Berlichtingen Posted September 12, 2003 Share Posted September 12, 2003 Originally posted by Wildman: 3. My comment of dedicated CAS was not from a ground point of view, but from an aircraft sortie point of view. I just haven't come across any reference to pilots being briefed on a dedicated CAS mission. Ex. Forward edge of battle here, expected run in along XXX degree, etc. That is all a fluid situation and required a concept called ON-CALL CAS. Where aircraft sit an loiter in a holding area waiting for instruction to move to an area and contact a Ground (or Air) FAC. WWII aircraft simple did not have the loiter time for that.On Call CAS does not require loitering aircraft... it requires forward airbases (or aircraft carriers... assuming you are close enough to the coast). That is one reason the modern Marines jumped on the opportunity to get thier hands on Harriers. This does bring up a gound point in CM terms... Your Air FO is going to have a MUCH longer delay than your Arty/Mortar FOs Realistically, FAC controlled air should extremely restricted in CM. I really can't think of too many examples of where it would be logical to even include it at all outside a form of air prep bombardment. The more I think on it, the more I believe CAS should be something availabe on turn one that you plot then (including setting a delay) or lose it 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 The RAF (and the USAAF?) did develop the 'cab-rank' system whereby loitering a/c could be quickly called down on targets in the frontline by FACs. However, these kinds of missions were strongly resisted by the airforce because they were extremely wasteful in resources. In addition to the planes waiting around in the air, more needed to be keopt ready on the ground to take over when fuel and/or munitions ran low. Overall, the ratio of sorties to targets engaged was very poor, at best. IIRC, the higher echelons in the army (i.e., corps up) recognised the waste, so even though the frontline troops loved them, these missions were fairly rare - usually only for special occasions or attacks. Scott, Desmond. Typhoon Pilot. London: Secker & Warburg, 1982. would possibly be a fair place to start looking at CAS from the RAF point-of-view. Regards JonS 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
imported_Wildman Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 Ture Berli, I'm so used to the long flight times now that I'm used to seeing stacked up flights or just long (3hrs) loiters by BUFFs 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 13, 2003 Author Share Posted September 13, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:04 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 13, 2003 Author Share Posted September 13, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:05 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Dorosh Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 Originally posted by Cabron66: </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: John D Salt is doing some serious research on friendly fire incidents; you may want to contact him for info. Who is this man and how would I contact him? How did you learn of his work? </font> 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 13, 2003 Author Share Posted September 13, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:06 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Emrys Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 Originally posted by Cabron66: Also, I was not aware the RAF or RCAF had developed this style of mission.Check out A Bridge Too Far, Cornelius Ryan and similar accounts of Market-Garden. His description of the first day's battle at the south end of the corridor IIRC mentions AFOs riding in armoured vehicles near the head of Guards Armoured. Michael 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 Believe it or not, the RAF was actually rather advanced as far as CAS goes. For Op CRUSADER (Nov '41) they set up the first go at what would become their standard air-control organisation. During that campaign they were able to get planes onto the target within 30 minutes of the call for fire. Not reliably, of course, but it was a fairly impressive start. Mind you, from the outset the DAF seems to have taken a fairly 'joint' approach to the war in North Africa, which no doubt helped things along. From 21st AG ORS Joint Report No.3; "Rocket Firing Typhoons in Close Support of Military Operations": [snips] MORALE EFFECT ON OUR OWN TROOPS 19. When asked ... 20. The following incident, which occurred near Overloon (E7632) on 13th October, illustrates the morale effect of rockets. A battalion in 3 Br Inf Div was lying along the south side of a wood approximately 300 yards from the enemy who were holding the northern edge of the next wood. During the morning the battalion tried to advance but were driven back across the intervening open ground. Air Support was requested and a squadron of Typhoons was ordered to attack the woo at 1400 hrs with RP. This attack took place as planned and the battalion advanced across the open ground immediately afterwards without opposition. The CO of the battalion said that not only had the RP successfully unnerved the enemy but they had also put new vigour into his own men who were somewhat disconsolateafter the casualties and reverses of the morning. CONCLUSIONS 21. The greatest ...Again, note the length of time it took to arrange this mission. Also, there is no mention of artillery support for the second attack, but I would be tremendously surprised if there wasn't any. In Normandy, with the crowded beachhead, a typical CAS sortie for the USAAF was just 15 minutes long. Initial safety distance was upwards of 1000 yards, but dropped to around 300yards. (per Doubler) Regards JonS 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 13, 2003 Author Share Posted September 13, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:07 