German Artillery Organization in WW II (JonS? JasonC? Germanboy? et al?)

[Michael Dorosh]

Some good discussion in the other thread I started, but in my quest to gather up some notes on the German Army I find my knowledge of German artillery pretty deficient. JonS wrote a very good treatise on Commonwealth arty in real life and in CMBO for my Canuck site, does anyone have any info on German artillery on the Eastern Front (beyond what

has been discussed in that thread already)?

I have a basic knowledge of the regimental and division level artillery - 10.5 cm and 15 cm guns IIRC and can look up the battery assignments. What I am wondering about is -

Were Nebelwerfers corps level assets? What other corps artillery did the Germans employ? The Commonwealth used 4.5 and 5.5 howitzers at the corps level, and also had AGRA, etc. Is there a site I can look at to see an accurate depiction of the chains of command of the German artillery? Older book titles will help as well, I have The Guns by Ian Hogg but some quick notes here might be a good springboard for further research on my end.

Did this change dramatically between 1941 and 1945? Did the 1941 model reflect any changes over the 1939, and if so, what "lessons" were learned in Poland and the West that resulted in these changes?

Why does German artillery take so long to call down?

I realize this may have been discussed in depth already, but my search yielded no results.

I liked JasonC's comments in the other thread about small ams mixes being irrelevant, largely. I would presume that artillery was indeed the largest inflictor of casualties in the East - on the order of 75 percent or so? Is that true?

What was the coastal artillery? This uniform grog is familiar with the coastal artillery uniform accoutrements, but has no knowledge of their organization. Did they serve at all in Russia?

[L.Tankersley]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I liked JasonC's comments in the other thread about small ams mixes being irrelevant, largely.

OT, and I didn't stick around to see that comment anyway, but I submit that while at a macro, strategic level the mix of small arms might have been largely irrelevant, I'll wager it was highly relevant to the individuals involved. And that could have ripple effects on morale and hence troop quality and efficiency.

[Michael Dorosh]

I disagree,L. that it would have any real impact on the amount of casualties inflicted by the infantry platoon.

[Bakker@home]

A quick reply, as my knowledge on this subject is limited.

Two works on this subject which I know are;

German Artillery in World War II by Joachim Engelman (Schiffer publishing)

And

Handbook on german military forces.

The first work is mostly a picture book with some details about the guns strewn around the photo comments and some TOE's, tables and nomenclatures. Very unstructured and not very informative.

The second work you should know. Little info on artillery organisations (TOE's) but some additional info on fire-control equipment and the performance of the artillery weapons themselves.

Some info bursts;

-early waryears (polish) still some 75mm batteries (36x 75 and 12x 105) on divisional level.

-early war usage of 4x100 mm guns in the 150m how. regiment to supplement shortage of 150 pieces.

-mid war standardisation of 36x105 and 12x150 on divisional level, brought back to 24x105 and 12x150 after the 1943 reorganization of the inf. divisions due to dwindling manpower (losses).

-appearance of mixed support batteries at the panzer and panzergren. divisions in 1943 consisting of 12x105(sp) and 6x150(sp) mixed with a 105 and 150 towed art. regiment.

-appearance in the same timeframe of rocket batteries at divisional level, particullary in SS divisions.

-standard army/corps artillery weapons were the 170mm gun and the 210mm how.

As for the rocket artillery, to the best of my knowledge these were organized as independent batteries (battalions, regiments) and assigned to divisions. Not massed in divisions like the soviets.

Particullary the larger projectors (wurfrahmen, stuka zu fuss) seem to be employed in small groups.

-Coastal artillery

The germans seem to have used every capable gun as coastal artillery. No matter what the origin or age. The atlantik wall was somewhere called 'a gun museum' or something like that, and that should give a clue. Mostly old german pieces and captured french and russian pieces of all calibres.

As a side note:

The artillery arms were a little neglected in the early years as the dive-bomber provided all the heavy long range firepower the panzer divisions needed. As air support dwindled the focus shifted to larger calibres artillery, rocket artillery and assault guns for direct fire support.

