6km x 4km map of Prokhorovka region

[Keke]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Keke:

This one is for Sergei

I'm planning to do a Static operation with it. :cool:

Ah yes, looks very pleasing to my eye! How large do you think the operation will become, in battalions and battles?

I wonder if Sardaukar still is working on a new Kuuterselkä scenario. VT line rocks. </font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by kipanderson:

In short, the Germans were bled white.

Let's see. The southern pincer, more succesful than the northern one, attacked against totally prepared defense, attacked initialy against 1:2 odds which later raised to 1:3 odds, took 10% overall casualties while inflicting 3 times more for the defender (6 times more in tanks). When the northern pincer is included, the casualties for the Germans were only 2-3% of overall casualties for the year 1943. Bled white you say?

Originally posted by kipanderson:

During the Korsun operation the newly reequipped, 60 strong, Panther battalion of Grossdeutschland was shot to pieces just as describe above.

I hope the source for this info is not a Soviet General Staff Study...

[Amedeo]

Originally posted by Keke:

Well, I'd be really interested to know what kind of numbers Newton presents then. Only thing I know about the book is that it constantly misspells Leibstandarde as "Liebstandarde", hehe.

And also Adolf misspelled as Adolph...

Anyway you may browse though the entire book on the Amazon.com website.

Regards,

Amedeo

[Aragorn2002]

Leibstandarte...

[Keke]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Leibstandarte...

[kipanderson]

Keke, hi,

The source for the German Panther battalion being shot to pieces, just as described, is the account given by the Germans themselves, to be found in Hell’s Gate by Douglas Nash. From memory it goes something like, 15 Panthers lost in the first mornings attack for the loss of 13 T34s by the Soviets. By the end of the second morning only 17 Panthers still left.

When it comes to Kursk do buy the Newton book, it explains all. Basically, Zetterling got it all wrong. Remember Newton used the same sources. To give just one quick example, which I think you may have eluded to.

6% losses at army level over the first five days of fighting in the north, translates into over 50% losses in the "fighting battalions of the divisions actually involved in the attack". As we all know just from CM, if a battalion of infantry has suffered 50% losses, in the rifle platoon the losses are likely to be more like 75%. That was just in the first five days.

The quickest and best way to see the effect of Kursk on the respective sides, and therefore who won, is to look at where the front line was on 1st July 43, and where it was two or three months later.

All the best,

Kip.

[Keke]

Originally posted by kipanderson:

Keke, hi,

The source for the German Panther battalion being shot to pieces, just as described, is the account given by the Germans themselves, to be found in Hell’s Gate by Douglas Nash. From memory it goes something like, 15 Panthers lost in the first mornings attack for the loss of 13 T34s by the Soviets. By the end of the second morning only 17 Panthers still left.

Was it one of the desperate mud attacks? Although German accounts are not 100% reliable, as you well know, I think there's no reason for argue this.

Originally posted by kipanderson:

When it comes to Kursk do buy the Newton book, it explains all. Basically, Zetterling got it all wrong. Remember Newton used the same sources. To give just one quick example, which I think you may have eluded to.

6% losses at army level over the first five days of fighting in the north, translates into over 50% losses in the "fighting battalions of the divisions actually involved in the attack". As we all know just from CM, if a battalion of infantry has suffered 50% losses, in the rifle platoon the losses are likely to be more like 75%. That was just in the first five days.

OK, I have to purchase Newton's book for more info. Have you read Zetterling's?

Originally posted by kipanderson:

The quickest and best way to see the effect of Kursk on the respective sides, and therefore who won, is to look at where the front line was on 1st July 43, and where it was two or three months later.

Sorry but this is "Who was on the Reichstag in the end?" -logic I so much despise. 'Nuff said.

[Amedeo]

OK, I have to purchase Newton's book for more info.

You don't, actually. As I already said, page scans of the whole book are available for browsing at the Amanon.com website.

Bye,

Amedeo

[Keke]

Originally posted by Amedeo:

You don't, actually. As I already said, page scans of the whole book are available for browsing at the Amanon.com website.

