Bagration Question

[coe]

I was wondering of some of you historical buffs could weigh in on this.

Right before Bagration, the Germans grouped their reserves in AG NorthUkraine. The Soviets of course attacked AG Center drawing the reserves north then hit AG North Ukraine with I presume fresh forces (correct me if I am wrong).

This means that the Soviets had the capability to perhaps attack both places at once. Now I know the idea that that attacking where the reserves are would cause more losses and that attacking the weak forces and eliminating them easily first then causes more manpower shortages for the defender (to fill the gaps) and this is what I presume what was done. But at the same time having the capability to hit both places means that it might not make much of a difference as to if you attacked both simultaneously. You'd be guaranteeing you'd be hitting the defenders at their weak points too. A major attack in NUkraine would have prevented reserves from going to the Center perhaps?

so I guess perhaps my question is if the force disparity was so great, such that the germans could only defend heavily in one place, and the Russians could deliver two blows, did it really matter if the germans concentrated or spread their reserves a bit more evenly. I'm also presuming here that the Russians were well fortified so that the weakened Germans before Bagration wouldn't have been able to concentrate and knock out a division here and there. In summation, if the Germans correctly anticipated the main target and rushed their reserves there ahead of time it might not have made a difference?

[Michael Emrys]

Couple things. First thing is that even if they had the forces on hand to launch two attacks simultaneously, the Soviets might not have had the logistical capacity to sustain two such attacks. I don't know if this was the case, I'll leave that to those who have studied the matter more closely than I, but the idea does occur to me.

Secondly, hitting the Germans in the south where they are the strongest doesn't make a lot of sense tactically. You won't make as much progress and it will cost you more in losses.

Finally, it would not be all that great an advantage to hold the German reserves in the south at this stage of the war. In Bagration, AGC was essentially destroyed. The arriving reserves weren't going to be able to do much to stop the Soviet advance before it petered out from outrunning its supply lines anyway. From the Soviet point of view, it's better to meet them while they (the Germans) are on the hop rather than occupying prepared positions.

Michael

[Joachim]

Hit both at the same time:

AGC will be destroyed as planned.

But the forces hitting AGNU and its reserves might be destroyed. Which will see a weakened Soviet front facing AGNU, allowing the Germans to shift their reserves plus elements from the frontline of AGNU towards AGC.

Numerical example, counting men only, no equipment (not historical, just to show some point):

Assume Soviets had 1.2 million men in front of AGC and AGNU each. AGC is 600.000 men, AGNU is 600.000 men, reserves are additional 200.000 men.

Attacking vs AGNU+reserves yields odds of 12:8 or 1.5:1. Germans dug in, reserves hit quickly with most of the attackers still in the defensive belt. Issue in doubt.

Attacking vs AGC yields odds of 2:1. Pretty safe.

Attacking vs AGNU w/o reserves yields odds of 2:1. Pretty safe.

When reserves from AGNU arrive in center: Attacking vs remains of AGC plus reserves yields odds of 1.5:1, battle behind defensive belt, Germans in disorder. Pretty safe. (Assuming both sides lost 200.000 men before the reserves arrive)

So attacking like the Soviets did would mean highly likely success on both fronts while attacking simultaneuously would yield a risk - and even in the case of success should yield more losses for the Soviets.

You can try this in CM in a battle vs the TacAI with two group flags, separated by distance and some hills. Some reserve forces slightly behind the southern group of flags.

Attack the northern group, capture a few flags there and the TacAI will send forces from the south. You'll usually easily waste those moving forces if you already established a defensive perimeter around the captured flags.

Now try the same scen attacking both groups of flags simulteaneuosly. Most of the reserves will hit you in the South, while you are still attacking, lots of forces (especially MGs and mortars) in open ground, no defensive perimeter established.

Then compare the losses in the AAR. If you play it a few times, the results should favor the delayed attack in the South.

