Tank destroyer organization

[TrapOne]

I'm struck by the organization of the tank destroyer platoon - in particular, by how it contains its own scouting and dismounted security element. According to doctrine and at least sometimes in practice, the platoon commander and staff sergeant rode jeeps or .50 cal armored cars, rather than the M10/M18/M36.

How does CMBN model the platoon? Do we get dismounts? Where's the platoon commander?

In North Africa, a TD platoon contained two gun sections, of two vehicles each; a security section; an antiaircraft section; and the platoon command element.

The organization grows simpler as equipment improves and experience grows. The T/O&Es for 1944 [1] give each TD platoon two gun sections, and a platoon headquarters and security section. Each gun section consists of two M10s, M18, or M36s each, for a total of four gun vehicles in the platoon.

It's the headquarters and security section that I'm interested in. The section includes the platoon commander and the platoon's senior NCO. The men ride in two M20 armored utility cars, equipped with radios and .50 cal. machine guns, and in a jeep, with a .30 cal. machine gun. The officer and eleven men in the section are armed mostly with rifles or carbines. Five of those enlisted soldiers are listed as "riflemen."

TD manuals make it clear that the security element exists to provide local protection and a basic scouting and reconnaissance capability. It seems to have been common for TD men to dismount machine guns from vehicles, for added firepower in the defense.

The T/O&Es suggest that the platoon commander was meant to ride an M20 or a jeep, not one of the TDs.

A 1950 Armor School report reviews actions fought by four TD battalions, spending time looking at a platoon scale. One section, about the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion in Normandy, in Aug. 1944, says this:

It is interesting to note that Lt. Leiper, as platoon leader, did not

ride in a tank destroyer, but rode at the head of his platoon in a jeep.

This type of guidance had been decided upon by the tank destroyer

Battalion Commander in England who had reasoned that it gave the

platoon leader a better chance to direct the actions of his 5 tank

destroyers; whereas, if he were squeezed in one of the tank destroyers

he would be more apt to fight the one tank destroyer rather than the

five. [2]

The "5 tank destroyers" looks like just a typo in the report.

The TD platoon looks more and more like a fascinating little combined-arms organization. Contemporary accounts give the impression that TD soldiers thought of their machines as mobile guns rather than as fighting vehicles, something probably encouraged by training and by leaders coming from field artillery backgrounds. Even towed guns, when operated by tank destroyer units, get referred to as TDs. It all suggests a different way of thinking of firepower and the use of terrain, one very different from the armored force mentality.

[1] War Department. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 18-27: Tank Destroyer Gun Company, Tank Destroyer Battalion, Self-Propelled. (Washington, DC, 15 March 1944)

[2] Jackson, William F. et al. The Employment of Four Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO. (Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1950), 71.

[Magpie_Oz]

Right from the outset the concept of the US Tank Destroyers was that they were highly mobile anti tank guns. The idea being that towed AT guns would be quickly overrun but the mounted guns could quickly relocate as needed.

I guess that is why they have a substantial recce and security element as they would operate in some instances like cavalry, selecting new firing positions as required etc.

and yes the commander was more of a battery commander than a tank commander so he would act as such and not be actually in charge of one of the TDs.

The concept never really worked and the TD's often found themselves having to be tanks which is a shame really, the M18, M36 and the British Achillies (M10 with a "man's" AT gun" are actually some of my favourite tanks from WW2

[Pak40]

Since there was usually only one tank destroyer battalion per Infantry or Armored Division, they were almost always dished out piecemeal to wherever they were needed.

As for the security and HQ, from accounts that I've read, when they arrived at the scene of a battle they would scout ahead on foot to get a grasp of the situation. Then go back and instruct the TDs as of the plan of action. Charging head in was usually not their style because their weaker armor could not stand up to some tank duel. At times they even seem to behave as tank snipers. Popping out when needed or directed by the HQ or scouting elements that were on foot in front of them.

[TrapOne]

There are different ways of parcelling out the TD battalion - by platoons to individual line battalions; by companies to regiments or combat commands, or to a line battalion on the attack; or with some companies held by division. (TDs providing indirect fire support, for instance, seem to have worked together as companies or battalions.) All seem to have been in use by different formations at different times.

I'm interested, mainly, in not seeing the TD platoon modeled as a group of four tank destroyers.

