Mick15

Vulture-suc4 said Absolutely agree, notwithstanding one or two issues an interesting article and thread. It underlines how often discussion forgets/ignores the importance of mechanical reliability. It may be an individual crewman would rather be in a working panther than facing the same in a particular allied vehicle - interesting speculation. However as a tool the unreliable vehicle must be flawed. (I think of my first car here - all over body massage at over 30mph) In this context the panther must be deeply flawed Interleaved road wheels - fault at the back take off two or three to fix it. Similarly any extensive work on torsion bars behind those wheels. Time consuming. IIRC those torsion bars ran through the body of the Panther chassis. Conventional saw tooth gear sprockets rather than herringbone arrangements - small surface area large stress - will break easily. This is particularly true when the original weight specification for the vehicle is exceeded as in the Panther. Site those gears in an inaccessible position and time for repair is a problem. I recollect being told, in a visit to Bovington, gear repair on a Panther took an inordinate time (days?) as much of the drivers compartment required dismantling. Finally a plug for the quality of these forums. On the subject of Michael Wittmann; For those interested there is nothing to add to what is in the thread in the CMBO forum - "Michael Wittmann - Did we find the answer". It is a truly great thread and very informative. It is not without its own unique drama including at least one teddy leaving the pram but if you want to cut to the chase read Desert Fox's post of 28th May 2002 within the thread.

Lone Commissar Its drag and drop. Select the gun/vehicle then drag and drop a crew member you wish to move into the position/role you wish them to occupy. If it is alreadt occupied the individuals swop. You can do this in the units screen as well - very handy for getting the best gunners/drivers where you want them.

Stratman59 I love playing this particular scenario (on the hard setting) and have tried all sorts of deployments and unit combinations and have been well and truly blitzkrieged but also had the immense satisfaction of successful defence. Consider two things 1 Redeploying your troops 2 Changing the initial units Spoiler 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 The victory by the largest margin was achieved by 1 Getting rid of the Bofors 2 Adding a third 75 3 Deploying on the reverse slope (2nd Trench line) with some infantry and the A/T rifles forward in the corn but just behind the crest i.e. no LOS (to or from) the German side 4 The sting - look to the left and there is a protected defilade across the German slope. Place a 75 there in the trees/bushes with a hold fire order - pick the one with the best gunner. add 3/4 infantry for recrewing. It should come as a very unpleasant shock to the German armour heading upslope. It stops the German armour from having the opportunity to wait for its infantry support. If your lucky you will also get the chance to use plenty of HE on that same infantry support. 5 Keep your reinforcements reverse slope as long as possible as well. Let the German armour come to you. 6 Don't use the mortar support unless you absolutely have to - it is very handy to shift German remnants from the first trench line when it is time to head back down. DOBRE SZCZĘŚCIE

An endorsement of SIOs post - This worked for me on Friday I had stripped out extra programs already but I still had Freeze/CTD problem with my minimum spec machine. During a couple of seperate TOW freezes I ran a diagnostic (just). Performance was stuck at 100% of page file allocation. Changed the page file allocation to 2000 Mb - now only problem is slight stutter in heated moments - especially air strikes. After SIO's suggestion I am now going to move page file allocation to 3000Mb. Spec being used Processor: Intel® Pentium® 4 CPU 2.80GHz Memory: 512MB RAM Windows XP Card name: NVIDIA GeForce 6200 Manufacturer: NVIDIA Chip type: GeForce 6200 Driver Name: nv4_disp.dll Driver Version: 6.14.0010.9371 (English) Driver Date/Size: 10/22/2006 13:22:00, 4527488 bytes