And some seem to exploit it at will. Check this: Newton's Zetterling critique.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

Sorry but this is "Who was on the Reichstag in the end?" -logic I so much despise. 'Nuff said.

You are making it a bit too easy on you to dismiss that one. The battle for Kursk and Polokovodets Rumyantsev are a set of two fairly well linked operational events, in which the outcome of both was linked (had the Germans managed to achieve a significantly better casualty ratio in Zitadelle, the Soviet forces could not have taken them apart two weeks later). So no, not 'nuff said', much as you would like that.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

You are making it a bit too easy on you to dismiss that one. The battle for Kursk and Polokovodets Rumyantsev are a set of two fairly well linked operational events, in which the outcome of both was linked (had the Germans managed to achieve a significantly better casualty ratio in Zitadelle, the Soviet forces could not have taken them apart two weeks later). So no, not 'nuff said', much as you would like that.

I'm dismissing nothing. Every battle, operation, campaign were linked together. The fact that Zetterling deals with the German offensive phase only doesn't mean he is "all wrong"...unless every campaign has to be viewed from "who was on the Reichstag in the end?" -perspective...

[Andreas]

Yes, you are dismissing it 'The logic I so despise - nuff said' - what is that other than a dismissal? And no, not every battle is linked as closely as these two - the performance of the Germans in Zitadelle had a direct impact on Polkovodets Rumyantsev. The performance of the Germans before Leningrad in 1941 did not have a direct impact on the Berlin Operation. So to dismiss it as 'that is just the old who flew the flag on the Reichstag thing' does not wash.

It is not the logic you so despise - think about it. If the Germans had really kicked Steppe Front's rear during their attack, who would have been there to attack German lines two weeks later? If the Soviets had completely trashed the German attack without needing to take 5th Guards TA out of the Steppe Front, would they have struggled as much around Kharkov and Akhtyrka? There is a direct link between the two battles. That Zetterling does not analyse it does not mean it is not there. Seeing the link does not mean that every campaign has to be viewed from the 'who made it to the Reichstag' angle. You can take that strawman home right now.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Yes, you are dismissing it 'The logic I so despise - nuff said' - what is that other than a dismissal? And no, not every battle is linked as closely as these two - the performance of the Germans in Zitadelle had a direct impact on Polkovodets Rumyantsev. The performance of the Germans before Leningrad in 1941 did not have a direct impact on the Berlin Operation. So to dismiss it as 'that is just the old who flew the flag on the Reichstag thing' does not wash.

It is not the logic you so despise - think about it. If the Germans had really kicked Steppe Front's rear during their attack, who would have been there to attack German lines two weeks later? If the Soviets had completely trashed the German attack without needing to take 5th Guards TA out of the Steppe Front, would they have struggled as much around Kharkov and Akhtyrka? There is a direct link between the two battles. That Zetterling does not analyse it does not mean it is not there. Seeing the link does not mean that every campaign has to be viewed from the 'who made it to the Reichstag' angle. You can take that strawman home right now.

Hehe, I remember you using the Reichstag argument at TDI forum, so I had to use it here of course.

And no, I'm not dismissing Soviet successes during their offensives, but pointing out that German casualties were not as high during their own offensive phase as has been traditionally viewed. Newton challenges this, but it seems that he does take the Soviet offensives into account while Zetterling doesn't.

'Nuff said.

[KG_Cloghaun]

@ Keke

I was unable to find in this thread you mentioning if you are planning to make a Kursk scenario out of this map you are working on, or just the map?

If you are making a scenario, could you give some details on it, like what you'll name it, what it will cover exactly, etc,..

I am impressed so far.

I am currently working on an operation covering the Battle of Kapitanovka, the initial objective of 5th Guards/2nd Ukrainian Front in their bid to create the Korsun Pocket. My map is 5040x2320,..quite a challenge.

Thankyou

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

And no, I'm not dismissing Soviet successes during their offensives, but pointing out that German casualties were not as high during their own offensive phase as has been traditionally viewed. Newton challenges this, but it seems that he does take the Soviet offensives into account while Zetterling doesn't.

'Nuff said.

That is not how I understand Newton's argument, so you excuse me if I don't agree that 'nuff has been said.