There is a reconnaissance company in a TD bn, identical to the division's organic cavalry reconnaissance company. In other words, attaching a TD bn to a div doubles the division's reconnaissance assets. The accounts I've seen show the TD recce co. being used, most of the time, in the same economy-of-force, security, screening, and occasional reconnaissance roles that the cavalry performed.

[Sergei]

CMBN, like CMSF and CMA, models the battalion as they historically were organized. If the German Gebirgsjäger Battalion had an Alpenhorn squad in the HQ Platoon in reality, then the HQ Platoon will have an Alpenhorn squad in the game. It's up to the player how to utilize them... with the US TD units one way would be protection from enemy infantry, as the M10's don't have coaxial or bow MG's and they probably don't want to turn that turret to engage the enemy with the rear facing AAMG...

[Melchior]

Right from the outset the concept of the US Tank Destroyers was that they were highly mobile anti tank guns. The idea being that towed AT guns would be quickly overrun but the mounted guns could quickly relocate as needed.

What was really sad is that this system of TD's the US had probably would have worked out perfectly in 1939-40 when the Panzers rarely followed their own lessons of keeping infantry and artillery close to the armour for support. US TD's were designed specifically to reject attacks from lots of small tanks trying to mob them all at once.

But hey that's just what happens when all your knowledge and research is theory and not practice.

[Andrew H.]

What was really sad is that this system of TD's the US had probably would have worked out perfectly in 1939-40 when the Panzers rarely followed their own lessons of keeping infantry and artillery close to the armour for support. US TD's were designed specifically to reject attacks from lots of small tanks trying to mob them all at once.

But hey that's just what happens when all your knowledge and research is theory and not practice.

Actually, I think this is backwards. TDs, as such, were fine units and were often highly effective against enemy tanks. I'd much rather be in an M-10 facing a Tiger than in an M-4 - the slightly thinner armor on the TD won't make much difference.

The problem with the TD doctrine is not with the TDs; it's with the *tanks.* TD doctrine said that TDs would fight tanks, and tanks would fight infantry. And as infantry fighters, tanks didn't need a gun that could take out a tank. Consequently, you have thousands of Shermans with the often ineffective 75mm gun, since the TD's with the 76's and 90's will take care of the tanks. This, obviously, didn't work in practice...but the flaw lay with the tanks' armament, not with the TD's.

[Michael Emrys]

The problem with the TD doctrine is not with the TDs; it's with the *tanks.* TD doctrine said that TDs would fight tanks, and tanks would fight infantry. And as infantry fighters, tanks didn't need a gun that could take out a tank. Consequently, you have thousands of Shermans with the often ineffective 75mm gun, since the TD's with the 76's and 90's will take care of the tanks. This, obviously, didn't work in practice...but the flaw lay with the tanks' armament, not with the TD's.

Actually it worked out pretty well in practice. The majority of Shermans were lost to causes other than German tanks. AT guns for instance, against which the 76 mm weapon of the TDs was actually inferior to the 75 mm since the HE round had a somewhat smaller blasting charge.

Michael

[Melchior]

Actually, I think this is backwards. TDs, as such, were fine units and were often highly effective against enemy tanks. I'd much rather be in an M-10 facing a Tiger than in an M-4 - the slightly thinner armor on the TD won't make much difference.

The problem with the TD doctrine is not with the TDs; it's with the *tanks.* TD doctrine said that TDs would fight tanks, and tanks would fight infantry. And as infantry fighters, tanks didn't need a gun that could take out a tank. Consequently, you have thousands of Shermans with the often ineffective 75mm gun, since the TD's with the 76's and 90's will take care of the tanks. This, obviously, didn't work in practice...but the flaw lay with the tanks' armament, not with the TD's.

Well look at the context. Statistically most tanks killed during the war were killed by AP shot fired from anti tank guns. On top of that it was predicted that a tank would basically spend 90% of its time fighting infantry or other soft units that made up the grand total population of an army.

The Sherman's low velocity gun was a problem but considering how rare encounters were with armour that the gun couldn't kill vs. how much more often they'd be dealing with Panzershrecks/fausts or concealed Pak guns it wasn't totally disastrous. The Axis opted to equip almost all of their tanks with high velocity guns but that was because they were pretty used to the infamous Russian tank spam hordes by then.

I suppose then you could still hold the Americans responsible for failing to equip more Shermans with the 105mm gun. The US Army was never exactly good at designing ordinance though.