German Losses East vs West Front

[kipanderson]

Hi,

I must apologies for not having read all the thread above. It is a case of lack of time. However, here are the percentages for German casualties in WWII. These come from German war time records, and in my view should be taken as correct, you will not get better. They can be found in the back of one of the “original” 1950s pamphlets produced by German officers for use by the US Army. Although the narratives in these pamphlets have now been found to be works of fiction, the data from German records certainly are not fiction. The data does not take account of the round up at the end. They are for the war up to the end of March, i.e. when there was still some form of “front”, as opposed to a lot of smaller or larger pockets.

The percentages were as follows. The figures are for KIA, MIA, and POW. Not WIA.

76% of Germans losses were suffered fighting against the Soviets,

18% in North West Europe from D-Day to the end of March 1945.

4% in the desert and Italy,

2% in minor and early wars.

All too clear who deserves the credit for destroying the German Army.

Just to add, the above comment is no discredit to the Western Allies. My father was one of the first British paras in 42 and ended the war in Norway with the SAS, so I would never write, or even think, anything that discredited that generation of Commonwealth or US forces. But my father would have been the first to give credit where it was due. In fact he spent about a months getting pissed with Russians on the northern Norwegian border. Thought they were both very fine soldiers, and good laugh to be with.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. fighting in NWE was just as intense,German divisions near wiped out, there was just far less of it compared to the four years in the East.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by coe:

By the way, enlighten me, since alot of the Panzers were shifted to the South in anticipation of an offensive there, what did they do once Bagration started? What was the role of Army Groups North and South during July-Aug, 1944?

Okay, I decided to use Glantz to explain the complexity of the Soviet Summer Offensive of 1944. The following is an excerpt from his book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War:

SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1944

Background

The Soviet winter offensive continued well into the spring. The successive and, finally, simultaneous front operations across southern Russia ultimately drove German forces from the Ukraine up to the Polish and Rumanian borders. By late April the momentum of that offensive had ebbed, and the Soviets were confronted with the task of deciding where to focus their next strategic offensive efforts.

There were several enticing options. They could continue their offensive southward into the Balkans and reap considerable political as well as military rewards. This option, however, would extend Soviet forces and leave large areas of the Soviet Union under German control which could also threaten the northern flank of potentially over-extended Soviet forces. The Soviets could also launch a major offensive from the northern Ukraine across central and eastern Poland to the Baltic Sea, entrapping both German Army Groups Center and North. But that option would involve maneuvers of a strategic scale, perhaps beyond the capabilities of Soviet forces. It would also leave large German forces on the Soviet flanks. Moreover, selection of this option would require the Soviets to disregard strategic maskirovka and continue the offensive along previously established lines. Shtemenko noted the STAVKA concern:

“It was considered impossible to continue the offensive in the Ukraine and Moldavia because powerful enemy groupings equal to our own in strength had been encountered in the L'vov, Yassy and Kishinev sectors of the front. All six of our tank armies were embroiled here in combat with the main German armor. The troops were tired and their supplies were badly in need of replenishment. Surprise action was out of the question. If we tried to press forward at once on these lines of advance, we should be faced with a long and bloody struggle in unfavorable conditions and with doubtful chances of success.”

A third option could involve a continuation of the offensive on the northern flank toward the Baltic States and into Finland. Shtemenko explained the reasons for rejecting that option:

“Nor were there yet any great prospects of breaking through to the frontiers of the Baltic republics. Surprise was not to be counted on here either. The enemy was expecting a big push by the Soviet Army and was taking steps to stop it. He had the advantage of internal maneuverability on a well-developed network of roads and railways, while our tanks were confronted by numerous obstacles. The terrain was clearly not in our favor. Troop concentration and supply presented serious difficulties. GHQ was convinced that under the circumstances the Baltic area could not provide the target for our main efforts.”

As a fourth option, the Soviets could crush German Army Group "Center" in the so-called Belorussian balcony (jutting westward north of the Pripyat marshes); penetrate into Poland and East Prussia; and, perhaps, reach the Baltic Sea and isolate German Army Group North as well. This would clear German troops from Belorussia and create conditions conducive to future operations in Poland on the direct route to East Prussia and, ultimately, Berlin The Soviets selected this option because, as Shtemenko noted:

“Analysis and re-analysis of the strategic situation gave us the growing conviction that success in the summer campaign of 1944 was to be sought in Belorussia and the western Ukraine. A major victory in the area would bring Soviet troops out on the vital frontiers of the Third Reich by the shortest possible route. At the same time more favorable conditions would be created for hitting the enemy hard on all other sectors, primarily, in the south, where there was already a strong buildup of our forces.”

In planning this strategic offensive the Soviets sought to capitalize on the deception potential of the other options by employing an extensive strategic maskirovka plan, by organizing extensive regrouping of their forces, and by carefully time-phasing all offensive activities.

