Russian air force

[Sergei]

In how good shape are Russian airforces these days? In the South Ossetian war they lost in short time four planes to Georgian air defenses, not that they seemed to try very hard (as in, they didn't throw in the kitchen sink) or then the air force just wasn't very well prepared for the operation.

Russians have had plenty of practise with combat air support in recent years in Chechnya and before that in Afghanistan, but in both cases the OPFOR has had no air force and very limited ground to air capacity. Just when was the last time (before 2008) that Russian or Soviet air force fought against another air force (apart from separate skirmishes)? Something in the Chinese border?

I'm just wondering how well up to task their organization and doctrine are if they haven't had much practise against other air forces or serious air defenses in decades. So if Russia decided to go air postal with something like Finland or Kazakhstan or other similar sized nation, how do you think they would fare in comparison to how NATO did against Serbia in 1999? Oh yeah, to answer that you'd probably have to have an opinion about how NATO did against Serbia, first.

[Tero]

I think (one of) the answer in the ex-Soviet equipment. They placed/sold it across the globe and they installed fail safes to prevent "friendly" fire against Red Army/Russian aircraft. The thing is the electronics are been upgraded so the fail safes are not there anymore. IIRC there was a bit of news in the Finnish media about the recently purchased SAM's and how they found some "extra" features when the electronics were being serviced or upgraded.

[Flanker15]

Today they still have some really great planes but the problem is:

They don't have enough money to build enough of them, keep them maintained properly and train pilots to fly them. So you end up with a Air-force that isn't as good as it could be. However the reforms that Putin started (and is propably continuing to run) are correcting these problems. Back in the early 80s they had perhapse the best airforce in the world, their planes were friggin awsome, Mig-29s and then the Su-27s more than a match for NATO's planes. Then the government collapsed and the money dried up, all aspects of the Russian military suffered.

If I remember corectlly in Georgia the planes that were shot down were a recon plane and several Su-25s, they were all shot down by SAMs. The reason appeared to be that they attempted the strikes without properly removing air defenses first and the older Su-25s need to attack in close range since they lack modern ATG weapons making them vulnerable to MANPADS.

As for the last time the Russian airforce was used before then, I guess Vietnam comes to mind. Both sides had times of sucess with better planes before the other side deployed something better.

Anyone know: did the Soviets deploy something better than the Phantom during Vietnam?

[Rob Ross]

This reminds me. I remember hearing during the conflict that one model of Russian aircraft bombed the factory in Georgia that built them!

For any grogs: Was that true, what type were they, and has an aircraft ever done that in history before?

Cheers.

[Secondbrooks]

I believe airforce didn't perform very well. Combined arms principles worked between artillery and infantry at most. Choppers and Airforce are said to fail to support troops. With choppers problem was lack of training and working with ground forces, could think that Airforces have doe that even less.

My small mind tried to read one article about it, it stated that Airforce was infact airfarce in Georgia, it was rather long article, covering about one A4 paper :eek:... Well i'm not interested of such things, so i didn't bother to read more that half of first and half of last sentece.

Talk about throwing pearls to pigs. :cool:

[Secondbrooks]

I think (one of) the answer in the ex-Soviet equipment. They placed/sold it across the globe and they installed fail safes to prevent "friendly" fire against Red Army/Russian aircraft. The thing is the electronics are been upgraded so the fail safes are not there anymore. IIRC there was a bit of news in the Finnish media about the recently purchased SAM's and how they found some "extra" features when the electronics were being serviced or upgraded.

I don't remember what is going to be BUK's destiny, has it even been defined yet? It should be pretty potent system and as said by some: best of it's time. (well it could bes guy who actually was selecting it ) And i remember talk that during next decade it would/could/should be modernized... Now soon i have feeling that it will be replaced, by French made long range AA-missiles SAMP/T (correct name?). Sounds odd to waste relatively fresh AA-system to buy a new one, while modernization would be much cheaper solution.

That, if BUK gets removed form service, would make point stronger that there indeed is something shady in it... Or then we are talking just about eek!!!-it's-Russian/Soviet-equipment-quickly-destory-it reaction.

[Sergei]

This reminds me. I remember hearing during the conflict that one model of Russian aircraft bombed the factory in Georgia that built them!

For any grogs: Was that true, what type were they, and has an aircraft ever done that in history before?

Cheers.