The artillery arms remained plagued by lack of modern pieces (most notable in ranges) and mostly still being horse-drawn.

Very fragmented I know, but it's getting late over here. I'm sure people will correct me if I made errors in the above.

Grtz, S.

EDIT: because I know my english is awfull enough without me making typo's every six words.

[ August 08, 2002, 03:52 PM: Message edited by: Bakker@home ]

[tankboy74]

I know of a few books that might help:

The German Order of Battle: Panzers and Artillery in World War II

by George F. Nafziger (Hardcover - June 1999)

German Artillery of World War Two

by Ian V. Hogg

German Heavy Field Artillery in World War II: 1934-1645 (Schiffer Military/Aviation History)

by Joachim Engelmann

The first I just ordered and hope it lives up to reviews. The second was very technical and centered on the guns. The third I read in college, but I remember as being very good.

Hope this helps

[RCHRD]

I've read that 80% of Russian casualties were caused by artillery. 80% of 29 million. Knock off a few percentage points for non battle casualties leaves about 5 million or so wounded by small arms, mixed to suit. That doesn't strike me as insignifigant.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Bakker@home:

-Coastal artillery

The germans seem to have used every capable gun as coastal artillery. No matter what the origin or age. The atlantik wall was somewhere called 'a gun museum' or something like that, and that should give a clue. Mostly old german pieces and captured french and russian pieces of all calibres.

And a few captured British pieces left behind by the BEF at Dunkirk.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

JasonC want to poke his head in? Little bump for JonS too.

Thanks for the info and recommendations so far, guys. I do have one of Hogg's books, and the German Army Handbook, I'll give that a good read over the weekend.

[ASL Veteran]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Thanks for the info and recommendations so far, guys. I do have one of Hogg's books, and the German Army Handbook, I'll give that a good read over the weekend.

Actually Michael, I think the "Handbook of German Military Forces" was what was being referred to as opposed to "The German Army Handbook". I actually have both. "The Handbook of German Military Forces" was originally published by US Forces in March 1945 as a sort of assessment of German weapons, tactics, and capabilities (an Army Technical Manual if you will). It is a collection of individual technical pamphlets that were in loose leaf form and which were subsequently combined into this one book ... which goes for about $40 US. It is much more detailed and interesting than "The German Army Handbook" and has even the most obscure and mundane items of German gear in it (like all models of German Pile Drivers for example). I'm sure a German grogly type like yourself has seen both books, but I just wanted to clarify the two books just in case.

[ August 08, 2002, 11:32 PM: Message edited by: ASL Veteran ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Yeah, I do have both! LOL! Buchner's book has the nuts and bolts of battery/regiment organization, and the US Army manual (to be taken with healthy dose of salt) has some info too.

I was hoping for an analysis, though, rather than just description. I'm not sure even Hogg really gets into the "why" of how German arty practice changed, but I'll see what I can dig up on my own.

[ASL Veteran]

I did not know that Buchner had a "German Army Handbook"!! My copy was written by WJK Davies and is only 172 pages long (and not really very informative). I like Buchner's work though so maybe I'll look for his version of "German Army Handbook". Buchner's book "German Infantry Handbook" was very informative - a must for any grogly type!

Sure are a lot of handbooks out there ....

[JonS]

Gudmundssons' On Artillery probably covers what you're after. I've heard its a good book, though I have yet to read it, having only browsed so far. It does, paraphrasing Gudmundssons words, for German and French artillery what Bidwells Firepower did for the Royal Artillery.

One bit that I did read, which I found rather surprising, is that Gudmundsson believes that at the end of WWII the Germans were better able to mass fires than the US Army was. This wasn't due to technical limitations - the US had the Germans cold in terms of communications - but rather in doctrinal and willingness to mass fires outside the local commanders immediate area of concern. US Gunner commanders were reluctant to release control of 'their' guns for missions outside their division AO, making massing of fires beyond the 4 Bns organic to the division slow and unresponsive. By contrast, the German ArKos were more willing to see their guns used by other commands.