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Dorosh Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 Originally posted by Cabron66: </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS: Again, note the length of time it took to arrange this mission. Also, there is no mention of artillery support for the second attack, but I would be tremendously surprised if there wasn't any. Sorry JonS, but I can't see what you're talking about in the example. How can you tell how long the mission took to arrange? Everything else is crystal. Thanks. </font> 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 13, 2003 Author Share Posted September 13, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:08 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 13, 2003 Author Share Posted September 13, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:09 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bastables Posted September 13, 2003 Share Posted September 13, 2003 Cut and paste form an old reply of mine to one on the many similar threads. "Veteran stories, fantastic chaps. Know of one who was then known as Sqn leader South 42nd Sqn flying the Tiffie or Typhoons during 44-45. He feels and thought at the time that the 2cm cannons were only any good at disabling engines through the opening on the rear of the Jerry tanks and the much more easily achieved busting tracks for a disable, guns were not tank killers. He feel that stories talking about ricochets to achieve kills through the belly are unlikely because a. no one in his Sqn was ever successful with such a techniques and b. They were told that belly armour was thicker than ?top? armour that had already proved impervious to 2cm cannon strikes. Also he notes that only the first few 2cm rounds were accurate due to the cannons having an unfortunate side effect of making the Tiffie rear due to recoil. I think you?ll find that the 2cm cannons on the Typhoons had better AP ability vs. the 12,7mm/.50cal machine guns." 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grisha Posted September 14, 2003 Share Posted September 14, 2003 Not sure if this discussion is limited to just western allies and western front Germans, but a similar discussion was had over a year ago regarding the eastern front - Topic: CMBB: aviation Since, that time I've also had access to Soviet military historical journals, and can add a bit more. By November 1942 in Stalingrad, the Soviets were starting to develop a network of radio/telephone command centers for coordination of air units with ground actions. The closest cooperation was located near the frontlines as forward air command staffs manned forward observation posts to direct and coordinate air missions during the breakthrough. By the time of the Belorussian offensive in June 1944, mobile air command staffs were being assigned to mobile groups. After the breakthrough of German lines, Soviet mobile groups received 75% of all available air resources for their exploitation in the German operational depths. This could easily result in a tank corps having dedicated air support from 2-3 air divisions (about 60-90 combat aircraft per air division, roughly). Air liaison teams from the support air unit staffs were colocated with formations down to tank/mech brigade level, offering closer cooperation via radio. I read in an issue of a Soviet historical journal that by the end of 1943, air support could be expected between 60-90 minutes from call-in. This was the time given for when an air mission was first called and assigned to an air unit on the ground. This figure could drop down to 20 minutes later on when air units were being assigned to fly on station in certain areas in echelon. Air units could also be re-assigned a new mission/target while inbound, and this was possible because of the extensive air command net that existed from the front level down to the mobile groups. By the third period of the war (1944-1945), there were instances when VVS units were informing Soviet forward detachments the location of retreating German units and the best route to bypass them. Not unlike Case Blau in 1942 when the Luftwaffe was doing pretty much the same thing for the advancing panzers. Also, VVS units could be subordinated to specific Red Army ground units. It wasn't done often, but when cases warranted it (mobile groups tasked with very deep exploitation, for one) Soviet ground formations could have air units at their beck and call. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Gyrene Posted September 14, 2003 Share Posted September 14, 2003 An important element of true CAS, which I'm not sure if it has been brought up yet in this thread, is how much "live" interaction there is between the aircraft & the controller. We could roughly break down CAS in levels, fill in the blanks or clear up my mistakes as needed: -Level 1: Preplanned airstrikes - No interaction between Requesting Force (RF) and Aircraft (AC) - "Bombs will drop at x by y at Noon." -Level 2: Opportunity airstrike - No interaction again - Friendly AC loiter beyonf FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area) and hit the enemy's rear. -Level 3: Opportunity airstrike with visual trigger - One way interaction from RF in the manner of preplanned color smoke or similar method. AC will loiter in Level 2 missions and attack color smoke when spotted. Crude interaction from AC to RF is possible with dropped messages. -Level 4: Radio requested airstrike by parent unit - Airstrike request is relayed to parent unit (Co to Bat, Bat to Div, etc) by radio or runner, airstrike is requested by parent unit. No interaction between orginal RF & AC. -Level 5: Radio request airstrike by unit in need - First true CAS as we know today: The unit in need makes the request for support directly to AC's parent unit. Some interaction between AC & RF - Single pass missions, one FAC per Division. -Level 6: Direct control of AC by RF - A trained FAC will have direct control over AC or Multiple AC. One FAC per