Ju-87/G Stuka tankbuster info (cross post fm CMAK)

[Andreas]

300

215 tanks more or less than Rudel killed?

You decide...

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

300

215 tanks more or less than Rudel killed?

You decide...

All the best

Andreas

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

How on earth do "front figures for 2 months" and "Army figures for 2 weeks" "correlate very well"??

period of X activity by force of Y composition leads to Z losses. we know X, Y and Z for both units and they correlate.

for starters a Front might have anything from 3-6 armies, and teh time period differs by a factor of 4.

you speculate only because you didn't bother to check what the orders of battle for these two units were during this period. there is no mystery here.

And there's nothing in there about the actual input required to achieve these figures - German activity/sorties/aircraft available/ammunition expended.

we made an assumption that they faced 80% of Luftwaffe's ground attack sorties. most likely that percentage is too high, but at least we get some kind of minimum Luftwaffe tank kill capacity number for this period.

we actually might have some chances to get the number of ground attack sorties for 1st Tank Army tank losses because of the Kursk database, but i don't think it's worth the hassle as people would most likely think it's meaningless anyway.

Comparing those numbers is a completely meaningless activity and can only serve to confuse with false claims of accuracy.

of course they are meaningless. instead of extrapolating from Soviet loss reports we should extrapolate from our arses.

And yes it is a coincidence - you are forgetting that some of those Hs-123 and even Me-109 sorties might have scored tanks too - the data is too general to allow for your math.

they probably got some tanks, but i doubt they got so many that the percentage would change drastically.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

How on earth do "front figures for 2 months" and "Army figures for 2 weeks" "correlate very well"??

period of X activity by force of Y composition leads to Z losses. we know X, Y and Z for both units and they correlate.

for starters a Front might have anything from 3-6 armies, and teh time period differs by a factor of 4.

you speculate only because you didn't bother to check what the orders of battle for these two units were during this period. there is no mystery here.

And there's nothing in there about the actual input required to achieve these figures - German activity/sorties/aircraft available/ammunition expended.

we made an assumption that they faced 80% of Luftwaffe's ground attack sorties. most likely that percentage is too high, but at least we get some kind of minimum Luftwaffe tank kill capacity number for this period.

we actually might have some chances to get the number of ground attack sorties for 1st Tank Army tank losses because of the Kursk database, but i don't think it's worth the hassle as people would most likely think it's meaningless anyway.

Comparing those numbers is a completely meaningless activity and can only serve to confuse with false claims of accuracy.

of course they are meaningless. instead of extrapolating from Soviet loss reports we should extrapolate from our arses.

And yes it is a coincidence - you are forgetting that some of those Hs-123 and even Me-109 sorties might have scored tanks too - the data is too general to allow for your math.

they probably got some tanks, but i doubt they got so many that the percentage would change drastically.

[Guest Mike]

You posted that we had losses from a front for 2 weeks, and an army for 2 months, then added themtogether to say

together we have reports for 224 tank losses in this two month period.

this is palpably untrue - we do not have any such thing.

What we have is 2 sets of figures covering 2 different time frames and adding them together in this manner is just nonsense.

By all means analyse them seperately - and please provide the information you seem to assume we should all know like the orders of battle to support your analysis.

But adding them together is essentially the same as pulling the figures out of your arse.

[Guest Mike]

You posted that we had losses from a front for 2 weeks, and an army for 2 months, then added themtogether to say

together we have reports for 224 tank losses in this two month period.

this is palpably untrue - we do not have any such thing.

What we have is 2 sets of figures covering 2 different time frames and adding them together in this manner is just nonsense.

By all means analyse them seperately - and please provide the information you seem to assume we should all know like the orders of battle to support your analysis.

But adding them together is essentially the same as pulling the figures out of your arse.

[John Kettler]

Andreas,

Never hurts to ask!

