Dandelion, can you expound on this?

[David Chapuis]

In another thread, Dandelion wrote:

It became obvious that the enemy [West Allies] could not be frightened by shock assaults, and that any bluff would be called. The Allied troops thus proved quite another calibre than that anticipated, and tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy. The SS lost much of their (subjectively perceived) morale superiority.

This paragraph caught my attention, especially the bold section. Would you (or anybody else) care to elaborate?

[Battlefront.com]

I'll toss in a few cents worth That the Germans, overall, thought the Western Allies were weak and soft. Kill a few of 'em and the rest would go home. That sort of thing. On top of this the Germans perceived the Soviets as being, tactically at least, fairly easy to beat. It was operationally where they had the problems. So when the Allies landed in the West the Germans thought it would be fairly easy to push them back into the ocean because they were soft and outnumbered (or at least not larger). Obviously not all German commanders were that blind, but a lot of the troops (much of which were fairly green) thought this way at first. They quickly found out the hard way three very important things:

1. The West wasn't as soft as they thought. Oh, and there wasn't just a few of 'em ashore either.

2. The Luftwaffe was nowhere to be seen, yet the West had planes a plenty. Big shock.

3. Western Artillery was used for precision hits, and lots of them. In the East the Germans could often outmaneuver the Soviet artillery because of its ridged control doctrine, but against the West... absolutely not the case.

The combo of all these things, plus the absolutely terrible terrain for offensive maneuvers (which is what the Germans initially needed to be doing), basically ground the German forces down and ground them down fast.

So yeah... when you get ready for an "easy push" to the sea, but instead find yourself hammered by air and artillery before you even start, then get hung up in boccage only to get hammered some more... definitely not what the Germans had in mind. Keep in mind this applies just as much to regular Heer infantry units, Heer Panzer units, Fallschirmjäger as well as SS. All of them thought that things would go a lot better than they did. Afterall, Göebels said it would...

Steve

[Pzman]

And we all Goebels was always right.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Göebels

In German, ö and oe are pronounced the same way, but there's no reason to write öe. Also, I think the Propaganda Minister's name was properly written Goebbels. Luftwaffe Marshall's name was Göring, but that is often written as Goering in English sources.

[dieseltaylor]

I am a little bemused that the Germans are thought to be naive as to Western capabilities. Experience in North Africa and Italy must have already provided evidence that despite lousy tanks and inept commanders the Allies kept winning.

The artillery had been very effective in NA, the Tigers HAD died, Allied air supremacy over France

was a given.

They may have hoped to drive the Allies into the sea but naval and air superiority had already been evidenced and would be ten times more powerful so close to Allied bases. To decide your best chance was an early assault on the invaders did not make it a winning strategy just the best of a poor set of options.

[David Chapuis]

I am also quite curious about 'tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy.'

Steve mentioned outmaneuvering Russian artillery, but not being about to do that in the west. What other tactics failed in the west that were successful in the east? Were German shock tactics still over-runnnig Russians wholesale in 43 & early 44?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

So when the Allies landed in the West the Germans thought it would be fairly easy to push them back into the ocean because they were soft and outnumbered (or at least not larger). Obviously not all German commanders were that blind, but a lot of the troops (much of which were fairly green) thought this way at first.

One might have thought they'd have learned something after a year and a half of fighting in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. Did word really spread that slowly in the German forces?

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Göebels

In German, ö and oe are pronounced the same way, but there's no reason to write öe. Also, I think the Propaganda Minister's name was properly written Goebbels. Luftwaffe Marshall's name was Göring, but that is often written as Goering in English sources. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

So when the Allies landed in the West the Germans thought it would be fairly easy to push them back into the ocean because they were soft and outnumbered (or at least not larger). Obviously not all German commanders were that blind, but a lot of the troops (much of which were fairly green) thought this way at first.

One might have thought they'd have learned something after a year and a half of fighting in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. Did word really spread that slowly in the German forces?

Michael </font>

[Michael Emrys]

My own assumption—partially borne out by my readings—is that the German staff system was not inefficient in distributing "lessons learned" material throughout the army. Whether a particular commander paid attention to it is of course another matter. The SS seem to have been especially resistant, probably due to a combination of ideological blinding and not being experienced in the staff system.