It's Sukhoi 25. I'd say it's unprecedented, I would be amazed if there's been other similar cases. It's not very often that nations that manufacture airplanes go to war with nations that use the same airplanes. Even then it's normally the manufacturer that does most of the bombing.

[Rob Ross]

Interesting! Thanks Sergei.

[Sergei]

I believe airforce didn't perform very well. Combined arms principles worked between artillery and infantry at most. Choppers and Airforce are said to fail to support troops. With choppers problem was lack of training and working with ground forces, could think that Airforces have doe that even less.

Hmm, interesting. You'd expect the air support elements in the Caucasus region to be more experienced in ground support roles. Then again it's a different situation when the enemy has a working radar and SAM network supporting their troops. It just spoils the leisurely CAS mood when the cockpit warning lights start twinkling and beeping... anyway, not that that made any difference.

[Secondbrooks]

Sergei. Here it is.

Air farce: The Russian Air Force didn't perform well during the conflict in South Ossetia

Russia & CIS Observer, №4 (23) November 2008 (http://www.ato.ru/rus/cis/archive/23-2008/)

Konstantin Makienko

The role of aviation in armed conflicts increased steadily over the past few decades and culminated in NATO's Yugoslavia campaign of 1999, which was won exclusively with air strikes. By contrast, the success of Russia's five-day operation in South Ossetia in August 2008 was secured by the decisive actions of airborne units and ground troops. The Russian Air Force, for its part, performed quite poorly and suffered losses that were too heavy for such a brief campaign. This resulted from both the weakness of the Russian Air Force and the fact that Georgia deployed relatively dense, modern air defenses in the conflict zone.

The general plan of Georgia's operation in South Ossetia called for a rapid destruction of the Ossetian armed forces and a lightning capture of the republic's capital city of Tskhinvali — well before the Russian army could have a chance to intervene. It appears that during the night from August 7 to 8. Tbilisi intended to deliver strikes on the positions of the Russian peacekeepers and the South Ossetian army in order to paralyze the chain of command. The next objective was to take Tskhinvali during August 8, install a puppet government chaired by Dmitry Sanakoyev (the former South Ossetian prime minister, appointed by the Georgian president in May 2007 as the head of the South Ossetian Provisional Administrative Entity], and bring residents of Georgian enclaves in the republic onto the streets during pro-Georgia mass rallies.

Tbilisi had a good chance of attaining these goals. Even if Moscow was quick enough to react (which proved to be the case), the build-up of Russian troops would proceed very slowly due to the region's complex terrain. Indeed, Russian military convoys were filtering into the conflict zone through the narrow Roki Tunnel, so their strength and firepower were increasing at an extremely slow pace. In this situation, the Russian Air Force — with its quick reaction times and powerful strike capability — was to provide immediate support to the surrounded peacekeepers and the weak South Os-setian armed groups. Ideally. Russian aviation should have suppressed the Georgian artillery and multiple-launch rocket system positions before the end of August 8. .Another urgent task was to deliver air strikes on the Georgian 4th Infantry Brigade, which was storming Tskhinvali.

Russian aviation attempted to accomplish these objectives, but immediately lost three Sukhoi Su-25 ground-attack aircraft to Georgian anti-air fire. After that, according to eyewitness accounts, there were no Russian aircraft over Tskhinvali on August 8 or the following day — that is. during the most critical period of the conflict. In effect, the Russian military command was forced to bring motor-rifle units into battle from the march, without first gaining superiority in numbers and firepower.

The Georgian troops maintained the tactical initiative on the outskirts of Tskhinvali throughout August 9 and even during August 10. What thwarted the Georgian operation in the end was not the Russian Air Force, but the resistance offered by peacekeepers and lightly armed, poorly organized South Ossetian units that stayed behind to defend the capital. (The main armed forces of South Ossetia were at that time concentrated in the settlement of Java to the north of Tskhinvali). Essentially, the Georgian troops failed to take Tskhinvali because they were not prepared psychologically for severe urban fighting.

The Russian Air Force's failure to provide efficient fire support to the ground troops was not just due to the surprisingly strong Georgian air defenses, but also because there was no proper interaction between the Russian air and ground forces, and no modern target indication equipment was available. Both these limitations were later mentioned as some of the conflict's key lessons by Lt. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, chief of the Russian Armed Forces Directorate of Combat Training and Service of Troops, who had served as a top military commander in Chechnya during the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 campaigns. Most likely, technological inadequacies and insufficient tactical readiness were not the only factors in the poor performance of Russian military aviation. The ineffectual reforms of the Russian armed forces, which saw army aviation transferred under the Air Force command in 2003-2004, must also have played a role.