All,

Are we to take the Chris Lawrence figures as being for K-Kills/TWOs? If so, then it stands to reason that more than the listed figure would've suffered

disablement long enough to keep them out of the immediate fight via broken tracks, damaged running gear, crew hits, etc., while still being available on the morrow. This is especially true for units hit as they emerged from the woods well out of contact with German ground troops.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Andreas,

Never hurts to ask!

All,

Are we to take the Chris Lawrence figures as being for K-Kills/TWOs? If so, then it stands to reason that more than the listed figure would've suffered

disablement long enough to keep them out of the immediate fight via broken tracks, damaged running gear, crew hits, etc., while still being available on the morrow. This is especially true for units hit as they emerged from the woods well out of contact with German ground troops.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Hetzer38]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Hetzer38:

It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.

Cheers, Hetzer.

I think you are conflating things. Unit level records were not cleaned up, as far as I can tell from having looked at some of the more recent Prokhorovka stuff. They can be presumed to be accurate. The cleaning started later, and only affected higher level reports. See e.g. Töppel's thesis on the mythology of Kursk. Also, Prokhorovka is a special case, due to the mythical proportions this battle assumed. Meyer's story has nothing to do with Prokhorovka.

All the best

Andreas </font>

[Hetzer38]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Hetzer38:

It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.

Cheers, Hetzer.

I think you are conflating things. Unit level records were not cleaned up, as far as I can tell from having looked at some of the more recent Prokhorovka stuff. They can be presumed to be accurate. The cleaning started later, and only affected higher level reports. See e.g. Töppel's thesis on the mythology of Kursk. Also, Prokhorovka is a special case, due to the mythical proportions this battle assumed. Meyer's story has nothing to do with Prokhorovka.

All the best

Andreas </font>

[John Kettler]

Hetzer38,

No wonder Andreas cited Toppel! I think there's much to be said for your argument about covering up disasters. If the Russians would cover up one, then why not another as well? After all, we're talking about people who made whole offensives into nonevents, led by Stalin, a man who hid the true cost of the last battle from the very people who paid it, warehousing the pitiful mutilated survivors in a bunch of classified hospitals. Most interesting figures on German and Russian tank losses. Too bad the manpower losses aren't directly comparable, since they are counting somewhat different things. Do we have a good number for German WIA?

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Hetzer38,

No wonder Andreas cited Toppel! I think there's much to be said for your argument about covering up disasters. If the Russians would cover up one, then why not another as well? After all, we're talking about people who made whole offensives into nonevents, led by Stalin, a man who hid the true cost of the last battle from the very people who paid it, warehousing the pitiful mutilated survivors in a bunch of classified hospitals. Most interesting figures on German and Russian tank losses. Too bad the manpower losses aren't directly comparable, since they are counting somewhat different things. Do we have a good number for German WIA?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

And after reading some pages of quotes from Roman Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", I think that's just what happened...

Again, as I already pointed out you are conflating unit records (which were not falsified for Kursk), and higher level attempts to airbrush history. It does not help to read 'some pages' of Töppel's work, you really need to spend some time on it. In particular I recommend looking at the Soviet sources and the short discussion of them in the Appendix.

If, as Chris indicates, the Soviet loss figures are from unit records, it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. If they are from the "History of the Great Patriotic War", that would be another story.

So, assuming Chris is using actual unit loss reports, as opposed to collated Front data, at the moment there is no indication on the Soviet side that Meyer's story is correct, and your assumption that the Soviets doctored the loss reports is most likely incorrect.

The idea that because the Soviets falsified Front level records, they would also falsify unit level records is not consistent with what is being presented in Töppel, and I would dismiss it.

Also, what you claim is a quote of Töppel by Pandur, is in fact not in the text. The whole post by Pandur is mixing numerous things giving wrong numbers (the tank park of the Red Army in July 1943 was almost certainly higher than 3,200-2,000 tanks), and is quite close to useless, IMO.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

And after reading some pages of quotes from Roman Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", I think that's just what happened...