Michael

[Europa]

I found the part about the Italians in the text above very interesting. Fascinating that the Germans did so well even when they had to guard and babysit another army. Must be like boxing with one arm tied to the back.

[Battlefront.com]

Well, I make enough typos in English so what can one expect from me after only 2 semesters of German over 15 years ago? Is it was, I originally wrote his name with the umlaut, then remembered that the more generally accepted spelling is with the oe. Problem is I forgot to remove the silly little dots But the two are interchangable for the most part, even if it isn't propper to do so.

As it so happens, I spelled his name wrong in any case. The little clubfooted weasel had double "b"s in his name, not a single one:

Goebbels

Goebels (one "b"), as Google just reminded me, are little porcelain figures like Hummels. And the latter should not be comfused with tracked vehicles with howitzers on them

BTW, the problem with those reports, like the one Michael pointed out (nice one), is that they were mostly written as propaganda pieces. The Western Allies made similar ones, for example trying to debunk the threat of the MG42 or Tiger tanks. One would think Armies would be more honest about things since troops will learn the truth sooner rather than later, but I guess not. Reading AARs out of Afghanistan and Iraq shows that the US Army and USMC (in particular the Marines) have learned that truth is a better weapon than propaganda. The AARs are, for the most part, quite honest (at least the ones done for Lessons Learned).

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

David

Steve mentioned outmaneuvering Russian artillery, but not being about to do that in the west. What other tactics failed in the west that were successful in the east? Were German shock tactics still over-runnnig Russians wholesale in 43 & early 44?

Remember that at the tactical level the Germans were only really starting to run into trouble in the East during the latter part of 1943. Bagration, the Soviet offensive that collapsed the entire Eastern Front, didn't start until June 22nd, three weeks after D-Day. This was the first time that the Germans were consistently beat at the tactical level, though at first mostly because they were so badly outnumbered, hampered by horrible strategic planning, and lacked armor and vehicles to fight back with.

The main thing that probably took the Germans by surprise in Normandy was the flexibility of Allied leadership. The Soviets suffered from generally poor junior leadership throughout the war, but especially prior to 1944. Part of this was because of the Purges, part because of the doctrine they had to fight under, and part because of the horrible losses sustained during the first 2 years (in particular) of the war in the East.

The inflexibility of Soviet leadership (or the lack of it in many cases) often allowed the Germans to come off better even though they might have been outnumbered or outmatched from an equipment standpoint. If a Soviet Rifle Company made a breakthrough, for example, that would cause a lot of problems for the Germans. But they learned that it would usually just sit tight and therefore could be eliminated provided reserves were in place. Not so with the Western Allies.

Not only did Western units fight with more initiative than the Soviets, but they also had much more sophisticated means of coordinating actions than the Soviets did. Artillery being one of the major aspects. The Soviets had a big problem with on-the-fly artillery support, the Allies did not. So if a Soviet Rifle Company got into a fix, it probably wasn't able to communicate with friendly forces as well as a Western Ally could, and would have less support options when it did.

Another thing... the Germans didn't know about ULTRA. Kinda sucks to have the enemy know when your officers are getting together for a meeting and then to attack the meeting place. The Germans had to chalk stuff up to Allied skill or luck, but in reality they were cheating

Last thought... while the Western Allies might have been outgunned by the Germans in many ways, the gap had narrowed quite a bit through new Allied weapons (Firefly and 76mm Shermans) and the crappy terrain. Having a super duper long range gun doesn't really give you a leg up when engagement ranges are measured in hundreds of meters. In the East the Germans still occupied terrain where their superior ranged weaposn were still king. Not so in the West.

Anyway... the basic thought here is the Germans were thinking too much about their experiences in the East and their early experiences with the Americans, in particular, in Africa. I've seen a lot of evidence that German officers and soldiers were shocked by how quickly the American forces improved. The Brits were always held in pretty good regard in terms of their fighting ability, just not in terms of their ability to win battles. Then they completely failed to figure out how the local Normandy terrain would affect combat ops in general. Lots of lesons they had to learn the hard way.

