RL AAR- ammo use

[vincere]

Came across this from an AAR of the Anglian Battle Group April to Sept 2007. Thought it pertinent to a discussion about perfect ammo that comes up from time to time. Maybe interesting for some to contrast with CMSF

'the group fought more than 350 close quarter battles. On average every sodier was involved in at least 40 serious engagements with Taliban. They (the Battle Group) had fired more than a million bullets and 22,000 artillery and mortar shells. They had thrown over 500 hand grenades and launched more than 7,000 rifle grenades at the enemy. And they had called in more than 200,000 pounds of air-delivered munitions.

Carver (the CO) estimated circa 1000 enemy KIA.'

'Attack State Red', Colonel Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Penguin Books 2010

[Dietrich]

They had thrown over 500 hand grenades and launched more than 7,000 rifle grenades at the enemy.

I wish my British pixeltruppen were that un-reluctant to use their AGLs. =P

[Erwin]

So for every single Taliban chap it took an average of 1,000 bullets 22 artillery and mortar shells, .5 hand grenades, 7 rifle grenades plus 200 pounds of air munitions.

Anyone have an estimate of how much it has taken to cause a single casualty in previous wars? WW2, Vietnam etc??

(Dollar cost?)

[theoboy3000]

Thats my battalion, 1st Bn , Royal Anglian Regiment and it is in reference to OP Herrick 6.

The reason for the hand grenades is that when we cleared TB held compounds 'red' you would grenade every room. And when you supress an enemy to then close in and destroy, it takes a lot of rounds as you can appreciate im sure.

Hope that helps.

[Jonny(FGM)]

Anyone have an estimate of how much it has taken to cause a single casualty in previous wars? WW2, Vietnam etc??

But then again how much higher were the friendly casualty rates in these wars? It seems to me that the brits have been trading FP for friendly casualties

[akd]

My first reaction is that those ratios are actually quite a bit lower than previous wars, particularly for artillery and air munitions.

[theoboy3000]

Whats more amazing is how the Taliban sustain those losses just from the one battlegroup in 6 months and they still have fighting power left in them...

"They come like wolves in the night, they do not eat, they do not sleep. They are war machines" - A Taliban commanders message intercepted on ICOM in reference to 1st Batalion during that tour...

[Field Marshal Blücher]

I'm pretty sure that expenditure of ammo isn't that much more than standard. When you factor in suppressive fire (with direct-fire weapons, grenades, artillery, etc.) that may or may not be actually falling on enemy positions, it takes a TON of ammunition fired to actually kill an enemy. A lot of civilians that I've told this to (I'm a civilian too) wonder how it could take so many bullets to kill a guy, but what they don't realize is that not all of it is actually aimed at an identified target with a clear line of sight.

[theoboy3000]

A lot of civilians that I've told this to (I'm a civilian too) wonder how it could take so many bullets to kill a guy, but what they don't realize is that not all of it is actually aimed at an identified target with a clear line of sight.

Exactly right and i find i get the same reaction when i say how many rounds i have fired, too much COD to appreciate suppressing fire...

[vincere]

Thats my battalion, 1st Bn , Royal Anglian Regiment and it is in reference to OP Herrick 6.

The reason for the hand grenades is that when we cleared TB held compounds 'red' you would grenade every room. And when you supress an enemy to then close in and destroy, it takes a lot of rounds as you can appreciate im sure.

Hope that helps.

Lot of admiration for that battalion and battle group attachments who were in the field. Carver, and particulary two of the company commanders are portrayed as aggressive hard chargers (and obviously the ranks performed admirably).

Much of the OP involved new sweeps, and area denial into the Green Zone previously mostly off limits. There was an impression that operations were influenced by a enemy KIA count metality. An analysis of the higher situation and of the next Battle Group shortly after portrayed a shift in mentality towards Hearts and Minds partly because Kill Counts were perceived not to be working by some because Taliban were replenishing just as fast if not faster for a while.

