A minor Quibble Regarding Artillery Pricing and Organization

[dalem]

Originally posted by Abteilung:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Abteilung:

Perhaps the logistical issues surrounding the shipment of heavy weapons to the theatre are accurately reflected in the pricing.

No. If there were shells in the ammo dumps it was generally raining 105mm on the Germans whenever necessary.

-dale </font>

[MAsta_KFC]

If you are playing against a human opponent who urgently desires an equal chance to win, my method can present problems, I recognize.

Michael

Actually, to be honest, I'm the one whos the fairness freak

I'd like to think I beat my opponent on equal terms, rather than due to inconsistencies in the game. Like I said before, I'm very pleased with CMAK pricing in general, just the Allied arty pricing.

[Abteilung]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Abteilung:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Abteilung:

Perhaps the logistical issues surrounding the shipment of heavy weapons to the theatre are accurately reflected in the pricing.

No. If there were shells in the ammo dumps it was generally raining 105mm on the Germans whenever necessary.

-dale </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

I do something similar Michael, but at low-medium pt QB levels it's still very much a problem.

I wondered if somebody would get around to that. The other thing I do when I run into that (and would I fear also not be welcomed by many players) is to go back and raise the number of overall points in the game, but not spend all of the other side's points. I do this because I already have a force mix in mind before I begin to design the battle, so I just fool around with the points until I get those forces. Just to make things easy, I may start off with giving both sides more points than they need, and not use up all of them in either case.

Why not just use the scenario editor then? Because I find the QB generator handier to use and reasonably adequate with my modifications.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Abteilung:

Perhaps the logistical issues surrounding the shipment of heavy weapons to the theatre are accurately reflected in the pricing.

No, I can sympathize with the rest of your post, but I'm afraid that this statement is entirely incorrect. BFC assigned prices to units based on battlefield effectiveness modified by rarity. The reason American artillery costs more is because it has more ammo and thus greater effect on the battlefield. Cost of production and transportation does not enter in except that it may ultimately have been a factor in determining rarity.

Michael

[Abteilung]

Thank you for answering my speculative theory, Michael. So it is a gameplay/balance type issue determining the cost. Hmm, interesting. I do still agree with the pricing, however, but now things appear in a different perspective. I now see why the really devastating items such as the U.S. VT fuses and schwere wurfkorpern used by Germany are always too expensive to buy.

[dalem]

Originally posted by Abteilung:

US-in-WWII-ignorers

I bolded a particularly troubling passage in your post which, for me, completely disengaged me from the message you were attempting to deliver. I'm not sure what you mean by that statement, not sure I really wish to, either. Sorry, but bias towards one combatant, political, and emotional affiliation are not items normally carried in my bag of wargaming tricks. I tend to shy away from individuals exhibiting the aforementioned behavior.

I enjoy the challenge of playing a simulation from all apsects, not just those which appear sexier for whatever reason.

Not referring to you in the slightest. I just meant that even those who scoff at the U.S. WWII Army's fighting ability, and there are many, agree that the artillery was a very successful arm. That's all. No labeling.

-dale

[dalem]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

I do something similar Michael, but at low-medium pt QB levels it's still very much a problem.

I wondered if somebody would get around to that. The other thing I do when I run into that (and would I fear also not be welcomed by many players) is to go back and raise the number of overall points in the game, but not spend all of the other side's points. I do this because I already have a force mix in mind before I begin to design the battle, so I just fool around with the points until I get those forces. Just to make things easy, I may start off with giving both sides more points than they need, and not use up all of them in either case.

Why not just use the scenario editor then? Because I find the QB generator handier to use and reasonably adequate with my modifications.

Michael </font>

[MAsta_KFC]

Hmmm what are the chances of this being fixed in the next patch?

[Redwolf]

Michael, if you "overbook" a Quickbattle (choosing a bigger one) you get all kinds of side effects: bigger map, more flags etc.

Furthermore, even if you eliminate the artillery points limit it is of little help. From June 1944 on the American 105mm FO, which should be present very often, ist just too frigging expensive to be bought in any kind of reasonable quickbattle size.

[dalem]

Originally posted by redwolf:

Michael, if you "overbook" a Quickbattle (choosing a bigger one) you get all kinds of side effects: bigger map, more flags etc.

