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Airpower in CMBB


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The Germans also had air superiority at the Oder bridgeheads for a while in 1945, because the Red Army Airforce could not operate from the forward airfields in western Poland after the rapid advance in the Vistula-Oder operation. This was due to weather and supply problems. The Germans used the concrete runways near Berlin.

Ais power was never as one-sided in the east as it was in the west. One sign for that is that the Ju-87 was used to the last in the east.

In CMBB, airpower has been changed considerably, and vehicle morale has a huge effect on it. I have seen some fun stuff, that made people at the second preview at my place scream. :D

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"On April 17, 1943 the Germans made a powerful attempt to neutralize the Soviet bridgehead at Myshako, Operation Neptun. The attack was preceded by a massive operations by 450 Stukas, bombers and ground-attack planes against the Soviet landing grounds. Throughout the day, German Fliegerkorps I carried out 1,560 sorties over the Kuban Bridgehead, mainly against Myshako. The Soviets, who by this time were inferior in numbers, could only mount 538 sorties that day. Nevertheless, the concentration of antiaircraft batteries that the Soviets had shipped in to Myshako since February 1943 met the assaulting German aircraft with a wall of steel and fire. Seven Stukas were shot down or returned to base with severe damage." ( 2000 Bergström).

I have to agree with Andreas, even during 1942 Air superiority was never clear cut over the Soviet Union and could change mid operation. The incident above occurred after the VVS had achieved air superiority to enable the Kuban landing to take place. Over the course of two months Fliegerkorps I grew in size to hack apart VVS superiority.

[ September 08, 2002, 04:41 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

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Incidently, Bastables, the event you quoted was part of an air campaign that saw 1000+ combat aircraft on either side arrayed in tense air combat. There were days when it seemed like planes were falling from the sky every 10 minutes. The entire air campaign lasted through April and May, and ended with Luftwaffe forces calling off air operations. Losses were substantial for both sides, but the VVS considered this campaign to be their 'Midway,' it had such an effect upon their development in tactics and operational effectiveness. After the Kuban Bridgehead, the VVS stayed on an offensive footing until the war's ended.

In another thread, I posted the reasons why the Luftwaffe was able to hold local superiority until war's end, and suffice to say it had more to do with VVS doctrine than the lack of ability of Soviet airman - at least from mid-1943, on (though I have to say initial VVS performance during Kursk is starting to look pretty poor). The way the VVS was subordinated to the Red Army as a supporting asset for ground operations had its advantages from the Soviet tanker's and rifleman's perspective, but it did allow the Luftwaffe to remain a force in the East throughout the duration.

That's probably much more information than you even wanted to know, but I've always had a soft spot for air combat. Anyway, it makes for a great situation for us, because both sides could conceivably have air assets throughout the entire war smile.gif

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Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

But lets face it, the Mig-3 had some setbacks flying against the Fw-190.

Gaylord, the MiG-3 was no longer in serial production by mid-1942 with only 134 in the VVS inventory by that time. By 1943, at least one fighter air regiment, 122nd, still had MiG-3s, but they were deployed away from the intense fighting down south. This unit did encounter a few 190s in the Western Front's sector, but by and large MiG-3s were a rarity at this time in the war. Most of them had been transferred to PVO units by then. It would've been far more common for the Luftwaffe to encounter P-39Ns, lightened versions of LaGG-3s, Yak-1B/7B/9/9Ds and La-5/5F/5FNs by 1943.
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Not only that but of couorse the poor ol' Mig-3 was optimised for high altitude performance - I wonder how it would have done vs the 190 above, say, 20,000 feet?

A rhetorical question of course......

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Sorry to ask this, but were are the actual CMBB-mechanics for airsupport covered ? Will there be on call strikes as was the case regularly in german battlegroups ? There were smoke grenades to mark targets for the Stukas and major objective battle groups had liason officers riding in the command vehicles at the head of the formation to call for air support within CM-battle timescale (Stukas circeld overhead and waited for target acquisitions by the liason officer).

Also is it possible to mark a certain bunker or area for airsupport (Simulating Stukas attacking) to have a kind of airbarrage (Stukas being the really heavy artillery). Timing of this barrages was key, since they had a very effective suppressing effect but not killing the defenders when being dug in, so it was essential to have the barrage exactly timed before the attackers charged the positions as was emphasized and stressed in german attack tactics regulations.

Will the Stukas scream and terrorize the conscript troops ?

Greets

Daniel

[ September 08, 2002, 06:56 PM: Message edited by: TSword ]

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Grisha,

Dickfeld mainly encountered MiG-3's in 1942 (Which they did shoot down to the point were the MIG-3 pilots refused to fight them. They even dropped invitations for a 2-man (Dickfeld & Graf) vs. as much MIG-3's the russians may bring in the air over a russian airfield, of course nobody showed up). It was not before being stationed around Mineralny Vody late 1942 before they encountered some lend-lease planes in the South.

Greets

Daniel

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