Again, as I already pointed out you are conflating unit records (which were not falsified for Kursk), and higher level attempts to airbrush history. It does not help to read 'some pages' of Töppel's work, you really need to spend some time on it. In particular I recommend looking at the Soviet sources and the short discussion of them in the Appendix.

If, as Chris indicates, the Soviet loss figures are from unit records, it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. If they are from the "History of the Great Patriotic War", that would be another story.

So, assuming Chris is using actual unit loss reports, as opposed to collated Front data, at the moment there is no indication on the Soviet side that Meyer's story is correct, and your assumption that the Soviets doctored the loss reports is most likely incorrect.

The idea that because the Soviets falsified Front level records, they would also falsify unit level records is not consistent with what is being presented in Töppel, and I would dismiss it.

Also, what you claim is a quote of Töppel by Pandur, is in fact not in the text. The whole post by Pandur is mixing numerous things giving wrong numbers (the tank park of the Red Army in July 1943 was almost certainly higher than 3,200-2,000 tanks), and is quite close to useless, IMO.

All the best

Andreas

[Hetzer38]

Originally posted by Andreas:

If, as Chris indicates, the Soviet loss figures are from unit records, it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. If they are from the "History of the Great Patriotic War", that would be another story.

So, assuming Chris is using actual unit loss reports, as opposed to collated Front data, at the moment there is no indication on the Soviet side that Meyer's story is correct, and your assumption that the Soviets doctored the loss reports is most likely incorrect.

If, yes - if Chris Lawrence is using actual unit loss reports...does anyone know for sure ?

How about the following numbers posted by Pandur, do they correlate with Roman Töppel's?

Panzer und Selbstfahrlafetten:

(tanks and assaultguns)

Ende Mai 1943

Panzer: 1846

SFL: 1403

Ende Juni (vor Zitadelle):

Panzer: 2287

SFL: 2287

Verluste Panzer bis Ende Zitadelle Mitte Juli:

(tank-losses until the end of "Zitadelle", middle of July)

Wehrmacht/SS: 248 (Prochorowka: 3)

Rote Armee: 1749 (Prochorowka: ca. 200)

Verluste Panzer gesamte Ostfront Juli/August:

(tank losses for the whole Eastern Front, July/august)

Wehmacht/SS: 1331

Rote Armee: 8125

(alle Zahlen nach R. Töppel: Kursk - Legenden, Mythen und Propaganda, Magisterarbeit 2001)

...

Zu den tatsächlichen Verlusten zitiere ich erneut R. Töppel:

(Regarding the actual losses, I again quote T. Pöppel)

HG Mitte (9. Armee) 5.-14. Juli: ca. 90 Panzer, StG und "Ferdinands"

HG Süd (4. PzA, AG Kempf) 5.-17. Juli: ca. 190 Panzer und StG.

Quellen (sources):

Der Verlust von max. 3 Panzern bezieht sich auf "die „Panzerschlacht von Prochorovka“ zwischen den beiden SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH und Das Reich des II. SS-Panzerkorps (Hausser) und Teilen der sowjetischen 5. Gardepanzerarmee (Rotmistrov) im Verlaufe des 12.7.1943.

( The loss of max. 3 tanks is related to the "Tank-battke of Prochorovka" between both SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH and Das Reich of the II. SS-Panzerkorps [Hausser] and parts of the 5th soviet Guards Tank Army [Rotmistrov] in the course of 12th July 1943.)

Bei den sowjetischen Verlusten handelt es sich um eine Schätzung, denn für die beiden sowjetischen Panzerkorps, die die Division Das Reich angriffen (2. PzK und 2. GdPzK), liegen für den 12.7. keine Verlustmeldungen vor.

(The soviet losses are an estimation, because their are no loss-reports for the two soviet tank-corps which attacked "Das Reich" [2nd PzK and 2nd GdPzK] on 12th July 1943.)

