Dandelion, can you expound on this?

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Bacques book has been debunked.

Got a source?

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Actually the lesson is never bring up anything having to do with morality in a discussion of WW II. Another thread blown to heck, and I must plead guilty to setting it off.

Is anyone even the slightest bit interested in the twin fights at Caretan and outside Caen, compare and constrast fashion?

I'm much more interested in tactical talk than morality. Dandelion, where are you?

[juan_gigante]

I agree. While I confess to participating in the "executing POWs" talk, everything that we could say has already been said. Lots of people did it. They were wrong to do so. Done. Now, I personally feel that the first few weeks in Normandy were the most interesting parts of the Allied campaign through Northwest Europe, and I would love to hear people talk about, as my understanding is sorely limited.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Bacques book has been debunked.

Got a source? </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Contrary to popular stereotypes, the Germans were the green forces in these fights. The Americans they faced were veterans, while the Canadians were also in their first action, though they had been in arms for several years. Many people have the impression that since the Germans had been fighting for so long their elite SS mobile divisions must have been decked out with veterans. This is simply not the case.

The SS was expanding and the first divisions committed in the west were units that formed in the west during late 1943 and early 1944. They had only just completed their training. In the case of 12SS, most of the privates were 16-19 year old members of the Hitler Youth. While there were vet units on the German side, they were not the ones that led the early counterattacks - they mostly had not arrived yet.

To get back on topic...

I think this is overstating the case somewhat. 12th SS-HJ was built around a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs from 1st LSSAH. Combine this with fanaticism of a fully indoctrinated youth (18 year olds in 1944 would have been 9 year olds when Hitler took power, giving them exposure to 9 years of the racist Übermensch rubbish that passed for education in Germany during the time; and I seriously doubt there were any 16-year old privates in the division in Normandy, although I stand to be corrected on this) and a long training period, and you should get a fairly effective formation, especially considering that it was overstrength, and lavishly equipped.

The Canadians on the other hand did not benefit from having a set of experienced junior and senior leaders, while in the case of the US I can not comment on whether 1st ID suffered from too much exposure to combat, in the way some people suspect the UK 50th and 7th Armoured did.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The Canadians on the other hand did not benefit from having a set of experienced junior and senior leaders,

Not true; the Canadian Army that went into Normandy did have a small cadre of general officers, officers, and senior Warrant Officers/NCOs that had gained battle experience in North Africa and the Mediterranean. I don't think any real study has ever been attempted on how successful this was. Certainly Simonds - commander of II Corps - benefited greatly from his command experience on Sicily as GOC First Canadian Division. I believe most Canadian battalions in NW Europe had a small number of troops on hand that had battle experience - including men in follow up formations like 2nd Cdn Division.

Emil Laloge, DCM, MM

Sergeant Laloge may have been exceptionally well recognized for his service (two medals for bravery was rare in WW II), but his battle experience was not so rare, relatively speaking. A sizeable number of men - commissioned and non-commissioned - were transferred for short tours with the British Army in North Africa for the purpose of battle experience. Some were given command positions (Strome Galloway being the most famous or at the least the most written about, going from the RCR to command a company of Irish Fusiliers (?) in Tunisia - though he didn't go to NW Europe until early 1945, having returned to RCR in Sicily/Italy after Tunisia).

[Andreas]

My understanding is that the whole cadre of 12th SS was experienced, but I stand to be corrected on that as well.

I am aware of the fact that some junior officers in Canadian formations had been to Africa and Italy (for a limited time, inlcuding Simonds), but I am reasonably certain that they still had nowhere near the amount of junior or senior leaders with combat experience that the Germans could field. Especially if you calculate it in man-years, instead of doing a head count.

[Battlefront.com]

This gets to the discussion point about how important training is vs. experience. The 12th SS had not fought as a formation, this is true. So as a formation it had no experience. Same is true with Panzer Lehr. But what was their level of training, and what was the level of experience of crucial NCOs and officers? In both formations the training was about as good as it could get and their leadership cadre fairly extensive and amongst the best soldiers in the Wehrmacht. On top of that, they were very well equipped (IIRC the 88 Flak batteries of 12th SS were very combat experienced, and they dished out a lot of pain).

This sort of status shouldn't be ignored simply because the unit hadn't fought together as a unit. The 101st Airborne was "green" by this definition as well, but they fought extremely well under bad circumstances. Same with the 12th SS and Panzer Lehr. 21st Pz also did quite well considering it was a rebuilt unit that was not so lavishly equipped and bore the brunt of the initial Allied attacks.

On the Allied side, there was a lot of inexperience. Many of the formations had never seen combat nor did they have seasoned leadership cadres. Some of them had been moved around so long that they actually were less effective than they were back in the US (which was a BIG lesson learned, BTW).

