Transformation of the US Army

[M1A1TC]

After five years, the Iraq war is transforming the military By Nancy A. Youssef, McClatchy Newspapers

Sun Mar 16, 6:00 AM ET

WASHINGTON — When U.S. forces crossed the Kuwaiti border into Iraq in the pre-dawn hours of March 20, 2003 , the military set out to shock and awe the Middle East with the swiftest transformation the region had ever seen.

Five years and hundreds of billions of dollars later, it's the U.S. military that's been transformed. The efficient, tech-savvy Army , built, armed and trained to fight conventional wars against aggressor states, is now making deals with tribal sheiks and building its power on friendly conversations with civilians.

Instead of planning for quick, decisive battles against other nations, as it was five years ago, today's American military is planning for protracted, nuanced conflicts with terrorist groups, insurgents, guerrillas, militias and other shadowy forces that seldom stand and fight.

The staples of American military doctrine that have developed since the Civil War — artillery, armor, air power, speed and overwhelming force— are of limited use against enemies who blend into civilian populations.

Five years after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq , the military is being reconfigured to fight insurgencies, but its evolution has been an unplanned, improvised affair, a series of course corrections in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . Some changes have been simply last-ditch efforts to stop the violence against Iraqis and U.S. troops, and some say the changes impair the military's ability to fight a conventional war against a "peer competitor."

Divisions are dispersed into what the military calls a more modular Army so smaller units can be moved throughout Iraq . The military has rolled out new vehicles to thwart high-powered explosives. It's set up new training centers and given captains and colonels far more leeway to lead at the local level, not simply follow a general's orders.

Pentagon leaders call this the military of the future.

"Clearly the training now is almost exclusively focused on COIN (counterinsurgency) because that's the fight we are in. And it will continue that way as long as the fight stays at the level that it is," said Adm. Michael Mullen , chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview with McClatchy .

In the last five years, the military has gained "speed, agility (and) flexibility that . . . we didn't have as a much heavier force" a few years ago, Mullen said.

It's a big departure from the transformation that then-Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld promised in the months leading up to the war. Under his plan, the Army would be smaller and rely more on precision air attacks and the latest technology.

Indeed, the war in Iraq was supposed to last a few weeks. The U.S. would dispatch the Iraqi military, overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, install a new government led by Iraqi exiles and introduce freedom, democracy and a market economy.

Within days, however, the U.S. lost control. Looters took to the streets, and an insurgency took root. The U.S. installed an American occupation government and tried to secure a hostile nation rather than a grateful one.

Back then, there was little talk of counterinsurgency. But the new Army Field Manual puts counterinsurgency on a par with conventional war. "Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient," it states. "Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success."

But while the Army has intellectually embraced counterinsurgency, it hasn't said how it will build a force that can fight both conventional wars and counterinsurgency campaigns. How should it train its soldiers? What kind of enemy will the U.S. face? So far, military leaders cannot agree on those fundamental questions.

By adopting a new mode of warfare, "the Army is a python that has just swallowed a pig," said a U.S. Army officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to speak more candidly. "It's not clear to me it understands how hard the digestion process is going to be."

"The Army is going to have to build organizations optimized to do (post-combat) stability operations, and that's not what this Army wants to do," the officer added.

Lt. Col. John Nagl , who co-authored the U.S. military's 2006 counterinsurgency manual with Gen. David Petraeus , now the top American military commander in Iraq , questions whether the Army is serious about counterinsurgency.

"The real question is: How does the Army react to the (new field manual)? Can the Army transform itself to be as effective as possible in future battles, which are going to look a lot like Iraq and Afghanistan ?" Nagl said in an interview with McClatchy .

Some think that Iraq is a temporary problem and that the U.S. shouldn't engage in nation-building, as called for under counterinsurgency strategy.

Some think the Army isn't prepared for both kinds of war. Pete Geren , the secretary of the Army , testified on Capitol Hill last month that as the Army steps up counterinsurgency training, it's losing its conventional war skills.

"Our goal is full-spectrum readiness. And right now we're— we're not able to claim that," Geren said. "We are not able to properly organize, train and equip for the rest of the spectrum of operations."

Gen. George Casey , the Army chief of staff, has repeatedly warned that the Army is strained by having 160,000 troops in Iraq . Other Army leaders estimate that the U.S. must reduce its deployment to 12 combat brigades from the current 18 or find itself at the "breaking point."

The war in Iraq has required some soldiers to serve multiple tours of up to 15 months and to remain in uniform longer than they signed up for. Before the war started, soldiers generally served six-month tours in combat zones.

Mullen acknowledged the friction between counterinsurgency and conventional warfare.