Steve

[Seanachai]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Not only did Western units fight with more initiative than the Soviets, but they also had much more sophisticated means of coordinating actions than the Soviets did.

Steve

Ah, communications!

"Git the hell outta here, Bonzer, we got the game on!"

-Maj. General Colt

Kelly's Heroes

[JasonC]

There were 2 early fights between counterattacking SS forces and allies in Normandy. In the US sector, the arriving 17th SS counterattacked Americans who had just taken Carentan, on the 13th of June. In the British sector, 12th SS counterattacked Canadians outside of Caen on the 7-9 June - a small initial action on the 7th, a full day of fighting on the 8th, and a last attack attempt on the 9th. After that the 12SS goes over to the defensive. The Canadians suffer severely in this fighting but stop the German attack. In the US sector the counterattack is stopped within a day and US armor takes the initiative.

Contrary to popular stereotypes, the Germans were the green forces in these fights. The Americans they faced were veterans, while the Canadians were also in their first action, though they had been in arms for several years. Many people have the impression that since the Germans had been fighting for so long their elite SS mobile divisions must have been decked out with veterans. This is simply not the case.

The SS was expanding and the first divisions committed in the west were units that formed in the west during late 1943 and early 1944. They had only just completed their training. In the case of 12SS, most of the privates were 16-19 year old members of the Hitler Youth. While there were vet units on the German side, they were not the ones that led the early counterattacks - they mostly had not arrived yet.

While there were green units on the Allied side, the German counterattacks were directed at important points recently taken, which in effect selected for Allied formations opposite given critical missions and performing them well. The Canadians got farther on D-Day than anyone else, against heavy opposition. That is part of why they were the aim point of 12SS's counterattack.

Canadians vs. 12 SS, 7-9 June (these are extracts from a Canadian side history) -

7 June- the 3rd Canadian Division, 9th Canadian Brigade, North Novas with the Sherbrooke tanks for support, and some Cameron Highlander machine-gunners, push through Buron and Authie toward Capriquet airport, 3 miles west of Caen; lose naval gunfire support, pass out of range of Canadian artillery, and lose contact with a British brigade ordered elsewhere; Lt Col Petch decides to withdraw to higher ground, but C company attacked by the German 12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Division at Authie, just North of Caen-Bayeux road; 250 North Nova Scotia Highlanders and 60 Sherbrooke Fusilier tankmen are killed or captured; 23 Canadian POWs are executed that night.

Note - this is essentially the complete destruction of a leading element of the Canadian force. An infantry company with a tank company in support is wiped out. The Germans had a panzer grenadier regiment supported by a Panzer IV battalion in the area.

8 June - Rommel orders Kurt Meyer's 12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Grenadiers to attack the Canadian 7th Brigade at Putot-en-Basin (8 kms west of Caen). They cross the railway and outflank the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, destroying the three forward companies; the rest are beaten back, leaving their wounded behind; the Canadian Scottish, Canscots and 1st Hussars then use an artillery barrage from the 12th and 13th field regiments to retake Putot, but Meyer counter-attacks with 22 Panther tanks; the Regina Rifles fight a night-long battle, and hold. During these fights, the SS murder several Canadian POWs.

Note - the initial break-in is completely effective and practically wiped out the front line battalion. The Brits hold at their reserve line and then come back behind a rolling barrage. Panthers trump that barrage, night stalemates tanks.

9 June - Kurt Meyer withdraws his defeated 12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Grenadiers to Rots, then throws his last fresh Panther tank company in broad daylight against the Regina Rifles position at Norrey; but the Sherman Firefly tanks of the 1st Hussars drive him back, killing 8 tanks with their 17-pounders. Later in the day, the Queens Own Rifles and 1st Hussars capture the village of Le Mesnil-Patry, seven miles forward of Norrey; attacked by 88s, they lose 19 of the Hussar Shermans in fifteen minutes; the Queen's Own Rifles have 87 casualties, the 1st Hussars 60.