Furthermore, even if you eliminate the artillery points limit it is of little help. From June 1944 on the American 105mm FO, which should be present very often, ist just too frigging expensive to be bought in any kind of reasonable quickbattle size.

Well maybe, given the date you mention for the change, the BFC guys did find some sources that confirm a general supply shortage for Italy as the focus changed over to Normandy??? Seems pretty harsh to me, based on what I've read, but not impossible.

-dale

[YankeeDog]

With the exception of very early on in the North Africa campaign and a brief period in late 1944, I have NEVER read of any widespread shell or tube shortages for American artillery batteries. In fact, quite the opposite; from what I have read shell shortages were much more common on the Axis side, especially post December-1944, but also in other periods, such as the last few months of North Africa as the Mediterranean sea lanes were increasingly interdicted by the Allies.

In any event, even if there were a widespread shell shortage for American artillery, the way to reflect this would be in rarity, not in pricing. As has already been noted, CM pricing is based on a unit's functionality, not on its production cost, or the difficulty of getting it to the battlefield.

I don’t think the problem is actually limited to the US 105mm caliber alone; I do see this as the most egregious problem with the current Arty FO units since this unit should arguably be the most common US Arty FO and the current pricing/shell load structure makes it completely unaffordable until you hit 1500pt. forces, and realistically mostly unaffordable until you hit 2000pt. forces. However, I think there are lesser problems all the way across the QB size spectrum here.

The larger the QB, the more Arty options both sides have, and the more complicated it gets to analyze things completely. As such, I’m going to outline which I see as the Arty purchase issues at the very small (sub-500pt. force level). I think my basic argument applies to large battles as well, it’s simply easier to illustrate with small battles where the Arty choices are limited.

In very small battles, depending on QB type it is difficult for the American player to afford any artillery, especially post-July 1944 with rarity on. For a 500pt. force, most CM QB types have an Arty “budget” of 125pts. A few, such as MEs, have an allotment of only 62pts. The cheapest American spotter, the 75mm(radio) spotter, just makes the 125pt. cutoff at 120pts. for Regular. However, he comes at a rarity premium of +20%, so with rarity on, he’s out of the 125pt. Arty budget. By buying Green experience, you can get around this, and you can *just* squeeze in a 81mm(wire) spotter (122pts.), but that's it. Under the 62pt. ME budget, the American player has no chance of purchasing Arty.

Now, contrast this with the German player: For a 125pt. Budget purchasing Regular experience, he can afford a wide variety of 75mm spotters (2, 4 & 6 tubes, wire & radio) ranging in price from 30 to 56 points. These 75mm spotters do come with a rarity penalty, but they still fall well below the 125pt. mark. Both the 81mm(wire) spotter (93pts., for either 4 tubes or 6 tubes) and the 81mm(radio) spotter (103 pts.) are also still affordable, though the 81mm(radio) spotter does come with a rarity of +20%, which put him at just about exactly 125pts. Given all these options, it is quite possible for the German player to even afford two spotters, though he’ll probably have to go all-wire to do so. On a small map on the defense, two wire spotters ain’t so bad.

Even under the ME 62pt. Arty budget, the German player still has options. True, he's limited to the cheap 75mm spotters, and with rarity on he probably can't afford to get a radio (especially a problem in fluid MEs), but if the terrain is relatively open and the map is relatively small, he might still be able to get some milage out of a wire spotter. In any event, unlike the American player, he does have options.

Battles of the sub-500pt. size are realistically going to mostly reflect patrols and probing attacks on small maps, heavy on the infantry (probably 2-3 platoons), though a little bit of light armor or a single tank is possible. Especially post-1944, the Americans for the most part had plenty of shells, tubes, and radios, and while it would be difficult to quantify definitively, I suspect that in general the Americans were more willing to expend arty in small-unit engagements than their German adversaries. The Germans were often dealing with shell and tube shortages due to production and transport problems and also a lack of enough good communications equipment. I don’t especially mind the Germans having access to a few artillery options in these small battles, and especially on the defense, but what does bothers me is that the Americans don’t.

Much of what I have said here also applies to Commonwealth vs. German forces. The Tommies are slightly better off since their FOs usually come with slightly few shells than the Americans, but the Brits and friends still have far less options than the Germans.