[Sergei]

Yes, it's better to have your enemy run back and forth like a headless chicken rather than stand and face your fighting force in a place where you want to succeed. Which is also why having the Bagration start 16 days after Overlord, rather than simultaneously, is also strategically sound (in addition to Soviets wanting to see Overlord really happen first): Germans had to focus their reserves to the west, like they had had to do during Zitadelle when Italy needed attention.

Then there's the matter of how organizing a million-man offensive to start on a certain date is complicated, and doing the same with two million men would be even harder. Especially when the Stavka wanted to supervise all preparations.

A fair comparison might be if Overlord and Dragoon had been launched simultaneously. It might have confused the hell out of Germans, but it would also have made Dragoon far bloodier for Allies and strained their logistic and planning capacity.

[Redwolf]

I was wondering of some of you historical buffs could weigh in on this.

Right before Bagration, the Germans grouped their reserves in AG NorthUkraine. The Soviets of course attacked AG Center drawing the reserves north then hit AG North Ukraine with I presume fresh forces (correct me if I am wrong).

This means that the Soviets had the capability to perhaps attack both places at once. Now I know the idea that that attacking where the reserves are would cause more losses and that attacking the weak forces and eliminating them easily first then causes more manpower shortages for the defender (to fill the gaps) and this is what I presume what was done. But at the same time having the capability to hit both places means that it might not make much of a difference as to if you attacked both simultaneously. You'd be guaranteeing you'd be hitting the defenders at their weak points too. A major attack in NUkraine would have prevented reserves from going to the Center perhaps?

so I guess perhaps my question is if the force disparity was so great, such that the germans could only defend heavily in one place, and the Russians could deliver two blows, did it really matter if the germans concentrated or spread their reserves a bit more evenly. I'm also presuming here that the Russians were well fortified so that the weakened Germans before Bagration wouldn't have been able to concentrate and knock out a division here and there. In summation, if the Germans correctly anticipated the main target and rushed their reserves there ahead of time it might not have made a difference?

The German reserves being in the wrong place was a result of a major deception campaign, in fact one that has been going on in a very professional manner since at least the winter of 42/43.

In addition to very professional deception work on part of the Soviets another reason was that the Germans had their reconnaissance capabilities severely reduced. Air reconnaissance was difficult sicne there weren't enough planes and the Soviet air force had substantial teeth. German ground forces lack vehicles for the most part except for the Panzer divisions which weren't in the front lines.

I don't think you can point at one specific amount of force as being "enough" to attack in a place and then specify how much you would need to attack in two place. You always want to through as much as possible at the point where you except the most payoff. Usually you will only divert to additional places to attack when you run out of space for the forces or when moving forces isn't practical.

You could argue that seeking out German strength and attacking there might have knocked out the best of the German forces but clearly the Soviets decided that space is more important or that the operation could slow down too much if the strong German forces are involved. Most likely the Soviets did not know the real German strength (or lack of it) for sure and decided to go through the weak place. The strong German reserves will lose equipment and general combat effectiveness if they are flanked so that's what the Soviets decided on.

This isn't like the situation with the fleets in WW1 where seeking the decisive battle with as many of the enemy forces as possible is the goal.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

This means that the Soviets had the capability to perhaps attack both places at once.

not only did they have the theoretical capability to hit two places at once, but they actually did hit four places at once (AG Centre, AGNU, AG North and Finland).

yes, those operations weren't launched simultaneously, they had to be launched one after another (and those operations themselves were internally and locally launched one part after another), but they all were still being executed simultaneously after they were launched.

Now I know the idea that that attacking where the reserves are would cause more losses and that attacking the weak forces and eliminating them easily first then causes more manpower shortages for the defender (to fill the gaps) and this is what I presume what was done. But at the same time having the capability to hit both places means that it might not make much of a difference as to if you attacked both simultaneously. You'd be guaranteeing you'd be hitting the defenders at their weak points too.

yes, they did all those things.