Note - The Germans try to lead with heavy armor to nullify Canadian artillery superiority, but in daylight discover 17-pdrs cannot be attacked frontally even by Panthers. The Canadians discover 88s can't be attacked frontally by Shermans either, and tactical statemate ensues.

"in the 6 days of June 6-11, 1017 Canadians are killed in action and 1814 more are wounded". At least 200 of those are after the fighting described above and 1075 are before it (D-Day). Meaning around 1500 men are lost in the fight against 12 SS.

At the end of this period, running Panthers have declined by 10, running Panzer IVs have declined by 40, and the 12SS report 1400 casualties over a somewhat longer period. The Germans might have inflicted 2:1 losses during their attacks, but do not succeed in moving the Canadians. As for "tactics from the east" that "didn't work in the west", it has a more sinister connotation in this context. 12SS executed 133 POWs in the first 10 days of the fighting.

"Evidence in German publications indicates that the purpose of these mass executions was to scare the rest of the Canadian prisoners into giving information. It didn’t work. The purpose of these atrocities was confirmed in a news story in the London Daily Herald as early as August the 3rd of 1944. It stated: "…The executions were ordered by an officer, said to be a major, apparently because he was infuriated at the Canadians for refusing to talk when interrogated... Hitler’s Last General, "a member of the 12th SS Reconnaissance Battalion stated that his company was given secret orders, the relevant part of which reads:"...the attitude at the front: SS troops shall take no prisoners. Prisoners are to be executed after having been interrogated..."

There is no sign this policy was taken literally in the 17SS area, and 12SS seems to have changed its behavior after June 17 or so. (Meyer was tried for these incidents after the war).

Things don't go even that well in the US sector on the 13 June. These are extracts from US side reports -

"An attack by the 506th Parachute Infantry was scheduled for the morning of 13 June, to deepen the defensive base around Carentan. Before the attack could get well under way a strong enemy counterattack, supported by armor, struck along both the Carentan-Baupte and Carentan-Periers roads (Map No. 19 ). Included in the German forces were elements of the 37th and 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiments and the 17th Tank Battalion (correct designation, but actually equipped with StuGs), all from the 17th SS-Panzer Grenadier (Goetz von Berlichgen) Division, and also remnants of the 6th Parachute Regiment.

The attack was obviously directed at the recapture of Carentan, and it drove to within 500 yards of the edge of the city. The 2d Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry, moved down to the 506th Parachute Infantry's right flank and helped to regain some of the lost ground.

But the attack threatened the junction of the V and VII Corps beachheads so seriously that First Army decided to send armor to repel it. Not until this armor arrived was the German threat eliminated and the link between the two corps firmly secured.

At 1030 elements of Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division, arrived in Carentan. One task force attacked west along the Carentan-Baupte road at 1400 and, followed by the 502d Parachute Infantry, passed through the 506th Parachute Infantry and drove westward. Another task force attacked along the Carentan-Periers highway. Both task forces received close support from the 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

The coordinated efforts of the tanks, infantry, and artillery threw the enemy back several thousand yards, inflicting an estimated loss of 500 men. That night the 506th Parachute Infantry was relieved by the 502d on the right flank and passed to division reserve in Carentan."

502 PIR and 506 PIR had been fighting for a week and had sustained serious casualties. An estimated 1240 were lost from the 101st on D-Day alone. Prorating the known losses over the remainder of the campaign, one gets an estimate of 2/3rds strength at the time of this fight. As their losses might have been "front-weighted", half to two thirds is the right range. All of 506 was involved, only one battalion of the 502 before nightfall, meaning 4 understrength PIBs.

The strength of the 502 PIR is put at 1460 before the Caretan battle and 1025 after. But that includes the initial attack to take the city. The total force of Paras at the time of the counterattack might have been around 1500 (not all of them front line troops), counting the 506th's contribution.

CCA 2nd armored was fresh, an "old" pattern US AD. Two task forces were engaged. The expected composition would therefore be 2 AIBs in halftracks, 1 battalion of Stuarts and another of Shermans, supported by 18 105s. Each TF might also have had a TD platoon and an armored cavalry platoon.

