Hard Limits, Soft Limits and Manpower in WWII

[ev]

One of the good features in SC2 is the use of Soft Limits in the advanced settings modes. For those of you that do not venture into this window, Soft Limits allow you to build extra units at a higher cost, once you exceed the maximum limit set for a given set of units. I would like to push the idea of soft limits one step further.

As I see it the soft limit/hard limit options try to simulate the fact that each country had limited resources. Elsewhere in this site much was said about Germany’s limited capacity to produce fuel, and hence to sustain a large armored force. Although I generally agree with the fact that Germany had limited fuel resources, there were other resource limitations that were more important during WWII.

At the start of WWII, Germany had a male population of some 30 million. By the end of the war the Wermacht had had some 13.5 million casualties (dead, missing, captured or disabled). See Glantz’s When Titans Clashed. By mid 1942, Germany had some 3.5 million men in the eastern front, and probably another half million men in arms elsewhere throughout Europe and North Africa., but had already lost about as many men in casualties. So, by mid 1942 Germany’s economy had been drained of 7 million workers (half in service and half in casualties) out of an initial population of 60 million. Clearly, this represented a huge drain to the economy.

Anecdotal evidence suggest that arms production suffered because of lack of manpower, long before Germany started to experience fuel shortages. In his memoirs, Lost Victories, Manstein tells us the Wermacht experienced sever manpower shortages as early as 1942. Manstein thinks the problem was the Luftwaffe and SS had first pick on recruits and there were not enough men left for the Wermacht. That may have been so, but numbers also tell us that the manpower pool was running on empty.

The soft/hard limits are a good start in an attempt to model this manpower shortages. But soft/hard limits fall short on one important count: loss replacement. SC2 limits only look at the total number of units you have on the board. You can have huge manpower losses, and, you can keep replacing them at “low cost” without triggering the soft/hard limit penalty. As long as you do not exceed the number of unit counters on the map, a player is not penalized for inordinate manpower losses.

I would like to see an SC2 take into account casualty replacement as something that can hurt war production if it exceeds certain limits. One easy way to achieve this is to assign each country a soft maximum of replacements per turn. Once you exceed this maximum, all additional replacements bought in that turn will cost extra - say 25% more.

Say for example Germany is given a monthly soft limit of 20 replacement points per turn. A German player may replace up to 20 combat points among all its units in any given turn at the prevailing MPP cost. However, if in a single turn the German player tries to replace 23 combat strength points (adding up all replacements bought in a single turn) then the last 3 replacement points purchased in that turn will cost 25% more.

Rebuilding lost units should count as part of this soft limit of replacements per turn. If the German player lost an infantry corps and he tries to rebuild it, rebuilding that unit should count as 10 replacement points for purposes of the soft replacement limit. But, disbanding a unit should give you a replacement credit for the turn in which a unit is disbanded.

I would give serious thought as to whether production of a new unit should count towards this manpower limit. Say the German player is building an Infantry Corps (combat strength 10). In doing so he would have reduced by 10 the replacement pool available for that turn. Hence, in the example above, he would be left with only another 10 points for replacement before triggering the replacement soft limit penalty.

Of course, this soft limit on replacements per turn is only a half measure to what would be the ideal way to model manpower availability. Ideally, we would have a replacement pool which expands in a month when casualties are not replaced, and contracts when replacements are purchased. But, programming such a pool would be more complicated. A soft limit on replacements per turn as described above would keep programming at a minimum while adding a reality check on casualty management.

[SeaMonkey]

I like this idea, but one reason the Third Reich had some production issues is because they didn't encourage the use of their female population in manufacturing and infrastructure type positions until later, like 43.

GGWaW had a similar feature based on manpower pools that limited the deployment of the units that were produced.

You could get them into the build Q, but you couldn't deploy to the map until they had been assigned population points. Each area of the map had a certain contribution level per turn to the manpower pool, discounting conquered territories.

