The american defense

[coe]

Well we know pretty much how German attacks faired when facing American defense (liberal artillery, massing/mobility of reserves, etc.). Many accounts of attacking the Germans tell of murderous defensive fire but often these attacks were successful (i.e. significant penetrations made, pockets of resistance reduced and in the end defender losses much more.)

My question is two fold - did the American accounts have a different perception as to what constituted heavy fire/resistance?

How did American attacks fare when faced with a truely American style defense?

[MikeyD]

I'm thinking of the battle of the Hurtgen (spelling?) forest. U.S. attacks againt murderous defensive fire, unable to use their armor in the terrain. It was't pretty.

[stoat]

I think it is up to the perception of whomever writes the reports.

What exactly is an "American" style defense?

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by stoat:

What exactly is an "American" style defense?

Trenches with empty beer cans on the ground and penthouse spreads taped to the sides.

[stoat]

Only the best for Uncle Sam's boys.

[coe]

well i was using american style defense abstractly but the type used in the Agincourt area for example

typically the massed artillery strike which strips away the infantry, then there's many many tank destroyers/tanks roaming around to get flank shots at the attacking force, then maybe add a few squadrons of fighterbombers (if weather permits) and have massed mobile reserve ready

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by stoat:

What exactly is an "American" style defense?

Expensive lawyers, courtroom drama, TV, trial by media.

[stoat]

Only the best for Uncle Sam's boys.

coe: The instances that come to mind are: Hurtgen (aforementioned), the assault on the Seigfreid Line, and much of the campaign in Italy. The results were: Hurtgen-can you call it a victory?, Siegfreid- victory, but a bloody one, and Italy- slow bloody fighting up unitl the end of the war.

Any time almost any force goes against a prepared defense like the kind you mentioned, if victory is acheived, it will be at a heavy cost.

[stoat]

I forgot Normandy.

[JasonC]

MikeyD - the Hurtgen remains one of the least understood battles of the war. People have the strangest mental pictures of it, most of which can be removed by one look at a topographical map.

"Forest" is a euphemism for steep, wooded 2000 foot hills. "Trail" is a euphemism for gorge. Typical maps that can show the (quite small) area where most of the fighting occurred need 50 *meter* contour lines to show the relief. Some have 10 meter contour lines - quite close together. There are numerous places where the elevation changes 600 feet in a modest distance.

Nor was it all forest, all the time. The tops of the ridges were often bare - cleared farmland and pasture. (The ridges are too steep to use, thus they are left forested). Late in the battle, the trees were toothpicks stripped bare by sustained artillery fire. The low lying areas and the slope were all heavily forested, yes. The villages where much of the hardest fighting occurred were not in the continuous pine forest, but higher.

The route recommended itself for two reasons. One, it was a "dry" route through water barriers in the area, precisely because the ground was so high. Two, early probes in September got through the permanent fortification belts rapidly, while they were still poorly manned. Some remained on flanks, but basically they were through the vaunted Siegfried line, in a permanent fortification sense, before the battle itself began.

The German defense was based on possession of the high ground on two dominating ridges, between which ran a narrow gorge. The Americans attempted to attack up the gorge, and to reach up onto the high ridges at successive points, from it.

Some of the hardest fighting occurred at the far end of the gorge, up on the high ground beyond it - the famous twin villages of Schmidt and Kommerscheidt. Which the Germans retook with armor once it fell. There was little about that portion of the fight that was anything like the forest infantry fighting usually depicted.

The length of the battle is often inflated. The early probes into the area - by a single regiment - were not properly part of the battle at all. The battle proper had three phases. An October period that lasted for 10 days and featured 2 US regiments, which pushed 3 km into the area. That was the sort of intense forest fighting usually depicted, but against a still inferior German force. It ratcheted down with the US side exhausted, relieving the initial 2 regiments with a fresh division.

Then the main fight in November, which had two parts. The Americans attacked on 2 November and rapidly took the villages. The Germans then counterattacked for several days with crack Panzergrenadiers and with tanks (at the tip - VG also hit the flanks, others inflitrated), while the Americans tried to feed in reinforcements, fighting in three directions at the end of an impossible trail. The Americans were thrown out and the combat ratcheted down again, until they could relieve the spent force.