As for the TO&E stuff, I think the previous posters have covered that well enough - and to be honest it isn't something I've spent much time looking at.

I believe that the Germans never really had the equivalents of the AGRAs, though they were able to mass non-divisional artillery for operations when required. Examples are "Rommels Circus" (Gruppe Boetcher(sp?)) which was to be used for the aborted attack on Tobruk in Nov 1941 (aborted by Op Crusader crashing into the party), and at Anzio in early 1944. I suppose these could be seen as "AGRA-like", though they were more ad-hoc.

Guns at this level tended to be the heavier calibres, as is usual, and included such pieces as the excellent K.18 170mm Gun. I believe that most of the Nebelwerfer btys and regts were held at Korps level, though I think that some of the divisions at Normandy (the SS Pz Divs?) had a few of their own.

Edit: Have just checked Zetterlings' site. 1st and 2nd SS Pz Divs each had a werfer bn. In addition there were another nine(?) werfer bns held at Korps or higher levels. Zetterling also details the other GHQ Arty units available in Normandy.

Here are a few notes on national artillery doctrine in WWII. Treat it with a grain of salt though, as its fairly broad brush

Regards

JonS

Oh, don't forget Andreas' excellent site on the German Observation Bns.

[ August 09, 2002, 12:46 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Andreas' site is the reason he gets honoured by his name in the subject line.

I am not after TO and E so much as an understanding of they whys and whatnots - you mention mass fires, but the two examples you give are concerted offensives, no?

A FOO in Normandy with the CW could call down Mike, Uncle or Victor targets almost at will, given the proper type of target presenting itself.

I take it Jerry couldn't holler "Victor Target" when a Soviet armoured corps came over the horizon?

[JonS]

Yes, the two examples I gave were of the ad-hoc formation of "AGRA-like" groupings of artillery, not massing of fire.

However, the comment on Gudmundssons book was about massing of fire, which he indicates that the Germans were better at than the US.

Incidentally (for other readers, as I know Mickey D has it), the Handbook on German Forces (TM 30-410), May 1945 is available online here in three parts. While you're there, you might want to grab Combat Lessons Learned, 1942-1944, 34th Infantry Division Pamphlet which is chock full of cheats that those gamey Yanks used in Italy

Regards

JonS

[ August 09, 2002, 01:04 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JasonC]

Actually, most higher level artillery units were assigned at the army level rather than corps, on any permanent basis that is. They were not limited to the heavy pieces, but included fair numbers of 150s, 100 guns, and even plain 105 howitzers - or captured guns or similar calibers. A portion, but rarely as much as half, were either 170s (used especially for counterbattery work to exploit their range) or 210s (the standard German heavy howitzer, above the 150s that is).

These were usually operational as independent battalions, though occasionally a regiment with several battalions was moved about as a more permanent unit. Why the lighter guns at army level? Transport to some degree. The army level guns were much more likely to be fully motorized than those in the line infantry divisions. That helped switch them about from sector to sector, and made even a 105 battalion something useful.

The standard employment of the Nebelwerfers was also as higher level artillery, not organic battalions within divisions. Only some of the SS divisions had single battalions of them organic. There were far more at higher echelons. They were usually organized as regiments of 3 werfer battalions, and later on sometimes as brigades of two such regiments. They were also more likely to be motorized (horses and rockets don't mix very well). With shorter range and rapid fire, they discharged in more intense flurries than tube artillery, and consequently were organized in larger permanent formations.

The standard system above the division level, and even to some extend down into the division level, was based on artillery commands - seperate regimental staffs sometimes, sometimes just small HQ units with senior artillery officers (arkos and harkos) who were expected to commandeer a divisional artillery regiment staff as necessary. These played the role of artillery brigades at corps and army in the US system. But they drew their component battalions and the actual tubes from army level artillery battalions and from divisions in their assigned sectors.