Battalion or above. Wave Off & Second Pass possible, returning Intel by AC to RF is common, as is the use of AC to extend RF's communications range to parent unit. First used by 1st Marine Division in Korea. -Level 7: Direct control of AC by RF without dedicated FAC, with Mission Customization - First seen during Vietnam - RF's FAC can request what ordnance he needs from a pool of waiting multi-service AC. Response from AC is near instant due to the large number of loitering AC at the disposal of the troops on the ground. FAC duties can and are often assumed by Company & Platoon commanders who are now trained in it's application. Level 8 could possibly be a variation of level 7, but with Airborne FAC's, which were in use as early as in the PTO in WWII, reached their zenith with the LOacHes and BirdDogs in Vietnam, and have since declined quite a bit with the retirement of the OV10. Gyrene 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
dieseltaylor Posted September 15, 2003 Share Posted September 15, 2003 Extract from - Hill 112, Tim Saunders, Battleground Series,ISBN 1 2 0279070 0 ".. the Tigers intervention in Maltot was mercifully brief. A British Forward Air Controller saw the enemy tanks coming down the slope to the west and had called up the RAF Typhoons from the "cab rank" of aircraft circling above, off the coast. The German counter-attach was quickly halted and the Tigers fled back to positions on the south-west ridge of Hill 112" Nicely proactive then! Aircraft probably 30 miles away or so. A few minutes fly time. Also talks of individual fast moving units as being fairly safe - but then in an assault most tanks would be in hunt mode slow moving, halted and probably mob-handed Very detailed little book which also includes up-to-date detailed tour guide to the battlefield. Eleven books in the series on the Western Front in France Two instances of air support gone wrong included.. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 15, 2003 Author Share Posted September 15, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:10 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JonS Posted September 15, 2003 Share Posted September 15, 2003 A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT AIR-GROUND SUPPORT [ September 15, 2003, 04:32 PM: Message edited by: JonS ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted September 15, 2003 Share Posted September 15, 2003 Good, interesting thread. One book I have not seen mentioned (maybe overlooked it) is from the Marshall fairy-tale, oops, historical Wehrmacht debriefing project, by Luftwaffe General Paul Deichmann Spearhead for the Blitzkrieg. It is a decent read, short and quite informative. Been a while I read it though. Bottomline to him was that the Luftwaffe was wasted in direct support of the Army, when it should have become a strategic weapon. Obviously he had read his Douhet, and keenly observed what the RAF/USAAF were doing to the German industry and cities while his flyboys were doing low-level bombing runs from the HE177 trying to stop the Soviet ground offensives. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grisha Posted September 15, 2003 Share Posted September 15, 2003 I've provided a link to an interview with an Il-2 pilot from the Soviet-German War. This should offer some insight into the 'up close and personal' perspective. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Emrys Posted September 15, 2003 Share Posted September 15, 2003 Originally posted by Andreas: Bottomline to him was that the Luftwaffe was wasted in direct support of the Army, when it should have become a strategic weapon. Obviously he had read his Douhet, and keenly observed what the RAF/USAAF were doing to the German industry and cities while his flyboys were doing low-level bombing runs from the HE177 trying to stop the Soviet ground offensives. Sounds to me like he was firmly in the grip of air force envy. At no time both before and during WW II was Germany able to have both a tactical and a strategic air force. It had to make a choice between the two. Given that the kind of war Germany expected to fight in the first instance, namely a continental war mainly involving ground forces, it made a great of sense to tailor the air force to maximize the synergistic effect of all arms by providing the greatest support directly to the army. Since the premise of Blitzkrieg was that Germany's enemies would be quickly overrun by the army, there would have been little or no time for a strategic air force to have effect anyway. It was Hitler's long term plan that once Germany's continental enemies had been dealt with, and the resources of Europe absorbed into the Reich, it would produce a navy and strategic air force sufficient to take on and defeat more distant enemies. Fat chance. BTW, the He-177 was simply a poor design that should have been abandoned early on anyway. Michael 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 16, 2003 Author Share Posted September 16, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:11 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 16, 2003 Author Share Posted September 16, 2003 All comments withdrawn. [ September 21, 2003, 06:12 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Emrys Posted September 16, 2003 Share Posted September 16, 2003 Originally posted by Cabron66: </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas: Bottomline to him was that the Luftwaffe was wasted in direct support of the Army, when it should have become a strategic weapon. Obviously he had read his Douhet...I agree with him. Relatively, the Luftwaffe could have been much more effective in a strategic role (especially in the ETO where it would have mattered most). If the GAF had managed to develop a reliable 4-engine bomber AND a long-range fighter to escort it this forum might be in German...</font> 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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