Here's my two pen'rth for this thread and I hope this helps. Firstly and most importantly what I have played thus far has been excellent and I fully intend to persevere in sorting out what appears to be an issue with this hardware rather than the software. Spec being used Processor: Intel® Pentium® 4 CPU 2.80GHz Memory: 512MB RAM Card name: NVIDIA GeForce 6200 Manufacturer: NVIDIA Chip type: GeForce 6200 Driver Name: nv4_disp.dll Driver Version: 6.14.0010.9371 (English) Driver Date/Size: 10/22/2006 13:22:00, 4527488 bytes Download and licensing went like clockwork as did launching the first training sessions but at contact/combat resolution I frequently get either a temporary freeze or a freeze and crash to desktop. This has happened infrequently in training scenarios 1 to 3 but has become crushingly inevitable in the command and control training scenario after occupying the village. This is probably a page file use problem as I have been able to initiate task manager during a couple of the freeze episodes. This shows page file full. What did help was following the advice in other threads re setting minimum graphics options and checking the correct flags for EAX/one cpu. Disabling every background process possible except my virus checker and LAN connection also helped. These are being switched off tonight. Given the resident Chancellor of the Exchequer's current freeze on further IT spending in this house; If anyone has any other suggestions I would love to hear them As I said it seems well worth the effort.

Kingfish 2) What unit(s) provided NGF for the attack on Maltot during Operation Jupiter in July '44? Added to last post I also have this description - an extract from the Artillery SP of 43rd Wessex Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) Brigadier Heath "Initial attack on the first objective is covered by a 3500 yard barrage at a gun to 35yds. This barrage overlaps the flanks by 500 yds. It is backed by heavy concentrations from AGRA on all known centres of enemy resistance, eg les Duanes 9664 ...." Heath had under command (for at least the initial support plan) for JUPITER 264 x 24 pdrs from the divisional establishments of 43rd Wessex, 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53rd Welsh Divisions. He also had access to the medium, heavy and super heavy guns of 3rd and 8th AGRA (and the Royal Naval Bombardment Force).

Kingfish 2) What unit(s) provided NGF for the attack on Maltot during Operation Jupiter in July '44? Added to last post I also have this description - an extract from the Artillery SP of 43rd Wessex Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) Brigadier Heath "Initial attack on the first objective is covered by a 3500 yard barrage at a gun to 35yds. This barrage overlaps the flanks by 500 yds. It is backed by heavy concentrations from AGRA on all known centres of enemy resistance, eg les Duanes 9664 ...." Heath had under command (for at least the initial support plan) for JUPITER 264 x 24 pdrs from the divisional establishments of 43rd Wessex, 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53rd Welsh Divisions. He also had access to the medium, heavy and super heavy guns of 3rd and 8th AGRA (and the Royal Naval Bombardment Force).

The Naval Bombardment force off Sword Beach on morning of 10 July 1944 included HMS Rodney (9 x 16 inch guns with 100 rounds per gun) and cruisers HMS Roberts and HMS Belfast. Sword Beach was 22000 yards from Hill 112 so 6 inch to the 16inch were within range. Not sure if any other ships of the bombardment force were able to add to the throw weight.

The Naval Bombardment force off Sword Beach on morning of 10 July 1944 included HMS Rodney (9 x 16 inch guns with 100 rounds per gun) and cruisers HMS Roberts and HMS Belfast. Sword Beach was 22000 yards from Hill 112 so 6 inch to the 16inch were within range. Not sure if any other ships of the bombardment force were able to add to the throw weight.

Sorry JonS There is no excuse for shandy! On a hot day find a tree (or someone with big hair) and quaff your ale in the shade:cool: . Order a shandy here and your card is marked -'poor bugger's from down south'

Another post after work has got in the way for a week or so. One little correction. John Kettler wrote Per page 73, ...after an earlier attack mounted to take Djedeida in conjunction with 5 Battalion of what you call the Hamps, The earlier attack was on the 29th in conjunction with the 5th battalion the Northamptonshire Regiment - the Northhamptons from Northants. They would not like being confused with the Hampshire Regiment (from Hants - it is an 'n'), who relieved the Northamptons after their heavy losses in that attack, that night. Very precious about their county names the shandy drinkers!