It was all very much a staff operation, meaning staff rather than line commanders were running the show for the most part. The arkos and harkos provided "ownership" clout, to match or exceed the officers in the divisional artillery formations. But the real planning was worked out between the officers of the divisional artillery regiment staff and the officers of the seperate artillery command staffs, who coordinated with divisional operations staff etc.

They made assignments. Such and such battalion gives dedicated support to regiment nnn. Within a division, some of the lights (105s) were almost always in dedicated support of the "up" regiments of that division. But remaining 105s, and 150s, and if there were any the longer reached 100 guns, were all subject to "planning squabble", no less than the army level and above guns.

The staffs would work out a solution to grouping or allocating the fires of those battalions. Say the point of enemy main effort in a given corps is judged to be the sector of the right hand up regiment of the left hand division. 4 of the 105 battalions are in dedicated support of the each regiment. Mass the 150s to support the main point of attack, say, and leave the extra 105 battalions on call for additional defensive fires. Or dedicate one to supporting one of the back infantry regiments scheduled to put in a counterattack.

The problem is to assign "ownership" of "rights" to supporting fires. Technocrats on staff work out some solution that fits the operational plan. Higher poohbahs from the artillery branch review and endorse that solution, overruling the local officers of a division's organic artillery regiment if necessary. Said poohbahs are "arkos" and "harkos". Sometimes they have extra signal or observation assets attached as well; sometimes a seperate artillery regiment staff without guns.

From the standpoint of a regiment or battalion in the line, somebody - they don't know who - decides they get x level of dedicated support. They can call for fire from this battalion or these battalions or that battery. The guys they are calling will not take fire orders from anybody else, and the unit can't call outside their assignments.

From the standpoint of a senior commander fighting his division, or his operations officer, they plan out where the guns will intervene most, listen to the artillery staffs moan about what is possible in the way of volume of fire and ranges and redeployments, and "ticket" this battalion of guns to that battalion of maneuver forces for today's battle. An artillery poohbah signs off on it, and then they all let the front line guys gulp for fire support as needed on the supply thus provided.

In practice, it let some of the divisional guns and higher level ones intervene on the battlefield where higher level commanders wanted it to. Without those commanders ordering the fire themselves, to some grandiose fire plan (although sometimes that is just what the artillery staffers did with the leeway the system gave them). It let the maneuver units get some sort of reliable fire support, ammo and enemy counterbattery permitting.

It did not let the front line guys dictate where the artillery fire would be massed. It also wasn't particularly fast. But most of the assignments remained the same for reasonably periods of time (a day or two), so it is not like they were trying to haggle over this sort of thing on the fly, with the gunners just waiting for a decision. Until told of a new assignment they fired in support of the old assigned unit. Dedicated FOs from each battery helped keep that relationship, as FOs had to be moved or additional ones sent to change a support assignment.

To say it was more responsive than the US system is pretty silly. It had much less "opportunity pull" than the US system. It could ensure non-starvation of some units by others grabbing of all the support by others, though. It was not designed to mass fires more massively, but to give senior officers a way of influencing the course of a battle by massing some of their guns. The ability to switch off *which* guns were being massed also helped keep the number of battery repositionings down.

Incidentally, most of the firing was done by the 105s and 150s, in all of the above. The bigger stuff (170, 210) had an order of magnitude less ammo to expend per weapon. So did lower level IGs and mortars down at regimental level and below. Well, lower there by a factor of 2-5 in number of shells, an order of magnitude lower in shell weight.

I hope this helps.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB]I disagree,L. that it would have any real impact on the amount of casualties inflicted by the infantry platoon

But do you disagree that'd smallarms quality (or, at least, _percieved_ quality) would have a significant effect on morale? (That's what L. was addressing - morale. I was somewhat puzzled to see "I disagree... casualties...")

I'd be very suprised if it didn't. As a rifleman I think I'd be _really_ happy if I believed my squad's rifles and LMG was better than the other guys. I'll probably get killed or harmed by artillery - but there's not a whole lot I can do about that. What I do have a great deal of say in, however, is the exchange of fire with my counterparts in the opposing army.