A major attack in NUkraine would have prevented reserves from going to the Center perhaps?

yes, that's exactly what it was supposed to do and what it did.

so I guess perhaps my question is if the force disparity was so great, such that the germans could only defend heavily in one place, and the Russians could deliver two blows, did it really matter if the germans concentrated or spread their reserves a bit more evenly.

yes it did, because even a weak panzer corps (an actual panzer formation, not just one in name) could ruin Soviet operations.

even in summer 1944 some Soviet offensives failed even without the help of German reserves (=were defeated locally). when they attack at three locations, two may fail but the third achieves a good penetration. their operational success is based on that third attack causing German defences to fall off balance when Germans don't have proper reserves at hand. if they have good reserves they counter that penetration and the entire Soviet offensive fails (or achieves only limited gains).

In summation, if the Germans correctly anticipated the main target and rushed their reserves there ahead of time it might not have made a difference?

it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war and most likely wouldn't have caused any of those Soviet operations to fail, but it would have limited the level of damage.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

A fair comparison might be if Overlord and Dragoon had been launched simultaneously. It might have confused the hell out of Germans, but it would also have made Dragoon far bloodier for Allies and strained their logistic and planning capacity.

it's far more confusing when you don't launch the attacks simultaneously across the whole front of coming operations. the defender won't realize there's a major operation going for a couple of days. when he does realize it, he doesn't know where the main thrusts are coming from or where they are heading at (as some of them haven't even been launched yet).

it creates yours headless chicken situation. in Bagration the limited panzer reserves of AGC spent some days marching around, receiving conflicting and confusing orders, just like the Soviet mech corps did in 1941. also notice how Bagration begins with limited offensives at its both extreme flanks.

in summer 1944 Soviets achieved the same thing on strategic level, by pulling German focus to their allies at extreme north and south before launching the decisive operations in the middle.

[coe]

I dunno, perhaps the best german strategy would have been to do a split of the reserves. It didn't seem like the reserves were exactly up to strength either though. although I presume given the stand fast orders prevented the best step (withdraw AGC from the balcony). Though, give that much of AGC got blown away on the run, they might have just as well stood fast perhaps (and lasted a little bit longer since I doubt on the run supplies were getting through anyways).

I'm not sure the Germans could have afforded to wait and see regardless of if the soviets attacked both places at once or attacked one at a time. The german front seemd very brittle and to wait would have been a catastrophe even if it wasn't the main attack.

[Joachim]

Well, splitting reserves would have contradicted doctrine - and definitely AGC would have been even worse off with less reserves. If AGNU might have been saved.... maybe.

But the general assumption of OKH was that "Iwan was spent". And don't even dare to question that assumption... err... "fact".

Changing from stand fast to a withdrawal does not work late. You've got to plan it in advance. Dig a 2nd line, move backwards step by step.... not an easy task, but the German army should still have been capable of doing that. For a successful withdrawal/mobile defense cf. von Manstein's "backhand blow" after Stalingrad.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Germans send units to help Centre in any case, so the question is a bit moot as the units are going to fight with AGC anyway.

because AGC has so few reseves the reserves end up being wasted. like mentioned, the only panzer division is running around in circles without firing a shot and then its little strength is even further divided by its elements being ordered to different directions. likewise when AGC starts to receive additional reserves, the panzer divisions and their elements are forced to be committed piecemeal as they arrive. the end result is that what little strength the reseves have is wasted in their piecemel commitment. the German panzer elements are quite effective in what they do, but their scattered commitment and low numbers make them insignificant. the Soviet tank & mech formations simply go around them. the effect of German panzer divisions would have been multiplied had they been there to begin with.

Germans simply got fooled by not detecting the new Soviet force concentrations built opposite AGC. as Germans knew of the large tank & mech concentrations facing AGNU, that's where they sent their strength. their error was not that they thought Soviet forces opposite AGNU were very strong, as they were (possibly stronger than those opposite AGC in tank & mech formations), and they certainly did not think the Soviets were spent. their error was to not detect the scale of new forces massed opposite AGC, that the Soviets were shifting their focus from south (where it was previously, very succesfully) to centre.

by looking quickly at the number of operational panzers in 31 May 1944, north to south (ignoring Finland), the numbers seem to be 73 for AGN , 86 for AGC, 606 for AGNU and 190 for AGSU. panzer ratio between AGNU and AGC is 7:1. or in other words, by taking 1/7th of AGNU's panzer strength you double the panzer strenght of AGC.