The logical solution to this is NOT to just arbitrarily make the current American artillery FOs cheaper. Once again, the root of the problem lies is the fact that the American FOs come with very large shell loads, which jack up their purchase prices. In the above example, the root problem is really that the American 81mm spotters are coming with 210 shells, vs. only 150 for the Germans. It seems to me that the simple solution would be to add a few additional American FO types, which would be “half load” FOs of the most common Arty Calibers, such as 81mm mortar and 105mm Howitzer. I don’t know if this is possible within the current game engine structure, but IMHO it would lead to more enjoyable QBs for those of us who like to play with reasonably realistic force structures. If it’s too late to change for CMAK, at the very least, I hope this thread has brought up some issues that will be kept in mind when structuring Artillery for the next engine.

Cheers,

YD

[Redwolf]

What YD said.

I really doubt that any of this is difficult to do in the old engine. Just drop the ammo load and make them cheaper, preferrably as new FOs in addition to the existing ones.

As said, it doesn't affect scenario people in any way, since they have no rarity in effect, nor does the price change affect knockout points and they can edit the ammo levels.

Or in other words: it would be sad if all the work on rarity would be wasted because baseline price disables it.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by redwolf:

Michael, if you "overbook" a Quickbattle (choosing a bigger one) you get all kinds of side effects: bigger map, more flags etc.

Good point. You can choose a small map in parameters, but I don't know if that puts any limit on flags. I don't think there is any perfect solution aside from BFC correcting the basic problem, it just comes down to which set of annoyances you are willing to live with. Personally, I like big maps most of the time, but I can foresee problems with lots of flags.

Question: Are the number and location of flags locked into predrawn maps that can be imported into QBs? Or does the QB generator establish those for each battle in all cases?

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

What's the feeling on increasing rarity on the German arty? That would bring the price up to levels comparable to the US and Allies while retaining the increased shell load for the Allies.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

But sometimes I just want to play a simple, "straight up" 1000 or 1200 pt QB, and not use my brain for force selection at all.

I hear ya, Dale. Sometimes I do that too.

Michael

[dalem]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

What's the feeling on increasing rarity on the German arty? That would bring the price up to levels comparable to the US and Allies while retaining the increased shell load for the Allies.

Michael

I don't like it. US and UK should have more arty available, even at the company level. I don't know how much the Germans should have - I don't have as good a "feel" for them, but I'd rather "fix" the Allies than "break" the Germans "as well".

-dale

[REVS]

Brian Smith wrote:

quote:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

I found the same problem in 1,000 to 1,500 pt QBs using Australian troops - couldn't afford any off-map arty support in combined arms fights.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Me too, in a 1000pt Meeting Engagement playing as commonwealth boys in Combined Arms I cannot buy a drop of artillery (well, not until very late in the North African campaign, that is). All I can get is one lousy strafing Hurricane, who shot up my boys as much as he shot up the opposition.

This is particularly annoying during a Meeting Engagement game, which is essentially one of the most artificial situations available in CMAK. Meeting Engagements rarely occurred on the WWII battlefield, with both sides equally balanced and equidistant from their objective.

Despite this, it is one of the more frequently played GAME formats, because of its inherent "equality" of opportunity. So it's a total bugger to be the Allied boys and have no artillery, while your opponent has quite a bit. (My regular opponent plays Conscripts, so he gets lots of artillery, and uses it well).

So, my request to the game's designers is to embrace the artificiality of the meeting engagement format, recognise that it is easily the gamiest of all formats, and re-adjust the system so that, if only for Meeting Engagement Quick Battles, that access to at least some artillery is possible. If this means reducing the total number of rounds available to a spotter on the Allied side, so be it.

For the historical 'realists' out there, they should never concern themselves with Meeting Engagements. This format is mostly for people who enjoy the game as a game, and not as some kind of history-simulator.

How about it BFC? Embrace the Meeting Engagement as a special "gamey" case and make it as genuinely an even, gamey contest as possible.

[JasonC]

Jons is simply wrong about the relative availability of 155s and 105s. He thinks that there are 3 times as many 105s and they are always firing at front line targets, and while the 155s spend half their time firing deeper, so there are 6 times as many 105 missions as 155 missions at the front line. I will explain all the problems with this.