After reading John kettler's last post and putting "Old Ironsides+1942" into google these came back. http://www.battlefront.co.nz/Article.asp?ArticleID=349 and this http://www.battlefront.co.nz/Article.asp?ArticleID=391

And going on... After a quick google search the battalion establishment at this time did include 4 A/T guns (Feel I should have known that). Battalion history mentions 2pdrs in training just before leaving the UK. So reasonable grounds for going for the clear account of the 6pdrs of 72nd A/T regiment plus up to 4 x 2pdrs and prime movers on the 2nd Hants establishment. Circumstanial evidence being - as John Salt pointed out - the 2nd Hants numbers reported moving to Tebourba on the 29/11 were close to full establishment (less LOB).

Rune Something of a guess but I think both were present. 72nd AT regiment certainly had 6pdrs. I believe the infantry battalion establishment at this time had 2pdrs at least attached. An account from Major Smith of the East Surreys of fighting in Tebourba finishes - "At this period we only had the 2pdr anti-tank gun which was not up to the task (of dealing with Mk III and Mk IV panzers). However the battalion was supported by one troop of 6pdr A/T guns" (64th - Glasgow Yeomanry) I took the we to mean the East Surreys. I don't have a reliable TOE for these '42 battalions though.

Rune I do not think that the Hampshires had any armoured support closer than 4 or 5 miles away during their part in the Tebourba fighting. My sources also suggest John Salt is correct and that the 2nd Hampshire’s fight on 1st December was infantry vs. infantry. I have this put together from Ken Ford’s Battleaxe Division and Vol III of the Regimental History of The Royal Hampshire Regiment. It ties in with the information you do have. Particularly interesting is Battle Group Dejeida having one mechanically sound Tiger and the Hampshires account of the ‘impervious tank’ of the 2nd December. I would suggest that the sources you and John have looked at have lost the fragmented sense of the fighting over large distances between Medjez el Bab and Dejeida 28th November to 3rd December. This is a bit of an essay but I hope of interest. So from the sources mentioned :- 22/11/42 2d Hampshires disembark @ Algiers, subordinate to 1st Guards Brigade of 78th (Battleaxe) division. 28/11/42 reach railhead @ Soul El Arba and Medjez on 29/11. Immediately on arrival they are ordered to relieve the Northamptons of the divisions 11th Brigade who had been written down attacking Djedeida on 28/11 and 29/11 supported by Honeys (? number) and "a few" Grant tanks of Combat Command B. The Northampton’s lost one complete company in Djedeida and sustained heavy losses in the others. The tanks available were reduced to a 'handful' and withdrawn. Evelegh (CO 78th Division) at Medjez received news of the Northampton's repulse mid afternoon on the 29th. The Northhamptons and East Surreys of his 11th brigade were both 'worn out and depleted' the third battalion (Lancashire Fusiliers) had been detached to Blade Force and "were not available". Despite having just arrived 2d Hampshires got sent forward to Tebourba. They moved forward the 16 to 18 miles to Tebourba that night in TCV. The move was W, X, Y and Z companies under command of Lt Col. Lee. One or two vehicles crashed and overturned in the rush forwards and a complete platoon from W company was lost from the strength. Otherwise the battalion appears to have been pretty well complete. The Hampshires relieved the remnants of the Northamptons in the latter’s positions about 4 miles east of Tebourba and 1 to 2 miles west of Djedeida "beneath the ridge before Djedeida". They dug in two companies up and two in reserve. Y and X companies forward (left and right respectively) with W behind Y and Z behind X. battalion HQ in the centre. The position was in close country and the Hants men were supported by two troops of 25 pdrs of 496th battery, 132d Field Regiment and at least one battery of 6pdrs of the 72d AT Regiment. The account I have goes on :- ”Daylight on 30th November revealed to Lt Col Lee just what his battalion had taken over. The positions were those the Northamptons had ended up in after their repulse of the previous day; they had not been chosen as a defensive line and were unsuitable and exposed. .... He was overlooked by thee ridge on his left beyond which the Northamptons had lost their A company.... To his right across the river further high ground looked down on the position .... the immediate vicinity was woodland and Olive groves giving good concealed approach to the position. Lt Col Lee requested permission to withdraw towards Tebourba or launch another attack on Djedeida. Both were refused the latter as there was no available armoured support. He was strongly ordered to hold the current position. Lee changed his dispositions slightly. X company moved to the forward edge of the woodland, Y onto the slopes of the ridge, W moved to occupy a central position