So, I think it is safe to say that both sides had a fair amount of inexperienced, but well trained, troops. The 12th SS and Pz Lehr most likely dished it out a lot worse than they took it, even thogh they were at a distinct disadvantage in many ways (no American unit had its frontlines made to look like the moon, for example, but Pz Lehr did). This is not to say that the Germans are somehow inherently better than the Allies, rather a few "green" units were probably equivalent to "Veteran" Allied units in terms of abilities (this includes equipment, BTW).

In CM we made no distinction between training and field experience. Instead, it is up to the scenario makers to decide what the net result of training and experience should be for a unit. Well trained, no experience... Regular. Very well trained, no experience... Veteran. Well trained, good experience... Veteran. Poorly trained, no experience... Green. Etc.

Steve

P.S. I meant to remind folks that the Hitler Jugend was what we would now call "Paramilitary" training. So those 18 year olds were probably better conditioned for military service than the average Allied 18 year old. It must count for something above and beyond the political indoctrination.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

So, I think it is safe to say that both sides had a fair amount of inexperienced, but well trained, troops. The 12th SS... most likely dished it out a lot worse than they took it, even thogh they were at a distinct disadvantage in many ways...

This was the same 12th SS that was annihilated in Normandy while their chief opponent, 3rd Canadian Division, not only withstood their counterattacks, and helped liberate Caen during CHARNWOOD, but went on after Normandy to fight at the Channel Ports and then the Scheldt? And even suffered the loss of its GOC in a bombing raid to boot? Not that he was missed, and of course 12th SS lost their own GOC IIRC...

[Andreas]

Well, apparently not the same, since 12th SS was not wiped out anywhere, except in Dramameier's tearful eulogy to it, if we are to believe Reynolds.

[JasonC]

"on whether 1st ID suffered from too much exposure to combat"

Not on point it seems to me. 1st ID was not involved in the Carentan fight. It was slightly farther east, in the sector of 352 ID, later 2nd Panzer sector once it arrived. The infantry formation on the US side was the 101st airborne, picked men with experienced cadres including veterans of Sicily etc. The armor on the US side was even more experienced - it was 2nd armored division, which had been fighting since late 1942.

There is no sign 2nd armored suffered from long previous combat. It performed extremely well later in the campaign, leading the breakout and fighting through half a dozen different German formations in the process.

The Canadian 3rd was comparatively green, in a combat sense. But had been under arms as a formation since 1942, training in England. By comparison neither of the German formations existed 9 months before, and some of them were just completing their training.

The Germans were well armed, 12SS in particular for its armor, and the infantry weapons in 17SS were also impressive (1000 MG-42s for 8 infantry type battalions is a huge figure, twice even the 2 LMG per squad establishment). 12SS was not well cadred, however. They were seriously short NCOs, being filled out with comparatively underaged privates.

2nd armored was also extremely well armed. The single combat command that took part in the Carentan fight was the size of some German panzer divisions in vehicle terms. It was light in infantry, but working with the paras obviously covered that weakness quite well.

101 might have been weakened by prior combat pretty seriously. They have sustained heavy losses on D-Day and had been in hard fighting for a week. But they were performing extremely well by any measure, just having successfully ejected 6 FJ regiment from the approaches to Carentan (across quite difficult marsh terrain) and rapidly taken the town itself. Unlike the Canadians, they did not lose whole front line companies when hit by armor, though they did give ground on their right. They got it back by the end of the day after the armor intervened.

The Canadians lost more heavily than 12SS did in the 3 days the Germans were on the attack. They still stopped Panthers, and drove the number of German runners down by 50 tanks in 3 days. The Germans did not make any ground. Their subsequent defensive successes brought local stalemate, as neither sides' armor could advance. Two weeks later in Epsom, 9th and 10th SS had to be thrown in to hold the line after 12SS proved unable to - hit by far more weight than just the Canadian 3rd, it is true.

What is interesting to me about these fights is they show the Germans trying their offensive minded doctrine and getting only exchanges for their efforts. They did not have local odds. They attacked roughly 1 to 1 and expected some inherent tactical superiority and good equipment to run over the Allies. It didn't. It just made for brawling that reduced both sides.

The Germans could not afford that and the Allies could, in the grand scheme of things. 12SS dropped a quarter of its armor in 3 days with nothing to show for it but a few messed up Canadian infantry battalions. 17SS lost a third of its running armor - though few were TWOs - and held the Americans up for one day.

The Germans thought that was the right use of their armor, to attack - until local experience taught them otherwise. They repeated the exercise on a larger scale in their counterattack into the teeth of Epsom. Later in the US sector, Lehr tried it with negative odds, with even worse results than 17SS. They repeated it after the breakout with Mortain.

