Ju-87/G Stuka tankbuster info (cross post fm CMAK)

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

You lost me there [regarding 1st Ukrainian Front numbers].

well, i just tried to point out that those 1st UF figures are usable.

anyway here's a rough calculation based on Central Front figures. it should meet your criticism.

first we assume that Central Front faced in July-August 1943 an unusually high proportion of all German air strikes.

besides the Central Front losses of 187 tanks we also have 1st Tank Army of the Voronezh Front report of having lost 37 tanks to German air arm during July 5-20 1943 (same period). together we have reports for 224 tank losses in this two month period.

if we assume that these reported losses made up 80% (!) of all Soviet tank losses to German air arm during this period, total Soviet losses for these two months would be 280 tanks or in other words 140 tanks per month.

if Germans would have maintained the same rough overall kill level for 1943, 1944 and four months of 1945, we get some 28 months. 28 month x 140 tank/month = 3920 tank.

if we assume they were only 30% as effective in 1942 we get for 1942: 12 month x 42 tank/month = 504 tank.

if we assume they were only 10% as effective in 1941, we get for 1941: 6 month x 14 tank/month = 84 tank.

thus the total would be 84 + 504 + 3920 = 4508 tanks or 4.5% of all Soviet tank losses.

[PFMM]

No undead reindeer cavalry. Just NO.

As a practising statistician your figures are an abomination to me.

Here's why:

One cannot take 187 from one souce and then take 37 from another souce and assume an average for two and half years. Rubbish in, rubbish out.

One needs figures for at least one, more likely two years, for each source. You need to examine both for long and short term trends, and corelation.

Does the weather have an effect? Does the target unit's activity have an effect? The relative concentration of opposing air forces? And so on.

The figures you have produced are not indicitive of anything. They are a fantasy.

[PFMM]

No undead reindeer cavalry. Just NO.

As a practising statistician your figures are an abomination to me.

Here's why:

One cannot take 187 from one souce and then take 37 from another souce and assume an average for two and half years. Rubbish in, rubbish out.

One needs figures for at least one, more likely two years, for each source. You need to examine both for long and short term trends, and corelation.

Does the weather have an effect? Does the target unit's activity have an effect? The relative concentration of opposing air forces? And so on.

The figures you have produced are not indicitive of anything. They are a fantasy.

[Andreas]

Thanks PFMM. That saved me typing a longer reply.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Thanks PFMM. That saved me typing a longer reply.

All the best

Andreas

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by PFMM:

No undead reindeer cavalry. Just NO.

As a practising statistician your figures are an abomination to me.

they are an abomination to me as well. too bad we don't have good data.

what you are missing is the whole point. many say that German kill awards are far too high and are not based on reality. they believe they are ten or fifty times too high and it's impossibility to achieve such high numbers.

what i am doing is using actual available Soviet reports to show that those kill numbers are quite achievable. my numbers aren't supposed to be accurate, they are supposed to show what kind of general figures we are talking about. it doesn't matter if the actual figure is not 4000. it's enough that it isn't 400 or 40 000.

One cannot take 187 from one souce and then take 37 from another souce and assume an average for two and half years. Rubbish in, rubbish out.

these two sources are for the same period. they are added together to get the total tank loss figure so far available to us for that specific period. i am using these figures to get the minimum possible Soviet losses for that period.

i average out to 2.5 years just to show what losses of this level mean in the longer run.

One needs figures for at least one, more likely two years, for each source. You need to examine both for long and short term trends, and corelation.

187 is a front level figure for two months. 37 is an army level figure for two weeks. they correlate very well. we also have a front level figure for 1945 and it correlates as well. we also have often thrown figure of 5% total Soviet losses (source unknown to me) and it correlates. German kill awards so far available to us correlate as well.

keep in mind the level of the reports - there's averaging out already within them.

Does the weather have an effect? Does the target unit's activity have an effect? The relative concentration of opposing air forces?

i think the basic setup is relatively identical with most Soviet offensives of this level and duration.

The figures you have produced are not indicitive of anything. They are a fantasy.

the figures give a general idea what kind of numbers we are talking about.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by PFMM:

No undead reindeer cavalry. Just NO.

