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Ju-87/G Stuka tankbuster info (cross post fm CMAK)


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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

You posted that we had losses from a front for 2 weeks, and an army for 2 months

the other way around.

What we have is 2 sets of figures covering 2 different time frames and adding them together in this manner is just nonsense.

one is for 15 days in July 1943, the other is for July-August 1943. the tank army belonged to a different front but operated on the same general sector.

the third is for 1st Ukrainian Front in 1945 and covers a little over one month.

By all means analyse them seperately - and please provide the information you seem to assume we should all know like the orders of battle to support your analysis.

blah, it's not worth it. the skeptics will just say that we can't make any wider conclusions based on such limited data.

you can quite easily google the OOBs etc for these units as Kursk is so well covered subject. for your convenience: 1st Tank Army total tank strength in 5th July 1943 was 811 tanks. Central Front total tank strength 5th July 1943 was 1647 tanks.

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In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.

KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).

How can he assume a 2-3:1 damaged to destroyed ratio (ist para above) when the KOSAVE figures show an actual ratio less than unity (circa 1050:1300 damaged:destroyed in the 2nd para)?
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In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.

KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).

How can he assume a 2-3:1 damaged to destroyed ratio (ist para above) when the KOSAVE figures show an actual ratio less than unity (circa 1050:1300 damaged:destroyed in the 2nd para)?
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as an aside to the current main topic of this thread....I've just looked at some pics of Pearl Harbour - there's one of a coule of destroyers in dry dock really badly damaged and they are termed "wrecked" - which seems like a good word for Marat too - a wrecked ship can sometimes be recovered/repaired.

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as an aside to the current main topic of this thread....I've just looked at some pics of Pearl Harbour - there's one of a coule of destroyers in dry dock really badly damaged and they are termed "wrecked" - which seems like a good word for Marat too - a wrecked ship can sometimes be recovered/repaired.

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Andreas,

Not at all! The information presented by Toppel, as expressed in what Hetzer38 provided by way of quotes and translations, goes way beyond anything I'd seen before on the scale of Russian losses at Kursk.

I tried to find my copy of KURSK by Geoffrey Jukes, since that is considered by the Russians themselves to be one of the first western books to properly acknowledge their massive contribution to defeating Germany, but couldn't. Instead, I'll cite Cornish, IMAGES OF KURSK, page 219 Losses at Kursk. He cites a total Russian force (Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts) of 1,272,700 with losses, to include units not in combat, of 177,847. Russian tank and SU losses are given as 1614 out of 5035 committed to battle.

Comparison of the revised numbers given in Toppel

with these paints quite a picture, for we have Toppel's corrected 866,000 Russian casualties against the earlier Russian figure of 177,847 and Toppel's 6000 tanks & SUs lost at Kursk defensively and in the later offensive counterstroke vs. the 1614 from earlier Russian sources. These "corrections" have the effect of increasing Russian casualties by more than a factor of four and increasing tank and SU losses

by over a factor of three.

Hence, my exclamation about the significance of Toppel's work.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Andreas,

Not at all! The information presented by Toppel, as expressed in what Hetzer38 provided by way of quotes and translations, goes way beyond anything I'd seen before on the scale of Russian losses at Kursk.

I tried to find my copy of KURSK by Geoffrey Jukes, since that is considered by the Russians themselves to be one of the first western books to properly acknowledge their massive contribution to defeating Germany, but couldn't. Instead, I'll cite Cornish, IMAGES OF KURSK, page 219 Losses at Kursk. He cites a total Russian force (Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts) of 1,272,700 with losses, to include units not in combat, of 177,847. Russian tank and SU losses are given as 1614 out of 5035 committed to battle.

Comparison of the revised numbers given in Toppel

with these paints quite a picture, for we have Toppel's corrected 866,000 Russian casualties against the earlier Russian figure of 177,847 and Toppel's 6000 tanks & SUs lost at Kursk defensively and in the later offensive counterstroke vs. the 1614 from earlier Russian sources. These "corrections" have the effect of increasing Russian casualties by more than a factor of four and increasing tank and SU losses

by over a factor of three.

Hence, my exclamation about the significance of Toppel's work.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.

KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).

How can he assume a 2-3:1 damaged to destroyed ratio (ist para above) when the KOSAVE figures show an actual ratio less than unity (circa 1050:1300 damaged:destroyed in the 2nd para)? </font>
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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.

KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).

How can he assume a 2-3:1 damaged to destroyed ratio (ist para above) when the KOSAVE figures show an actual ratio less than unity (circa 1050:1300 damaged:destroyed in the 2nd para)? </font>
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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

How can he assume a 2-3:1 damaged to destroyed ratio (ist para above) when the KOSAVE figures show an actual ratio less than unity (circa 1050:1300 damaged:destroyed in the 2nd para)?

Because the first set is as per Krivosheev and the second set is as per KOSAVE ?

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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

How can he assume a 2-3:1 damaged to destroyed ratio (ist para above) when the KOSAVE figures show an actual ratio less than unity (circa 1050:1300 damaged:destroyed in the 2nd para)?

Because the first set is as per Krivosheev and the second set is as per KOSAVE ?

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That is so - but he then uses the KOSAVE data to confirm one thing, completely ignoring it's contradiction of another.

That's really bad analysis - you cannot take 1 facet of oa set of data to confirm another facet where they disagree elsewhere unless you do some pretty damned rigorous analysis to account for the differences that exist.

Without that analysis they cannot support each other in any aspect - it's just wishful thinking - sort of 9/11 conspiracy stuff....oh look - there were wargames that day therefore it must have been a missile that hit the pentagon - non sequiter.

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That is so - but he then uses the KOSAVE data to confirm one thing, completely ignoring it's contradiction of another.

That's really bad analysis - you cannot take 1 facet of oa set of data to confirm another facet where they disagree elsewhere unless you do some pretty damned rigorous analysis to account for the differences that exist.

Without that analysis they cannot support each other in any aspect - it's just wishful thinking - sort of 9/11 conspiracy stuff....oh look - there were wargames that day therefore it must have been a missile that hit the pentagon - non sequiter.

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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

That is so - but he then uses the KOSAVE data to confirm one thing, completely ignoring it's contradiction of another.

From what I know about Krivosheevs work you need to be careful about how he classifies data. The Winter War data he released ha a class of losses listes as frostbite. A joint Finnish-Russian research panel later judged these were killed but not counted in the KIA/DOW/MIA and consequently not in the appropriate loss cathtegory.

That's really bad analysis - you cannot take 1 facet of oa set of data to confirm another facet where they disagree elsewhere unless you do some pretty damned rigorous analysis to account for the differences that exist.

COSAVE is missing Su-76 data, isn't it ?

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Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

That is so - but he then uses the KOSAVE data to confirm one thing, completely ignoring it's contradiction of another.

From what I know about Krivosheevs work you need to be careful about how he classifies data. The Winter War data he released ha a class of losses listes as frostbite. A joint Finnish-Russian research panel later judged these were killed but not counted in the KIA/DOW/MIA and consequently not in the appropriate loss cathtegory.

That's really bad analysis - you cannot take 1 facet of oa set of data to confirm another facet where they disagree elsewhere unless you do some pretty damned rigorous analysis to account for the differences that exist.

COSAVE is missing Su-76 data, isn't it ?

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Originally posted by Andreas:

No, that would be a silly thing to say, which is why I have not done so, and a silly thing to read into my posts, since I have not done so.

i wrote:

"i'd expect that out of all the planes the ground attack planes did the greater part of tank killing".

you replied:

"There were also other ground attack planes, most notably the Hs 129, but also FW 190 Jabos, and I would think that ordinary bombing would also account for a good number".

thus here you appear to think that tank killers weren't essential enough to account for greater part of tank kills. i actually ment all ground attack planes, not just tank killers as you appear to interpret, but that's irrelevant as you display your opinion regarding importance of tank killers - i.e. didn't do greater part of tank killing.

then later when i used July 1943 Soviet tank loss figures for pre-1943 period you wrote that one massive problem with it is that there were no dedicated tank killers back then. thus here you think dedicated tank killers would be so important that their non-existence would be a massive problem. this got even clearer when when i replied "there were dedicated ground attack planes right from the start in 1941 and Hs 129 variants armed with 30mm gun entered service in 1942" and you responded "Yes, but I doubt they were responsible for that many kills."

i think you end up contradicting yourself because of your bias. you appear to only post to dicredit German kill claims, not to have objective discussion. you only post factors that speak against German claims, not factors that speak for them. you for example write that it's a massive problem that Germans didn't have any Ju-87Gs in 1941-42 where as in July 5-20th 1943 they apparently had one (1), while you for example do not post that it's a massive problem that we don't have Soviet loss figures for those tank types that are the easiest to destroy from air.