Definitely realistic and low user demand handled mostly by the program.

I would also like to see the ability to disband a percentage of the hard build limits of one unit category and reallocate them to another unit category.

So if the USA would like to sacrifice their engineers to build an additional TG, then it would be possible. Of course this will lead to greater deviation from historical force mixes.

[arado234]

Again ev you are historicaly correct(ive read mansteins book its very good)but if you add this in(which will be much more favorable to the allies because of their huge manpower atvanatge)what would you suggest to balance it for germany?

[Baron]

EV - it is a pleasure to read posts, always well thought out. I hate to point out the fly in the soup - but as far as the Germans go I'd ask this. How many millions of prisoners did they use in their economy? Thats why they could devote so much of their manpower to the tooth end of the equation.

[Guest Mike]

According to wiki by 1944 19.9% of workers in Germany were forced.

[Baron]

So that would mean about 4 million or so? That is taking into account that only about 2/3 of the 30 million would be of working age. I wonder what the figures are by year?

[arado234]

Out of those 19.9% "happy"forced workers, how many actually did the job correctly?What part did they play in helping saboteurs?

[Guest Mike]

Another wiki page gives 7.6 million foreign workers in Germany in 1944 vs 10.6 million Germans, but doesn't say how many were forced.

It's difficutl to imagine forced labourers doign the best job imaginable, but then they were a largte part of the increase in production from late '43.

[Hyazinth von Strachwitz]

According to the "Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Deutschen Wehrmacht" the total Losses (Killed and MIA) of the Wehrmacht and WaffenSS were between 3 and 3.5 Mio from 39 to 45... I have it at home. 80% of these Casualties were between Mid 43 and 45 on the eastern front.

[jon_j_rambo]

Here's a link with the dead.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties

Compared to Revelations, WW2 will look like a picnic. It's hard to imagine looking at death statistics like it's sometime of game. Mankind did this to itself. You think in the future it's going to suddenly stop w/o God intervening?

[ev]

It seems from the historical numbers that even before HItler launced Barbarosa, Germany was already facing manpower shortages. At some point, slave labor may have helped. But there are two very important points to remember about slave labor:

First, slave labor was not a good source of recruits for the army. The army was desparte for recruits since early '42. To fill the gap, they had to draft well educated, skilled labor, technicians and profesionals already in their 30's and even 40's. ...not to mention children and old men by the end of the war.

Any way, each time they took away a technician or an engineer from a major factory, port or train service, they were hurting the economy in a disproportionately high manner... it caused a higher degree of dislocation in the chain of production than whe you recruit someone who is not performing a similar task already.

To the extent you had well educated women to take over those task, the dislocation would be reduced. Still there would be a time lag before the person filling the possition gets acquainted with her new tasks.

Slave labor, however, is a different ball game all together. There were tasks you could not trust to captured enemy soldiers. In fact, you had to restructure production sistems, and even rellocate factories to take advantage of their labor. All this represented additional costs to the economy.

Balancing for the game seems the crux of the matter. One element we could work on is Russia's activation. In SC2 Russia seems to eager to attack Germany. Germany's easy victories throught Western Europe were actually quite scarry. I imagine Russia would not have attacked Germany as early as SC2 would have it.

[SeaMonkey]

ev, although I agree about the timing of Russian intervention as it would have potentially unfolded, I think SC gets it about right for balance.

If Axis await for USSR DoW, the Red Army is usually strong enough to eclipse any possibility of a successful Barbarossa.

Without Moscow, no Axis victory.

[ev]

Originally posted by SeaMonkey:

...Without Moscow, no Axis victory.

Should Moscow be the holy grail of SC2? Shouldn't we define Axis victory conditions?

[jon_j_rambo]

Far as slave labor, when somebody puts a gun to your head, I'm sure you'd be willing to put in a little bit of overtime.