Another striking thing from that book is what a high impact even 1 or 2 casualties had on even the large operational level.

Back to ammo use. If I recall, this Battle Group sorely missed direct fire support at times from AFV. Even when available in the form of Scimitars and light vehicle mounted .50s- the fact that the grunts were in the Green Zone and the fire support well away from it meant they were ineffective for fear of blue on blue.

Oh yeah, nearly forgot. The Taliban were mostly not hill-billies with an AK. Their SOP was prepared abush sites with planed concealed, dead ground type withdrawal routes, to the next ambush position. Also on the attack heavy fire while trying to flank again along planned routes. It was also noted that Taliban fire was on the whole accurate (mortars less so, but bracketing at times).

Some comparisons with other theatres would be interesting.

But from the last patch point of view, are the British ammo levels too low?!!?

[Apocalypse 31]

So for every single Taliban chap it took an average of 1,000 bullets 22 artillery and mortar shells, .5 hand grenades, 7 rifle grenades plus 200 pounds of air munitions.

Anyone have an estimate of how much it has taken to cause a single casualty in previous wars? WW2, Vietnam etc??

(Dollar cost?)

You cant get wrapped around the axle on this fact.

He who has the most firepower, wins the day. Or at least scares the crap out of the other guy.

When talking about dollars, consider that it costs much more for human life. A Marine commander on Guadacanal said it best: "It's easier to get more ammunition, than more Marines"

[LongLeftFlank]

Whats more amazing is how the Taliban sustain those losses just from the one battlegroup in 6 months and they still have fighting power left in them....

That won't last forever either unless the Western forces are told to quit. It is a fondly held myth of antiwar types that any popular guerrilla movement can tap into a bottomless pool of resentful underemployed and highly motivated youth to replace heavy battlefield losses (and everyone knows those body counts are all fabricated by the imperialists anyway -- another fondly held myth).

In hindsight, that has been found to be false, repeatedly. A modern military force can in fact kill and maim enough guerrillas over time that the fanatical remainder lose their ability to wage anything more than random terrorism, which alienates the populace. So long as your society has the stomach to keep losing your own professional soldiers at a steady rate.

Once the Coalition finally coopted the tribal militias in Iraq, the AQIZ forces ran out of recruits rapidly; they were down to fielding 12 year olds by late 2007. By 1972 the Viet Cong had been depleted to the point where they were no longer capable of overrunning South Vietnam, and the NVA had to do that via conventional invasion (on the second try); they too were recruiting child soldiers. Same thing in El Salvador, Guatemala, Algeria (1990s) and Sri Lanka. Before that in Bolivia, Malaya, Cambodia and North Korea. Likely also true in Chechnya.

[snake_eye]

That won't last forever either unless the Western forces are told to quit. ......In hindsight, that has been found to be false, repeatedly. A modern military force can in fact kill and maim enough guerrillas over time that the fanatical remainder lose their ability to wage anything more than random terrorism, which alienates the populace. So long as your society has the stomach to keep losing your own professional soldiers at a steady rate.........

Once the Coalition finally coopted the tribal militias in Iraq, the AQIZ forces ran out of recruits rapidly; they were down to fielding 12 year olds by late 2007. By 1972 the Viet Cong had been depleted to the point where they were no longer capable of overrunning South Vietnam, and the NVA had to do that via conventional invasion (on the second try); they too were recruiting child soldiers. Same thing in El Salvador, Guatemala, Algeria (1990s) and Sri Lanka. Before that in Bolivia, Malaya, Cambodia and North Korea. Likely also true in Chechnya.

That's true, but one should not forget that the TB are not trying to win a conventional war, but an unconventional one. They are hitting where it has the most impact in term of world wide coverage and since we are not willing to accept losses the same way they are, the politics at one time will be backing up and that leads to a handover of the fight to the country forces. That's why the OMLT are there.

Meanwhile, it is better to suppress by fire and or Recon by fire with a lot of ammo expenditure and avoid unnecessary casualties that will only give more points to the enemy.