First, there aren't 3 times as many 105s and 155s. There are 3 battalions of 105s in div arty, yes. There are also cannon companies with each regiment, though with shorter range than the div arty 105s. There is only 1 155 battalion in div arty, and only in infantry divisions. But that is not the only place there are 155s. Only a small portion of the 155s are in infantry division div arty. US arty just wasn't organized with the 155s all at division.

For every division in Europe, there was an arty group of 3 battalions above the division level. About 2/3rds of their guns were 155s. (The rest were split between 4.5 inch and 8 inch). If you don't count the cannon companies, the 105 to 155 ratio was about 1 to 1. If you do count them, it was about 3 to 2. But not 3 to 1.

Second, the number of tubes and the number of fire missions are two different things. Longer range guns might fire more often, because they can reach more targets. Or guns with cheaper rounds might fire more often. The way you can tell how often they actually fired, is to go look at the actual ammo expenditure and see how many missions it comes to.

A fire mission of 155s is only 35 rounds. A fire mission of 105s is (in CMAK) 120 rounds. If you go to the US army green books you can find actual ammo expenditure for various periods and campaigns. And what you find is that the 155s are firing about half as many shells, absolute terms, as the 105s. Which is nearly twice as many CM modules. If as Jons estimates, half of the 155 mission are deeper than front line fighting, they'd still be 86% as common as 105 missions - about the same.

Next I'll address the issue of logistics and shell shortages. There was a 105mm shell shortage in northwest Europe in the fall, from October through December. This does not however mean that no 105mm was available or expended. About 3 million rounds of it were fired during the "shortage". In absolute stockpiles available, the shortage was actually more severe during and at the conclusion of the battle of the Bulge, than at the Seigfried line. But this does not mean shells were scarce for the Bulge fighting. Instead, individual 105 battalions often fired 2000 rounds per day during the Bulge fighting, and sometimes reached 5000.

What the shortage actually was, was a rationing problem. No nation can supply its guns with ammo as fast as that ammo can be fired, if the guns are worked continually. Not remotely. That means the guns of just this army (e.g. 7th army) over here, if worked as fast as the whole ammo stream allows, could fire off all the rounds that can be supplied to the entire theater. Leaving nothing for this other army (e.g. 3rd army) next to it.

What happened is the logistics boys tried to meet goals like "have a weeks supply of ammo up with the guns, and another weeks supply at army level dumps". This then created an incentive for a unit to fire more than its "fair share", put in a high number for "a week's supply", and grab a higher portion of the available stream. In response, the logistics types go to a system of rounds per gun rationing. Trouble is, that piles up shells where they aren't needed and starves the most active sectors. You want to send the shells were they can do the most good. You don't want the gunners to fire at unimportant targets merely trying to create the impression that they are needier than the next guy.

The level of ammo actually delivered was higher than the logistics people had planned - by large amounts. But consumption was higher still. In Normandy, they were still juggling all of this, and briefly had a "rounds per gun" system of allocation. Which was not an actual shell shortage, it was just an allocation device.

Then came the breakout. Shell usage plummeted at first. It was also hard to move the stuff, because gas off the beaches was the overall bottleneck. The result was big stockpiles at rear dumps and not much up with the units. The logistics guys looked at their "week's supplies" goals and saw small numbers - the amount needed for a Sunday drive across empty France, times seven. So they started building army and corp dumps instead of sending lots to the firing units.

Then the drive stops at the west-wall. Suddenly everybody is calling fire missions again. As it happens, the boys up around Aachen and the Hurtgen saw this coming before Patton's guys down in the Lorraine. They shot up their usage, claimed big quotas, and grab way more than their share of the shells. Ammo going just to that army significantly exceeded all the ammo landing at the beaches. The dumps were emptying - into that one army, its unit stockpiles in particular.

The supply channel is "concertina-ing". It booms (crossing France), then busts (Hurtgen hogs it all).

In October, the rearward dumps aren't flush anymore, the Hurtgen area is still well supplied, but Patton is starving. 3rd army goes to guns per day rationing. In the course of October the guys up north fire off the excess they scarfed out of the rear dumps. By November they are starving too, and rationing. The logistics boys have the fronts on rationing, and are trying to rebuild their dump system, and to relocate it up near the actual front.

Now, during all this, ships are still unloading at the beaches, and units up front are still firing. But input and output have more or less equalized - at, in November, 3 million 105 shells per month.