6th FJ originally had -

Heavy AT - 4 75mm Pak

Artillery - 9 120mm Mortars, 6 75mm leIG

Other Wpns - 230 MG-42s, 41 81mm Mortars, 34 Panzerschrecks

Infantry companies - 9 FJ, 1 FJ Aufklarung, 1 FJ Pioneer

6th FJ had been in fighting for almost a week and had sustained serious casualties. Its battalions were considered middling strength after this battle, though that includes replacements received. They might have been as low as half strength or as high as two thirds strength at the time of this fight - that is the right range.

17th SS had -

AFVs - 41 StuGs, 12 Marders, 12 Bisons

Heavy AT - 12 88 Flak, 22 75mm Pak

Artillery - 12 150mm sH, 25 105mm leH, 4 10 cm K, 8 75mm leIG

Light Flak - 9 37mm Flak, 7 20mm Quad Flak, 16 20mm Flak (single)

Other Wpns - 1008 MG-42s, 99 81mm Mortars, 72 Flamethrowers

Infantry companies - 18 SS Pz Gdr, 5 SS Aufklarung, 5 SS Pioneer, 7 Heavy Weapons (MG/Mortar)

However, 3 pioneer companies and the 88mm and 37mm Flak did not arrive until well after this battle.

The attack on the 13th on June was lead by the 37th Pz Gdr regiment and the StuG battalion. By the 15th, the division had suffered 79 killed in action, 316 wounded and 61 missing. 4 StuGs were TWO and 13 were in short term repair after the fighting on the 13th.

US side reports say the 38 SS Pz Gdr Rgt and remaining elements of 6 FJ Rgt also took part in the fighting. If so, the US would have been outnumbered in infantry roughly 2:1. If only the 37 SS Pz Gdr Rgt were involved, the infantry numbers would have been about even. As for AFVs, the US would have had a 2:1 advantage, but with half of them light tanks. They also have two battalions in halftracks, so overall they had far more light armored vehicles than the Germans.

The Germans had the potential for a serious artillery superiority, but since they were counterattacking off an approach march we don't really have any idea how much artillery they had actually brought up. They certainly had lots of mortars. We know the US arty was limited - 18 Priests fired essentially all the missions.

The men of 17th SS were picked and trained but green, they had not seen combat before. They performed well through the rest of the campaign but this was their first fight and they lost it. The men from 6 FJR were formed around a veteran cadre from the previous 6th FJR but most of the men were new before the Normandy campaign. They were picked and trained, and had been in action for a week at the time of this fight, giving a tough account of themselves to date.

The US paras were veterans, some of them having participated in previous jumps and all of them engaged heavily since D-Day. They were picked men. The US armor were also veterans, the 2nd AD being one of the oldest in the field, with several campaigns under its belt. They performed very well leading the breakout a month and a half later.

Thus, while the men on both sides were picked, the US side were far more experienced - not the reverse. The Germans had excellent equipment, especially infantry arms, and adequate AFV support. The US had no great firepower superiority from arty, if the Germans had any shortfall on that score it was self inflicted through haste or not thinking they'd need it. The US had a modest superiority in armored vehicles, matching the Germans in serious AFVs and exceeding them in lights and halftracks.

The procedure of simply putting a reasonable amount of armor at the head of a well armed Pz Gdr regiment and attacking whatever was in front of them did not work like a charm in either of these cases. In the Canadian sector, initial break-ins were successful and the front line Canadian infantry suffered severely. The tank fighting was an exchange brawl for the Pz IVs. Panthers did not change this if the enemy were ready for the attack. In the US sector, this procedure had even less success. The US front line infantry held, and its armor counterattacked successfully, resulting in nothing better than a brawl (if that).

Stories about it all being Goerings fault, or about massive Allied arty, are dodges that have nothing to do with it. Green SS units proved no better man for man than the western Allies, when attacking. Neither Panthers in the Brit sector nor numerous superior infantry weapons in the US sector, though undoubtedly unpleasant to deal with, made any appreciable difference in the operational outcome.