[JasonC]

Turreted tank numbers are extremely misleading in mid 1944, because large portions of the fleets have already transitioned to the SP gun format.

AG center has 377 SP guns before Bagration. I've seen 73 and 118 (the discrepancy is over a single reinforcing unit) for the turreted tanks. Either way, the formation has 450 to 500 AFVs, not less than 100. They are just predominately turretless, in numerous StuG formations and in the StuG and Marder companies in the Panzerjaeger battalions of numerous infantry divisions.

Lvov Sandomierz in the south (Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front's attack against AG South) is not the same scale as Bagration, but only about half its size. In manpower the two are close (Bagration still bigger), but in the heavy "capital equipment" of mobile operations, Bagration has 4000 AFVs (a third of them SP types by the way), 24000 artillery pieces and 5300 aircraft in support; Konev only has 2000 AFVs, 11000 artillery and 3200 aircraft.

If Konev had attacked with his 2000 tanks before any reserves shifted he'd have had operational armor odds of only 3 to 1; as it actually played out, German transfers of armor out of the sector to the north brought AG South down to 420 AFVs by the time the offensive occurred, giving 5 to 1 operational armor odds. Bagration enjoyed initial armor odds of 8 or 9 to 1, and a shift of ~200 tanks into the sector still left those odds around 6 to 1. Actually higher, because the Germans lost significant amounts of their available armor in the forward IDs before much armored help could arrive.

Russian armor losses were high in offensives mid through late war. The initial strengths massed for offensives have to be regarded almost as ammo, expected to be expended in each operation not to live through it. Their armor losses in Bagration were 3000 tanks, for example, or 3/4 of the initial engaged force. Mass armor before an effort, expend it to inflict losses on the Germans (especially its infantry) and take ground, but expect to lose it and to lose it especially fast facing concentrated German armor. That is the underlying driver or pace setter. The Russians did not have unlimited tanks and could not afford to throw them against the Germans where the Germans were strongest.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

operational panzer number comparison between the Army Groups was just that -- the easiest way to get numerical comparison between panzers. yes, all Groups had several hundred assault guns & tank destroyers (i have no idea about the number of runners of all the units).

1st Ukrainian Front (opposite AGNU) was the strongest of all Soviet Fronts and it had more tank & mech formations than Bagration combined initially. in the number of AFVs the fronts taking part in Bagration are stronger, but there are only 5 tank and 3 mech corps (and a number of cavalry corps). 1st UF alone has 7 tank & 3 mech corps. with 1st Belorussian Front supporting on right it's a very strong force.

even with full hindsight and knowing the actual Soviet planning, i have hard time accepting the fact that 1UF was not The planned history maker of summer 1944.

[Michael Emrys]

even with full hindsight and knowing the actual Soviet planning, i have hard time accepting the fact that 1UF was not The planned history maker of summer 1944.

If that is indeed the case, it makes even more sense to draw off the armored reserves to the north before attacking. However, we should not overlook the possibility that stacking the additional tank corps in 1st. UF might have also been part of their deception campaign.

Michael

[JasonC]

Excluding the SPs is not symmetric - they form 75-80% of the AFV fleet in AG center and well under half in the south. Without them the armor ratio between the two formations seems to be an 8 to 1 split, but the actual AFV ratio is less than a 2 to 1 split. The Russian split is also 2 to 1, just in the other direction.

As for Russian formation counts, they are irrelevant for combat power compared to actual equipment in the field. As for where they come from, largely just the Ukraine having been the previous point of main effort, resulting in numerous understrength formations from combat losses and operational wear. Giving tank corps that are the strength of single western tank battalions and brigades that are the strength of single western tank companies... Again, Stavka controlled the reinforcing formations for a reason, and a third of the AFV fleet for Bagration are SP types.