Then the Bulge hits. Suddenly this guns per day business is all wrong. It would feed the flanks and starve the only sector that matters. The problem is no longer to balance Aachen and Metz and leave something for the dump system. It is, instead, to starve the flanks and empty the dumps, but get every available shell to the Ardennes. So what they did is let the overall shell shortage continue and even tighten, but removed all the rationing system limits on units in the Bulge sector. That let those units scarf everything, just like the Hurtgen guys had done before, but this time on purpose.

The last of the shell shortage is that when the Alsace stuff hits a month later, they can't get the kind of supply the Bulge people got, because the Bulge already took it. By February that is over too, the front is moving again, and shell demand drops.

This whole thing hit the 105mm HE supply. The 155 supply was not as tight, and expenditure of it continued high throughout. Note also that the low point of expenditure in November was still 3 million 105 rounds per month. Which is about 1/3rd higher than the German average for the whole war, in that caliber.

There were other local shortages in certain ammo categories. For instance, in Normandy the demand for 81mm rounds was collosal, because every battalion had them and could fire them rapidly and wanted to put locally controlled fire down on the next hedgerow. They couldn't. The planners had not foreseen the demand, and 81mm coming over the beach was tiny. It went to whoever and was gone in minutes.

Most of the US 81s sat out Normandy for lack of ammunition, and often the crews were used as riflemen. This wasn't because no supply was reaching those units. They had lots of 105 and 155 support. Just not 81s. The planners had thought such short range weapons - as arty goes - just wouldn't have that many targets.

Now, as to the overall level of US arty supply, you can look at rounds expended and notice something revealing. The US expended about as much 105 and 155 ammo as the Germans expended 105 and 150 ammo. But not over the same period. The US expended that much, in just the west front and Italy, in just a year. The Germans expended that much on all fronts combined, over the whole war.

The east front was as big, to twice as big, as the west. And it was in existence about four times as long. Yes the US spent as much in the shorter period on the smaller front. They were firing a lot more per unit time, therefore. German accounts confirm this, and regularly note things like US arty firing five to ten times as much as their own.

It is not hard to understand how this happens, even with the need to get the stuff clear across the world. Germany had only about 1/4th the industrial capacity of the US. It was fighting on two fronts (or 3 if you count the Med as a separate one). Most of Germany's industrial potential was directed at Russia. 2/3rds of the much larger US industrial potential was directed at Germany. A big part of how that showed up, was simple weight of shells.

[JonS]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Jons is simply wrong about the relative availability of 155s and 105s. He thinks that there are 3 times as many 105s and they are always firing at front line targets, and while the 155s spend half their time firing deeper, so there are 6 times as many 105 missions as 155 missions at the front line. I will explain all the problems with this.

First, there aren't 3 times as many 105s and 155s. There are 3 battalions of 105s in div arty, yes. There are also cannon companies with each regiment, though with shorter range than the div arty 105s. There is only 1 155 battalion in div arty, and only in infantry divisions. But that is not the only place there are 155s. Only a small portion of the 155s are in infantry division div arty. US arty just wasn't organized with the 155s all at division.

For every division in Europe, there was an arty group of 3 battalions above the division level. About 2/3rds of their guns were 155s. (The rest were split between 4.5 inch and 8 inch). If you don't count the cannon companies, the 105 to 155 ratio was about 1 to 1. If you do count them, it was about 3 to 2. But not 3 to 1.

Second, the number of tubes and the number of fire missions are two different things. Longer range guns might fire more often, because they can reach more targets. Or guns with cheaper rounds might fire more often. The way you can tell how often they actually fired, is to go look at the actual ammo expenditure and see how many missions it comes to.

A fire mission of 155s is only 35 rounds. A fire mission of 105s is (in CMAK) 120 rounds. If you go to the US army green books you can find actual ammo expenditure for various periods and campaigns. And what you find is that the 155s are firing about half as many shells, absolute terms, as the 105s. Which is nearly twice as many CM modules. If as Jons estimates, half of the 155 mission are deeper than front line fighting, they'd still be 86% as common as 105 missions - about the same.

You know what the funny thing is? I don't really disagree with much of that. Do you want to know why? Simple; it's the answer to a different question.

In a standard US Inf Div Arty there are 3 x 105mm bns, and 1 x 155mm bns. I did not count the regt cannon companies because they aren't part of div arty. I didn't count the attached arty gps because they are only transitory, and can at least be taken away at any time.