[ July 16, 2005, 09:38 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Aragorn2002]

QUOTE "Evidence in German publications indicates that the purpose of these mass executions was to scare the rest of the Canadian prisoners into giving information. It didn’t work. The purpose of these atrocities was confirmed in a news story in the London Daily Herald as early as August the 3rd of 1944. It stated: "…The executions were ordered by an officer, said to be a major, apparently because he was infuriated at the Canadians for refusing to talk when interrogated... Hitler’s Last General, "a member of the 12th SS Reconnaissance Battalion stated that his company was given secret orders, the relevant part of which reads:"...the attitude at the front: SS troops shall take no prisoners. Prisoners are to be executed after having been interrogated..." QUOTE

I don't feel the need to defend shooting of POW's by anyone and utterly despise it, but I have the impression that it was so common on both sides (including the Canadians) that it is hardly justified to accuse only the Germans of shooting prisoners. I hope this won't end up in an endless discussion on war crimes, but I'm pretty sure the Canadians gave as good as they got. And like I said I'm not defending anyone, including the Waffen-SS, who no doubt had their share of ruthless thugs among their ranks. Shooting prisoners sadly enough is part of what makes war so cruel. It happens...even today.

QUOTE Green SS units proved no better man for man than the western Allies, when attacking QUOTE

Given the fact that they lacked the enormous fire support from artillery and air force the allies had I think their greatest merit lies in the fact that they (especially the 12th SS) attacked at all. And their training had been thorough, but they didn't have the almost limitless fuel resources and ammo for their training allied units had, which was a great disadvantage in making them ready. Apart from that part of their heavy equipment arrived shortly before the invasion. It won't do to belittle the performance of these German troops. They were remarkable soldiers.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

[QB]I don't feel the need to defend shooting of POW's by anyone and utterly despise it, but I have the impression that it was so common on both sides (including the Canadians) that it is hardly justified to accuse only the Germans of shooting prisoners. I hope this won't end up in an endless discussion on war crimes, but I'm pretty sure the Canadians gave as good as they got.

They didn't - what is your source for this? Ralph Allen quoted a Royal Winnipeg Rifleman as saying something like "any SS man we see, we give him the works regardless now" and there is the oft told story of the British sailor turning away "sick as a parrot" after finding German troops with their throats cut on Juno on 6 June. I've not seen any hard analysis of Canadian conduct in Normandy that suggests prisoners were killed routinely, or even at all. Care to elaborate?

Given the fact that (green SS units) lacked the enormous fire support from artillery and air force the allies had I think their greatest merit lies in the fact that they (especially the 12th SS) attacked at all. And their training had been thorough, but they didn't have the almost limitless fuel resources and ammo for their training allied units had, which was a great disadvantage in making them ready. Apart from that part of their heavy equipment arrived shortly before the invasion. It won't do to belittle the performance of these German troops. They were remarkable soldiers.

How much artillery is really necessary for a battalion attack on a single village, such as Putot-en-Bessin? Does one really need battleship support to perform well tactically? A detailed look at some of the counterattacks in the first days of the invasion, at least by 12th SS on the 3rd Canadian Division, shows poor tactical handling (my source is CONDUCT UNBECOMING, a look at the murders in detail - which shows why the Hitlerjugend were so bloodthirsty; much of it was frustration at being stopped cold).

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

8 June - Rommel orders Kurt Meyer's 12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Grenadiers to attack the Canadian 7th Brigade at Putot-en-Basin (8 kms west of Caen). They cross the railway and outflank the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, destroying the three forward companies; the rest are beaten back, leaving their wounded behind; the Canadian Scottish, Canscots and 1st Hussars then use an artillery barrage from the 12th and 13th field regiments to retake Putot, but Meyer counter-attacks with 22 Panther tanks;

Just a brief note - both titles you mention in that sentence (bolded, above) refer to the same unit, the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Scottish Regiment.

If you want the entire trivia, the full title was The Canadian Scottish Regiment. Many histories also call them "1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment" which is a bit redundant - all infantry units in First Canadian Army were 1st Battalions of their regiments; for some reason historians feel the need to refer to the Canadian Scottish as 1st Battalion, not sure why. In either event, "Canscots" is a contraction of the name and not a seperate unit - and again, an invention of historians I think, as the approved short title was, and is, C Scot R, sometimes pronounced "See Scot Ar" or even "See Scots".

