Relative Parity on the Eastern Front in CMBB

[Jagdratt]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Skipper:

> And the human wave technique worked.

Yup, tell me more about it.

well, since you asked...

The Germans did not need the Red Army at all, except for someone to beat up, which they did in every single engagement from 1941 to 1945. First they go in and win, and are so successful that they start squabbling and because of that they lose. The Red Army meanwhile stands around kicking stones and once the squabbling Germans have defeated themselves undertakes one human wave attack that can not even be held up by that regular German version of GI Joe named Panzermeyer, and capture Berlin.

The history of the war in Russia according to Guderian, and von Manstein, with some added war porn by Panzermeyer.

Also, the Red Army did not play fair.

[Gen-x87H]

> I remember seeing something about the

> production of Panthers vs T-34s around the

> battle of Kursk.

Why not King Tigers vs SU-76?

Did they have KTs around Kursk?

> The Germans were getting something like 50

> tanks a month vs the Soviets 1000.

Which makes it what, 600 tanks per year? Surely, they only built Panthers. Especially around Kursk.

I was making a reference between two tanks.

If you cant see beyond that. Not my problem.

> Parity? Hard to say. This game will have a hard

> time modeling the lack of coordination and

> Stalins stupidity in the first weeks of the

> war.

NB: this is a tactical game.

Really??????

> In all reality it will be hard for a Soviet

> player to mimick the ineffectiveness of the

> Soviet droves until later in the war when the

> Germans were lacking in every single part of

> the battle.

Mainly due to frost and mud, no doubt?

I was thinking along the lines of the Germans were outmanned,outgunned, outnumbered at every corner of the war after Kursk.

Gen

[Cauldron]

The Russian never reached the level of command in tanks than the German.

This is stated by none othe than Von Manstein. What they lacked in qaulity of command they made up for in numbers.

eric

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Cauldron:

The Russian never reached the level of command in tanks than the German.

This is stated by none othe than Von Manstein. What they lacked in qaulity of command they made up for in numbers.

eric

Guys, you are looking up the wrong tree for explanations of Soviet victory. Unlike the Germans, Soviet operations determined Soviet tactics. In other words, successful Soviet operations (which were increasing in frequency and scale by mid 1943) set the stage for successful Soviet tactics. Stop thinking that the Soviets had the same corresponding values in military art that the West had. They did not. If anything, the Soviets proved that successful military operations do not have to be grounded in field command 'initiative' or 'responsiveness'. And to say that the Soviets won by numbers only reveals a lack of knowledge in Soviet operational art, which is not some vague concept, but a sophisticated and comprehensive system of conducting war, using methods that we all understand but would not use in the same manner in the West.

Like Skipper says above, read Glantz especially his books from Frank Cass Publishers.

[ May 06, 2002, 04:01 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[RCHRD]

At the level of CM, which I wonder will model the superiority of visibility, communications, or the three man turret, I'll take a T-34 or KV any day.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Cauldron:

The Russian never reached the level of command in tanks than the German.

This is stated by none othe than Von Manstein. What they lacked in qaulity of command they made up for in numbers.

eric

Wasn't von Manstein on the losing side?

Sorry mate, but to say that the side that pulled off Bagration, the Vistula-Oder operation, and defeated the Germans at Kursk just won because of numbers is pushing it a bit, eh? The Soviets had numerical superiority when they lost until 1943 too. So I wonder what changed then. Maybe von Manstein explains that?

[Roksovkiy]

No, numbers had no effect whatsoever on the Germans. It was the brilliant soviet operational skill that enabled them to win battles after losing 6 times as many casualties than the Germans in 1943.

[Skipper]

"As a result of the failure of Zitadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. Armored troops, replenished with such difficulties, due toi large losses of equipment were for a long time out of action... Of course, russians hurried to exploit their success. And there were no more calm days on the eastern front. Initiative went fully to the enemy." © Guderian, Inspector General of panzer troops

"By the end of 14 July, it has become obvious that german offensive has failed. From the german side, personnel losses were not so great, but LOSSES OF TANKS WERE HORRIBLE. Tanks of Panther type did not justify our hopes, they were easy to set on fire,... crews did not have sufficient skills. Of all Panthers that took part in the battle, on 14 July just a few machines remaind intact. Sitation in SS panzer corps was not any better... russian High Command during Kursk Battle acted with a great skill... by 23 July 4th Panzer Army was thrown back to its initial positions" © von Mellentin, chief of staff 48th Panzer Corps

[Le Tondu]

Wow. Great responses. I have learned something here. Thank you one and all!