Did the raw count of the larger mech formations help mislead the Germans as to the next point of main effort? Undoubtedly, formations are easier to ID by signals intelligence than vehicle numbers are. Wrong footing the enemy armor allocation with 2 to 1 where they put up 1 to 2 is still a deception and wing attack success any way it is sliced.

[Cuirassier]

June 1, AGC has 480 StuG III and 73 tanks (29 of which were Tigers). Apparently the Germans have 4740 afv's assigned to the eastern front at the time, though this wouldn't be an operational number--maybe more like half that figure. FWIW.

The Germans kept the bulk of their armor with AGNU because they thought all six Soviet Tank Armies were in the Ukraine and tank armies traditionally led the Soviet main efforts, not individual tank or mech corps. The Germans also believed that the Soviets would use these tank armies in a curving thrust to the baltic sea or employ them against Romania and the Balkans, hence the German central positioning of reserves between the two potential sectors for Soviet offensives.

Of course, they overlooked the possibility of a major offensive against AGC along the Minsk axis.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

yes it's not symmetric, but we were talking about reserves and their use in Bagration. StuGs in infantry divisions etc have little to do with it. in practice the punch of reserves comes from the panzer divisions. and, not least importantly, the numbers for operational panzers are far easier to come by than numbers for operational SPs.

i am not trying to distort numbers intentionally. i don't have any personal agenda with this topic. i might as well argue that Germans didn't concentrate any armor in AGNU at all -- the armor was there simply because that's where they were fighting.

anyway, i did try to make sense of SP numbers, because i would myself like to have something better than just panzer numbers. i only got to AGC and only for StuGs and i think i already lost 50% of my remaining sanity.

what comes to the 480 number, the report with that number states that 404 of those are operational. various other reports with later pre-Bagration dates gives something like this:

218 operational StuGs in the seven StuG Brigades within AGC Bagration area (7 of the total 32 brigades are in the AGC Bagration area, and 218 of the 710 operational assault guns).

67 operational StuGs in the three PG Divisions of AGC.

about 278 operational StuGs in Infantry Divisions and equivalents. it's interpolated, i couldn't find reports for all the divisions "yet". minimum number based on known reports (for 15 Infantry Divisions) is 149.

total: about 563 operational StuGs (434 minimum).

while looking at the above i also looked at panzers.

Panzer II: 26 (from Sturm Brigage 667)

Panzer III: 7-22 (7 in 20.PD, 15 extra from unknown source indicated in higher level report)

Panzer IV: 67 (56 in 20.PD, 11 in PGD "FHH")

Panzer VI: 29 (from 501st)

Total: 129-144

now i only need to find reports for the rest of the AGC StuG units. then find reports for all internal and separate Panzerjäger. then all that for AGNU. such happy times. i think i will pass.

[JasonC]

Right, to both. StuGs are already being used to fill out understrength turreted tanks in the PDs themselves, and double the strength of those formations in AGC. And 7 independent StuG brigades at full TOE is a considerable reserve armor force in its own right, and hardly counts as penny packets out among the IDs. Command can misuse them that way if it likes, sure, but used properly a full StuG brigade paired with a reserve infantry regiment can take on the same "linebacker" or local counterattack roles a Panzer division KG would be used for. This triples the number of significant reserve formations for stopping enemy armor...

[undead reindeer cavalry]

yes and there were the Panzerjäger units as well.

yes, often KGs were formed by combining infantry, a StuG Brigade and a Panzerjäger Abteilung. sometimes as "true" KGs (e.g. KG Schünmann 25.6.: I/PGR30, SB 190 & PJA 741) and sometimes as strong integrated groupings (like 78. Sturm Division: had both a SB and a PJA as an integrated part of it -- a powerful SP group of 31 StuGs & 17 Nashorns). the assault (sturm) variants of the SBs even contained an infantry arm in themselves.

the StuG & Panzerjäger Brigades & Abteilungen were certainly of great value. the theory behind their sound use, just like with the Panzer Brigades, is itself of great interest to me.

i might try to find out the Panzerjäger situation for AGC later, but it's very time consuming and making sense of the conflicting reports really stresses the brain. sorting it all out might be almost trivial if my German was better and i had the extra $$$ and luck to obtain the various German books that deal with this very subject.