around battalion HQ and Z in reserve. I have a sketch of this deployment. The rest of the 30th passed with harassment from Stukas.” The Germans appear to have spent the 'relative lull' organising the ad hoc battle groups already mentioned :- Battle Group Hudel (~40 tanks), Battle Group Luder (~20 tanks), Battle Group Koch (~? Tanks) and Battle Group Djedeida (at least 7 tanks). Only the last was involved in the attack on the Hampshires on 1st December. Groups Hudel and Koch were sent well north of the Hampshires position and were directed well North and North East of Tebourba. Battle Group Koch was sent south of the Medjerda river. This was a classic pincer movement and if reaching the Tebourba gap (the defile between Tebourba and Medjez El Bab) would trap the british infantry in an east of Tebourba. Only battle group Djedeida attacked the Hampshires. Battle Groups Hudel and Luder ran straight into Blade Force and the Americans CCB. Battle Group Koch ran into D company East Surreys holding the bridge at El Bathan. These fights were between 4 and 8 miles away from the Hampshires positions. I think in those sources with a larger view this has been lost and the tanks of Blade Force The Hampshires certainly knew the enemy had moved past them on both flanks and were aware of fighting to the rear. On the 1st December only infantry attacks were launched on the Hampshires throughout the day and with aggressive patrolling and infiltration into the night. 2nd December saw the main attack on the Hampshires. At dawn infantry and 7 tanks attacked the position. The tanks moved directly on Y Company on the more open ridge. These were engaged by field and AT guns, two set ablaze and two immobilised. “One tank seemed impervious to all solid shot and closed on Y Company’s right hand platoon. Nothing more was heard of this platoon.” Another tank started shelling the battalion HQ forcing Lt Col Lee to pull his command post back to Z company. X Company was being heavily attacked by strong infantry forces who had infiltrated the woods. Mid morning “more tanks entered the fray and started picking off the AT guns one by one” and “Just after 1200 X Company was overrun: just six men managed to get back to battalion HQ.” Lt Col Lee did have success with counter attacks through the woods including – “Lt. Freemantle and his men put in a bayonet charge that killed or wounded over forty of the enemy, the rest being put to flight”. The fight then petered out possibly (my guess) as it had moved into the close wooded terrain less suitable for the few tanks and because of the fierce counterattacks. The terrain was described thus – “His .. (Lt Col Lee) .. positions were a series of slit trenches in the very thick country with little field of fire. A more unmilitary place to be you could not imagine. You could not see more than fifty yards”. No real respite for the Hampshires however as the Stukas returned. That night 2nd /3rd Lt Col Lee pulled the Hampshires back two miles to the defensive position between point 186 and the Medjerda he had wished to occupy two days before. There were still some AT guns and 25pdrs with the battalion. There was fighting throughout the 3rd during which time contact with brigade was lost and the Hampshires were surrounded. Their postion becoming most precarious when the high ground of point 186 (held by elements of the East Surreys) was lost. The VC won by Major Le Patourel mentioned by John Salt was won when he and four volunteers attacked automatic weapons placed on point 186 that were causing great suffering to the remaining gunners and Z company. By the time darkness fell there were 10 officers 200 men and one 25pdr. The 25pdrs firing over open sights had accounted for at least another 5 tanks that day. This is from the battalion history for that day :- “All morning the enemy was held off by small parties of men often at the point of the bayonet. At last, however, enemy infantry, supported by tanks, succeeded in breaking through on the extreme right and got round behind W company’s position. Captain Waldron drove them off with a bayonet charge … Z company now reduced to one weak platoon grimly held off the enemy in the main position. All day the gunners had been fighting magnificently. They had knocked out five tanks with 25-pounders, and all targets had been taken on over open sights. By 5 o’clock in the evening only one gun remained in action.” The night of the 3rd Lt Col Lee made the decision to breakout. They broke through the cordon with “heavy loss” and reached Tebouba to find it long abandoned by friends. The Tebourba gap was now held by the enemy and the remaining Hants men split into small groups to best make the many miles back to Medjez. Two days later at Medjez the 2nd Hampshires mustered 5 Officers and 194 men including the LOB from 29/11. Edit Sorry I meant to add - I would be interested in play testing the scenario also if that is OK [ January 27, 2006, 05:27 PM: Message edited by: Mick15 ]