The third phase lasted for the second half of November, and succeeding in clearing most of the forest. This was the only portion of the fighting that fits the popular conceptions, in that a huge number of US formations were taking part, German artillery fire was very strong, etc. Less well known is the fact the Germans counterattacked continually, giving the fighting a see-saw character. The Germans found it easier to get their limited tanks to the farthest points the US had reached than the US found it to get tanks to those spots.

The US had no great edge in numbers, not more than 3 to 2 overall. Its losses were about twice those of the Germans, though the latter had to feed 9 divisions through the sector to hold it. The principle cause of the far higher losses on the US side is that they were attacking with inadequate odds. In addition, the defenders' registered artillery proved much more effective than the attackers', with observation was so difficult, and so dependent on possession of particular points of high ground, initially in the defenders' hands.

[coe]

interesting though in the third phase that despite massive German resistance the Americans still succeeded in taking and holding most of the forest. I am hard pressed to find an example where the Germans were able to to that against the western allies.

by the way, any actual major benefits to when the Germans managed to infiltrate the lines - I remember reading some accounts of the Lorraine campaign (written by Cole) where he mentions that whole German units managed to infiltrate - but usually it seems those units were destroyed shortly afterward (even if the Germans were on the ttack to support the infiltration).

[roqf77]

true but by this time the germans were low on ammunition and other supplies.

[JasonC]

I'll focus on the late Hurtgen fighting, from mid November to early December. The previous period was the Schmidt affair, and before that the forces involved on both sides had been small.

The Schmidt effort had failed not because they could not get to the objective but because they got there on a narrow front, could not reinforce the guys at the tip, and were easily counterattacked from three sides by fresh German reserves, from high quality units and including tanks. The response of the Americans was to shift to a broader advance by whole corps. That led to the hardest period of the Hurtgen fighting.

The German formations were seriously attrited when this phase of the fighting began, and morale was not high. These were not crack Panzer formations fresh from reserve, but weary infantry and VG divisions that had been in the line for months, absorbing repeated waves of fragmented KGs and replacements to keep up sufficient strength to hold a line. Draconian threats were used to deter desertion and surrender, including threats to the soldiers' families. But men surrendered in large numbers anyway, as I will describe below.

The Germans were not short of artillery or of ammo. On the contrary, their supply lines had shortened when the German border was reached, and any immediate deficiencies made up by October. In addition, infantry losses were far higher than arty ones. As successive formations were sent to the area, the artillery park grew while the infantry component of the defense stood still or declined. A similar thing happened with engineering improvements, from the length of the battle, its see saw character, and its pauses between the phases.

This led by the late Hurtgen fighting to battle conditions for the Germans in which arty was dominant, engineering improvements were everywhere, but men to actually man the lines were incredibly scarce. For example, a German position covering one draw leading to an important ridge checked the company sent to probe it. A neighboring company reached the crest against light opposition. The checked company then followed the successful one, but that night supply parties found the draw route still blocked. So the guys on the ridge were ordered to open the draw "block" with a night attack from the crest. One platoon was sent.

The German position had AP mines in front, blocking the draw - but the attack managed to come from the other side, avoiding them. (The earlier, direct attempt had been stopped by mines, MG fire, and called arty). It was completely wired in, however, 360 degrees. The position consisted of one large concrete bunker and 14 small log ones - covered foxholes essentially. The garrison of this little fortress? 15 Germans. The US platoon wiped them out.

The Germans used highly effective battlefield interdiction tactics in this phase of the fighting. Which exploited engineering time, abundant artillery, superior observation, and the defender's intel edge. The idea was to prevent any safe "push" of men or supplies forward to the leading American units, to thereby slow or fix them, and then to simply shell them continually.

There were few roads in the area, a number of thin firebreaks, and small forest trails. All of these the Germans systematically mined. Not a mine tile or two across each one. No, 3 miles of firebreak, mined along the entire length and 50m or so into the woods on either side. Roads blocked by downed trees not in 1-2 spots, but for patches a mile long, the downed trees then booby-trapped. Roads and firebreaks got AT mines in addition to AP. Every footpath sewn with AP mines. Some linear AP mine barriers in addition, in the deep forest itself. Exits from steep-banked streams in the draws covered by AP mines. And all of the above then registered for interdiction artillery fire, using guns up to 210mm and including very long range 170mm pieces to reach well into the US rear.

