WORST Generals of WWII?

[Snorri]

Paulsen.. for the barbarossa planning(?)-s? Dandelion mentioned Student.. i have to insist, malta op. was ruined by Hitler (as usual). But he`s not a general(at all)..so who "beats" this hawaiian one?

[Kanonier Reichmann]

I'm amazed Marshall Graziani hasn't been mentioned yet. If you want an absolute stinker he certainly fits the bill.

Regards

Jim R.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kanonier Reichmann:

I'm amazed Marshall Graziani hasn't been mentioned yet. If you want an absolute stinker he certainly fits the bill.

That may be true, and I certainly used to think so. But recently I came across some information that convinced me that he realized that Musollini's dream of conquest was unrealizable, so he stalled as long as he could and finally when ordered to advance into Egypt, did so in such a way as to try to keep his ragtag army together instead of strung out all over the desert, and in supply. Then by assuming defensive dispositions, hoped that the British would batter themselves against his army and that way he wouldn't lose too badly. Of course, he miscalculated badly, which suggests that he still was no great shakes as a general. But he may not have been quite as bad as he is usually described.

Michael

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

That may be true, and I certainly used to think so. But recently I came across some information that convinced me that he realized that Musollini's dream of conquest was unrealizable, so he stalled as long as he could and finally when ordered to advance into Egypt, did so in such a way as to try to keep his ragtag army together instead of strung out all over the desert, and in supply. Then by assuming defensive dispositions, hoped that the British would batter themselves against his army and that way he wouldn't lose too badly. Of course, he miscalculated badly, which suggests that he still was no great shakes as a general. But he may not have been quite as bad as he is usually described.

Michael

Graziani was an honourable man, as was d'Aosta as I see it. None of them beat up on wounded people in fielhospitals, still they meet only ridicule. Sometimes I wonder if we're only served with the loudmouths and primadonnas of the Generalry.

You've adjusted your sig Michael. I smell a triumphant victory. Feel like sharing?

Cheerio

Dandelion

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by winkelried:

The U.S. generals who ordered the sustained attacks in the Hurtgenwald area? 120'000 U.S. soldiers engaged, 24'000 lost (killed, MIA, POW, wounded) another 9'000 lost to sickness ...

The trouble with naming the generals in charge of this battle as among the all caps WORST is that those responsible were bascially Bradley (the Army Group commander) and Hodges (1st Army Commander). They basically were highly successful and this was their worst mistake. It's a blot on their record but it can't really place them among the worst.

I'm wondering about Von Paulus--if the argument is just that he didn't disobey Hitler's orders by attempting a breakout from Stalingrad, does that make him among the worst. It was not an easy thing to disobey Hitler's orders (though a few dared it and lived), so maybe the real responsiblity goes to Adolf? Did Von Paulus show other signs of poor command at an earlier date? My sense is that the bad strategic position he found himself in at Stalingrad was really Hitler's fault too.

As to the definition of a truly bad general, when it comes to field command, Axe2121's description of Dimitri Pavlov gives the essentials, I think:

Pavlov's desicions over the next several days showed a man hopelessly out of touch with what was happening to the men under his command.

[snip]

Neither Erickson, Glantz, Salisbury nor Werth are particularly kind to him with phrases like "total loss of control," "panicked" and "totally and terribly" out of his depth peppering their descriptions of him in the first week of Barbarossa.

So, I'd define a WORST level field commander as someone who has no understanding of what's happening to the forces under his command, who panics and/or conveys a feeling of being out of his depth to those serving under him. This fits Fredendall, Jones (of the 106th) and various others we've mentioned.

On a strategic level, it might involve insisting on strategies that are doomed to defeat, that can't be executed by the available forces, or that exalt the value of costly yet dubious symbolic gestures over tangible military results. I'd say Mussolini, Hitler, Tojo and Mark Clark (for his symbolic grab of Rome) fit this latter definition.

Of course, the line between field and strategic generalship is hard to draw. On the strategic level fanaticism (and a fanatic refusal to face the facts) can be as or more dangerous than panic.

[ May 11, 2004, 02:11 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Graziani was an honourable man, as was d'Aosta as I see it.

I take it that is the same Graziani who had the nickname 'The Butcher' from his treatment of the Sanussi insurgents? Was his treatment of them really so horrible even by those day's standards?

One day I'll be able to understand enough Italian read his 'Fronte del Sud'!

Feldmarschall Busch comes to mind as an inept German commander. Rose from divisional commander rank in 1940 to AG command by 1944, allegedly mostly on the strength of his political views.

[Jaws]

Originally posted by Snorri:

Paulsen.. for the barbarossa planning(?)-s? Dandelion mentioned Student.. i have to insist, malta op. was ruined by Hitler (as usual). But he`s not a general(at all)..so who "beats" this hawaiian one?

No, for the Stalingrad debacle.

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Dandelion:

Graziani was an honourable man, as was d'Aosta as I see it.

I take it that is the same Graziani who had the nickname 'The Butcher' from his treatment of the Sanussi insurgents? Was his treatment of them really so horrible even by those day's standards?

One day I'll be able to understand enough Italian read his 'Fronte del Sud'!

</font>

[guachi]

What about Auchenleck, umm, however you spell it. That British guy before Montgomery in North Africa, right?

I'm not saying he's bad. I can't even spell his name. I was just wondering how he might rate.

Jason

[Mick15]

What about Auchenleck, umm, however you spell it. That British guy before Montgomery in North Africa, right?

I'm not saying he's bad. I can't even spell his name. I was just wondering how he might rate.