[SeaMonkey]

In the context of a game based on WW2, ev, yes...Moscow is a significant part of the VC, if not the major contributor.

[Lars]

Originally posted by ev:

Anecdotal evidence suggest that arms production suffered because of lack of manpower, long before Germany started to experience fuel shortages.

Which is why you really shouldn't go with anecdotal evidence, when you have something better available.

Study of German war production data as well as interrogation of those who were in charge of rearmament at the time, leaves no doubt that until the defeat at Moscow German industry was incompletely mobilized and that in fact Germany did not foresee the need for full economic mobilization. German arms production during 1940 and 1941 was generally below that of Britain. When the full meaning of the reverses at Moscow became apparent the German leaders called for all-out production. The conquests of the previous years had greatly strengthened Germany's economy; with the exception of oil and rubber, supplies of virtually all the previously scarce imported materials were or had become accessible. Great reserves of foreign labor only awaited voluntary or forced recruitment. The industrial plant of France, the Low Countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia had been added to that of Germany. After the defeat at Moscow early in 1942, armament production increased rapidly. However, such increase was more the result of improvements in industrial efficiency than of general economic mobilization. Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top government management in Germany was not efficient.

Because the German economy through most of the war was substantially undermobilized, it was resilient under air attack. Civilian consumption was high during the early years of the war and inventories both in trade channels and consumers' possession were also high. These helped cushion the people of the German cities from the effects of bombing. Plant and machinery were plentiful and incompletely used. Thus it was comparatively easy to substitute unused or partly used machinery for that which was destroyed. While there was constant pressure throughout for German manpower for the Wehrmacht, the industrial labor supply, as augmented by foreign labor, was sufficient to permit the diversion of large numbers to the repair of bomb damage or the clearance of debris with relatively small sacrifice of essential production.

From the Strategic Bombing Survey.

[arado234]

Rambo your making some great comments.

Yes when someone puts a gun to your head i bet you dont even ask for double time.

[ev]

Lars, I've read similar works to those you point out here.

...and, clearly the short war mindset was a big part of the picture. That explains why war industry was not fully mobilized. It also explains why Germany drafted such huge number of men in disregard of industrial production.

Having said that, I do not think this contradicts my earlier statements. Germany drafted too many men into the Army. This must have impacted war production. You cannot 10-15% of the labor force out of the economy in a couple of years and expect it to have no impact.

Single shifts and under utilized equipment are as much proof of the short war mindset as they are proof of the fact that would be laborers were in uniform somewhere else. In fact, I would argue manpower missmanagement was as much a result of this very shortwar mindset you point out.

[Lars]

Well, you're going to have a hard time proving it when the facts say otherwise.

btw, you could argue that Ind Tech should give a bigger boost to the Germans. Would be a better case.

[arado234]

Also germany was able to greatly increase their ind. output as soon as they went to total war production even though they were being hammered from all sides.

I think lars is right about german ind.tech having a bigger effect.

[Guest Mike]

What is oft forgotten about that increase in German producion is how much of it didn't get anywhere once the Wallies started destroying the transport infrastructure......long lines of Me-262's stuck at factories part asembled because not all the components had arrived, Type XXI subs built in sections all over het place....and those sections stayed all over the place because htey couldn't be shipped....and so forth.

[arado234]

Thats one of the many good thing about this game S.O.is that you can choose to invest in overall production and if you choose to protect it properly alot of the allied efforts to destroy it will be greatly reduced.In reality its questionable if germany could have done that.

[pzgndr]

But soft/hard limits fall short on one important count: loss replacement... You can have huge manpower losses, and, you can keep replacing them at “low cost” without triggering the soft/hard limit penalty.

In SC2-WaW you can now edit the "low cost" for reinforcements and rebuilds for units destroyed while still in supply. Players can experiment with different values. Increasing these costs will make loss replacement more of a challenge.