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

They didn't - what is your source for this? Ralph Allen quoted a Royal Winnipeg Rifleman as saying something like "any SS man we see, we give him the works regardless now" and there is the oft told story of the British sailor turning away "sick as a parrot" after finding German troops with their throats cut on Juno on 6 June. I've not seen any hard analysis of Canadian conduct in Normandy that suggests prisoners were killed routinely, or even at all. Care to elaborate?

All quotes from Reynolds Steel Inferno:

Hastings Overlord, points out that almost every one of the Allied witnesss he interviewed for his book had direct knowledge or experience of the shooting of German prisoners and that many British and American units shot Waffen-SS prisoners as a matter of routine.

Reynolds also mentions Tony Foster's Meeting of Generals (haven't read it myself). On page 334 a Canadian sergeant describes how French Canadian soldiers 'slit the throats of most German soldiers they found, wounded as well as dead' during the fighting for Carpiquet airfield. Read also what Reynold has to say on war crimes. There is also a number of German accounts on the Canadians shooting POW's. Meyer himself claimed to have seen a group of German soldiers lying beside a road near the railway at Rots on 9th June, all shot through the head. They didn't? I'm trully amazed.

Fire support from a battle ship might not be necessary, but it sure give you a good feeling to see the enemy taking a good beating before you have to cross an open field. And I also don't deny that the 12th SS in some cases did show poor tactical handling, they did.

I don't argue about the fact that they did shoot Canadian POW's, it is very well possible, but as Reynolds says 'the anger of battle' is never restricted to one side of the opponents.

I haven't read CONDUCT UNBECOMING, I've checked it at Amazon.com, but found it too expensive, especially since I order quite a lot of books and have other books on my list with greater priority. If I find it for a reasonable price though, I would love to read it. Can you tell me a bit more about this book? Perhaps I will change my mind and buy it anyway.

[JasonC]

Claims that is was an arty differential are horsefeathers. I showed that in the US sector case, where the entire US arty support was 18 SP 105s. They were green, they attacked, when they hit vets they were stopped immediately. When they hit green infantry without armor they carved up the front line forces and were stopped by the reserves. They lost as much as they inflicted against vets, they might have inflicted as many as 2:1 when they hit greens and had superior armor. They were not "remarkable soldiers", there wasn't the slightest thing elite about them, they were simply well equipped recruits.

As for the claims that everybody does it in re war crimes, it is a whitewash and nonsense. We have the testimony of the German soldiers themselves that is was deliberate policy in 12SS at that particular time, an order from superiors, meant to create fear and extract intelligence, that it failed utterly to do so, and was dropped after about ten days. All they got was name rank and number, and trials after the war.

[Aragorn2002]

http://grad.usask.ca/gateway/archive9.html

[Aragorn2002]

QUOTE "Evidence in German publications indicates that the purpose of these mass executions was to scare the rest of the Canadian prisoners into giving information. It didn’t work. The purpose of these atrocities was confirmed in a news story in the London Daily Herald as early as August the 3rd of 1944. It stated: "…The executions were ordered by an officer, said to be a major, apparently because he was infuriated at the Canadians for refusing to talk when interrogated... Hitler’s Last General, "a member of the 12th SS Reconnaissance Battalion stated that his company was given secret orders, the relevant part of which reads:"...the attitude at the front: SS troops shall take no prisoners. Prisoners are to be executed after having been interrogated..." QUOTE

"We have the testimony of the German soldiers themselves that is was deliberate policy"

Not very convincing. But again, I don't doubt the Germans did it AS WELL. German sources also mention Canadian secret orders...But I feel like an advocate for the devil now and that is not my intention. I think shooting POW's was pretty common practice throughout the whole war in the west and in the east (and the Pacific).

[ July 16, 2005, 11:34 AM: Message edited by: aragorn2002 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

All quotes from Reynolds Steel Inferno:

Hastings Overlord, points out that almost every one of the Allied witnesss he interviewed for his book had direct knowledge or experience of the shooting of German prisoners and that many British and American units shot Waffen-SS prisoners as a matter of routine.