[Berlichtingen]

Something else that is of importance...

The Russian Tank Divisions were broken up into ad-hoc brigades and served out in penny packets in '41... While the Germans massed their armor. Combine that with superior tactical control and tighter combined arms integration ad you see the Germans with the exact same advantages they had over the French/British in 1940. Therein lies the reason of the early german victories. As the war didn't end in the first year, the Soviets addressed their command problem (not entirely) and the Germans addressed the disparety in gun/armor. For tactical battles on CM's scale should reach rough parity in 1942

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Captain Wacky:

BTW, I saw your picture on the Cesspool page Berlichtingen-if you shaved your head, trimmed the goatee and lost the glasses you'd make one mean Lenin impersonator

When I have my full beard, I do a passing impersonation of Rasputan... though I have been accused of looking like Marks as well

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Zitadelle:

The long 75mm on the PzKW IV was a 'L48' gun. As for its introduction, it came about on the (Ausf number) 'F2' or as the Brits referred to it during the Desert War the 'Mk IV Special.' It was then used to upgrade some of the earlier (and surviving) PzKW IVs as well.

Nope.

All PzIV through ausf F1 had the 7,5cm KwK 37 L/24

PzIV ausf F2 & G had the 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43

PzIV ausf H and beyond had the 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48

I find it odd that both the L/43 & the L/48 are both model 40

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Ah, Guderian wasn't that bad... neither was Manstein really (though Manstein does like to lay blame on Hitler as much as possible)

[Keke]

Germans had tactical, not operational, superiority throughout the war. During the last year the average kill ratio in tank battles was 4:1 in favour of Germans. Earlier this rating had naturally been higher, fe 6:1 (minimum) was the ratio at Prokhorovka. Only way to model this difference in a game like CM, would be that German quality tanks with veteran (or better) crew should cost many, many times more than Russian tanks with regukar (or weaker) crew. This would make numerically off-balanced, but more realistic battles.

[Skipper]

I wonder how that "average" was calculated? For I can find you a selection of 100 tank vs tank engagements for which the average will be reversed.

At Kursk battle soviet side had almost twice as many tanks as german (~5200 vs ~2700). Quality-wise, german force was a bit better.

I've quoted Guderian and Mellentin above about how the outcome looked for germans. RKKA still had a tank army to throw around (and throw around they did).

6:1 you say? How comes?

[TSword]

Some good posts to the topic:

Zitadelle has it quite right.

A few numbers to highlight the german and russian tactical capabilities (Sources: Glantz's The Battle of Kursk & Kharkov 1942 Anatomy of a Military Disaster, A.Dewey's Jagdtiger, M. Nipe's Last victory in Russia):

- Kharkow May 1942

The newly created (Leningrad and Kharkov were lost) Tankfactories Tankograd & Uralmashzavod produced T-34 and KV-1 to outfit 138 tankbrigades (Each with around 60 tanks). Stalin ordered an armored thrust toward Kharkov impressed by his numbers of "superior" tanks.

Von Kleist's 1 st TA wiped out most of these new brigades. Result: Germans dictated summer 1942

- Kursk 1943

5th Guards Tank Army looses majority of it's tanks (over 400) in one day against opposing 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS Panzergren. divisions (Part of Hoth's 4th Army) with 43 Tigers and some other tanks, loosing 1 Tiger as complete loss this day...

(This battle went into the annals of History as the tank battle of Prokhorovka were the german spearhead was smashed..)

SchwPzJg Abt. 653 (45 Ferdinands) from 6. July to 13 July 1943 (Part of Model's 9th Army) had destroyed 320 russian tanks with the total loss of 13 Ferdinands and 24 crewmembers killed.

In the russian offensive vs. Orel salient (12. July - 20 August 1943) alone the russians according to numbers of their own lost 500'000 men.

On 6 July a Detachment of 505 Schw. PzAbt. (9 th Army) slaughtered 107th Tankbrigade (as part of a counterattack), in a matter of minutes 46 of 50 tanks were knocked out, additionally 23 tanks of 164 th Tankbrigade were also destroyed.