HOTO, I'd also be very surprised if anyone was able to come anywhere near to quanitying the effect.

And, swinging back around to something vaugly on topic, and something I've been wondering about: I've read that mortar fire caused more casualties than even the big-gun artillery over the entire run of the war. True? Is so, how much of that came from a platoon's or company's "on map" mortars? W. Allied armies had many co. or lower level mortars, right? Were the Germans missing a trick? (Maybe JasonC will be attracted if a bridge metaphor is used.)

Hey! His post appeared _above_ mine as soon as the page re-loaded after I pressed Submit. I'm awesome!

[ August 09, 2002, 01:43 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bakker@home:

-early war usage of 4x100 mm guns in the 150m how. regiment to supplement shortage of 150 pieces.

This statement, like so much else in the German Army Handbook, is just plain wrong. I really think of the German Army Handbook as an interesting piece on what the Allies thought the Germans were doing/having, but not as something that states what they did, or that anyone should rely on anywhere unless it is corroborated by another source.

The 10cm K18 fulfilled a doctrinally important role in the heavy detachements of the motorised and armoured divisions, due to its longer range. It was not a good gun (see. v. Senger und Etterlin 'The German Guns') because it did not deliver enough weight of fire, and was too heavy to be used by horse-drawn detachments. It was needed because it had the range to reach out slightly beyond 19km, thus enabling armoured spearheads to receive artillery support when they had outranged their howitzers. For this reason (range), it was also used by the Navy. There were independent detachments around that were army-level assets (one or two in AG NOrth at the start of Barbarossa for example), and that would support the breakthrough on the main axis, presumably delivering CB and interdiction fire support along that axis. Again something you need range for, especially if those pesky Soviet heavy howitzers outrange yours by a considerable margin. There was a fairly constant number of about 700 10cm K18 in action throughout the war.

The Germans could not holler 'Victor Target' - well they could, but nothing on the scale of a Victor would happen... The mobility, firing arc restrictions, range limitations and supply problems would not have made that a sensible use.

In critical sectors (e.g. Zhitomir 1944, Yelnia 1941) Arko (Artillerie Kommando) units were stationed. I understand that these were administrative units, attached to a Corps HQ, and equipped with signals and FOO detachments whose purpose it was to combine the artillery of the Corps. At that level, Uncle tragets were possible, but I doubt there were many of these Arkos.

When the Germans put their mind to it, they could reduce Soviet artillery to nothing (e.g. Leningrad prior to the attempted offensive to take the city in 1942). Most of the time they did/could not to that degree, and they had to live with having less artillery support than their opponents. From the time when things started to go really pear-shaped in the east, artillery had to provide men for so-called Alarmeinheiten (emergency response units), to contain Soviet break-ins or ocunter-attack on the small unit level. This led to high losses of experienced cader, and to a diminishing of the effectiveness of the guns, as far as I understand it.

An interesting comment by a German vet was that he felt that Anglo-American CB in Normandy was much less efficient than theirs. Like all vet comments, this has to be taken with a grain of salt though.

I will dig out some info on artillery practice when I am back in London next week and post it here.

[Tarquelne]

How often did Army artillery officers reach the highest levels of command compared to officers in the Inf., Armor, etc.? I understand it was pretty common among the Allied (or maybe just American or British) forces, due to the importance attached to artillery support and an artilleryman's strong logistics background. (True?)

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

How often did Army artillery officers reach the highest levels of command compared to officers in the Inf., Armor, etc.? I understand it was pretty common among the Allied (or maybe just American or British) forces, due to the importance attached to artillery support and an artilleryman's strong logistics background. (True?)

There are a few examples I can think of. von Fretter-Pico became at least an Army commander, and another guy (name escapes me) was tasked with defending various fortified cities, until he finally did not make it out of one.

[Andreas]

Long live Google (i.e. no idea how correct this is):

The following should give a good impression fo the role of an Arko, it did for me. The 'smoke mortar battalion' is probably a nebelwerfer unit, and the special observation battalion must be a Beobachtungsabteilung.