Jason

The Auk - Sir Claude Auchinlek - was one of the best - there is a substantial amount in an earlier thread but in short he outfaced Rommel (militarily) each time he took personal control of VIII Army in the later Crusader and the first Alamain battles.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mick15:

The Auk - Sir Claude Auchinlek - was one of the best...

You took the words right out of my mouth. He and Wavell both represent a sad waste of some pretty awesome talent.

Michael

[Shosties]

The Auk, Wavell, and O'Connor.

The what ifs, the what ifs!

What if Churchill hadn't diverted manpower to Greece?

What if that German recce group hadn't gotten lucky and snagged O'Connor?

Could these men have gone on to be revered and lionized and Montgomery forgotten instead?

Bill Slim!

There's more to British generalship than Monty.

[Shosties]

Paulus wasn't a Junker or descended from nobility anywhere else for that matter. There is no von to get tacked in front of his surname.

[Shosties]

If Bradley and Hodges are to be called on the carpet for the Hurtgen battles, then it would only be fair to point out the failure of Montgomery and Horrocks to cut off the tenuous route of retreat for the 15th Army from its positions on the Channel coast. One wonders how Market Garden would have gone if this had been done. Montgomery went onto compound this error and the debacle of Market Garden with his clear preference of working on the Market Garden salient at the expense of the clearing of the Scheldt.

[Siege]

While not a General, I really wish I could remember the name of the Admiral that ordered the relief mission to Wake Island to turn around. With the extra airpower from the Saratoga as well as more ground troops, and an already demoralized and reduced Japanese force, Wake could have held.

From what I had read, the lookouts on the picket ships could actually see Wake Island and there was almost a mutiny on the bridge of the Saratoga when the order to turn around came in.

-Hans

[sand digger]

Originally posted by Shosties4th:

If Bradley and Hodges are to be called on the carpet for the Hurtgen battles, then it would only be fair to point out the failure of Montgomery and Horrocks to cut off the tenuous route of retreat for the 15th Army from its positions on the Channel coast. One wonders how Market Garden would have gone if this had been done. Montgomery went onto compound this error and the debacle of Market Garden with his clear preference of working on the Market Garden salient at the expense of the clearing of the Scheldt.

Not so sure about that. The scope and area of operations was Eisenhower's province.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Siege:

From what I had read, the lookouts on the picket ships could actually see Wake Island and there was almost a mutiny on the bridge of the Saratoga when the order to turn around came in.

Eh? What sort of aircraft can't make the flight to a low-lying island that can be seen by ships in the group? Sounds like a tad bit of exaggeration there methinks.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

On a strategic level, it might involve insisting on strategies that are doomed to defeat, that can't be executed by the available forces, or that exalt the value of costly yet dubious symbolic gestures over tangible military results. I'd say Mussolini, Hitler, Tojo and Mark Clark (for his symbolic grab of Rome) fit this latter definition.

You could throw Churchill into the mix as well then. His almost fanatical pre-occupation with the so called "soft underbelly of Europe" being Greece & the Balkans cost alot of men in futile operations in both the First & Second World Wars.

Regards

Jim R.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by sand digger:

Not so sure about that. The scope and area of operations was Eisenhower's province.

AIUI Eisenhower needed to read the riot act to Monty to get him to focus on the Scheldt, and even then it was done grudgingly.

[Volkov]

Mark me in for Gen Mark Clark.....

Any Citadel Grad would be flipping out if they read this post.. They idolize him as some kind a WW2 Superhero General. There's a Museum, Hall, and all sorts of Clark stuf....but a spade is a spade....He would have been better suited being in command of a potato peeling detail...

[Michael Emrys]

Clark would probably have made a good staff officer. He just wasn't cut out for high command.

Michael

[Dook]

Originally posted by Siege:

While not a General, I really wish I could remember the name of the Admiral that ordered the relief mission to Wake Island to turn around. With the extra airpower from the Saratoga as well as more ground troops, and an already demoralized and reduced Japanese force, Wake could have held.

From what I had read, the lookouts on the picket ships could actually see Wake Island and there was almost a mutiny on the bridge of the Saratoga when the order to turn around came in.

-Hans

It was VADM William S. Pye who recalled the relief expedition to Wake island. The expedition was 200 nm from the island, so I doubt the lookouts could see it.

The relief expedition might have succeeded in holding the island in the short term, but given the string of Japanese successes in Dec. 1941 and the presence of Japanese land-based air nearby, it is unclear whether the US could have held the island for long.

Moreover, Pye thought, perhaps understandably, that risking the loss of a US carrier at that stage of the war wasn't worth it.

[winkelried]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by winkelried:

The U.S. generals who ordered the sustained attacks in the Hurtgenwald area? 120'000 U.S. soldiers engaged, 24'000 lost (killed, MIA, POW, wounded) another 9'000 lost to sickness ...

The trouble with naming the generals in charge of this battle as among the all caps WORST is that those responsible were bascially Bradley (the Army Group commander) and Hodges (1st Army Commander). They basically were highly successful and this was their worst mistake. It's a blot on their record but it can't really place them among the worst.</font>

[winkelried]

Maybe we should also add Patton for his resistance against the introduction of the Pershing tank ... a decision which cost the live of a lot of brave U.S. services men unnecessarily.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by winkelried:

The U.S. generals who ordered the sustained attacks in the Hurtgenwald area? 120'000 U.S. soldiers engaged, 24'000 lost (killed, MIA, POW, wounded) another 9'000 lost to sickness ...

Well, what was the alternative? While some serious mistakes were made by the commanders, in particular the failure to correctly identify the key objectives, i.e. the dams, it seems pretty clear to me that the battle needed to be fought, and the losses would probably not have been much less even if the objectives had been clearly ID'd. The Scheldt debacle has to rate a lot higher than this on the balls-up scale.