Die beiden Panzerkorps 18 und 29 verloren etwa 150 Panzer und SFL als Totalverluste, für die beiden anderen Panzerkorps wurden zusammen 50 Totalverluste angenommen.

(The two Tank-corps 18 and 29 approximatly lost 150 tanks and assaultguns (total-write-offs), for both other tank-corps together 50 total-write-offs are estimated.)

Von den deutschen Verbänden liegen für den 12.7. ebenfalls keine vollständigen Verlustmeldungen vor.

(There are no complete loss-reports for the german formations either.)

Die beiden Divisionen LSSAH und Das Reich verloren jedoch zwischen dem 10.7. und dem 13.7.1943 nur 3 Panzer als Totalverluste.

(But both divisions, LSSAH and Das Reich lost only 3 tanks as total-write-offs)

Quellen (sources): OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 22 u. 63; CAMO 2, S. 8; CAMO 1, S. 6; Kolomyjec, Swirin, Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 49.

... ?

Cheers, Hetzer.

P.S.

I know I should buy Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", and quote him directly instead of quoting quotes of the book, but I don't grow money in the cellar...and my wife is being pregnant - again! - and we'll hopefully have a second healthy kid in ~8 months...so I fear there's no more books for daddy too soon (...hmm, maybe I should borrow some...)

[ March 23, 2007, 05:36 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]

[Hetzer38]

Originally posted by Andreas:

If, as Chris indicates, the Soviet loss figures are from unit records, it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. If they are from the "History of the Great Patriotic War", that would be another story.

So, assuming Chris is using actual unit loss reports, as opposed to collated Front data, at the moment there is no indication on the Soviet side that Meyer's story is correct, and your assumption that the Soviets doctored the loss reports is most likely incorrect.

If, yes - if Chris Lawrence is using actual unit loss reports...does anyone know for sure ?

How about the following numbers posted by Pandur, do they correlate with Roman Töppel's?

Panzer und Selbstfahrlafetten:

(tanks and assaultguns)

Ende Mai 1943

Panzer: 1846

SFL: 1403

Ende Juni (vor Zitadelle):

Panzer: 2287

SFL: 2287

Verluste Panzer bis Ende Zitadelle Mitte Juli:

(tank-losses until the end of "Zitadelle", middle of July)

Wehrmacht/SS: 248 (Prochorowka: 3)

Rote Armee: 1749 (Prochorowka: ca. 200)

Verluste Panzer gesamte Ostfront Juli/August:

(tank losses for the whole Eastern Front, July/august)

Wehmacht/SS: 1331

Rote Armee: 8125

(alle Zahlen nach R. Töppel: Kursk - Legenden, Mythen und Propaganda, Magisterarbeit 2001)

...

Zu den tatsächlichen Verlusten zitiere ich erneut R. Töppel:

(Regarding the actual losses, I again quote T. Pöppel)

HG Mitte (9. Armee) 5.-14. Juli: ca. 90 Panzer, StG und "Ferdinands"

HG Süd (4. PzA, AG Kempf) 5.-17. Juli: ca. 190 Panzer und StG.

Quellen (sources):

Der Verlust von max. 3 Panzern bezieht sich auf "die „Panzerschlacht von Prochorovka“ zwischen den beiden SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH und Das Reich des II. SS-Panzerkorps (Hausser) und Teilen der sowjetischen 5. Gardepanzerarmee (Rotmistrov) im Verlaufe des 12.7.1943.

( The loss of max. 3 tanks is related to the "Tank-battke of Prochorovka" between both SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH and Das Reich of the II. SS-Panzerkorps [Hausser] and parts of the 5th soviet Guards Tank Army [Rotmistrov] in the course of 12th July 1943.)

Bei den sowjetischen Verlusten handelt es sich um eine Schätzung, denn für die beiden sowjetischen Panzerkorps, die die Division Das Reich angriffen (2. PzK und 2. GdPzK), liegen für den 12.7. keine Verlustmeldungen vor.