EDIT: in any case the StuG Brigades in AGC were not used in the kind of "fire brigade" operational reserve role typical for Panzer Divisions. at local level sure, but still as part of the frontline units. there just weren't enough of them with the huge sectors of AGC.

[coe]

Given the length of AGC line and the number of AFVs available (which if you think about it is far less than the number of cars in a Mall parking lot), how in the world was it possible to get the StuG/Tanks to the breakthrough points in time? (it is also scary that such a small number of AFV's could make a difference.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Given the length of AGC line and the number of AFVs available (which if you think about it is far less than the number of cars in a Mall parking lot), how in the world was it possible to get the StuG/Tanks to the breakthrough points in time? (it is also scary that such a small number of AFV's could make a difference.

they couldn't get the armor to the breakthrough points in time and there were more breakthroughs than there was armor. like mentioned, initially the only Panzer Division is running around without firing a shot as the higher ups keep changing their mind which breakthrough to counter.

most of the armor either happens to be in a breakthrough sector or is later fighting delaying / blocking actions or rescue actions (into or out of an encirclement).

it's hard to judge how much of a difference German armor made because most of the actions are small and scattered.

[JasonC]

URD - we know what a significant reinforcement of armor could do amid the flood. The first sizable formation to reach the scene from AG South formed a blocking position at the Beresina crossings along the Moscow to Minsk highway. It had 29 Tigers, 70 Panthers (!), and about 25 other runners. 5th Guards Tank Army slammed into this position head on. The PD fought it to a standstill and held the ground for a week, claiming 300 Russian AFVs destroyed in that period. It was also ground to powder itself, with only 8 AFVs operational one week later, when it abandoned the stand and fell back.

Holding off a vastly superior enemy force, trading armor for armor at 2.5 to 3 to 1, and buying time for other formations to escape encirclement, is what 125 operational AFVs could and did accomplish in the course of Bagration. That isn't nothing. It didn't reverse the larger outcome, being driven by larger scale forces than any single PD could cope with. But it certainly helped, and offensives were stopped and forces extracted alive in other battles in the east, when there were enough cases like that along enough of the frontage.

The local armor ratio is what determined whether the Russian mech formations romped or were contained...

[undead reindeer cavalry]

yes but i was thinking more about the hundreds of assault guns and tank destroyers, and especially how they did in general (not just in the cases where Soviets tried to headbutt against them).

[coe]

That's something I was wondering about, the Pz Div had only 8 left. Were most of the rest total write offs. 3 to 1 in armor isn't a good exchange if you are German at that time of the war (thinking about the vast amounts of armor facing the germans at that time as well as production capabilities etc.). Then again, if you are vastly outnumbered I presume that your losses will be higher if you are forced to fight? 3-1 with tigers and panthers?

[undead reindeer cavalry]

no they were not total write-offs and that 8 is most likely for July 8th and is actually 18 not 8 (Zaloga's Osprey book on Bagration). anyway 5. Panzer Division strength already 9th July is 25 Panthers (36%), 25 Panzer IVs (45%), 15 Tigers (75%). Zaloga most likely chose July 8th numbers to show that fighting was fierce, eventhough it gives a false impression of the state of 5.PD after that week (or he just overlooked).

by 7th July 505th (another Tiger unit taking part in the battles with 5.PD) is down to 5 operational Tigers, and by 12th leaves the front.

5. PD was fighting a blocking action, trading blood & machines for time for the evacuation of Minsk, so the loss ratio may not have been optimal but it's still very high in my opinion. Soviet sources give a lot of credit to aviation & artillery in fighting 5.PD. last but not least 5 GTA commader was in the end sacked because of the losses in Bagration.