Kingfish It is sent - 500kb I'm afraid with screen shots. A final plug for the benefit of every one else - do have a go at this one.

Kingfish Thank you very much - an excellent scenario with an excellent map - a very realistic feel to it. I played this as Axis vs AI with default deployment and the computer experience cranked up one notch. I would really recommend this one to all. I just scraped a minor victory after a few nasty surprises. One question ***** Possible Spoiler ***** Are there automatic ceasefire conditions? I was dropped out of the game with a ceasefire at about turn 40. Unless I inadvertently hit the ceasefire button at some point I was perplexed by this. I did return to a game save for turn 29 but got same result.

And for skill and luck with a 2" mortar luck at the Super-King encounter thread

In the same vein you may or may not know that on night of 7/8th August 1944 elements of the 5 DCLI took out a Royal Tiger with a single 2" mortar round in Le Plessis Grimoult - small village on the southern slopes of Mt Pincon. This is the first hand account of CSM R Philp: "To our surprise across the other side of the road was a large German tank being loaded with ammunition from a lorry, which was parked right against it. We stopped under cover and watched the Germans, carrying ammunition, smoking cigarettes, talking casually - and they weren't aware we were there! Then a message came to me from the company commander telling me to mortar them. The first HE landed right on the truck it blew up, caught fire and killed the crew; it must have killed them all. The tank also caught fire and exploded from inside. So that was all cleared." Sgt F. Bolt was with the 2" mortar his account is: "We came down the road from Mt Pincon leading towards the village. There was a row of trees on the left hand side of the road. I was there with the man who fired the 2" mortar.... It [round 1] went up in the air and dropped right on the crossroads were the tank was. I thought the bomb went down the tank turret and then exploded, but other witnesses say it hit the lorry. There was a big bang and then flames and that was it!" Possibly the first Royal Tiger destroyed in Normandy - anyone know?

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh I would suggest that Mr Dorosh is being charitable to Sergei and that it the 'likelihood' is not all that low either. There are examples from the 300 Spartans to date where the effect on the campaign is significant and not just bridges. Another theme could be defence of passes/defiles where numbers engaged to critical effect are kept low by the terrain. Leaving Leonidas and to keep to CMAK era - for example;- Sidi Nisir February 1943 - the very bloody nose inflicted on Kampfgruppe Lang by 5bn Hants and particularly E & F Troops 155 battery RA meant Oschenkopf had no chance of success and the outcome of the Tunisian campaign would not be at best very significantly delayed. Kohima various company actions on the hilltops around in the two weeks prior to 19th April 1944. The Royal West Kents prevented the Japanese 31st Division debouching onto the vital Imphal-Dimapur Road. This would have been catastrophic for the defence of India. Gloster Hill - The delaying action by the 622 men of the 1st Bn Gloucestershires, 23-25th April 1951, on the hill above the Imjin near Solma-Ri Korea. This was and still is acknowledged as preventing the Chinese encirclement of I Corps and playing a large part in bringing the chinese communists to face saving negotiation - protracted though it was. I am sure there are many more knowledgable than I who can add greatly to this list.