As a practising statistician your figures are an abomination to me.

they are an abomination to me as well. too bad we don't have good data.

what you are missing is the whole point. many say that German kill awards are far too high and are not based on reality. they believe they are ten or fifty times too high and it's impossibility to achieve such high numbers.

what i am doing is using actual available Soviet reports to show that those kill numbers are quite achievable. my numbers aren't supposed to be accurate, they are supposed to show what kind of general figures we are talking about. it doesn't matter if the actual figure is not 4000. it's enough that it isn't 400 or 40 000.

One cannot take 187 from one souce and then take 37 from another souce and assume an average for two and half years. Rubbish in, rubbish out.

these two sources are for the same period. they are added together to get the total tank loss figure so far available to us for that specific period. i am using these figures to get the minimum possible Soviet losses for that period.

i average out to 2.5 years just to show what losses of this level mean in the longer run.

One needs figures for at least one, more likely two years, for each source. You need to examine both for long and short term trends, and corelation.

187 is a front level figure for two months. 37 is an army level figure for two weeks. they correlate very well. we also have a front level figure for 1945 and it correlates as well. we also have often thrown figure of 5% total Soviet losses (source unknown to me) and it correlates. German kill awards so far available to us correlate as well.

keep in mind the level of the reports - there's averaging out already within them.

Does the weather have an effect? Does the target unit's activity have an effect? The relative concentration of opposing air forces?

i think the basic setup is relatively identical with most Soviet offensives of this level and duration.

The figures you have produced are not indicitive of anything. They are a fantasy.

the figures give a general idea what kind of numbers we are talking about.

[Andreas]

I don't think they do, actually.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

I don't think they do, actually.

All the best

Andreas

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

The achievements of II SG 1 during 1942 are summarized as:

6508 sorties (average of 17 to 18 every 24 hours)

3138 sorties by Hs 129, 1532 by Hs 123, 1838 by Me 109E.

1386.5 tons of bombs released, 52 Soviet aircraft shot down and 55 destroyed on the ground.

Casualties in Gruppe: 20 Hs 129, 5 Hs 123, 16 Me 109E.

Claims of destruction for 91 tanks, 1081 light MT and 273 vehicles.

no doubt it's just a coincidence but 3138 sorties by Hs 129 and 91 tank kills means a 2.9% tank kills per mission.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

The achievements of II SG 1 during 1942 are summarized as:

6508 sorties (average of 17 to 18 every 24 hours)

3138 sorties by Hs 129, 1532 by Hs 123, 1838 by Me 109E.

1386.5 tons of bombs released, 52 Soviet aircraft shot down and 55 destroyed on the ground.

Casualties in Gruppe: 20 Hs 129, 5 Hs 123, 16 Me 109E.

Claims of destruction for 91 tanks, 1081 light MT and 273 vehicles.

no doubt it's just a coincidence but 3138 sorties by Hs 129 and 91 tank kills means a 2.9% tank kills per mission.

[Guest Mike]

How on earth do "front figures for 2 months" and "Army figures for 2 weeks" "correlate very well"??

for starters a Front might have anything from 3-6 armies, and teh time period differs by a factor of 4.

So if you extrapolate from that you have to multiply the army figures from 12-24 to get an equivalent "front" figure (or divide the front figure by the same to get an army figure)

And there's nothing in there about the actual input required to achieve these figures - German activity/sorties/aircraft available/ammunition expended.

Comparing those numbers is a completely meaningless activity and can only serve to confuse with false claims of accuracy.

And yes it is a coincidence - you are forgetting that some of those Hs-123 and even Me-109 sorties might have scored tanks too - the data is too general to allow for your math.

[Guest Mike]

How on earth do "front figures for 2 months" and "Army figures for 2 weeks" "correlate very well"??

for starters a Front might have anything from 3-6 armies, and teh time period differs by a factor of 4.

So if you extrapolate from that you have to multiply the army figures from 12-24 to get an equivalent "front" figure (or divide the front figure by the same to get an army figure)

And there's nothing in there about the actual input required to achieve these figures - German activity/sorties/aircraft available/ammunition expended.

Comparing those numbers is a completely meaningless activity and can only serve to confuse with false claims of accuracy.

And yes it is a coincidence - you are forgetting that some of those Hs-123 and even Me-109 sorties might have scored tanks too - the data is too general to allow for your math.

[Hetzer38]

While talking about numbers...