During April the STAVKA, general staff, and STAVKA representatives worked on a concept of operations in close consultation with front commanders. By 12 April the STAVKA had decided to give priority to an offensive along the Belorussian direction and then, by 28 April, had worked out the sequencing of the summer's operations. The offensive would begin in early June with the Leningrad Front attacking toward Vyburg on the Karelian Isthmus. Soon after, the Karelian Front would commence operations north of Lake Ladoga. When German attention had turned north Soviet forces would strike in Belorussia, and after German reserves had sped north from eastern Poland to deal with these Soviet attacks, Soviet forces in the northern Ukraine would attack toward L'vov and the Vistula River in eastern Poland. Simultaneously the 2d Baltic Front would attack to tie down German Army Group North forces in the Baltic. After defeat of German forces in Belorussia and eastern Poland, the Soviets would cap their success with an advance into Rumania, which by then should have been denuded of German reserves.

As the offensive unfolded it would cover five distinct operations follows:

Karelian Isthmus-south Karelia - 10 June-9 August 1944

Belorussia - 23 June-29 August 1944

L'vov-Sandomierz - 13 July-29 August 1944

Lublin-Brest - 18 July-2 August 1944 (technically part of the Belorussian operation, but in reality a link between that operation and the L'vov-Sandomierz operation)

Yassy-Kishinev - 20 August-7 September 1944

Each operation would take advantage of conditions created by earlier operations, a principal feature of any strategic operational plan.

During preliminary planning the STAVKA re-organized the structure of its operating fronts so that they matched the requirements of the upcoming offensive. The Western Front, operating on the Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev directions was subdivided into the 2d and 3d Belorussian Fronts; and the Belorussian Front, operating on the Rogachev and Mozyr direction, became the lst Belorussian Front and, in so doing, absorbed the three Soviet armies of the former 2d Belorussian Front in the Kovel' area. This reorganization created three fronts which would cooperate with a fourth (1st Baltic) in the critical Belorussian operation. Subsequently, elements of two fronts (1st Belorussian left wing and 2d Ukrainian) would conduct the operations through central and southern Poland: and two fronts (2d and 3d Ukrainian) would advance into Rumania. The successive summer strategic offensives would be far more powerful than those which had occurred in the winter across the Ukraine.

Soviet success in the upcoming operations depended to a large degree on their ability to move and concentrate strategic reserves secretly between strategic directions and transfer armies between fronts. The strategic plan required the movement of 5th Guards Tank Army from the southern Ukraine to Belorussia, movement of 2d Guards and 51st Armies from the Crimea to Belorussia, transfer of 28th Army from the southern Ukraine to Belorussia, shifting of 8th Guards Army and 2d Tank Army from Moldavia to the northern Ukraine, and the lateral transfer of 6th Guards Army from the 2d to the 1st Baltic Front. These regroupings would provide the force necessary to carry out the projected offensives. It was, however, absolutely necessary for the Soviets to conceal these movements, for their strategic maskirovka plan required German identification (if these armies elsewhere.

Both the earlier offensive successes of Soviet forces and the strategic positioning of those forces in late spring facilitated Soviet use of strategic deception on an unprecedented scale. Very simply, the Soviet's strategic maskirovka plan sought to play upon German fears about future Soviet offensive operations against central and southeastern Europe. By capitalizing on the situation which had persisted from January to May 1944, the Soviets actively advertised their intent to continue operations along previous lines into southern Poland and Rumania. Shtemenko described Soviet intent, writing:

“During the preparations for the Belorussian operation the General Staff wanted to somehow convince the Hitlerite command that the main Red Army attacks in the summer of 1944 would come in the south and the Baltic. Already, on 3 May, the 3d Ukrainian Front commander had been given the following order: You are charged with conducting operational maskirovka measures for the purpose of misinforming the enemy. It is necessary to show a concentration of eight-nine rifle divisions, reinforced with tanks and artillery, beyond the right flank of the front .... The false region of concentration should be animated, showing the movement and disposition of separate groups of men, vehicles, tanks and guns, and the equipping of the region; anti-aircraft guns should be placed at the locations of tank and artillery mock-ups, simultaneously designating the air defense of the entire region by the installation of anti-aircraft systems and patrolling by fighters.

“The visibility and plausibility of the false objectives would be verified by observation and photographing from the air .... The period of conduct of operational maskirovka is from 5-15 June of this year.”

In accordance with this order the 3d Ukrainian Front created a false concentration area on the Kishinev direction of eight to nine rifle divisions, two artillery divisions, one tank corps, and a complete army rear area. From 29 May to 14 June forces were moved from four rail stations to the appointed area. From 15 June to 5 July the front simulated concentration of these forces and attack preparations. All concentration areas were animated with mockups, false radio nets and unit numbers and even air cover.

A similar order went to the 3d Baltic Front. In addition, the STAVKA ordered all fronts in the south to remain as active as possible and demonstrate the presence of the bulk of Soviet tank armies in that region. Vasilevsky later wrote:

“In order to reinforce the German opinion [that we would attack in the south], we demonstratively "left in the south" the majority of our tank armies. During daytime in the central sector of the .. front we conducted feverish "defensive" work (on the southern sector defensive work went on at night) and so forth.”