Overall i have the following picture:

The russians strength were:

- Determined statical defense

- Detailed planning

- Massed employment of artillery for breakthrough operations (The russians always tried to follow their doctrine, whereas infantry has to create the Breaktrough, while the tankformations had to exploit)

The russians weakness (Up to mid 1944 atleast):

- Poor logistics in the attack (once on the move)

- Almost no indirect fire support after breakthrough for exploiting forces

- Unable to efficiently direct and control greater number of mobile forces -> Piecemeal commitment

- Poor communications

- Generally poor leadership with only very limited self initiative especially in mid ranks.

Russian tanks:

In 1941 the russians had superior tanks with the T-34 and KV-1 (The KV-1 having reliability problems with transmission). In 1942 the germans were even. In 1943 - 1945 the germans dominated with the Tiger I, II and Panthers. (Around 200 JS-2 were built, appearing on the front around July 1944).

A decisive factor in a battle by mobile forces is command and control. And here the germans (atleast the "elite" formations) were vastly superior to their counterparts up to 1944. Most russian tanks (Only Leader had a radio) had no radio installed in their tanks so they had to follow the leader quite closely. Once the Leader was knocked out or lost because of smoke or terrain the whole column normally fell into total confusion.

There are several accounts of german tankers which became mixed up in such tankformations completely unnoticed, rolling along them at point blank and killing one after another.

The sword is only as good as the one holding it...

To correctly reflect that in CMBB the player should only be able to control the radio equipped Commandtank of a russian tankcolumn the others (without radio) would only follow more or less without any control by the player. Moreover the early T-34 turrets had very bad buttoned visibility, and relatively long reaction times because Commander had to act as gunner.

The infantry units:

Here again the german army was clearly superior up to atleast end-1943, because the core of their troops consisted of very well trained and experienced men, whereas the unbelievable casualty numbers in 1941, 42 and 43 of course lowered the experience level dramatically in the russian counterparts and especially for commanding men. However the moral of these troops were generally equal their german counterparts.

So here again for CMBB, the Command and Control abilities for typical 1943 russian inf-formation should be considerably lower than that of a german unit. -> Much longer reaction times.

Also the experience level would be much lower, BUT not the Moral. With time more and more russian formations improved, while the average german inf-formation will degenerated (To a much lesser degree in the elite SS-formations).

Artillery:

Up to 1944 Self-propelled artillery was almost non-existant on the russian side, whereas the german tankdivisions and foremost the elite SS-divisions were lavishly equipped with Self-propelled artillery from 75 mm - 150 mm (StuGIII, Grille, Wespe, Hummel and many more types).

Standard calibre for a russian Inf-formation was 75 mm, whereas the german counterpart had 75 - 150 mm in their arsenal.

The vast majority of russian artillery was combined in Army- or Stawka- level formations and mostly used at the Schwerpunkt either for attack or defense. The russians relied more on number of tubes and intricate planning, than mobility and fast reaction.

In CMBB this should be reflected by:

No organic artillery > 75 mm for average russian Inf-formations, however vast amounts of artillery for battles at a russian Schwerpunkt (Main point of effort), but preplotted with much longer reaction time for in the battle directed fire. Almost no artillery for russian formations on the move (After Breaktrough, or in hasty defense. Of course many, many times russian artillery had to engage over open sights, because they were overrun).

For the german side on the other hand every formation (Division) had organic artillery up to 150 mm at hand which could react quickly to situations in attack or defense. For mobile formations a vast repertoire of indirect fire was available (Towed artillery, Self propelled).

Air-support

For the russian side the same as for artillery.

For the german side (Up to end 1943), at the Schwerpunkt Air support was delivered with high accuracy by accompanying Luftwaffe liason officers which rode in Command-tanks or vehicles in the first line and directed the Air support with great success. -> CMBB should reflect this very important part of german operational warfare (The current model is way off).

One has to remember, germany lost the war foremost strategically -> Win the battle but loose the war.

Would you attack 3'000'000 men and 6000 tanks echeloned in 3 very strongly fortified defensive lines with 900'000 men and 2000 tanks ?