From the Dupuy-forum, posted by Chris Lawrence (08-14-2002)

...Conveniently enough the Soviet attack is clearly identified in their records and there is only one brigade it could be.

This is the 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. It is the only candidate and was reported at attacking from Visloye at 1200 Moscow time (1100 Berlin time).

There are no other candidates. The division operated with two tank brigades forward and one in the second echolon. The other forward brigade (4th Guards Tank Brigade) was to its right at Nepkhayevo while the other tank brigade remained in the rear. The Corps 47th Heavy Tank Regiment (Churchills) was already 7 - 10 kilometers away in the III Panzer Corps area engaged, and the independent 96th Tank Brigade was moving southeast of Gostishchevo and joined that fight.

Therefore, one is left with the 26th Tank Brigade. It reports that it attacked from Visloye at 1200 (Moscow) time. Visloye is at the northwest tip of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This attack drove onto height 209.5, two kilometers southwest of Visloye. The brigade then reports being attacked by 40-50 planes during the German counterattack (which occurred at 1210 Berlin time according to German reports).

The Soviet losses

The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.

The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.

As the 4th Guards Tank Brigade clearly took casualties, this all points to the actual losses of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade being around nine tanks. Assuming that some were lost to German armor, antitank guns and infantry (both during the attack and during the German counterattack) then it would appear that the claim by the VIII Air Corps of "more than 6 hits" may in fact be high. The claim of 40 tanks killed appears to be off by an order of magnitude.

How old are these records C. Lawrence is referring to ?

...Vor diesem sehr eindrucksvollen Denkmal gab Oberst a.D. Koltunow eine Erklärung zu den damaligen Geschehnissen ab, in der er zugab, dass die sowjetische Geschichtsschreibung über den Ablauf der Panzerschlacht bei Prochorowka nicht der ganzen Wahrheit entspricht. Er sei damals "aufgefordert" worden, die Zahlen zu "bereinigen".

In June 1996, Colonel a.D. Koltunow admitted that soviet historical literature about the Tank-Battle around Prochorowka isn't corresponding with the whole truth. He was "asked" at that time to "clean-up" the numbers.

[from: Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil I)]

It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.

Cheers, Hetzer.

[ March 19, 2007, 03:12 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]

[Hetzer38]

While talking about numbers...

From the Dupuy-forum, posted by Chris Lawrence (08-14-2002)

...Conveniently enough the Soviet attack is clearly identified in their records and there is only one brigade it could be.

This is the 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. It is the only candidate and was reported at attacking from Visloye at 1200 Moscow time (1100 Berlin time).

There are no other candidates. The division operated with two tank brigades forward and one in the second echolon. The other forward brigade (4th Guards Tank Brigade) was to its right at Nepkhayevo while the other tank brigade remained in the rear. The Corps 47th Heavy Tank Regiment (Churchills) was already 7 - 10 kilometers away in the III Panzer Corps area engaged, and the independent 96th Tank Brigade was moving southeast of Gostishchevo and joined that fight.

Therefore, one is left with the 26th Tank Brigade. It reports that it attacked from Visloye at 1200 (Moscow) time. Visloye is at the northwest tip of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This attack drove onto height 209.5, two kilometers southwest of Visloye. The brigade then reports being attacked by 40-50 planes during the German counterattack (which occurred at 1210 Berlin time according to German reports).

The Soviet losses

The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.

The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.

As the 4th Guards Tank Brigade clearly took casualties, this all points to the actual losses of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade being around nine tanks. Assuming that some were lost to German armor, antitank guns and infantry (both during the attack and during the German counterattack) then it would appear that the claim by the VIII Air Corps of "more than 6 hits" may in fact be high. The claim of 40 tanks killed appears to be off by an order of magnitude.

How old are these records C. Lawrence is referring to ?

...Vor diesem sehr eindrucksvollen Denkmal gab Oberst a.D. Koltunow eine Erklärung zu den damaligen Geschehnissen ab, in der er zugab, dass die sowjetische Geschichtsschreibung über den Ablauf der Panzerschlacht bei Prochorowka nicht der ganzen Wahrheit entspricht. Er sei damals "aufgefordert" worden, die Zahlen zu "bereinigen".

In June 1996, Colonel a.D. Koltunow admitted that soviet historical literature about the Tank-Battle around Prochorowka isn't corresponding with the whole truth. He was "asked" at that time to "clean-up" the numbers.