That was the first component, and its purpose was to strip the Americans of vehicle support, both tanks for their attacks, and trucks and jeeps for battlefield supply. Infantry foot columns had to maneuver off trail, using new routes marked out by white tape laid by the engineers, to avoid getting lost. (Lots did get lost before those were laid). All wounded had to be carried out by litter to a distance of 1000 yards, up and down 500 foot ridges. All ammo, food, and water had to be man-packed forward.

Next, the Germans put artillery OPs on all the points of high ground and good observation. They called arty fire on every carrying party spotted. Occasional unspotted interdiction was laid on trail junctions and fords, but only modest ammo was expended that way. Bypassed FOs remained hidden in their log-covered holes and continued to call missions. Night infiltrations put additional OPs and LPs in the woods. Fire was called on sound contacts - when the Americans cut trees to get overhead cover for their own holes, Germans would hear their axes and drop arty. Stream crossings were registered for mortar fire, both 81mm and 120mm.

These missions were by no means restricted to the forward lines, which in fact were frequently not in LOS contact (or even in sound contact). Many Americans expressed a preference for being up at the leading foxhole line. At least there they had cover and could go stationary, and could strike back at the Germans. Carrying parties, reliefs, and replacements were interdicted by observed arty, very efficiently. Occasionally a company badly caught in one of these would lose 50% of its strength on its approach march.

The overall German artillery park included 210mm howitzers, 170mm guns, numerous division level 150mm guns, captured Russian 122mm howitzers, numerous 105mm howitzers, 120mm and 81mm mortars, 88mm Flak used indirect (including occasional reports of them firing 10-12 rounds a minute for 20 minutes straight). Most of the fire was directed, so ammo was expended efficiently. It was also expended freely (not limited ammo), and caused the overwhelming majority of US casualties.

They also had 88mm and 75mm PAK and a handful of StuGs lining the high villages if any US tanks got that far forward. The StuGs and some Pz IVs were also used in 1-2s to lead counterattacks, dug in as bunkers, or hidden in houses in the villages to ride out artillery prep and surprise those trying to exploit after them. But most of the defense was mines and arty and modest amounts of infantry.

The infantry use followed a pattern, in which fresh units committed to an area still had the strength per unit and the morale to launch local counterattacks, typically on the flanks of any terrain feature the US had just taken. These also infiltrated at night to establish positions behind the leading US units, in the "interdiction zone". Counterattacks typically featured 100-300 men and occasionally 1-2 AFVs where the terrain allowed. But they took serious losses used this aggressively and quickly burnt themselves out.

The reduced units them defended with LPs forward and dug in positions behind them. The LPs would fire a few shots and skedaddle. The main positions served more to protect the defenders than to deny the Americans ground along continuous fronts, and were typically constructed, strongpoint fashion, with 360 degree defense. Strung between them were the minefields and registered artillery. But the Americans also regularly managed to bypass through the deep woods, while occasionally running onto an unexpected position attempt to do so.

German units took additional losses from probes that got their LPs, modest ones from US artillery fire while defensive, and from being bypassed and cut off. US artillery fire also gradually beat down their morale and isolated them in their holes. The longer a unit had been in the line, the less active it became. Eventually they were too intimidate by the artillery fire to venture out of their holes even to go get food or to evacuate wounded. Once reduced to that state, the men readily surrendered once an American unit reached them.

A typical sequence was, US forces jump off and proceed 500 yards without encountering anything but token opposition from a few LPs. Then they hit their first "trouble", which might be an actual German position, a minefield, or an observed point where arty is called on them (small clearing, crossing a road or stream at right angles, draw, observed crest, etc). Some are halted and others look for a different route, the best off making it a little farther and reaching some useful, key piece of terrain.

Then the Germans send shells, perhaps a local counterattack which will typically fail, followed by more shells. The Americans are by then in deep confusion. Leaders out of action, subunits mixed up and lost, men carrying wounded out, follow on forces cut up by interdiction, firefights breaking out in the rear with bypassed German elements, green replacement leaders stuffing up simple moves (like crossing a clearing instead of skirting it, and getting mortared as a result; or persisting into a minefield or attacking wire defended, dug in MGs frontally), raw replacements scattering under artillery fire. The remaining effectives up front want to dig in to get some shelter from arty, the officers want to know what the hell happened, the wounded scream for help, nobody knows anything, everyone is thoroughly exhausted, wet, and miserable. The forward units may or may not give ground before digging in.