Body counts as done in Vietnam and later on, are no more the issue. What does it prove to say that x TB have been killed and to have x more TB attacking the next days! You do the counting anyway, since they are there, if they have not been removed already, you estimate the number that might have been KIA or WIA depending on the volume of fire used and there are no press release about it. We are doing surgical strikes. Everything is clean ! no blood, no bodies, no more pictures seen on a front page. You only see them when a terrorist attack has been done on civilians. The Politics can then say, see what they have done!

Meanwhile the guys are strolling in the contryside and doing their job. They can use all the expenditure of ammo they feel fit for one enemy KIA, is not that important. The important thing is that they get back to the COP unarmed at the end of their patrol.

[LongLeftFlank]

Agreed. "Heavy battlefield losses" are the prerequisite for the bad guys running out of men before we run out of patience. If they don't engage us, we can't readily kill them, especially when they can hide and refit in Pakistan. On the other hand, if they don't engage it's possible (not guaranteed though) over time for the government to get its act together enough that even the rural majority will see the Taliban as troublesome bandits and oppose them with its own militias. Without strong local support, they wither. Of course, it's not guaranteed either that the Afghan government will be pro-Western or anti-AQ once the foreigners depart.

[Erwin]

A slight aside, but Alexander (the Great) pacified Afghanistan by basically killing everybody. It must have taken a generation or so to recover, but they didn't stay pacified. There is something about human will...

Many empires since then have tried to do the same to the Afghans. It's not called the graveyard of empires for nothing.

There does not seem to be an easy answer, like "all we need(ed) to do is persevere" re Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq etc.

[vincere]

That won't last forever either unless the Western forces are told to quit. It is a fondly held myth of antiwar types that any popular guerrilla movement can tap into a bottomless pool of resentful underemployed and highly motivated youth to replace heavy battlefield losses (and everyone knows those body counts are all fabricated by the imperialists anyway -- another fondly held myth).

In hindsight, that has been found to be false, repeatedly. A modern military force can in fact kill and maim enough guerrillas over time that the fanatical remainder lose their ability to wage anything more than random terrorism, which alienates the populace. So long as your society has the stomach to keep losing your own professional soldiers at a steady rate.

Once the Coalition finally coopted the tribal militias in Iraq, the AQIZ forces ran out of recruits rapidly; they were down to fielding 12 year olds by late 2007. By 1972 the Viet Cong had been depleted to the point where they were no longer capable of overrunning South Vietnam, and the NVA had to do that via conventional invasion (on the second try); they too were recruiting child soldiers. Same thing in El Salvador, Guatemala, Algeria (1990s) and Sri Lanka. Before that in Bolivia, Malaya, Cambodia and North Korea. Likely also true in Chechnya.

I'd go with that. I was crudely summarising- it was a move towards not a complete drop of kill count and adoption of Hearts and Minds. The hearts and minds being foucussed on Afghan fighters who may change sides and securing more areas over sweeps- kill them if they won't switch sides and kill the foriegn fighters. Indeed, the next book 'Op Snake Bite' is the first I've read that touches on Blue Death Squad raids aimed at attriting the hardcore leadership.

Also, 'Op Snake Bite' has more analysis and did decribe diefferences of approach between commanders and nations. The CO of the theatre Mobile Reserve 82nd Abn had and expressed very forthright views about how the war should be waged.

Re: ammo cost. Putting the humanistic cost to one side for a mo'- casualties cost a $£ fortune too.

[Erwin]

Quite right re human casualty cost vincere... What I was trying to allude to was that wars are not worth it if they bankrupt your empire in terms of treasure, casualties etc.

A few years ago someone said that maybe we should just get used to a certain level of terrorism in the same way that we do about crime. The war on drugs hasn't worked either. I don't consider that the west is in any danger of Taliban tanks rolling over Europe or getting to the US. There IS a danger of our economies collapsing cos we spend too much on unwinnable wars. IIRC the Boer War, a small police action of the British Empire in S.A., is considered the war that started the decline of the Brits.