One other deficiency of the Russian Air Force demonstrated during the South Ossetian operation was its inability to gain and sustain air superiority over the battlefield. Russian military convoys advancing along narrow mountainous roads were totally exposed to air raids by Georgian ground-attack aviation. There is no evidence that Russian fighters provided air protection for the ground troops. Numerous reports assert that Georgian Su-25 attacks were countered with the help of tactical air defense assets, i.e. self-propelled AA guns and man-portable air defense systems. The low efficiency of the Georgian air raids can be put down exclusively to inadequate pilot training. That said, Georgian Su-25s continued attempted attacks on the Russian troops even on August 11, the last day of combat actions. It is totally unbelievable that the Russian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority almost to the end of the five-day war, despite the fact that the enemy had no fighter aviation.

In the course of the conflict, the Russian Air Force demonstrated a complete inability to suppress enemy air defenses. To be fair, Russian aviation had never before faced such a task. The Georgian troops had at least one battalion (according to some sources, two battalions) of relatively modern Buk-Ml (SA-11) self-propelled SAM systems, at least two battalions (a total of eight units) of Osa-AK (SA-8B) self-propelled SAM systems, and six to 10 of the upgraded Osa-AKM version. They managed to deploy dense air defenses right in the conflict zone, as well as near the Georgian cities of Gori and Tbilisi. On the very first day of combat action, Georgian air defense units inflicted heavy losses on Russian aviation. They shot down up to four war-planes — one Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bomber and three Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. By the end of the conflict Russia, had lost at least seven warplanes; the figure could exceed 10 if we count the aircraft that returned to base but were damaged beyond repair.

The Georgian air defenses were eventually destroyed by Russian infantry detachments. After the Georgian army's collapse on August 11-12, the Russian troops seized at least six serviceable Buk-Ml systems and up to five intact examples of the Osa-AK/Osa-AK.M. One possible explanation for the Russian Air Force's failure to suppress Georgian air defense is that its pilots most likely had not been practicing such missions — as this kind of training had proved irrelevant in both Chechen campaigns. On the other hand, the Russian Air Force found itself pitted against much more advanced air defense systems in Georgia (mostly Buk-M1 s) than NATO pilots had in Iraq and Yugoslavia (obsolete Kub/Kvadrat (SA-6) and even S-125 (SA-3) SAM systems). Although Georgian anti-aircraft weapons ended up in the hands of Russian infantry, there have been reports indicating that the Russian Air Force did manage to suppress Georgian air defense radar stations by the second half of the day on August 11.

The only operations by Russian aviation during the South Ossetian conflict that could be described as moderately successful were strikes on Georgian military and administrative targets. The damage caused by the air strikes was negligible, but they considerably demoralized the enemy. There is no doubt that political considerations restricted the scale of bombardments. For example, Russia abstained from striking on Tbilisi International Airport, which Georgia was using to receive flights bringing servicemen of the 1st Infantry Brigade from Iraq.

Overall, the operation in South Osse-tia highlighted the need for profound modernization of the Russian Air Force. Apart from the procurement of new aircraft (primarily multirole types) and modernization of the existing fleet, the service needs to intensify its combat training, with a special focus on practicing the suppression of enemy air defenses.

[Stalins Organ]

The Tu-22 that was shot down was on a recon flight, and was (apparently) crewed by instruction staff from a flight school somewhere.....which imnplies that the Russians don't consider their line pilots all that flash.

[Michael Emrys]

Back in the early 80s they had perhapse the best airforce in the world, their planes were friggin awsome...

Hmmm, that's not exactly how I remember it. After the fall of the USSR, when Western aeronautical experts were able to get a good look at the former Soviet planes, they pronounced them surprisingly crudely built. Whether they would have performed well enough in the numbers that they would have been committed, no one can now say for sure, but to proclaim them the best strikes me as hasty, to say the least.

Michael

[Flanker15]

When I say best I'm sort of only refering to air-superiority from the Mig-29 and Su-27 alone, the rest of their airforce left somthing to be desired.