Then the next stage is trying to keep the terrain feature thus grabbed. Which takes days, and features dug in guys up front riding it out, and battlefield interdiction tactics trying to cut off all help from reaching them. Meanwhile the forward units are not attacking further. The Germans therefore have time to bring in replacements and reinforcements, dig fresh positions farther back, register a new round of artillery traps, lay more mines and wire, etc. They take their own losses doing it, to US arty fire (much less often observed or aimed, but ever present anyway). And some of them have time to cross over and surrender.

Repeat. A week can get you a kilometer or a mile if you are lucky, from 2-3 rounds of that. In which the actual advance takes place in 2-3 occasions of 2-4 hours each, and the rest is all sorting out the resulting mess, while the arty continually murders people. Units get intimidated. There is no way to get away from the enemy artillery. Divisions are in the line for several weeks of this, being topped off with replacements continually, and keeping about 75% trench strength as a result. But continually bleeding their officers, NCOs, veterans, cohesion, and morale.

The Germans are so weak in infantry the constant temptation is to push harder to get ground and not let them thicken up to a better stand. But the men can't be pushed harder than a certain pace, and come apart when pushed too hard. They spent a lot of time "apart", as a result. Normally, full consolidation includes relief of the advance elements, rotation of units, improved positions. But logistically all those rely on vehicle power, not available up a steep 500 foot hillside in a forest, with all the routes mined and shelled. Instead everything is exhausting, and the men are therefore predictably exhausted much of the time.

On the German side, the defense is clever in the use of obstacles and especially artillery. But the infantry is coming apart, the strain on them only marginally less than on the US. They keep ground from moving against them only as long as they have the morale to counterattack the instant something is taken. But doing so gets them out of their holes, takes losses to US artillery and small arms, and "spends" the wasting asset of their morale. Regiments bleed 50 men a day in surrenders.

Occasionally the Germans try to make a "set piece" stand, in a defended village or hilltop, which full strength infantry units, mutiple supporting direct fire positions, AFVs, and registered arty. But it does not work nearly as well as the above "slow lose" process. The Americans just pull the firepower chain and put 100 plus guns at a time on single battalions (up to 240mm caliber). Their infantry turns the position through deep woods somewhere and gets up onto some hill, forces FOs to displace.

In a few places, the Americans manage to clear the roads or make new ones and get armor up to the front lines. They have gobs more of it, it just doesn't have any way to get at the Germans. When it does, like as not the Germans could see the vulnerability coming and are waiting with numerous hidden PAK. The Americans lose a few tanks and the rest aren't willing to press it. If the Germans aren't waiting, the tanks lead infantry successfully, arty doesn't stop them (usually focuses too much on the tanks), but only a limited feature is taken. The vehicle blocks reappear on the other side of that village or ridgetop or whatever.

To recreate these conditions in CM, you'd need god-like artillery on both sides, with weakened green troops. The Americans fairly abundant, the Germans very thin on the ground. The Germans had all the TRPs and AP mines anybody could possibly want, plus modest numbers of log bunkers and wire. Parts of the terrain are continuous pine forest with 20m visibility, others "scattered trees" with medium damage (from shells), and the most heavily shelled areas would best by simulated by "rocky" with massive damage and an occasional dot of scattered trees. All with steep relief, "large hills" in CM terms.

I doubt there is any way to recreate realistic levels of confusion and disorganization in CM as it stands. The closest approximation would probably be "time dilation" in an "operation", meaning a single CM battle represents more like a day of action. With FOs "topping off" every time.

Loss dependent releases of "reserves" would have to be used to simulate the way beating the local maneuver-force enemy made no difference to the overall fight conditions. There was no way to run the other guy completely out of men in a battle taking this long. He could always bring in additional forces from outside the sector, before you could do anything with a local edge. You bled the whole enemy army, therefore, not the local battalion.

I hope this is interesting.