Yes, we want to stop rogue WMD's. If we put a fraction of the resources we're spending on conventional wars and propping up people like Karzai so he and his "corcrons" (corrupt cronies) can live as multi-billionnaires in UAE towards the sort of intelligence and spec ops assets that are required we might get somewhere.

[Sakai007]

One problem we face, in this day and age it's multiplied, is the force multiplier of mass media. I know that TV shows don't directly kill people, but the way mass media sways a fickle public opinion, and in turn votes, elections, governments, and policies, can not be ignored. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not only been fought on the front lines, but on the front page and the CNN news ticker. The US Gov knows that there is a large and loud anti-war movement in the US. I personally think it is what got Obama elected, any liberal running for office would have nailed it, even my kitty. The Taliban knows this too, and they also know quite well how to run an unconventional war. They watch the same cable news we do, and can almost watch in real time the effect their actions and our actions against them are seen by our nation. They must actually laugh at the fact that our own media never makes public out successes, only our failures and mistakes. When we build a school that thousands of Afghan kids will go to and learn from a hopefully unbiased view of the world, we don't hear about it, when we bomb their old school on accident, it's on every news program in the world. We are slanting the war against ourselves, building anti-war and anti-US sentiment across the globe, and all the Taliban has to do is show up and die, which they seem more then willing to keep on doing!

[LongLeftFlank]

I dunno -- Karzai seems to me about the best we can expect right now from an Afghan ruler who isn't an out and out warlord. He needs to act a little ornery to prove he isn't just a Western puppet, or he gets killed the day after Western forces leave (Wiki up "Ahmed Taraki" or "Hafizullah Amin" or "Najib / Najibullah" if you want to see the track record). Were I sitting in his place, I'm not sure what I'd be doing differently.

And there are different flavours of corruption -- one man's corruption is another's patronage. You just hope the largesse gets spread fairly widely, and that your cronies have enough sense not to mess too much with whoever it is actually generating wealth in the society (whether that's herders of shaggy wide-assed goats or foreign mining companies).

Unfortunately, since the most lucrative and competitive product of Afghanistan appears to be heroin, that's going to be a destabilizer no matter who is ruling in Kabul.

[astano]

Oh yeah, nearly forgot. The Taliban were mostly not hill-billies with an AK. Their SOP was prepared abush sites with planed concealed, dead ground type withdrawal routes, to the next ambush position. Also on the attack heavy fire while trying to flank again along planned routes. It was also noted that Taliban fire was on the whole accurate (mortars less so, but bracketing at times).

That's interesting. I've often read that the Taliban are tactically sophisticated but can't hit the broad side of a barn. I remember hearing, during the initial phases of last winter's Operation Moshtarak, that Taliban rifle fire was more of a nuisance than a threat. I recall there was some speculation that the handful of Taliban snipers that could shoot were all foreigners. Whatever came of that I don't know.

EDIT: Here's an article talking about Afghan marksmanship in general. Haven't found anything about the foreign sniper speculation again, but I seem to remember it was an NYT piece. http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/afghan-marksmen-forget-the-fables/#more-16713

[vincere]

That's interesting. I've often read that the Taliban are tactically sophisticated but can't hit the broad side of a barn. I remember hearing, during the initial phases of last winter's Operation Moshtarak, that Taliban rifle fire was more of a nuisance than a threat. I recall there was some speculation that the handful of Taliban snipers that could shoot were all foreigners. Whatever came of that I don't know.

EDIT: Here's an article talking about Afghan marksmanship in general. Haven't found anything about the foreign sniper speculation again, but I seem to remember it was an NYT piece. http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/afghan-marksmen-forget-the-fables/#more-16713

Yeah, largely not up to blue individual standards but group level accurate to the point of regulary genuinely contesting the fire fight and often winning initially until blue either manouvered on the groung or by arty and or air. Regularly pinning units for periods; but generaly Brits and US section platoon and company leadership, fighting skills and spirit turned tide. However numerous quote of fears of either being outflanked and over run while being somewhat pinned.