Originally posted by Jon S Very much looks as though you are correct - I went scurrying to my notes to find were the kangaroo info came from. I have two accounts of an interview with Pat Spencer Moore, ADC to Major General Thomas (GOC 43d Division) He describes a commanders conference in the tower of Fontaine Etoupefour church at 1500 on 10 July as it became clear that progress to the crest of hill 112 was stalled and as Eterville/Maltot was being heavily counterattacked. The GOC made 3 decisions 1 4th Dorsets would be recommitted to support 7th Hants in Maltot. 2 Over ruling Brigadier Michael Carver of 4th Armoured Brigade elements would be brought south of the Odon to support an attack to "stabilize the battle for Hill 112 - perhaps even win it". 3 5 DCLI of 214 brigade would be the only infantry committed to this attack as 7th Somerset Light Infantry and 1st Worcestershires were already committed to support 130 brigade at Eterville. In describing this first hand account in my copy of the book "Hill 112 Battles for the Odon" the author then goes on to state; "5 DCLI in their assembly area north of the Odon ... dismount from their Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers and move by foot to the bottom of hill 112" This statement, on page 115, is not a direct quote from the ADC's account nor is it referenced - so given the information revealed by a quick google search and Michael Dorosh's link probably not Kangaroos but one red herring - sorry. I would like to know what 214 brigade were intended to ride though. I personally doubt that operational planning in July '44 expected shank's pony to be the best way to allow an infantry brigade (214) to accompany an armoured brigade (4) on a rapid pass through a taken, but potentially unsecured, enemy MLR to a relatively distant objective (establishing an Orne bridgehead). As I have several sources making it clear that this was the original final phase objective for Operation Jupiter and as I cannot think of any more allusions to animals I shall leave you with that question.

Operation Jupiter 10 July 44 - 43d Wessex division attacked on a two brigade front with one brigade in reserve. Forming up position (FUP) ran for just over 2000 yards (about 1800 metres) from the banks of the Odon at Trette Poux to the eastern edge of Baron. The intention was to secure Hill 112 using the two attacking brigades to break the MLR on a front of approximately 2500 yards and then pass the third brigade (214 mounted in Kangaroos - the hybrid APCs not the animals) with 4th Armoured Brigade through to secure bridgehead(s) on the River Orne a further 2 km beyond Hill 112. The attack of 129 brigade onto Hill 112 is well documented and has its own very good scenario in CMBO. Worth having a look at. Less well known and perhaps more typical (if there is such a thing) is the attack on 129 bgde's left flank of 130 bgde. 130 brigade put two battalions 4th and 5th Dorsets on a FUP of 1000 yards (~900m) for an average advance of 1100 yards(~1km) to the Caen - Everecy road with primary objectives of; 5th Dorsets a fortified farm (Les Duanes) and a chateau (de Fontaine) between quarter and third of a mile (400-600 metres) from the FUP. 4th Dorsets the village of Eterville third to two thirds of a mile (600 to 1000 metres) from FUP. Advance would commence at 0500 Both battalions used box formation (2 Coys up 2 Coys reserve) and, besides integral brigade troops, were each supported by a squadron of the Churchill equipped 9RTR (B Sqdn for 5th Dorsets and C Sqdn for 4th Dorsets). 4th Dorsets also had 1 trp Crocodiles from 141 RAC of 79 Armoured Div in support. Also available to the attacking brigades were the M10 tank destroyers of 129 battery, 86th AT Regiment RA A third battalion (7th Hants) with A sqdn 9 RTR was in reserve and would move onto the same FUP at 0600 to be available to 'leapfrog' the leading battalions when on their objectives and continue the advance a further 1200 yards into Maltot. The two Dorset battalions would be expected to reorganise and support this advance. Each battalion would have one battery from 112 Field Regt RA (8 X 25pdrs with relevant battery commander deployed with Btn HQ and FOO(s?) with coys) for direct support. The artillery regt commander would be deployed at brigade HQ. In this operation - for priority (uncle) targets the divisional CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) - probably a Brigadier deployed at division HQ - could call on the divisional artillery of his own (43d Wessex) and 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53d Welsh Divisions. A total of 264 x 25 pdrs. Also committed to a pre attack barrage was the 3d and 8th Army Groups heavy artillery and the Royal Naval Bombardment Force. The pre attack barrage was on a front of 3500 yards overlapping the flanks of the attack (both brigades combined) by 500 yards, had particular concentrations on known centres of resistance and lasted from 0400 to 0500 hrs. A couple of other points. 129 brigade put all 3 of its battalions onto the FUP for the attack. Their FUP was the same length, 1000 yards but had a slightly longer line - some 1500 yards - to establish on their primary objective. There wasn't a specified doctrine (as Mr Salt so accurately pointed out) on brigade frontage and battalions committed to attack/reserve. That decision was always informed by the notional 1000 yard brigade front for attack and then corrected for terrain and intelligence assessments and/or constrained by troop availability and exhaustion. This was of course done over tea. I would suggest you decide on your map then over a cup or two of PG or Tetleys (with condensed milk and plenty of sugar for authenticity) decide the objectives, how realistically wrong the intelligence would be and then allocate the troops for attack/reserve. BTW you can (or could two years ago) get a copy of the contemporary 1:25000 map of Hill 112 with the 43d Wessex Intelligence overprint of 8 July 1944 from the Keep Military Museum, Bridport Road, Dorchester. (If M Dorosh reads this I believe that at about midnight on 11 July the Canadian 4th Brigade moved into Eterville and the salient created by 129 brigade, and later 15th Scottish troops, to relieve them so it might be of interest.) There is also a very good account in Tim Saunders "Hill 112 Battles of the Odon" ISBN 0 85052 737-6. He breaks the account up by brigade attacks and it would be an excellent source for the variety of answers to your original question if you can get a copy - it doesn't include scale on maps however. I however am sure of the distances I quoted as I was there, on my bike, having a good look around two weeks ago.