The germans did at Kursk, and for the 4 PzArmy quite succesful (Vatutin was forced to commit all his reserves and had even to rely on the Steppe (Koniev) Fronts reserves).

I really can only redommend Glantz's books, and Nipe's Last victory in Russia. The latter giving you an extremely detailed inside view into the working of german mobile units both on the defense and attack (alos highlighting the russian weaknesses).

Greets

Daniel

[Skipper]

Daniel,

It's funny, but ALL your facts and numbers seem to be skewed towards your point of view.

Like, germans had 2700, not 2000 AFVs. RKKA had 5,200 not 6000 AFVs. Ditto for manpower, losses, equipment characteristics etc.

Also, you (your sources?) seem to be mixing operational losses with irreversible losses wherever needed.

After reading your post, one can't help but wonder, what kind of numerical superiority should RKKA have had to eventually crush the III Reich on the battlefield if it was so crappy in the tactical department???

[ May 05, 2002, 04:35 PM: Message edited by: Skipper ]

[RCHRD]

A Soviet tank brigade, up until the autumn of 43, had only two battalions, about 44 tanks. One third of those were light tanks. Not a juggernaut.

[TSword]

Skipper,

I don't know whether i'm right or wrong, but i've read Glantz very carefully..., maybe i've overseen something ? Will check it out sometimes

[Keke]

6:1 you say? How comes?

Zetterling and Frankson. Kursk 1943, p 102, 107-109:

First the extent of the battle of Prokhorovka must be defined. Our definition is that the clash started on 12 July and ended on 16 July. It involved II SS-Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps on the German side, while the Red Army had three armies involved in the fighting (69th Army, 5th Guards Tank Army and 5th Guards Army).

...

If the strength for 12 July is used, it can be concluded that the [iII Panzer Corps] probably had no more than 135 tanks and assault guns available for the Prokhorovka battle. ...[O]n the evening before 12 July the II SS-Panzer Corps had 294 tanks and assault guns operational of which 15 were Tigers (no Panthers or Ferdinands, not even in workshops).

...

It seems that against the German III Panzer Corps, at least 150 Soviet tanks were newly committed on 12 July, while at least 450 tanks were hurled against II SS-Panzer Corps. Also a further 100 joined in against the II SS-Panzer Corps on 13 July, on the northern side of the Psel. As we have written earlier the 2nd Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps had 187 tanks together and, if we assume that at least 120 belonged to 2nd Guards Tank Corps (80 versus II SS and 40 versus III Panzer), these figures will be obtained.

...

Depending on how one prefers to define the battle at Prokhorovka, it involved from 294 German (II SS-Panzer Corps) and 616 Soviet AFV (those engaging II SS-Panzer Corps) up to a maximum of 429 German and 870 Soviet AFV.

...

Tank losses have often been described as equally severe for both sides but this does not match the reality. The German losses in destroyed tanks were very small compared to the losses suffered by the Red Army. The II SS-Panzer Corps lost 36 tanks and assault guns between 5 and 23 July of which at least 19 were destroyed before Prokhorovka. Accordingly, the II SS-Panzer Corps cannot have lost more than 17 during Prokhorovka.

The III Panzer Corps, which had less armour than II SS-Panzer Corps, seems to have had higher losses. During the period from 11 to 20 July, it lost 37 tanks and assault guns, but not all units of the corps took part in the Prokhorovka battle.

Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army reported that it had lost 222 T-34, 89 T-70, 12 Churchill and 11 assault guns up to 16 July. These were total write-offs. This gives a total of 334 destroyed Soviet tanks and assault guns, which can be compared to, at most, 54 German tanks and assault guns destroyed. This means the Soviet tank losses were at least six times higher. In fact, since more German units are included in this calculation than actually took part in the Prokhorovka battle, while not all Soviet units are included, the real ratio was even higher.

[TSword]

RCHRD,

Glantz, pg. 34 (kursk Battle):

"..The tank corps consisted of three tank brigades, a mot. rifle brigade, and an increasing array of supporting arms. Depending on the strength of their component tank brigades (53 or 65 tanks organized into two or three tank battalions), the corps contained 168 - 224 tanks..."

Maybe he is wrong ?

[Keke]

Here are the figures from (1) the Glantz´s book and (2) the Soviet General Staff.