The Su-27 in particular was very well designed, it could out perform the NATO planes of the time, engage targets in BVR without using radar and in a knife fight could perform very spectacular maneuvers combined with helmet mounted targeting and Offbore sighted R-73s. The Western fighters only recently matched its close range ability with the AIM-9X.

The advantage the NATO fighters had at the time was better BVR radar tracking missiles, mainly the AMRAAM.

[gunnergoz]

Yeah, that and the fact that the Russians will ram your plane when they're out of ammo!

[Michael Emrys]

The Su-27 in particular was very well designed...

It's a great design, a true classic. Trouble is, the Russians couldn't afford many of them, and new US designs are closing the gap.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Yeah, that and the fact that the Russians will ram your plane when they're out of ammo!

But they have to get in close before they can do that. I know, that's stating the obvious. But the point is that that is a tactic that isn't stupendously hard to avoid.

Michael

[FAI]

When I say best I'm sort of only refering to air-superiority from the Mig-29 and Su-27 alone, the rest of their airforce left somthing to be desired.

The Su-27 in particular was very well designed, it could out perform the NATO planes of the time, engage targets in BVR without using radar and in a knife fight could perform very spectacular maneuvers combined with helmet mounted targeting and Offbore sighted R-73s. The Western fighters only recently matched its close range ability with the AIM-9X.

The advantage the NATO fighters had at the time was better BVR radar tracking missiles, mainly the AMRAAM.

I've found claims that the SU30-MKII could out-maneuver an F-22. What do you think?

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Bigduke6]

I think I can respond to this question because, as it happened, I was nearby during a couple of the Russian sorties.

The answer is "yes." Next to Tbilisi airport is a factory that makes Su-25, as I understand it the only Soviet-era factory that did so. The Russians largely used Su-25 for their air strikes. Go figure. It looked like the Russians were tossing 3-4 dumb bombs at the factory per raid. Not huge bombs either, they clearly were trying to miss the airport, which usually they did.

Typically, the Russian plane would come in from the east, sometime in the morning, from Dagestan, rather than the north and Ossetia and/or Chechnya. I was told this was because the Georgians were pointing their air defence radars north, and the Russians were sneaky.

The Russians came pretty much daily for the duration of the active phase of the war. Every time the raid came Tbilisi airport would shut down, but not for long. One time the airport received an civilian aircraft, the Russians bombed the factory, and the Tbilisi airport ground crew unloaded and reloaded the Boeing, and had it back in the air, in about an hour and change, shut down for the air raid included.

As to history I don't know of any cases where a bomber winds up dropping on the factory that built it. I'd be willing to bet that during WW2 something the Finns bought from the Soviets wound up dropping on industrial targets around Leningrad, among which for sure were aircraft factories. But I'm sure one of our Finns knows for sure and will be around shortly to clarify the record.

This reminds me. I remember hearing during the conflict that one model of Russian aircraft bombed the factory in Georgia that built them!

For any grogs: Was that true, what type were they, and has an aircraft ever done that in history before?

Cheers.

[Bigduke6]

As I understand it the Tu-22 was sent kind of on a scramble mission because the Russians only realized they didn't have any good air recon of Georgia, after the war began. Kind of makes you wonder about Russian sattelite capacity, huh? Anyway, what supposedly happened was that the General Staff said "Find out NOW!" and that translated to this ad hoc sortie with top end pilots, because when the General Staff wants something you don't wait for the system to filter the order down to a line unit, you grab the best people you can as close to Moscow as you can.

Sooo....all was well and good except that Russian intelligence apparently goofed on Georgian ADA capacity, or more specifically that the Georgians had bought an SAM-11 variant made in Ukraine called Buk, which operated on frequencies the Russians either didn't know about or weren't planning to jam. As a result the Tu-22 sails into Georgian airspace at the edge of the stratosphere and the aircrew is pretty much sure the Georgians can touch it, and surprise yes they can. The Russians are still mad, they have accused the Ukrainians of sending everything but Rambo and Jean Claude Van Damme, in secret, to support the Georgians. But it really seems like Russian intelligence just missed the presence of the Buk system, or Russian command failed to get the fact the Buk system was in Georgia and operational to the Tu-22 aircrew.