(The soviet losses are an estimation, because their are no loss-reports for the two soviet tank-corps which attacked "Das Reich" [2nd PzK and 2nd GdPzK] on 12th July 1943.)

Die beiden Panzerkorps 18 und 29 verloren etwa 150 Panzer und SFL als Totalverluste, für die beiden anderen Panzerkorps wurden zusammen 50 Totalverluste angenommen.

(The two Tank-corps 18 and 29 approximatly lost 150 tanks and assaultguns (total-write-offs), for both other tank-corps together 50 total-write-offs are estimated.)

Von den deutschen Verbänden liegen für den 12.7. ebenfalls keine vollständigen Verlustmeldungen vor.

(There are no complete loss-reports for the german formations either.)

Die beiden Divisionen LSSAH und Das Reich verloren jedoch zwischen dem 10.7. und dem 13.7.1943 nur 3 Panzer als Totalverluste.

(But both divisions, LSSAH and Das Reich lost only 3 tanks as total-write-offs)

Quellen (sources): OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 22 u. 63; CAMO 2, S. 8; CAMO 1, S. 6; Kolomyjec, Swirin, Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 49.

... ?

Cheers, Hetzer.

P.S.

I know I should buy Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", and quote him directly instead of quoting quotes of the book, but I don't grow money in the cellar...and my wife is being pregnant - again! - and we'll hopefully have a second healthy kid in ~8 months...so I fear there's no more books for daddy too soon (...hmm, maybe I should borrow some...)

[ March 23, 2007, 05:36 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

If, yes - if Chris Lawrence is using actual unit loss reports...does anyone know for sure ?

Ask him on the TDI Forum.

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

How about the following numbers posted by Pandur, do they correlate with Roman Töppel's?

One error in the first quote, looks like a typo. SFL should be 1,834 for end June. Note these are German AFV numbers, not Soviet.

The second quote is verbatim, from having a quick glance.

I used Töppel to correct much of the Wikipedia article on Prokhorovka. I have just checked and found that since then some Russian nationalist has changed it back to a totally worthless description that has nothing to do with the battle.

Why Wikipedia is ****

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

If, yes - if Chris Lawrence is using actual unit loss reports...does anyone know for sure ?

Ask him on the TDI Forum.

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

How about the following numbers posted by Pandur, do they correlate with Roman Töppel's?

One error in the first quote, looks like a typo. SFL should be 1,834 for end June. Note these are German AFV numbers, not Soviet.

The second quote is verbatim, from having a quick glance.

I used Töppel to correct much of the Wikipedia article on Prokhorovka. I have just checked and found that since then some Russian nationalist has changed it back to a totally worthless description that has nothing to do with the battle.

Why Wikipedia is ****

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

I know I should buy Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", and quote him directly instead of quoting quotes of the book, but I don't grow money in the cellar...and my wife is being pregnant - again! - and we'll hopefully have a second healthy kid in ~8 months...so I fear there's no more books for daddy too soon (...hmm, maybe I should borrow some...)

Email me.

Apart from that, if you contact the publisher of the MGZ, they may send you the issue for free. They have done that for me with a different one.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hetzer38:

I know I should buy Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", and quote him directly instead of quoting quotes of the book, but I don't grow money in the cellar...and my wife is being pregnant - again! - and we'll hopefully have a second healthy kid in ~8 months...so I fear there's no more books for daddy too soon (...hmm, maybe I should borrow some...)

Email me.

Apart from that, if you contact the publisher of the MGZ, they may send you the issue for free. They have done that for me with a different one.

All the best

Andreas

[Hetzer38]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Hetzer38,

No wonder Andreas cited Toppel! I think there's much to be said for your argument about covering up disasters. If the Russians would cover up one, then why not another as well? After all, we're talking about people who made whole offensives into nonevents, led by Stalin, a man who hid the true cost of the last battle from the very people who paid it, warehousing the pitiful mutilated survivors in a bunch of classified hospitals. Most interesting figures on German and Russian tank losses. Too bad the manpower losses aren't directly comparable, since they are counting somewhat different things. Do we have a good number for German WIA?