Some mention of Taliban sniper aces up by the dam. 1x whole operation to take him out.

Talib tactics are evolving too. Another book about 1 R Irish talked about taliban pinning and manouvering to get between blue target unit and its fire support group. Also, sophisticated use if mines.

What's you definition of accurate by the way. I think i'm quoting it as enough to get the heads down. Whizzing overhead, very close dirt churning, breaking branches over head.

(Also- there is wide variation of taliban quality)

Anyway- from what i've been reading definately not all your spray and pray types. RPG fire in particular, perhaps because of ranges, was widely varied in accuracy. However, depending on trajectory near misses counld land some way off. Also, RPGs caused significant supression and casualties at times.

[Erwin]

"I dunno -- Karzai seems to me about the best we can expect right now from an Afghan ruler who isn't an out and out warlord. "

The horrible truth may be that your assessment is correct.

But, my understanding is that these guys, essentially the entire Afghan govt, don't even live in Afghanistan - they have their families in mansions literally in Dubai etc. and it's hard to see how they give a dam about their country other than lining their pockets with the (again literally) billions of dollars that have been "misplaced" by the US in the past few years.

And when the rest of us are suffering thru the worst recession etc., there is something amoral and immoral about what is beng done with taxpayer money.

So, I think Karzai basically IS a warlord... just more subtle.

[vincere]

"I dunno -- Karzai seems to me about the best we can expect right now from an Afghan ruler who isn't an out and out warlord. "

The horrible truth may be that your assessment is correct.

But, my understanding is that these guys, essentially the entire Afghan govt, don't even live in Afghanistan - they have their families in mansions literally in Dubai etc. and it's hard to see how they give a dam about their country other than lining their pockets with the (again literally) billions of dollars that have been "misplaced" by the US in the past few years.

And when the rest of us are suffering thru the worst recession etc., there is something amoral and immoral about what is beng done with taxpayer money.

So, I think Karzai basically IS a warlord... just more subtle.

There's a quote about the hearts and minds of rebuilding after the battle of Musa Quala. Most Senior commanders, US and Brit agreed that it was a priority. Inbed of author of Snake Bite went back there after a year and the Mosk plan still had not been built even though the British had paid for it twice.

I also got the impression, although not stated, that you could really question whether, at times, Karzy acted to keep the war going. It's in his interests to keep us there. The Brits (at the top political level) contented themselves with "muddling through". Could make my blood boil.

[astano]

What's you definition of accurate by the way. I think i'm quoting it as enough to get the heads down. Whizzing overhead, very close dirt churning, breaking branches over head.

(Also- there is wide variation of taliban quality)

Anyway- from what i've been reading definately not all your spray and pray types. RPG fire in particular, perhaps because of ranges, was widely varied in accuracy. However, depending on trajectory near misses counld land some way off. Also, RPGs caused significant supression and casualties at times.

You're probably more well-read on the subject than I am. Generally I'd agree that suppressive accuracy is good enough in combat. On the other hand the Taliban seem largely incapable of inflicting casualties with small arms (thankfully). The plural of anecdote is not data, but the number of comments and articles like the one I quoted previously make me wonder if in many instances Taliban fighters can even achieve that level of accuracy.

My first thought when I read your post quoted previously was about the amount of regional variation within the Taliban. Amazing that people who live in valleys a few miles from each other can be so different - I wonder if this doesn't extend to military prowess too?

[Erwin]

"It's in his interests to keep us there."

Couldn't have said it better.

And that leads to the question of who on OUR side benefits from all this? How much has flowed back in kickbacks to OUR side of the pond?

You know... when we all look back on this in two or three hundred years, I wonder if the history books will tell of this being the period of incredible corruption and self-interest on all sides that led to the downfall of western hegemony.