From this site:

Corps Commander General Georg Stumme reinforced the 10th Panzer Division with Artillery Headquarters 128 (Arko 128) for the attack. Arko 128 was to plan and execute fire support in the attack sector, serve as the fire support control center for the division, and coordinate the fire of the division's 90th Artillery Regiment and the other artillery that was attached to the panzer division for the breakthrough. The Germans positioned Arko 128 away from the division command post, freeing the command post from the dominating pressure of the fire support control apparatus and associated technical processes and procedures, and allowing it to remain light, mobile and movement-oriented.

Stumme also reinforced the 10th Panzer Division with Artillery Regiment 618, its four artillery battalions, one special artillery observation battalion and one smoke mortar battalion to supplement the firepower of the 90th Artillery Regiment.

From Feldgrau Glossary

Kommandeur [plural: Kommandeure]: Typically, the person commanding a unit (Divisionskommandeur: divisional commander). Other uses are rare, except for the artillery branch. An Artillerie-Kommandeur (abbreviated Arko) was a numbered HQ used to control artillery assets at Korps level. (Some were called Artillerie-Führer for a short period in the war.) Later in the war, the Germans created the Höherer Artillerie-Kommandeur (abbreviated Harko) to control artillery assets at Armee level.

[ August 09, 2002, 06:47 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[JasonC]

On how many Arkos there were, a time snapshot for which there are good OOBs is the begining of Kursk. There were 5 in 9th Army, 5 in 4th Panzer Army, and 4 in Army Detachment Kempf. They are basically artillery brigade headquarters, in western terms. Those are in addition to a few independent artillery regiments, many nebelwerfer regiments, and some artillery regiments that were staff only and used to coordinate fires, used by Arkos rather than being Arkos proper.

Obviously, in sectors where there were few additional guns from higher echelons, the divisional artillery regiment staffs could handle more of the fire allocation job. In sectors where there was any significant massing of army level assets, you could expect several Arkos.

[ August 09, 2002, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Just a sidenote for T - most senior Canadian officers in WW II were gunners also - Andy McNaughton who commanded all overseas troops in England until 1942, Harry Crerar who commanded 1st Canadian Army, plus several div commanders (Matthews, et al).

Andreas would have liked Andy; a flash spotter and sound ranger from way back.

[ August 09, 2002, 12:54 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

... artillery officers reach the highest levels of command ... it was pretty common among the Allied ... forces, due to the importance attached to artillery support and an artilleryman's strong logistics background. (True?)

Also, AIUI, it was/is due to the gunners broader perspective. Gunners are under no illusions that they can win battles by themselves, and train from the beginning of their careers to work with other arms. From this comes a better appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the whole army, rather than just their own corps. Taking NZ as an example, a disproportionate number of our CGSs have been gunners.

[ASL Veteran]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bakker@home:

[qb]-early war usage of 4x100 mm guns in the 150m how. regiment to supplement shortage of 150 pieces.

This statement, like so much else in the German Army Handbook, is just plain wrong.</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Having dug the book out, I see I am actually referencing "German Infantry Handbook" by Buchner - my apologies for the confusion!

Thanks to all for the replies. Let me see if I've gotten this right.

The Arko was both an officer, and the designation for his headquarters, and he co-ordinated -

either

a) all the artillery units within a corps

or

all corps-level artillery units within a corps

Which is correct? Sorry to be dense!

The Harkos, then, created later in the war, would have done the same with

a) all the artillery units within an Army

or

all army-level artillery units within that army?

JasonC, let me know if I have read your comments right on artillery assignments. You say that the independent artillery regiments - ranging from 10.5cm regiments up to the heavy 17 and 21 cm stuff - would usually be assigned as fire support for x, y or z division? Their FOs would stay with that unit for several days, or as long as considered necessary, and their fire would be dedicated for that unit only - no other requests were possible.

Is this correct?