They apparently just thought that was the way to use armor. Maybe they also underestimated the Allies, but it looks to me like they overestimated the value of being on the tactical offensive. Meanwhile their best results actually came where they stood on the defensive with serious armor right behind the line, against the Brits. And from quality infantry selling itself slowly and dear in terrain, in front of the Americans (mostly FJ).

In other words, what they actually were good at and what they thought they were good at were two different things...

[JasonC]

On 12SS losses, they apparently lost 8000 men in Normandy. The rear echelons survived the battle, but the infantry was practically wiped out. AFV strength is obscured by KGs formed and disbanded late in the battle, but in late August they had only 10-15 runners left. I'd say it was thoroughly "fought out" and needed a complete rebuild, but it was not eliminated.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

On 12SS losses, they apparently lost 8000 men in Normandy. The rear echelons survived the battle, but the infantry was practically wiped out. AFV strength is obscured by KGs formed and disbanded late in the battle, but in late August they had only 10-15 runners left. I'd say it was thoroughly "fought out" and needed a complete rebuild, but it was not eliminated.

When did the Division take to the field again? I was under the impression it wasn't until Dec 16th or thereabouts? 3rd Canadian stayed in the field despite considerable losses, and fought again through September (Cap Griz Nez etc.0 and all of October during the Scheldt/Breskens Pocket actions.

[Battlefront.com]

This was the same 12th SS that was annihilated in Normandy while their chief opponent, 3rd Canadian Division, not only withstood their counterattacks,

Oh, I forgot that the 12th SS only had one engagement and was only battled by the a single Canadian division, which single handedly wiped it out without much difficulty. My bad.

Seriously though... you're kidding, right?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

The Germans had a bad system for replacing losses. Instead of feeding in smaller replacment units, they would keep a unit at the front until it could be relieved (or was totally spent), then would withdraw it for rebuilding somewhere in the rear. The Germans tweaked this system several times to be more flexible, but basically the "all or nothing" replacement system remained in place for the whole war. Especially because Hitler insisted on newly raised manpower being used to create NEW units instead of fully refreshing existing ones.

In contrast, the Western Allies fed in replacements to units already at the front as the standard method of replacement, which meant that their combat strength could be better maintained. This meant the staying power, long term, of a German formation was shorter than a Western Allied one. It also meant lower cohesion in units that had suffered significant losses. This was something the German system avoided, though at the cost of removal of the unit from combat.

Steve

[juan_gigante]

I think that it is worthy of note that, IMHO, more was being asked of those Divisions caught early in the fighting in Normandy. Many of the inexperienced yet well-trained Allied units gave incredible performances, but that fact that units like 12SS, 17SS, 21st Panzer, etc. did as well as they did is very impressive. I would argue that the German units were, in many engagements, attacking in bad terrain, against units like the 3rd Canadian and 101st Airborne that could certainly be considered their equals in training, units that were very well-supplied, with the constant threat of Allied CAS, fewer supplies than ideal because of CAS, fewer supplies, tanks, etc. than I'm sure they would have liked (when 6th Fallschrimjaeger Regiment General Heydte (sp?) asked for more mortars, he was told that "for paratroopers, a knife is enough"), and so on and so on, the GErman units were facing long odds. (hooray for run-on sentences!! w00t!) I think the crux of this argument can be aimed back around to one of Steve's earlier comments regarding training and combat experience being used to determine the CM experience level. "In CM we made no distinction between training and field experience. Instead, it is up to the scenario makers to decide what the net result of training and experience should be for a unit. Well trained, no experience... Regular. Very well trained, no experience... Veteran. Well trained, good experience... Veteran. Poorly trained, no experience... Green. Etc." That makes a whole lot of sense to me, and I think that that explains to some degree this debate by pointing out that these units could be described as roughly equal in "experience".

[juan_gigante]

Wow, that makes no sense. In essence, even though they lost, I am impressed with how well the German units did in a tough spot. Also, well-trained but combat inexperienced units can still be "regular", as many of these units were. THat's much simpler.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Seriously though... you're kidding, right?

Steve [/QB]

I believe my point was that 12th SS was trashed so badly in Normandy that it didn't take to the field again until December whereas Third Division was still at it in September and especially October. It was in response to your post that "The 12th SS... most likely dished it out a lot worse than they took it, even thogh they were at a distinct disadvantage in many ways..."

Perhaps I wasn't clear; I was disagreeing with your assumption that the 12th SS dished it out worse than it got.

[JasonC]

In re 6 FJ Rgt asking for more mortars and being told to fight with knives, it is a fish story. 6 FJ had 40 81mm and 9 120mm mortars for a single regiment, hardly poorly equipped in mortars. 17SS had 99 81mm mortars and reinforced the same sector. In both cases that is over 12 81s per battalion, enough for company level and battalion level mortars and to spare. They were lavishly equipped with MGs as well. 6 FJ had more than enough for 2 LMGs per squad plus heavies, and 17SS had fully twice the establishment per battalion needed for a 2 LMG per squad load out. Knives my eye, in other words.