Several things about the general manpower argument are unconvincing to me. Idealistically, it would seem that you could and should be able to take historical manpower data and equate that to unit strengths and replacements and then proceed to make the numbers match. But it's not that simple in an abstract game like this.

What exactly does a unit strength point represent, and when? A full strength division in 1939 was different in 1942 and different again in 1944 for many countries. Tables of organization changed and that is very difficult to accurately represent in a game.

What exactly does zero strength and unit destruction really mean? If you believe a 15,000-man division and all of its equipment are in fact killed and destroyed, then that's different than zero strength meaning "combat ineffective" where actual unit strength drops below about 50% or so. This stuff is not clearly defined at this abstract level of a grand strategy game.

For a tactical or operational game these details can be better accounted for. Some strategic games like HOI and now CEAW attempt to model manpower, but these models are abstract and full of questionable assumptions. They provide some sense of accounting for real manpower limits, but they are still abstract and require some micromanagement, either directly by the player or indirectly with additional game code. Better than simple force pool limits or no? That's up to players to decide for themselves.

[Desert Dave]

SC2 limits only look at the total number of units you have on the board. You can have huge manpower losses, and, you can keep replacing them at “low cost” without triggering the soft/hard limit penalty. As long as you do not exceed the number of unit counters on the map, a player is not penalized for inordinate manpower losses.

Having read all that's been said,

I keep coming back to the simple,

Yet truly intractable - fact,

As mentioned above.

No matter the "abstracted" mechanisms

(... which, truly might approach the infinite)

That any one game player might assume,

Whether that be

Coerced labor contributions,

Industrial output/efficiency,

Strategic, or even tactical bombing,

Etc, and else, almost - ad infinitum,

And no matter the fluid definition

Of what a size "3" unit

Might be, IE,

It is then considered "shattered"

Or "in imagined retreat" status,

The fact is - on board,

It has an effective value of "3"

(... and as ever, modified by readiness

and morale and supply status, etc)

But, the one thing it is not - is zero

Number of soldiers.

OK, no matter all that,

And much more besides,

IF you can forever reconstitute

Your @-start units + allowable builds

At a very low cost,

THEN you don't actually, strictly have

"Force pool limits," IMO.

Well,

Maybe these aren't necessary

To have a fun, fairly historical

And emminently re-playable game?

Then again, for another player,

Perhaps... they are.

In which case,

Each individual CAN indeed "tweak"

Several editable factors

To make the force-pool loose,

Or quite constrained, as they'd prefer.

One thing is certain, however,

And that is... NO Nation,

Large, small or middling sized

Could continue to summon a never-ending

Supply of combat capable soldiers.

Theoretically,

Russia and USA had the most flexibility

Due to considerable reliance

On women in the labor force.

Even there,

Some "hard & fast" limit would surely

And FINALLY be reached, wouldn't it?

When does a perfectly satisfactory

WHAT IF?

(... IE, YOU! As supreme commander CAN

eke-out the absolute maximum from your

native and foreign laborers)

Become a possible, but highly unlikely

WHY NOT?

Have it where... anything goes?

[ September 02, 2007, 05:18 AM: Message edited by: Desert Dave ]

[arado234]

The only(board) game ive ever played that gets so tech.as to get down to the actual loss of weapons(individual tanks, machine guns etc), commanders,indvidual men is squad leader.There is noway you could mimic this in any strategic game.

The fact that all new units and those that are brought back up to strength start at very low or no experience does represnt the fact that most of the unit that was attacked was destroyed.Ex:a unit with say 4 experience bars gets knocked down to a strength of one,when its brought up to full strength it looses prettywell all of its experience.This alone makes the unit much less efective and most units that were brought back to strengh or any new ones formed did have a core of experienced men.Some more than others.Even the german units that managed to escape the massacre at falaise werenot completely destroyed down to absolutely zero and yet you could argue that thier combat effectiveness was zero.Sc2 represents this very well without making the game to complicated.