"I think that (tension) will be constructive, and actually with what we learned through counterinsurgency, potentially very creative tension as we move to the next several years to get back to a broader spectrum of training."

The military's embrace of counterinsurgency came only in the last 18 months as soldiers noted measurable security improvements in Iraq . In the early years of the war, only a handful of military commanders spoke of the importance of economic development, respecting civilians and employing military might cautiously.

Back then, many ridiculed using "soft power" against what they considered a ruthless enemy. Soldiers said they were in Iraq to fight.

These days in Iraq , soldiers say they're likely to spend the rest of their careers in places such as Iraq , reaching out to civilians and fighting major battles only occasionally. Instead of generals giving orders from behind the front lines, captains and colonels will be forced to adapt as they maneuver through local, tribal politics. And many soldiers say those mid-level leaders will base their decisions on their experiences in Iraq .

Sgt. John Pierce Senkarik , 25, of 1st Brigade, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, is serving in Diyala province, and could be one of them. Senkarik, of Pensacola, Fla. , comes from a family imbued with military history, and he once thought he'd fight the same kind of battles his forebears did. But since he signed up, he said, he's seen a transformation within the Army .

Senkarik, who's serving his second tour in Iraq , said he plans to stay in the military so the Army can capitalize on his experiences there.

"The Army is filled with junior leaders and middle-level leaders who have a vast amount of combat experience in counterinsurgency, in urban combat," he said. Mid-level officers will lead and be "responsible for the up-and-coming Army ."

( Steve Lannen of the Lexington Herald-Leader contributed from Diyala province, Iraq .)

[Clavicula_Nox]

Well, we all hope that good leaders and officers will stay in the Army and eventually replace the politcians...but I doubt that will happen to any real extent. Anyways, the emphasis on smaller and self-contained units (Brigade Combat Teams) has helped a lot, and hopefully with the future expanse of the Army, this doctrine will continue to serve in a meaningful capacity.

[gibsonm]

And as always the Army (or whoever’s country) will be equipped and organised to fight the last war.

[M1A1TC]

I just extended my contract by one more year...We will see what happens

[FAI]

4K in a couple of days...

[FAI]

Originally posted by Clavicula_Nox:

Well, we all hope that good leaders and officers will stay in the Army and eventually replace the politcians...but I doubt that will happen to any real extent. Anyways, the emphasis on smaller and self-contained units (Brigade Combat Teams) has helped a lot, and hopefully with the future expanse of the Army, this doctrine will continue to serve in a meaningful capacity.

You're putting too much faith in ex-military man-cum-politician. They'd be first and foremost politicians.

[Splinty]

Re-enlistments and extensions are at an all time high according to Army Times. The problem is getting new recruits not keeping them.

[MikeyD]

I heard the Army was hemorraghing mid-level field officers badly. Foot soldiers are looking at $20,000 reenlistment bonuses compared to a recession stateside. They got no place they can go.

[Clavicula_Nox]

Originally posted by FAI:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Clavicula_Nox:

Well, we all hope that good leaders and officers will stay in the Army and eventually replace the politcians...but I doubt that will happen to any real extent. Anyways, the emphasis on smaller and self-contained units (Brigade Combat Teams) has helped a lot, and hopefully with the future expanse of the Army, this doctrine will continue to serve in a meaningful capacity.

You're putting too much faith in ex-military man-cum-politician. They'd be first and foremost politicians. </font>

[M1A1TC]

I only did one year because I know my unit isnt deploying till fall of 2010. I want to avoid being deployed, since I am getting married and all. After they come back, Ill re-join the unit

In National Guard they are offering $7.5K for 3 years, $15K for 6 years

[Clavicula_Nox]

Oh. How many deployments do you have?

[M1A1TC]

Well, we did one in 2006 for 16 months, came back spring 2007. Supposed to be 5 years between deployments

[Clavicula_Nox]

5 years!? What? Why? Oh man..2004-2005 Iraq, June 2006-Feb 2007 Iraq, July 2007-October 2007 A-stan. I got off easy, guys from 82nd go back after 6 months.

[M1A1TC]

I am in the Guard now, thats why. The Army cant use us as much as active duty guys. The 6 year cycle (one deployment, 5 training) is brand new, just implemented, so who knows how well it will work

[Clavicula_Nox]

Oh, that makes sense. Which do you prefer?

[M1A1TC]

Well, I like the new system, it gives the NG guys enough time to train and get things done at home between missions. The combat tours are supposed to be a year now...