Regards,

John Kettler

Maybe this will do ?

Kursk casualties.

German records cited in Glantz, "Battle of Kursk" (p.275) suggest that the Ninth Army lost 20,720 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 11th July, while Army Group South lost 29,102 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 20th July. While these dates don't match exactly, it is likely that July 5th to 18th (more or less the time frame for the Kursk Defensive Operation, as opposed to Orel and Belgorod Offensive Operations, which were entirely different battles), the Germans lost at most 50,000 dead, wounded and missing in action.

Data from the KOSAVE II database states that between July 4th and 18th, the German Corps and divisions directly involved in the battle lost 34,217 killed, wounded and missing, of which killed and missing amounted to 5,591 and 1,142, respectively. [These figures exclude non-combat casualties.] Considering they started with 307,365 effectives, these losses translate into loss rates of 2.2% irrevocable and 11.1% total, which is far from atypical.

Tank-wise, the Germans lost approximately 1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged and 323 destroyed (total write-offs or abandoned). This is out of 2,528 tanks and assault guns on hand at July 1, and represents a total loss/damage rate of 76.5% and write-off rate of 12.8%. The figures are roughly confirmed by Heinrici (though he had estimated a total loss rate of approximately 60%), and can be verified with July month data in Panzer Truppen Volume II. KOSAVE II gives somewhat lower figures of 1,310 damaged and 226 destroyed and abandoned; here, the damaged figure is closer to Heinrici's, but the destroyed is lower. Either way, we can say that approximately 1,300-1,500 tanks and assault guns were damaged (some repeatedly - damaged, repaired, damaged again), and 225-325 destroyed completely or abandoned.

On the Soviet side, we have to look at Krivosheev as the definitive source. He cites for the Kursk Defensive Operation (July 5th to July 23rd) losses of 70,330 irrecoverable and 107,517 sick and wounded (for 177,847 total) out of 1,272,700 with the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Front. If one factors in that roughly 25% of personnel in these fronts was actually not in the combat zone (and so 954,525 were - give or take), this translates into irrevocable loss rate of 7.4% and total loss rate of 18.6%, which, in turn, are 3.0-3.5 times German irrevocable and 1.5-2.0 times German total - not surprising (especially given equipment and training disparities, plus the fact that the Russians were attacking a lot during the "defensive" operation), and also suggestive that, somehow, the German wounded had better survival rates (or, alternatively, that Soviet wounded were not evacuated from the combat zone as much and so fought on or died where they lay). [Note that these figures also include non-combat dead and wounded.]

KOSAVE II drills this down further - it claims that out of 510,252 engaged at the start of the operation, the Soviets lost 25,839 killed, 27,300 missing 117,552 wounded in action. This translates into irrevocable loss rate of 10.4% and total loss rate of 23.0%. The main discrepancy in the loss ratios with our Krivosheev-based estimates is with the denominator, and so the previous conclusions stand.

In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.

KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).

The bottom line is - no matter how one splits hairs and argues about +1% point here and -1% point there, Soviet personnel losses during Kursk Defensive Operation were 4 to 6 times greater than those of the Germans, while tank and assault gun irrevocable losses were 5 to 6 times greater. As explained earlier on in the thread, the loss discrepancy can be accounted for by difference in training and command & control at that stage of the war; at times drastic inferiority of Soviet equipment, especially armour, over much of 1943; the fact that Soviet formations frequently lost ground, thus unable to recover wounded and damaged tanks (see the discrepancy in implied wounded survival rates between the two sides); and the fact that, during the Kursk Defensive Operation, many Soviet formations spent days in vigorous attacks on the advancing German units (which, in turn, prompted greater casualty rates than should otherwise have been the case, even if only by a few percentage points).