naturally you are free to post and to not post anything you like, to be as vague as you prefer, but it's only natural that readers will form their view of your opinions based on what you choose to post.

if person A writes "T-34/76 was a great tank" and person B only replies with "its gun was ineffective against Tiger and early models were plagued by mechanical failures", it's natural to assume that person B does not agree that T-34/76 was a great tank. yes, it is possible that he agrees that it was a great tank and just points out two weaknesses, but given the context it's natural to assume that he does not agree.

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Originally posted by Andreas:

No, that would be a silly thing to say, which is why I have not done so, and a silly thing to read into my posts, since I have not done so.

i wrote:

"i'd expect that out of all the planes the ground attack planes did the greater part of tank killing".

you replied:

"There were also other ground attack planes, most notably the Hs 129, but also FW 190 Jabos, and I would think that ordinary bombing would also account for a good number".

thus here you appear to think that tank killers weren't essential enough to account for greater part of tank kills. i actually ment all ground attack planes, not just tank killers as you appear to interpret, but that's irrelevant as you display your opinion regarding importance of tank killers - i.e. didn't do greater part of tank killing.

then later when i used July 1943 Soviet tank loss figures for pre-1943 period you wrote that one massive problem with it is that there were no dedicated tank killers back then. thus here you think dedicated tank killers would be so important that their non-existence would be a massive problem. this got even clearer when when i replied "there were dedicated ground attack planes right from the start in 1941 and Hs 129 variants armed with 30mm gun entered service in 1942" and you responded "Yes, but I doubt they were responsible for that many kills."

i think you end up contradicting yourself because of your bias. you appear to only post to dicredit German kill claims, not to have objective discussion. you only post factors that speak against German claims, not factors that speak for them. you for example write that it's a massive problem that Germans didn't have any Ju-87Gs in 1941-42 where as in July 5-20th 1943 they apparently had one (1), while you for example do not post that it's a massive problem that we don't have Soviet loss figures for those tank types that are the easiest to destroy from air.

naturally you are free to post and to not post anything you like, to be as vague as you prefer, but it's only natural that readers will form their view of your opinions based on what you choose to post.

if person A writes "T-34/76 was a great tank" and person B only replies with "its gun was ineffective against Tiger and early models were plagued by mechanical failures", it's natural to assume that person B does not agree that T-34/76 was a great tank. yes, it is possible that he agrees that it was a great tank and just points out two weaknesses, but given the context it's natural to assume that he does not agree.

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Wanted to note for the record that an interview, just aired on the History Channel's Modern Marvels: A-10 Tank Buster, with Pierre Sprey, the "father" of the A-10, vindicates what I was saying early in this thread about the importance of Rudel and his extraordinary combat experience to the A-10 design process.

Sprey said specifically, on camera, that they "interviewed Colonel Rudel," that what Rudel had to say was "very important" and was "incorporated directly into the design." He did mention A-1

experience was incorporated as well, but it was clear, from the amount of time of time he spent on it and how he talked about it, that it was of secondary importance at best. Rather than disparaging Rudel's combat achievements, Pierre Sprey praised them, albeit focused solely on tank kills and Rudel's unique combat decorations.

Some now familiar Rudel and Ju-87G footage was shown, and it was good, clear stuff vastly superior to the YouTube clips in quality.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Wanted to note for the record that an interview, just aired on the History Channel's Modern Marvels: A-10 Tank Buster, with Pierre Sprey, the "father" of the A-10, vindicates what I was saying early in this thread about the importance of Rudel and his extraordinary combat experience to the A-10 design process.

Sprey said specifically, on camera, that they "interviewed Colonel Rudel," that what Rudel had to say was "very important" and was "incorporated directly into the design." He did mention A-1

experience was incorporated as well, but it was clear, from the amount of time of time he spent on it and how he talked about it, that it was of secondary importance at best. Rather than disparaging Rudel's combat achievements, Pierre Sprey praised them, albeit focused solely on tank kills and Rudel's unique combat decorations.

Some now familiar Rudel and Ju-87G footage was shown, and it was good, clear stuff vastly superior to the YouTube clips in quality.

Regards,

John Kettler

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