(1) Glantz and House. The Battle of Kursk, p 151-152, 275, 414:

Given the attrition of the penetration battle, by 10 July the II SS Panzer Corps' strength had fallen to fewer than 300 tanks and assault guns, and Army Detachment Kempf's III Panzer Corps numbered fewer than 200. On the Soviet side, General P.A. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army eventually controlled five corps totaling 830 tanks and self-propelled guns. ...[A]bout 572 [German and Soviet AFVs] met on the field of Prokhorovka itself. (Note: Calculated as 172 tanks and assault guns of Leibstandarte and Das Reich and just over 400 tanks and self-propelled guns of Rotmistrov's 2d, 18th, and 29th Tank Corps.)

...

German armor losses in Citadel are more difficult to pin down.... Considering repaired armored vehicles, these figures indicate that [iI SS Panzer Corps] lost between 60 and 70 tanks on 12 July (at Prokhorovka).... (Note: Finally, during the battle for Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost over 400 of its 840 tanks and self-propelled guns....)

(2) The Soviet General Staff. The Battle for Kursk, 1943 (originally published in 1944), p 222, 228:

[German units attacking toward Prokhorovka] consisted of three SS Panzer Corps divisions (Adolf Hitler, Death's Head, and Das Reich), 17th Panzer Division units, and also the 168th Infantry Division. This grouping numbered more than 600 tanks, including more than 100 heavy tanks ('Tigers') and self-propelled 'Ferdinand' guns.

...

By the beginning of combat operations the 2d Guards Tatsinskaia Tank Corps and the 2d Tank Corps, which had a total of no more than 200 tanks...were subordinated to the 5th Guards Tank Army.... Thus the 5th Guards Tank Army had 793 tanks, including 501 T-34 tanks, 261 T-70s, and 31 'Churchills', and therefore, with respect to the number of tanks, the correlation of forces was approximately equal, although the enemy had qualitative superiority, especially in heavy tanks and self-propelled 'Ferdinand' guns.

...

As a result of five days of combat, the Germans lost around 300 tanks [and] 20 self-propelled guns....

[ May 05, 2002, 07:13 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[TSword]

Skipper,

I've checked Glantz's book (pg 290 ff):

Red Army: 3'6 Million men (off which around 1 Mill. Stawka reserves), 5670 tanks NOT COUNTING THE MATERIAL RESERVES to fill gaps and losses !!!!!!!!!!!!

German Army (p. 283 ff):

940'000 men, 2778 Tanks and Assaultguns (OK, 20 % OFF), NO RESERVES

And you're right the case of "destroyed" russian tanks are operational losses, while the sole tiger and 14 elefants were consolidated complete losses (as i mentioned correctly), the operational losses of course were much higher. At average a german tankdivision had around 50 tanks operational.

The germans lost vs. the russians because they were gamblers, and the russians planners or if you will chessplayers (Hitler hated planners and their representations in the Wehrmacht as Staff Officers with their objective calculations and lists which already showed in 1941 that the war was lost, he looked at them as being defaetists, he emphasized that only because he was a gambler he came to power....). The russians gained steadily in strength whereas the germans declined, and as i said, in mid 1944 there were the few german "crack" divisions beside a huge hopeless mass of mauled infantry divisions. In beginning of 1943 those "firefighter" formations could plug a soviet thrust. But afterwards there just were too many holes to plug (The non-mobile infantry being destroyed or severly mauled in the process of these holes..). Because the germans had to rely so much on the few "firefighter"-units they were a good target for russian deception plans, which worked out beautifully in summer 1944.

The gambler may win a round, but the cool headed planner will win the game.

Greets

Daniel

[ May 05, 2002, 07:41 PM: Message edited by: TSword ]

[RCHRD]

A tank corps consisted of three tank brigades, each with two battalions of 21 tanks each, plus HQ tanks, for about 44 tanks, including more or less 33% T-70's. Also from Glantz and Charles Sharp. His statement isn't wrong it just doesn't define the number of batt's in the brigade. Ex July 43; 18th Tk Corps: 110 Tk Bgde w/311,312 Tk Batt's, 2/3 T-34, 1/3 T-70. 180 and 181 Tank Brigades had the same composition. Oct 43 the third Tk Battalion for each brigade was ordered for all tank corps. It's in Glantz and it's in Sharp.