Of course, the flip side to all of this is that, at the end of it all, after taking these losses the Soviets still had more effectives than the Germans in the combat zone, as well as 25%-50% of their total Front strength as yet unengaged (depending on whether one takes Glantz or KOSAVE II data) - and sufficient _other_ troops to launch the Orel and Belgorod offensives (not to mention the mess that kept on in the Leningrad/Volkhov regions since about late 1941). Meanwhile, the Germans, while certainly not totally worn out, had committed more or less everything up to and including mechanized kitchen sinks (a lesser-known invention of Porsche) to this one strategic offensives, and still could not find sufficient troops to secure their tactical flanks, let alone to halt Soviet operational counter-offensives (or leave enough troops to deal with Sicily, which was a fairly obvious thing after the fall of Tunisia). In other words, yet another case of the Germans trying to strategically and operationally do too much with too little (their story since the "Miracle on the Marne", in my opinion), with predictable results. Of course, as the loss rates above testify, on the tactical level they were still formidable opponents at this point in the war, and so the Soviets in 1943 still had to compensate with meaningful superiority in the combat zone, even when on the operational defensive! [something the FoW points system more or less adequately reflects, with _perhaps_ a few exceptions.]

[by Jozhik_Chernobyl'skij, posted @ FOW-forum]

Cheers, Hetzer

[Hetzer38]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Hetzer38,

No wonder Andreas cited Toppel! I think there's much to be said for your argument about covering up disasters. If the Russians would cover up one, then why not another as well? After all, we're talking about people who made whole offensives into nonevents, led by Stalin, a man who hid the true cost of the last battle from the very people who paid it, warehousing the pitiful mutilated survivors in a bunch of classified hospitals. Most interesting figures on German and Russian tank losses. Too bad the manpower losses aren't directly comparable, since they are counting somewhat different things. Do we have a good number for German WIA?

Regards,

John Kettler

Maybe this will do ?

Kursk casualties.

German records cited in Glantz, "Battle of Kursk" (p.275) suggest that the Ninth Army lost 20,720 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 11th July, while Army Group South lost 29,102 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 20th July. While these dates don't match exactly, it is likely that July 5th to 18th (more or less the time frame for the Kursk Defensive Operation, as opposed to Orel and Belgorod Offensive Operations, which were entirely different battles), the Germans lost at most 50,000 dead, wounded and missing in action.

Data from the KOSAVE II database states that between July 4th and 18th, the German Corps and divisions directly involved in the battle lost 34,217 killed, wounded and missing, of which killed and missing amounted to 5,591 and 1,142, respectively. [These figures exclude non-combat casualties.] Considering they started with 307,365 effectives, these losses translate into loss rates of 2.2% irrevocable and 11.1% total, which is far from atypical.

Tank-wise, the Germans lost approximately 1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged and 323 destroyed (total write-offs or abandoned). This is out of 2,528 tanks and assault guns on hand at July 1, and represents a total loss/damage rate of 76.5% and write-off rate of 12.8%. The figures are roughly confirmed by Heinrici (though he had estimated a total loss rate of approximately 60%), and can be verified with July month data in Panzer Truppen Volume II. KOSAVE II gives somewhat lower figures of 1,310 damaged and 226 destroyed and abandoned; here, the damaged figure is closer to Heinrici's, but the destroyed is lower. Either way, we can say that approximately 1,300-1,500 tanks and assault guns were damaged (some repeatedly - damaged, repaired, damaged again), and 225-325 destroyed completely or abandoned.

On the Soviet side, we have to look at Krivosheev as the definitive source. He cites for the Kursk Defensive Operation (July 5th to July 23rd) losses of 70,330 irrecoverable and 107,517 sick and wounded (for 177,847 total) out of 1,272,700 with the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Front. If one factors in that roughly 25% of personnel in these fronts was actually not in the combat zone (and so 954,525 were - give or take), this translates into irrevocable loss rate of 7.4% and total loss rate of 18.6%, which, in turn, are 3.0-3.5 times German irrevocable and 1.5-2.0 times German total - not surprising (especially given equipment and training disparities, plus the fact that the Russians were attacking a lot during the "defensive" operation), and also suggestive that, somehow, the German wounded had better survival rates (or, alternatively, that Soviet wounded were not evacuated from the combat zone as much and so fought on or died where they lay). [Note that these figures also include non-combat dead and wounded.]