[from: Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil I)]

It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.

Cheers, Hetzer.

[ March 19, 2007, 03:12 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]

[Hetzer38]

- Just in case someone asks "Who the f*ck is Bruno Meyer!?"

* Insert Bruno's story here * (4th post from above)

...The Henschel 129s, supported by Fw 190s, for three hours uniterruptedly attacked the soviet concentration. When one Staffel was above the battlefield, another returned to the base, the third was at the airfield to re-fuel and take ammunition, whereas the fourth took off for another action. Not even one soviet tank succeeded in breaking through to the rear of the German army...

Bruno Meyer was born on November 13, 1915 on Haiti. He began service with the Luftwaffe at the end of 1937 at the cadet school in Hildesheim. His military career began in Poland during the September Campaign of 1939, when he piloted a Henschel Hs 123 biplane in the ranks of II.(Schlacht)/LG 2. As that unit's pilot he later fought in France and on the Eastern Front. In the spring of 1941 he became commander of 5.(Schlacht)/LG 2. On exceeding the number of 200 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight's cross on August 21, 1941. In the first half of 1942 he fought with his Staffel at the middle part of the Eastern Front. On July 8, 1942 he was comissioned commander of 3./Erg.Zerst.Gr. based at 'Deblin-Irena' airfield. On November 1, 1942, he accepted the duty of commander of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 2, equipped with Hs 129s, which was soon moved to Africa. In the summer of 1943 he led his Staffel in the fights at Kursk. On October 18, 1943 he became commander of IV.(Pz)/SG 9, which then won significant successes in fights in the area of Bielgorod, Orel, Krivoy Rog and Uman. After he recieved the rank of Major in October 1944, he took the headquarters post of "Führer der Panzerschlachtflieger" (commander of tank-destroying pilots at the commander-in-chief of the strafing air force)..

[from: Miniatury Lotnicze 8 - Hs 129 in combat - by Marek Murawski]

Cheers, Hetzer.

[Edit-misspelling, wrote "was born 1925" instead of 1915 - Thank you Mies!]

[ March 20, 2007, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]

[Hetzer38]

- Just in case someone asks "Who the f*ck is Bruno Meyer!?"

* Insert Bruno's story here * (4th post from above)

...The Henschel 129s, supported by Fw 190s, for three hours uniterruptedly attacked the soviet concentration. When one Staffel was above the battlefield, another returned to the base, the third was at the airfield to re-fuel and take ammunition, whereas the fourth took off for another action. Not even one soviet tank succeeded in breaking through to the rear of the German army...

Bruno Meyer was born on November 13, 1915 on Haiti. He began service with the Luftwaffe at the end of 1937 at the cadet school in Hildesheim. His military career began in Poland during the September Campaign of 1939, when he piloted a Henschel Hs 123 biplane in the ranks of II.(Schlacht)/LG 2. As that unit's pilot he later fought in France and on the Eastern Front. In the spring of 1941 he became commander of 5.(Schlacht)/LG 2. On exceeding the number of 200 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight's cross on August 21, 1941. In the first half of 1942 he fought with his Staffel at the middle part of the Eastern Front. On July 8, 1942 he was comissioned commander of 3./Erg.Zerst.Gr. based at 'Deblin-Irena' airfield. On November 1, 1942, he accepted the duty of commander of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 2, equipped with Hs 129s, which was soon moved to Africa. In the summer of 1943 he led his Staffel in the fights at Kursk. On October 18, 1943 he became commander of IV.(Pz)/SG 9, which then won significant successes in fights in the area of Bielgorod, Orel, Krivoy Rog and Uman. After he recieved the rank of Major in October 1944, he took the headquarters post of "Führer der Panzerschlachtflieger" (commander of tank-destroying pilots at the commander-in-chief of the strafing air force)..

[from: Miniatury Lotnicze 8 - Hs 129 in combat - by Marek Murawski]

Cheers, Hetzer.

[Edit-misspelling, wrote "was born 1925" instead of 1915 - Thank you Mies!]

[ March 20, 2007, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.

Cheers, Hetzer.

I think you are conflating things. Unit level records were not cleaned up, as far as I can tell from having looked at some of the more recent Prokhorovka stuff. They can be presumed to be accurate. The cleaning started later, and only affected higher level reports. See e.g. Töppel's thesis on the mythology of Kursk. Also, Prokhorovka is a special case, due to the mythical proportions this battle assumed. Meyer's story has nothing to do with Prokhorovka.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.