IIMU that Newton criticises Zetterling choice of unit of analysis in two ways. First the scope of the battle. I.e. he would include the Orel battles, and Polkovodets Rumyantsev. I think there are good arguments for that because it will ensure a more robust analysis (German forces of Model's 2nd Army were diverted to deal with Bagramyan's Orel offensive - making it more difficult to continue on the northern shoulder). But IMO more importantly, he also criticises the loss analysis within the battle as Zetterling defines it. In particular Zetterling's analysis of the losses on army level.

It is quite clear to me that this is the totally wrong way of looking at it. You can only have 5% ration strength losses on army level, but still be left with completely gutted formations. In a German division, the 'teeth' units usually were about 1/3rd or less of the total strength (let's ignore the fact that ration strength includes soldiers who are ill/wounded, and Soviet POWs in auxiliary roles). The Germans had three different terms for this Verpflegunsstärke (ration strength), Gefechtsstärke (combat strength) and Grabenstärke (trench strength), with the latter a very narrow number of just the soldiers available to fight the enemy. Since the majority of losses in the division will occur in the teeth units, a 5% overall loss of the division turns into 3-4 times that on the combat level. Hence we see reports of divisions with a nominal strength of ~12,000 men deemed destroyed when they took ~2,500 men losses.

The same with Zetterling's figures - while the army's ration strength may only have gone down by 5%, that means that the typical infantry platoon was probably pretty much wiped out. Hence Kip's use of the term 'bled dry'. That is before we get into issues such as the need to divert forces elsewhere.

I also note that on the TDI Forum, this particular criticism has not been refuted, AFAICT.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

That is not how I understand Newton's argument, so you excuse me if I don't agree that 'nuff has been said.

IIMU that Newton criticises Zetterling choice of unit of analysis in two ways. First the scope of the battle. I.e. he would include the Orel battles, and Polkovodets Rumyantsev. I think there are good arguments for that because it will ensure a more robust analysis (German forces of Model's 2nd Army were diverted to deal with Bagramyan's Orel offensive - making it more difficult to continue on the northern shoulder). But IMO more importantly, he also criticises the loss analysis within the battle as Zetterling defines it. In particular Zetterling's analysis of the losses on army level.

It is quite clear to me that this is the totally wrong way of looking at it. You can only have 5% ration strength losses on army level, but still be left with completely gutted formations. In a German division, the 'teeth' units usually were about 1/3rd or less of the total strength (let's ignore the fact that ration strength includes soldiers who are ill/wounded, and Soviet POWs in auxiliary roles). The Germans had three different terms for this Verpflegunsstärke (ration strength), Gefechtsstärke (combat strength) and Grabenstärke (trench strength), with the latter a very narrow number of just the soldiers available to fight the enemy. Since the majority of losses in the division will occur in the teeth units, a 5% overall loss of the division turns into 3-4 times that on the combat level. Hence we see reports of divisions with a nominal strength of ~12,000 men deemed destroyed when they took ~2,500 men losses.

The same with Zetterling's figures - while the army's ration strength may only have gone down by 5%, that means that the typical infantry platoon was probably pretty much wiped out. Hence Kip's use of the term 'bled dry'. That is before we get into issues such as the need to divert forces elsewhere.

I also note that on the TDI Forum, this particular criticism has not been refuted, AFAICT.

I don't know about TDI's current discussion because I haven't visited it for a while. Anyway I agree that Zetterling (and Frankson) tend to emphasize army level casualties too much instead of actual frontline formations. However this doesn't negate the facts FE about the Prokhorovka engagement on 12th July which had been so throughly mythologized...

For the record, Zetterling & Frankson have also published a non-statistical counterpart, "Slaget om Kursk", which has not been translated to English yet (?), and it takes into account also the Orel offensive and the 4th battle of Kharkov.

'Nuff said.

[Andreas]

Well, I am still wondering what the mythology of Prokhorovka has to do with the statement that the German formations were bled white? But I take it you now agree with Kip's statement that the German formations were bled white?

[Keke]

Originally posted by KG_Cloghaun:

@ Keke

I was unable to find in this thread you mentioning if you are planning to make a Kursk scenario out of this map you are working on, or just the map?