After that the Russians went to low and fast and not sending aircraft deep into Georgia if they could avoid it. They sort of reverted to the Red Army system where Tac Air flies around just ahead of the armored columns and hits pre-planned stuff or just circles and tries to hit targets of opportunity which, since the Georgians spent a good portion of the war running like crazy, translated to bashed vehicles on roads leading away from the Russians.

The Tu-22 that was shot down was on a recon flight' date=' and was (apparently) crewed by instruction staff from a flight school somewhere.....which imnplies that the Russians don't consider their line pilots all that flash.[/quote']

[Rob Ross]

Good stuff BD6 - sounds like you had a ringside seat to it all, but I'm not exactly sure that I envy you that!

Also good stuff by the Tiblisi airport guys, that's some impressive air handing :-)

[Sergei]

I'd be willing to bet that during WW2 something the Finns bought from the Soviets wound up dropping on industrial targets around Leningrad, among which for sure were aircraft factories.

You are absolutely right, except that Finland at no point before or during WW2 bought any military equipment from Soviet Union (we just 'borrowed' stuff, including bombers that had crash landed behind our lines) and AFAIK Finnish Air Force didn't take part in bombing Leningrad, and even if that happened then the Blenheims would have been a more likely choice.

The Russians are still mad, they have accused the Ukrainians of sending everything but Rambo and Jean Claude Van Damme, in secret, to support the Georgians.

Ah, and let's not forget all those Lithuanian female snipers...

[Bigduke6]

Sergei,

You sure about that "only borrowing" stuff?

The reason I ask is I found this neat linkie:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_units_of_the_Finnish_Air_Force_during_the_Continuation_War

which in aggregrate lists the following Soviet aircraft as operating in the Finnish air force during the continuation war -

2 Polikarpov U-2

2 Lavochkin LaGG-3

8 Polikarpov I-153

4 Ilyushin DB-3M

3 Ilyushin Il-4

4 Ilyushin DB-3M

An unclear number of Ilyushin Il-4

4 Petlyakov Pe-2

14 Tupolev SB-2

3 Beriev MBR-2s

2 Polikarpov I-16s

5 Polikarpov I-153s

To me, that's an awful lot of aircraft to be "borrowed" or rebuilt from crashlanded planes. Although I guess not impossible.

In any case, by my count that's 30 to maybe 40 bomber type aircraft built in the Soviet Union operated by Finland, so to me it's somewhere between possible and probable some of them bombed Leningrad at some point.

But then based on my superficial reading it appears the Finns avoided bombing major Soviet industrial targets, meaning that if that were the case, even three dozen Soviet-built bombers in the inventory would not mean they wound up bombing the factory that built them.

I suppose the next step in this globally critical research would be to find out which of the Soviet aircraft in the Finnish air force, were built near Leningrad.

[Sergei]

None were purchased from USSR at any point in 1920's or 1930's, I'm sure of that. See the following list from the Finnish Wikipedia page, it shows when the trophy planes were acquired and when taken from use:

Beriev MBR-2 & MBR-2bis 5 1941 1942

Curtiss P-40M Warhawk 1 1943 1945

Iljušin DB-3f ie. Il-4 11 1943 1945

Polikarpov I-152 (I-15bis) 5 1940 1945

Polikarpov I-153 11 1940 1945

Polikarpov I-16 2 1940 1943

Polikarpov I-16 UTI 1 1941 1943

Polikarpov U-2 4 1942 1945

Petljakov Pe-2 7 1941 1946

Petljakov Pe-3 1 1943 1944

Šavrov Sh-2 2 1942 1944

Here's also the list on bombers in English, the years differ a bit, but they both must be true because it's Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_of_the_Finnish_Air_Force#Bombers

Were all of them crashlanded and captured? I'm not sure, some may have been captured on airfields and some bought from Germany that had gotten a ton of them. The Polikarpov's captured in 1940 certainly were crash landed, and it's not hard to believe that they could have landed intact on the ice sheet of a lake, as they were light and could land at low speed and may have been equipped with skis.

[jurpo]

Were all of them crashlanded and captured? I'm not sure, some may have been captured on airfields and some bought from Germany that had gotten a ton of them.

Especially bombers were bought from German war booty stocks (no, they didn't just hand them out for nothing) they had captured during the Barbarossa advance.

I have a reference book on Finnish bombers, but it's buried in a box somewhere and I'm too lazy to dig it out now, so see, e.g., http://www.sci.fi/~ambush/faf/fafincolor.html.