Cheers, Hetzer.

I think you are conflating things. Unit level records were not cleaned up, as far as I can tell from having looked at some of the more recent Prokhorovka stuff. They can be presumed to be accurate. The cleaning started later, and only affected higher level reports. See e.g. Töppel's thesis on the mythology of Kursk. Also, Prokhorovka is a special case, due to the mythical proportions this battle assumed. Meyer's story has nothing to do with Prokhorovka.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

All,

This and its sister thread on CMAK seem to get more interesting and deeper by the day. Obviously, some of you are up to date on WW II historiography I've never even seen. Far more exciting than the senior history seminars from my college days!

Andreas,

Is the referenced thesis available, in English, online?

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

All,

This and its sister thread on CMAK seem to get more interesting and deeper by the day. Obviously, some of you are up to date on WW II historiography I've never even seen. Far more exciting than the senior history seminars from my college days!

Andreas,

Is the referenced thesis available, in English, online?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Mies]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

[QB] - Just in case someone asks "Who the f*ck is Bruno Meyer!?"

Bruno Meyer was born on November 13, 1925 on Haiti. He began service with the Luftwaffe at the end of 1937 at the cadet school in Hildesheim. His military career began in Poland during the September Campaign of 1939, when he piloted a Henschel Hs 123 biplane in the ranks of II.(Schlacht)/LG 2. As that unit's pilot he later fought in France and on the Eastern Front. In the spring of 1941 he became commander of 5.(Schlacht)/LG 2. On exceeding the number of 200 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight's cross on August 21, 1941. In the first half of 1942 he fought with his Staffel at the middle part of the Eastern Front. On July 8, 1942 he was comissioned commander of 3./Erg.Zerst.Gr. based at 'Deblin-Irena' airfield. On November 1, 1942, he accepted the duty of commander of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 2, equipped with Hs 129s, which was soon moved to Africa. In the summer of 1943 he led his Staffel in the fights at Kursk. On October 18, 1943 he became commander of IV.(Pz)/SG 9, which then won significant successes in fights in the area of Bielgorod, Orel, Krivoy Rog and Uman. After he recieved the rank of Major in October 1944, he took the headquarters post of "Führer der Panzerschlachtflieger" (commander of tank-destroying pilots at the commander-in-chief of the strafing air force)..

I hope this guys birth date is mistyped as it would probably make him the youngest Luftwaffe pilot at just under 14 years of age when the war began .

Mies

[Mies]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

[QB] - Just in case someone asks "Who the f*ck is Bruno Meyer!?"

Bruno Meyer was born on November 13, 1925 on Haiti. He began service with the Luftwaffe at the end of 1937 at the cadet school in Hildesheim. His military career began in Poland during the September Campaign of 1939, when he piloted a Henschel Hs 123 biplane in the ranks of II.(Schlacht)/LG 2. As that unit's pilot he later fought in France and on the Eastern Front. In the spring of 1941 he became commander of 5.(Schlacht)/LG 2. On exceeding the number of 200 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight's cross on August 21, 1941. In the first half of 1942 he fought with his Staffel at the middle part of the Eastern Front. On July 8, 1942 he was comissioned commander of 3./Erg.Zerst.Gr. based at 'Deblin-Irena' airfield. On November 1, 1942, he accepted the duty of commander of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 2, equipped with Hs 129s, which was soon moved to Africa. In the summer of 1943 he led his Staffel in the fights at Kursk. On October 18, 1943 he became commander of IV.(Pz)/SG 9, which then won significant successes in fights in the area of Bielgorod, Orel, Krivoy Rog and Uman. After he recieved the rank of Major in October 1944, he took the headquarters post of "Führer der Panzerschlachtflieger" (commander of tank-destroying pilots at the commander-in-chief of the strafing air force)..

I hope this guys birth date is mistyped as it would probably make him the youngest Luftwaffe pilot at just under 14 years of age when the war began .

Mies

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Andreas,

Is the referenced thesis available, in English, online?

Regards,

John Kettler

No, and no.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Andreas,

Is the referenced thesis available, in English, online?

Regards,

John Kettler

No, and no.

All the best

Andreas