[Grapeshot]

Perhaps I wasn't clear; I was disagreeing with your assumption that the 12th SS dished it out worse than it got.

Should this not be a pretty straightforward with personal and equipment losses. You figure 2 to 1 ratio when attacking and there you have it. Does anyone have any figures?

[Battlefront.com]

I don't have any on hand since all my books are packed away at the moment. But I would like it if someone came up with figures since I wish to stand by my statement that the 12th SS, all things considered, dealt out more than it received while it was in Normandy. It was also responsible for holding open the northern part of the escape route out of the Falaise Pocket with pitifully small and hodgepodge forces, despite massive pressure on it. This was, however, the division's last combat op of note since that was all it had to give.

Steve

[RMC]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The Germans had a bad system for replacing losses. Instead of feeding in smaller replacment units, they would keep a unit at the front until it could be relieved (or was totally spent), then would withdraw it for rebuilding somewhere in the rear. The Germans tweaked this system several times to be more flexible, but basically the "all or nothing" replacement system remained in place for the whole war. Especially because Hitler insisted on newly raised manpower being used to create NEW units instead of fully refreshing existing ones.

This isn't entirely correct. The Germans did feed regular replacements into the line from the ersatzbataillonen. This system could not replace the men as quickly as they were lost and so they were from time to time required to withdraw units for rebuild.

In contrast, the Western Allies fed in replacements to units already at the front as the standard method of replacement, which meant that their combat strength could be better maintained. This meant the staying power, long term, of a German formation was shorter than a Western Allied one. It also meant lower cohesion in units that had suffered significant losses. This was something the German system avoided, though at the cost of removal of the unit from combat.

The Germans also recognized that units should be rotated out from combat on a periodic basis in order to reduce the psychiatric casualties. The US system, with the steady stream of replacements from the depot did allow units to stay in the line pretty much indefinitely. In terms of numbers this kept the combat strength of the units up, but with the training shortfalls and issues with cohesion I question whether these units really maintained their combat power over time.

[Battlefront.com]

Forgot to reply to this one:

And even suffered the loss of its GOC in a bombing raid to boot?

The 12th SS lost its GOC, Fritz Witt, on 16 of June. IIRC much of the senior staff was also killed or wounded in the attack, which was likely the result of an ULTRA interception. After that it was SOP to never meet with more than a few officers in one place at one time. Not sure what that really has to do with anything, but I figured since you thought it was important I would note it

Steve

[Grapeshot]

From a quick google search on the subject I didn't get a lot of figures. In terms of afvs it would seem that the 12 ss gave out much more then it received. From the few figures I saw on the early action

The I. Battalion sustained 15 dead, 87 wounded and 10 missing. Losses of the II. were even heavier, including most company chiefs and the commander. The Tank Battalion lost six Panzer IV. But the 27th Canadian Tank Regiment lost 28 Shermans and the 9th Canadian Brigade suffered 245 casualties.

On June 11 fighting again centered on Mohnke's 26th Regiment, giving this unit its brief moment of limited victory. The 3rd Canadian Division decided to clear the Mue valley by driving toward higher ground at le Haut du Basq, which was Colonel Mohnke's headquarters. The 6th Canadian Armored Regiment spearheaded the assault, supported by the infantry of the Queen's Own Rifles. They passed through Norrey en Bessin under heavy shelling and reached the open corn fields north of le Mesnil Patry. Leading tanks reached the village under heavy machine gun and mortar fire, when they were attacked by Mohnke's Ill. Battalion, commanded by SS Captain Hans Scapini, from Cristot on their right and the I. Battalion, commanded by SS Major Bernhard Krause, from St. Mauvieu on their left. The Canadians were forced to retreat, leaving behind them 37 burned out tanks, 95 dead officers and men and a large number of wounded and missing. The 6th Canadian Regiment suffered one third of ail their casualties in the European campaign during this encounter with the Hitler Youth at le Mesnil Patry. The 26th Regiment lost only 13 Panthers and had fewer casualties than the Canadians.

From what I read, both sides took a beating but the Germans had no way to sustain the losses. Also, I have a feeling that the veteran nco's the 12 ss had were mainly in the tank corp. I saw various accounts from Canadian commanders that the 12 ss fought hard but made various tactical errors (frontal attacks instead of flanking, coordinations of actions ect)

[JasonC]

"The Tank Battalion lost six Panzer IV"

Check the number of runners. Pz IVs drop by 40 in their fight with the Canadians, not 6. Running Panthers drop by 10.