service rifle that the U.S. has EVER produced, and is still in the top rankings today.

SLR

Yeah but with all the other noise on the battlefield, who could hear the clip ejecting?

M-14 is an excellent weapon, accurate at long range, durable, but too heavy, too big and restrictive as to the amount of ammo to be carried. Nearly impossible to fire accurately on full auto.

A great weapon on the target range, in combat not as effective as the new crop of assault rifles which replaced it as the primary infantry weapon in US formations.

Oh wait I forgot to address the original question of the thread. How did the US win with all of its shortcomings? simple God was on its side.

[JonS]

simple God was on its side.

Gott mit US?

[Michael Emrys]

No, the decisive attack started in Feb during Big Week. German single-engine pilot losses in the first 6 months of 1944 were over 100%.

EDIT: slight correction;

from W. Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p.240;

Total German fighter pilot losses Jan-May: 2262

Average fighter pilot strength: 2283

% Loss: 99% (with a sharply rising trendline)

What he said. The Luftwaffe was a virtually spent force well before D-Day. It was still active, but it would never make a decisive contribution again.

Michael

[sburke]

IIRC The last serious attempt by the Luftwaffe to intervene in the Western Front in any real way was January 1st 1945 Operation Bodenplatte. Despite attaining surprise, they achieved very little if anything at great cost.

[Magpie_Oz]

Gott mit US?

He must have been busy, wasn't he with everyone but the Japanese ?

[Bigduke6]

Heavens no, the Soviets had Marx and Lenin, and the Chinese (well, the Nationalists at least if not the Reds) had, er, Confucious.

He must have been busy, wasn't he with everyone but the Japanese ?

[MikeyD]

About the inferior US tank gun. When you read the literature you see lots of comments about the Panther gun's and the Firefly 17 pounder's markedly inferior HE shell compared to the Sherman gun. There was real dissatisfaction with those rounds. The Brits had a superior little tank killer in the 6 pounder (called 'the poor man's 17 pounder' with APDS ammo) but they still elected to bore-out their 6 pounder tank guns and rechamber for the same 75mm shell used by the Sherman. Effective and accurate HE is a very valuable thing to have. Tank killing potential may be 'sexy' and would be useful in an enemy tank were to appear, but its not the tank's primary meat-and-potatos work.

I'm reminded of the TOW2B anti-tank missile, a superior overflight tank killer with two small downward-facing platter charges. Apparently, though, of zero utility for anything except killing tanks. For Iraq they scrambled to rebuilt a batch of obsolete TOW2 missiles with a redesigned non-HEAT squash-head round. For the biggest possible HE bang-for-the-buck.

[Jock Tamson]

This thread is for the sake of constructive and revealing argument

1. US tanks were not effective

US doctrine was to use tanks to support infantry, and tank killers to destroy tanks. Patton's conviction that tanks should be used for breakthroughs rather than taking on enemy tanks and the subsequent debate among the top brass effectively stopped the M26 Pershing from being available in significant numbers before the end of the war.

[Sgt Joch]

If I may stick my size nines in on one of the areas - the one regarding allied airpower being ineffective.

Correct me if I'm wrong but during the battle of the bulge wasn't one of the key critera to the success of it hinge on bad weather - thus grounding allied airpower and their abililty to stick it to the german armour moving on the roads?

If allied CAS really was that pants why did the German planners fear it so?

Regards

Skimbo

Others have answered, but another point is the fact that Tac Air was effective enough to disrupt/stop all movements during the day. In Normandy, german units only moved at night and spent the day hiding in camouflaged positions where they were difficult to spot from the air.

When German units were caught in the open, for example, in the Falaise Gap, Tac Air could be deadly. They did not knock out many AFVs, but many were simply abandoned by their crews because they ran out of fuel or were caught up in massive traffic jams.

For the Wacht Am Rein offensive to have any kind of chance, the Panzers had to be able to move forward 24 hours a day which is why the planners wanted overcast conditions.

[Georgie]

US doctrine was to use tanks to support infantry, and tank killers to destroy tanks. Patton's conviction that tanks should be used for breakthroughs rather than taking on enemy tanks and the subsequent debate among the top brass effectively stopped the M26 Pershing from being available in significant numbers before the end of the war.

Was the Pershing capable of taking on the King Tiger from the front or did it use the same 90mm gun that the Jackson used?

[Georgie]

Was the Pershing capable of taking on the King Tiger from the front or did it use the same 90mm gun that the Jackson used?

This link is interesting but doesn't answer the question.

http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/feature.pages/super.pershing.1.htm#anchor2238566