If you are making a scenario, could you give some details on it, like what you'll name it, what it will cover exactly, etc,..

I am impressed so far.

I am currently working on an operation covering the Battle of Kapitanovka, the initial objective of 5th Guards/2nd Ukrainian Front in their bid to create the Korsun Pocket. My map is 5040x2320,..quite a challenge.

Thankyou

Nope, I'm not planning a Kursk scenario for CMBB, at least for now. The idea to make a topographical 'study' of the area came after I had played Franko's "Tank Warning" -operation to see how accurate the map actually was. Let's just say that designers should use Mapping Mission more... Also, according to that operation Germans got trashed in Prokhorovka 12th July...

Anyhow, if I was to make a Kursk scenario for CMBB, I'd try to keep it manageable in size. The system is not suitable for monster scenarios, IMO.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Well, I am still wondering what the mythology of Prokhorovka has to do with the statement that the German formations were bled white? But I take it you now agree with Kip's statement that the German formations were bled white?

No I don't. They would have been bled white if they had lost FE over 300 tanks 12th July at Prokhorovka, like the Soviet mythology goes, instead of 25 tanks (including stugs) which happened in reality...

[Andreas]

So infantry losses don't matter? An interesting interpretation, if that is what you mean. It is not what German commanders thought.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

So infantry losses don't matter? An interesting interpretation, if that is what you mean. It is not what German commanders thought.

You asked what Prokhorovka mythology had to do with the statement...And of course infantry losses do matter. When you cause them 5 times more for your enemy, like the southern pincer did 5-20th July against totally prepared defence, that ain't too bad...

[Andreas]

Well, but it is totally meaningless if you don't start eating into your enemy's reserves. Which is what happened. Tactically fine for the Germans, well done - but operationally/strategically desastrous, as was shown two weeks later.

They also matter tactically if you can not make good your losses on the spot, i.e. without taking a breather to bring up the reserves. Because then your infantry losses are the critical factor, your tank losses are not. So IMO the Prokhorovka myth is pretty much irrelevant when looking at the question of whether the Germans were bled white. If they had lost no tanks at Prokhorovka, they still could not have gone on much further, because the tanks were not the issue.

Like so many others, you seem to make the mistake of just looking at the exchange rate of losses, without looking at the question of who could actually afford it in the short run (let alone the long run, but that is the Reichstag argument). The Red Army could at Kursk (not comfortably), while the Germans absolutely could not. Therefore 'that ain't too bad' is actually 'that was a friggin' desaster', because they needed to inflict probably 1:10 or more to avoid being kicked back to the Dnepr by autumn. Steppe Front could insert two fresh armies into Voronezh Front on the 18th, on top of the two armies it had already inserted. All that 1:5 bought the Germans was two weeks by making it impossible for the Steppe Front to be inserted as a whole to counter-attack from the move.

Big friggin' whoop, in General Forum parlance.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Tactically fine for the Germans, well done -

Yep that has been my point.

Originally posted by Andreas:

but operationally/strategically desastrous, as was shown two weeks later.

I wouldn't call it disastrous, that is what happened in summer of 1944, and then many times in a row, but a defeat nontheless. And I have never claimed otherwise, mind you.

[Andreas]

I'd have gone with 'catastrophic' for summer 1944.

What was disastrous about summer 1943 was the piercing of the Dnepr (non-existent Ostwall) line in the south.

I did not say you claimed otherwise, but from just reading about exchange ratios, it sounds as if the Germans had won themselves to death. Which is not what happened - tactical exchange ratios were neither here nor there, because the Germans were operationally and strategically outfought by STAVKA in the summer battles of 1943, starting with Zitadelle/Orjol.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I did not say you claimed otherwise, but from just reading about exchange ratios, it sounds as if the Germans had won themselves to death. Which is not what happened - tactical exchange ratios were neither here nor there, because the Germans were operationally and strategically outfought by STAVKA in the summer battles of 1943, starting with Zitadelle/Orjol.

Now, if I would make a Prokhorovka scenario for CMBB, should I take into account the tactical or the operational level?