At any given moment for any given division, they had 1 x 155 and 3 x 105mm bns, at least. They may well have had more - much more in some case - but only very very seldomly would they have had less.

So, on average, in any given engagement, a US bn could expect to have access to a 105mm bty, and in 1/6th of those cases could expect to have access to a 155mm bty.

Oddly enough I understand the difference between barrels and missions. I do not understand how you go from a actual ammo consumption figure to some conection with the wholly arbitrary ammo figures that CM FOs come equiped with, and how that relates to relative missions fired, let alone what inf bns could expect in the way of spt. That bit does have me baffled.

Anywa, there were enough arty gps to attach one to each div - on average. But did each div always have 1 and only 1 gp attached? What if it was in a quiet sector and had none? What if it was in a busy sector and had 4? What if it had attached one of the many independant 105mm bns, instead of the 155mms? How does that affect expectations?

And finally, what if we are talking about Italy, where there were far, far fewer independent arty bns to go around (about 1/20th c.f. NWE)?

Regards

JonS

[REVS]

Oi!

This thread has been hijacked by the enormously learned seriousness of Jason C and Jon S's debate about the distribution of various artillery units according to their version of wot happened back then.

The original poster was griping, in a nicely gamey kind of way, about how much Allied artillery costs in a QB, compared with how much cheapo Axis stuff costs.

So I'd hate this thread to end on a heavy-as-mud Grog debate.

So, how about it BFC and others? How come artillery costs in CMAK are so lopsided that even in a 1000pt QB the dreaded Axis guys, who are meant to be suffering the equipment shortfalls, can get oodles of artillery and the defenders of truth, justice and the Allied way, with an enormous military-industrial machine behind them, get nuffink?

Call that realistic?

I don't!

[CMplayer]

Originally posted by Soddball:

1,000 points will buy you (if you're lucky) two companies of infantry and a couple of tanks. Are you saying that divisional level artillery should be priced low enough to allow typical support of such small groups of forces?

Yes of course it should. Those two companies of infantry could easily be at the sharp end the the whole division.

[CMplayer]

Ah. Someone else already said that. Serves me right for responding before finishing reading the thread.

[REVS]

Please, don't get bogged down in the 'divisional command got X units of 105mm this and that" kind of argument".

What we're talking about here in QBs is the simple fact of gaming (ie, what a big percentage of buyers of Combat Mission are actually on about, no matter how much they profess to be grog-ettes)

We non-grog QB players don't really give a rat's hooter about historical realities on some silly bloody official distribution table of actual allocations of artillery pieces. We're creating a completely artificial thing called a Quick Battle, and it's a Meeting Engagement most likely, a very non-historical little scenario.

And those evil fascist knuckleheads, who are meant to be suffering the equipment shortfalls, seem to have oodles of artillery and cute equipment, while the good guys on the Allied side get zero – ZILCH! — artillery, even in a 1000pt QB.

So, the issue seems to be the chasm that will slowly expand. BFC tries to create a game and model it on some strange version of 'reality' back then, but the humumgous and important problem of supply just doesn't make it into their equations.

So no matter how much Axis shipping we sink off-board, no matter how much our bombing of the German military factories occurs off-board, rest assured that on a BFC battlefield, the Axis boys get the supplies they want, with full fuel, full ammunition and without a worry about Axis industrial inferiority in the world.

How about it BFC, when do you start modelling the minor matter of Axis equipment, fuel and other shortages?

The way it's currently set up, it feels like it's the allies who don't have the ammo, fuel or artillery shells.

[Joachim]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Question: Are the number and location of flags locked into predrawn maps that can be imported into QBs? Or does the QB generator establish those for each battle in all cases?

Michael

If there are flags, they are locked (dynamic flag selection is locked, too). If there are none, the QB generator sets new ones according to battle type.

My 2 cents (that's 2.5 for those on the other side of the pond) on 105mm pricing:

a) GE 75mm are crap, thus not a real option.

I want a "Tiger light" with half the ammo at 60% cost .

I could live with a cheaper 105mm spotter with less ammo. But half the ammo must cost at least 60-70% (risk of losing it is spread, two have more LOS than one, option of 8 tubes in one turn) of a "full" FO.

Gruß

Joachim