KOSAVE II drills this down further - it claims that out of 510,252 engaged at the start of the operation, the Soviets lost 25,839 killed, 27,300 missing 117,552 wounded in action. This translates into irrevocable loss rate of 10.4% and total loss rate of 23.0%. The main discrepancy in the loss ratios with our Krivosheev-based estimates is with the denominator, and so the previous conclusions stand.

In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.

KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).

The bottom line is - no matter how one splits hairs and argues about +1% point here and -1% point there, Soviet personnel losses during Kursk Defensive Operation were 4 to 6 times greater than those of the Germans, while tank and assault gun irrevocable losses were 5 to 6 times greater. As explained earlier on in the thread, the loss discrepancy can be accounted for by difference in training and command & control at that stage of the war; at times drastic inferiority of Soviet equipment, especially armour, over much of 1943; the fact that Soviet formations frequently lost ground, thus unable to recover wounded and damaged tanks (see the discrepancy in implied wounded survival rates between the two sides); and the fact that, during the Kursk Defensive Operation, many Soviet formations spent days in vigorous attacks on the advancing German units (which, in turn, prompted greater casualty rates than should otherwise have been the case, even if only by a few percentage points).

Of course, the flip side to all of this is that, at the end of it all, after taking these losses the Soviets still had more effectives than the Germans in the combat zone, as well as 25%-50% of their total Front strength as yet unengaged (depending on whether one takes Glantz or KOSAVE II data) - and sufficient _other_ troops to launch the Orel and Belgorod offensives (not to mention the mess that kept on in the Leningrad/Volkhov regions since about late 1941). Meanwhile, the Germans, while certainly not totally worn out, had committed more or less everything up to and including mechanized kitchen sinks (a lesser-known invention of Porsche) to this one strategic offensives, and still could not find sufficient troops to secure their tactical flanks, let alone to halt Soviet operational counter-offensives (or leave enough troops to deal with Sicily, which was a fairly obvious thing after the fall of Tunisia). In other words, yet another case of the Germans trying to strategically and operationally do too much with too little (their story since the "Miracle on the Marne", in my opinion), with predictable results. Of course, as the loss rates above testify, on the tactical level they were still formidable opponents at this point in the war, and so the Soviets in 1943 still had to compensate with meaningful superiority in the combat zone, even when on the operational defensive! [something the FoW points system more or less adequately reflects, with _perhaps_ a few exceptions.]

[by Jozhik_Chernobyl'skij, posted @ FOW-forum]

Cheers, Hetzer

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

No wonder Andreas cited Toppel!

Do you mind explaining what that is supposed to mean?

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

No wonder Andreas cited Toppel!

Do you mind explaining what that is supposed to mean?

All the best

Andreas

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Stalin's Organist:

You posted that we had losses from a front for 2 weeks, and an army for 2 months

the other way around.

What we have is 2 sets of figures covering 2 different time frames and adding them together in this manner is just nonsense.

one is for 15 days in July 1943, the other is for July-August 1943. the tank army belonged to a different front but operated on the same general sector.

the third is for 1st Ukrainian Front in 1945 and covers a little over one month.

By all means analyse them seperately - and please provide the information you seem to assume we should all know like the orders of battle to support your analysis.

blah, it's not worth it. the skeptics will just say that we can't make any wider conclusions based on such limited data.

you can quite easily google the OOBs etc for these units as Kursk is so well covered subject. for your convenience: 1st Tank Army total tank strength in 5th July 1943 was 811 tanks. Central Front total tank strength 5th July 1943 was 1647 tanks.