I was more interested in the Canadians. I'll need to revisit my Hastings - my copy is dogeared and worn. Not trying to be flip, just very interested in the Canadian side of things - which you address below...

Reynolds also mentions Tony Foster's Meeting of Generals (haven't read it myself). On page 334 a Canadian sergeant describes how French Canadian soldiers 'slit the throats of most German soldiers they found, wounded as well as dead' during the fighting for Carpiquet airfield. Read also what Reynold has to say on war crimes. There is also a number of German accounts on the Canadians shooting POW's. Meyer himself claimed to have seen a group of German soldiers lying beside a road near the railway at Rots on 9th June, all shot through the head. They didn't? I'm trully amazed.

I didn't like Reynold's book and gave it away years ago after one reading...but like you I have other reading to catch up on too. I'll have to find Foster's book. Thanks for the leads - and yes, I've heard that French Canadians are often cited as culprits in war crimes; Gwilym Jones, MM who was a tanker in Italy in the Trois Rivieres talks about one incident with a Van Doos NCO. I agree that it happens - but how often, in the Canadian case, would anyone over the rank of sergeant have been culpable? I thought the difference in the SS was that company and battalion commanders were the ones permitting such conduct? Not that the murdered prisoners are any less dead either way, of course...

Fire support from a battle ship might not be necessary, but it sure give you a good feeling to see the enemy taking a good beating before you have to cross an open field. And I also don't deny that the 12th SS in some cases did show poor tactical handling, they did.

I don't argue about the fact that they did shoot Canadian POW's, it is very well possible, but as Reynolds says 'the anger of battle' is never restricted to one side of the opponents.

Conduct Unbecoming, which you ask about below, examines this. Some of the Canadian POWs were indeed shot immediately after battle had concluded, but he distinguishes between these and the cold blooded murders taken after interrogation far from the battle area. Many of the 12th SS murders were conducted in that latter manner. I'm not aware of any Canadian company or battalion commander interogating a German and then ordering him shot or shooting him himself. I don't doubt many riflemen refused to take prisoners but would draw a distinction between that and cold blooded murder after interrogation - but we may be straying off topic.

I haven't read CONDUCT UNBECOMING, I've checked it at Amazon.com, but found it too expensive, especially since I order quite a lot of books and have other books on my list with greater priority. If I find it for a reasonable price though, I would love to read it. Can you tell me a bit more about this book? Perhaps I will change my mind and buy it anyway.

I borrowed my copy but would likely pay for one someday. It's really a good book. I don't think the author is a military historian per se, but he delved into the German records as well as the Canadian ones. It's frustrating in that no roster is given of the murdered - I tried to construct one from his book and located it at http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/fatalities/normandy.htm

But aside from that, the author has categorized all the incidents, tried to seperate what was "combat anger" as you might call it and deliberate murders, gives character sketches of the German commanders, and above all gives amazing descriptions of the tactical battles, from both German and Canadian pespectives. Would have been better with more photos and maps, but really painted, for me, a vivid picture. Try and get a copy from the library before making your decision but I would recommend it based on my own experiences with the book. Hope that helps; would love to hear your thoughts on it should you find a copy. I'd loan you mine, but it is not really mine to loan out!

In fact, Adam_L asked in the General Forum if there are any books out there written from the perspective of both sides of a tactical engagement; I recommended Conduct Unbecoming as the only book I know of to do exactly that. Pretty amazing as far as that goes.

[ July 16, 2005, 11:42 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by JasonC:

They were not "remarkable soldiers", there wasn't the slightest thing elite about them, they were simply well equipped recruits.[/QB]

Their determination and toughness was remarkable. But I'm not going to argue about that any longer. I respect your point of view, but do not agree with it.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

They were not "remarkable soldiers", there wasn't the slightest thing elite about them, they were simply well equipped recruits.

Their determination and toughness was remarkable. But I'm not going to argue about that any longer. I respect your point of view, but do not agree with it. [/QB]</font>