In addition the STAVKA ordered forces in the eastern and southern Ukraine to conduct limited objective attacks during May, in accordance with earlier operational objectives, to convince the German command that this was the region of continuing Soviet strategic interest. Consequently, on 1 May Konev (2d Ukrainian Front) launched an attack with 27th and 2d Tank Armies across the Prut River, toward Yassy, which culminated in a Soviet defeat at Tyrgu-Frumos. The fact that the operation to this day has been considered a major Soviet effort attests to the success of the Soviet maskirovka plan. It, in fact, perpetuated German concerns for their position in Rumania and kept German reserves rooted to Rumania. The Soviets undertook similar efforts along the front in the southern Ukraine. In actuality, the large concentration of forces in the 1st Ukrainian Front sector had a dual purpose: to deceive the Germans regarding an attack in June and, thereafter, to conduct a real attack in July. The STAVKA itself adopted strict security measures to insure planning secrecy which Shtemenko later described:

“Precautions were taken to keep our intentions secret. Only a very narrow circle of people were directly engaged in working out the plans of the summer campaign as a whole and the Belorussian operation, in particular. They were, in fact, fully known only to five people: the Supreme Commander's First Deputy, the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy, the Chief of the Operations Department and one of his deputies. All correspondence on this subject as well as telephone conversations or telegraph messages were strictly forbidden and a very strict check was kept on this. Proposals from the fronts concerning operations were also dealt with by only two or three people, were usually written by hand and reported, as a rule, by the commanders in person. The troops were set to work on perfecting their defences. Front, army and divisional newspapers published material only on defence matters. All talks to the troops were about maintaining a firm hold on present positions. Powerful radio stations were temporarily closed down. Only low-power transmitters not less than 60 kilometres from the front-line and using shortened aerials under special radio control were used for the training radio network.”

Meanwhile the Soviets prepared to undertake the massive job of redeployment -concealed from German observation. A STAVKA directive of 29 May required that front commanders move all troops and equipment at night, observing strict light and march discipline. Daytime movement of small groups was permitted only during inclement weather or outside the range of enemy air observation. During pauses in troop movements, all forces were to be dispersed and camouflaged and kept isolated from contact with the civilian population. In general, road movement was kept to a minimum, and rail was used whenever possible. Of particular importance was the concealment of the relief of front line units. This was done at night as close to the time of attack as feasible without interfering with last-minute attack preparations.

To conceal regroupment northward by rail and road, the Soviets simulated heavy rail and road movements to the south and southwest, using false dispatcher transmissions, and some actual movements. Meanwhile, traffic to real concentration areas was cloaked in maximum secrecy. Unloading of units and equipment occurred at numerous stations up to 100 or more kilometers from the front, and all unloading took place at night. STAVKA reserve units moved to assembly areas no closer than 50-100 kilometers from the front. Movement of units to forward positions occurred 5-7 days before the offensive to heavily concealed areas 12-20 kilometers from the front. Final deployments occurred one or two nights prior to the attack.

By the end of April the STAVKA had ordered all fronts to go on the defense (except those specifically conducting deception) and had completed the outline for the summer offensive. Now work began on detailed planning to realize the basic concept of the operation, the first task of which was to plan the Belorussian operation.

Thus, the Soviet concept for the 1944 summer offensive was grander in scale than that of 1943. First, it was offensive in nature from the very start. Rather than involving a strategic offensive on one primary direction it envisioned the conduct of a series of powerful multi-front strategic offensives, successively along several strategic directions with the objective of destroying several German army groups. The strategic maskirovka plan was also more ambitious. In 1943 the Soviets had sought to conceal portions of one front (Steppe) in strategic reserve and then use that front to launch a counter-offensive. Elsewhere, the Soviets had sought to regroup secretly individual armies within fronts to maintain the momentum of the attack. In 1943 they had achieved mixed success. In 1944, however, the Soviets sought to regroup large strategic reserves between fronts and strategic directions as well. Simultaneously, the Soviets frequently would attempt to regroup armies within fronts. Maskirovka plans at STAVKA level and within fronts and armies were far more sophisticated in 1944 than they had been in 1943, as events would bear out.

[Tripps]

Originally posted by LightningWar:

I was also surprised at the relatively low civilian casualties on the Japanese side. I could of sworn when they fire bombed cities like Tokyo. A lot more civs perished.

LW

Yeah thats what caught my eye as well, quoting from some old book dating back to 1980:

" Major General Curtis LeMay, comander of the US B29 force in the Marianas during WWII, advised Washington that a forthcoming raid on Tokyo would be "an outstanding show". it was. A one-night firebomb attack in March 1945 leveled densely populated poor sections of the city, and - according to officials and students of the available records - killed (roasting many in their beds) more people than did the US atomic raid on Hiroshima five months later.

The Hisroshima toll was about 80,000 people. The historian Lewis Mumford has estimated the Tokyo toll as being upward of 180 000."

No emphasis added.

FWIW

cheers