The Auk - Sir Claude Auchinlek - was one of the best - there is a substantial amount in an earlier thread but in short he outfaced Rommel (militarily) each time he took personal control of VIII Army in the later Crusader and the first Alamain battles.

Joe Stilwell and various members of his staff Not incompetent and as Chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek a commander with more than his fair share of problems. He makes my list as one of the poorer Generals as he was very dangerous to serve under especially if a Chindit - particularly in 77 Brigade between 6 June and 27 June 1944. In capturing Mogaung, while under Stilwell's orders, they were reduced from 2000 to 800 and virtually accused by Stilwell of 'malingering'. Stilwell's refusal to evacuate the survivors immediately after these battles cost 77 Brigade another couple of hundred casualties as exhausted men succumbed to typhus, cerebral malaria and septicaemia - 77 Brigade had been in almost continual fighting - much of it in strongholds behind Japanese lines - since 5 March 1944. On 24 June and 27 June 77 Brigade put in attacks that were to be supported by Stilwell's Chinese troops, who conspicuously failed to move. Despite this 77 Brigade did capture Mogaung. Stilwell's HQ announced to world radio the very next day that Chinese-American forces had captured Mogaung. Calvert (commander of 77 Brigade) signalled Stilwell "Understand Chinese have taken Moguang. Please record we have taken umbrage" Stilwell's son - his staff IO - did report umbrage must be a very small village as he couldn't find it on the map. As a one off the above example might be excusable but was part of a consistent pattern - Stilwell did not treat the Marauders (Merrill's) much better either.

RE Gore Force - addendum Sorry the list of American units attaching themselves to Gore Force should be 3 x Grants, 5 x M-10s, 3 x 6pdr and a "scattering" of infantry. I missed the 6 pdrs. Btw the 10 Royal Buffs in your source should almost certainly be one coy of the 10 Rifle Brigade. The reference to the 'Buffs' is an error.