[Hortlund]

VERY interesting. Thank you very much for taking the time to type that out Jason.

[Zalgiris 1410]

I agree thanks, JasonC that's all been very interesting, but please what are your sources since you havn't provided any to qualify your opinion or have you just made it all up? :confused: :eek:

[Mad Russian]

I have a series of scenarios that follows an American Division across France, Belgium and into Germany.

I put together a series of battles following the progress of the 3rd Armored Division from their first combats to their last. I chose the battles that seemed to me the most interesting of the war for the division.

For, those that are interested you can email me.

[michael_wittman44]

Metz was a pretty bloody campaign and doesn't seem to ever get much recognision.

[JasonC]

Understandable, since it was the most bone-headed, stubborn, unimaginative battle of the slashingest, dashingest, most maneuver-ee icon of a commander the US had. It was decidedly unnecessary. Patton could have expanded the bridgehead over the Moselle at Nancy, north and north east, and bypassed Metz to the south.

Made a lot more sense than what he did. Only drawback I can see is the historical course set up the unexpected north turn to counter the Bulge better than a southern push would have, if the latter weren't very successful. If it worked, he'd have had Metz anyway and been in just as good a position.

Incidentally, Cole does cover the Metz fighting in his "Lorraine Campaign" green book.

[Mies]

I'm currently reading Stephen Ambrose's The Victors, which has a part in there on an aspect of the Huertgen forest battle that I never realized. Behind the Hurtgen forest (German side) is the Ruhr river valley. During the battle the Germans commanded the dams up stream. Should the American First Army have broken through the forest they would have ended up in the valley, giving the Germans the opportunity to open the dams and swamp the Ruhr valley. This would have seriously hampered any attempt for the Allies to exploit a breakthrough and quickly get to the Rhine river.

Ambrose therefore states that the Huergen forest as the sole objective of the offensive order by in that part of the line was a waste of time and resources (as JasonC perfectly demonstrated above). It would have made more sence to:

a) Go after 2 objectives, the Huertgen forest and the Ruhr river dams or

Bypass the Huertgen forest altogether and go for those dams in the first place.

A small piece of this can be found here .

Mies

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mies:

Behind the Hurtgen forest (German side) is the Ruhr river valley. During the battle the Germans commanded the dams up stream. Should the American First Army have broken through the forest they would have ended up in the valley, giving the Germans the opportunity to open the dams and swamp the Ruhr valley. This would have seriously hampered any attempt for the Allies to exploit a breakthrough and quickly get to the Rhine river.

Ambrose therefore states that the Huergen forest as the sole objective of the offensive order by in that part of the line was a waste of time and resources (as JasonC perfectly demonstrated above). It would have made more sence to:

a) Go after 2 objectives, the Huertgen forest and the Ruhr river dams or

Bypass the Huertgen forest altogether and go for those dams in the first place.

Are you sure you've got that right? I was always given to understand that the purpose of the Hürtgen fight was to get at the dams. Since that offensive did not succeed, the German retained posession of the dams and opened them when the Allies began crossing downstream.

How else could the dams have been approached at the time in question?

PS: The river in question was the Roer and not the Ruhr, which is on the other side, the eastern, of the Rhine.

Michael

[Mies]

Are you sure you've got that right?

No I'm not 100% sure actually. I'm just quoting what Ambrose said. It's dangerous to base statements on 1 source I know. It was a coincidence that I read this topic while just having read the passage in Ambroses book. However I never really read anything before on another motive for taking the Huertgen forest other then getting to the Rhine as quickly as possible in September '44. It never occured to me that the land behind the Huertgen made for ideal innudation (is that English?) / flooding country. Hence my surprise when I read about the Roer valley and the dams. I just voiced my eye opener here.

PS: The river in question was the Roer and not the Ruhr, which is on the other side, the eastern, of the Rhine.

Sorry about that, I translated that incorrectly, but you are right it should be the Roer and not the Ruhr.

Mies

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mies:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Are you sure you've got that right?

No I'm not 100% sure actually. I'm just quoting what Ambrose said. It's dangerous to base statements on 1 source I know.</font>

[Mies]

A good place to begin your reading on this subject would be the CMH Green Book

Thanks, I've added that one to my wish list. Never hurts to get some more insights.

Mies