I dont want to be deployed again. Its time to stop being selfish, and think about my new family. Ive seen too many friends get divorces, I dont want to end up like that

[Clavicula_Nox]

Yeah, I know guys who can count the number of wives by the number of deployments they've had. I suppose the best way to avoid ending up like that is to have the right wife in the first place, communicate to her about how important she is to you, and don't piss her off while deployed. I wouldn't know, but I will be finding out shortly when I take my first married deployment. I luck out because as sof, we don't generally go for more than 6 months at a time, but just end going more often.

I would like to finish college, and will probably get into Reserves and re-class to either CA or PSYOP when I get the chance, then possibly return to active duty via OCS, ROTC, or just go full-stop Green to Gold. Not sure at this point.

[Oddball_E8]

each new war changes the way the military operates...

[M1A1TC]

The point I was making with my original post is that the US Army is transforming itself to fight COIN type operations. Yet, the CMSF combat is mostly conventional in nature

[abneo3sierra]

Clavicula, what unit are you in?

M1A1- We always tool to fight the last war unfortunately as gibson said above. Not sure if we will ever learn, and not sure really if an army can learn that even. As a football fan I compare it to two coaches, each watching game films of the previous weeks games, and each adjusting to what the other will do based on what they did the previous week. It is chess at the highest level, and our opponents watch us as well, and learn, or try to, what we will do in a situation. Then we change how we act based on what we believe they will do. In the end, it is a gamble where the losers take sometimes years into the next war to learn, and start the whole process over again.

[Splinty]

Hey M1A1, don't count on the 5 year turn-around to keep you safe. I did one tour in 03-04, and got re-deployed in 06-07. It's all based around the needs of the Army, and there's a "we got you if we need you" clause.

[Omenowl]

The united States military as a whole has been focusing on conventional type wars rather than COIN, nation building and low intensity combat. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are all more along the UN missions rather than the cold war missions.

The problem is not always fighting the last war, but rather fighting wars we don't want to fight. The army planned not to get involved in nation building so the money went to other items. The airforce is more enamored by the F-22 rather than cheap drones piloted by enlisted. The airforce still puts fighters as a higher priority than heavy lift capability.

Ideally we want another Iraq war where we can fight for 60 days and bring our troops back home. The reality is far different.

[M1A1TC]

Originally posted by Splinty:

Hey M1A1, don't count on the 5 year turn-around to keep you safe. I did one tour in 03-04, and got re-deployed in 06-07. It's all based around the needs of the Army, and there's a "we got you if we need you" clause.

I know Splinty, but my Battalion is scheduled for deployment in 2010, so we cant be tasked before that mission

[Clavicula_Nox]

Originally posted by abneo3sierra:

Clavicula, what unit are you in?

M1A1- We always tool to fight the last war unfortunately as gibson said above. Not sure if we will ever learn, and not sure really if an army can learn that even. As a football fan I compare it to two coaches, each watching game films of the previous weeks games, and each adjusting to what the other will do based on what they did the previous week. It is chess at the highest level, and our opponents watch us as well, and learn, or try to, what we will do in a situation. Then we change how we act based on what we believe they will do. In the end, it is a gamble where the losers take sometimes years into the next war to learn, and start the whole process over again.

USASOC, not one of the subordinate units. Prior to that, 35th Signal Brigade (Airborne) for a year and a couple of months; the year was spent deployed in 2004-2005.

The airforce is more enamored by the F-22 rather than cheap drones piloted by enlisted. The airforce still puts fighters as a higher priority than heavy lift capability.

Yes, and the Army is taking over the UAV mission, as far as I'm aware.

[Tuomio]

I don't think the actual war waging is much different than it has ever been. You just shoot until nobody shoots back, move on and repeat if necessary. Things that are left behind belong to some other entity. Death and destruction is the things that will always wait in there, for political hands-on approach.

Personally i see the whole insurgency-against-military a hologram, which is generated to evade the tough underlying POLITICAL questions. The situation in Iraq is not the kind of which military can bring answers for. Maybe we don't event HAVE to answer all questions (as they might never end), world keeps on turning even if the mechanisms are not fully understood.

The actual 30 days of Iraq war was excelent, non-hypochritical military action, which succeeded well (good preparation & excecution). It all should've ended there, pack the gear and get the hell out.

I see the rest of it (military making love with the population) as pure political BS which has no reason to exist, other than to feed itself, bloat and eventually explode. Every penny in there is like blowing air into a balloon. Cultural salvation is a internal process and savage ("Thin") cultures will not get any better because they just are not there yet. World Wars saw collapse of many infrastructures, but when you have strong culture, it will rise from the ashesh out on its own. You can install homes, but you cant install self-esteem, pride and comfort-seeking, because those things run in family lines, are passed on from parent to a child.

If one would start to train its military for proxy counter-insurgency tool, it would be like sharpening a hammer so you can cut bread with it. Crap in, crap out.