Glantz's conclusions on Kursk

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Keke:

So how was German intelligence gathering inferior to Soviets? (Or was it?...)

Not sure what you're referring to, Keke. By intelligence do you mean spies and such? Or are you referring to the product of the whole process that combines reconnaissance and intelligence?

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Keke:

So how was German intelligence gathering inferior to Soviets? (Or was it?...)

Not sure what you're referring to, Keke. By intelligence do you mean spies and such? Or are you referring to the product of the whole process that combines reconnaissance and intelligence? </font>

[kipanderson]

Grisha, hi,

“One helpful analogy is to use computer gaming for purposes of understanding Zitadelle. The Germans intented to play a turn-based game, but the Soviets flatly rejected this, and instead went RTS What was intended to be a methodical reduction of Soviet defenses ended up being a "wrist-twitch fest" as seemingly endless Soviet forces kept appearing on the German flanks. German units were far superior in this wide open terrain, but it was exceedingly difficult to do much more than try to keep some semblance of an advance while defending the next Soviet attack on some unexpected flank.”

The above quote from you is an outstanding way of explaining how and why initiative is important in war . The effect it has on commanders at the receiving end. It is such a good way of explaining it that I intend to use the analogy in future myself, I cannot resist it !

However, I still disagree about the use of Soviet armour at Kursk. We will have to agree to disagree. Cost/price matters, and the same resources used in attacks against Uber armour could have been used to defend against it to greater effect. In my view.

I am as unhinged a fan of the Soviet Operational Art as anyone free to walk the streets. Who has not been picked up by the men in white coats . But in this case, the operational/ strategic goal would have been better achieved if the Uber armour had been allowed to regroup and forced to attack Soviet forces. In my view.

All good fun,

All the best,

Kip.

[Lt. Kije]

You think Glantz is a bad writer? Ha! I spit on your paltry bad writing. Let's see you top late-career John Keegan:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

"The settlers, particularly those implanted in the great bend of the Yellow River, tended to nomadise themselves when dessications set in and thus to swell the numbers of the horse peoples who beat in successive waves against the Wall; offensives by the horse peoples also undid the efforts of the frontier commanders to sinicise the semi-nomads whose natural home the inter-zone was."

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

I relish that final, exquisitely unreadable, phrase. Forgive me, but I must repeat it,

"...to sinicise the semi-nomads whose natural home the inter-zone was".

Now THAT is bad writing.

Glantz is a lightweight, a PzKw38(t), in relation to Keegan.

-- Lt. Kije

My moving shadow scars the heart of the world

[Lt. Kije]

double post

[ March 06, 2003, 03:38 PM: Message edited by: Lt. Kije ]

[CombinedArms]

Seems to me the Germans frequently had the intelligence edge early in the war (including in intelligence both detecting the enemy's intentions and disguising one's own). But the Allies, both East and West, took over that edge by late 1942 and held it (with occasional lapses--e.g. the Ardennes offensive) through most of the rest of the war.

The German intelligence edge early in the war is quite tangible. They achieved suprise in France in 1940 and with the launching of Barbarossa in June '41 (mostly because Stalin dismissed a lot of tangible evidence). They also achieved surprise in early 1942 with the launching of the attack through the Caucases, when the Russians expected an attack in the center. This achievement of strategic surprise was critical to their long string of successes early in the war.

But by late 1942, the Allies became quite adept at reading German intentions and disguising their own. This was partly through the Lucy ring and Ultra and a growing network of partisans and of disaffected anti-Nazis within the German high command-- and partly through a series of really clever deceptions that the Germans were all too eager to believe. A quick recap of some highlights:

The Germans failed to anticipate the counter-offensive encircling Stalingrad.

The Germans failed to anticipate the invasion of North Africa. They were worried about Dakar due to Allied misdirection efforts.

The Germans failed to anticipate the invasion of Sicily. (They did catch Salerno--but that was sort of a no-brainer.)

The German attack on Kursk was closely monitored in advance by the Russians, who achieved a massive buildup of defenses and strategic reserves. On the other hand, Model's concerns about the Russian buildup were dismissed. The Germans also failed to anticipate the massive counteroffensive following Kursk.

The Germans failed to anticipate the location of Overlord and then continued to believe in an attack on Pas de Calais for more than a month after the Allied landing.

The Germans failed to anticipate the offensive leading to the destruction of Army Group Center.

The Germans failed to anticipate the Dragoon landings in southern France.

And the list goes on....Part of this was that from late '42 on, the Allies had the initiative, and could thus suggest multiple options and then strike where they choose--which had been the German perogative early in the war. But they also got better at the art of intelligence gathering and analysis and at the art misdirection, while Axis capacities in that area seemed to be outstripped or to gradually degrade. And by late in the war, it was often the Germans who refused to believe mounting evidence of a looming crisis--such as their refusal to believe that Enigma could ever be compromised. Both in gather intelligence and in cogently analyzing it, the Allies held a significant edge from late '42 on.

[ March 06, 2003, 03:17 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Trommelfeuer]

@Andreas: Thanx a lot for the answer to my question!

I have to agree, the "german turn based game / russian RTS tactics" analasis by Grisha is very good!

Are there any CM:BB "Prokhorovka" / "Panzerschlacht bei Kursk" scenarios ?

With friendly greetings, Trommelfeuer

[ March 06, 2003, 03:13 PM: Message edited by: Trommelfeuer ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Lt. Kije:

...I relish that final, exquisitely unreadable, phrase. Forgive me, but I must repeat it,

"...to sinicise the semi-nomads whose natural home the inter-zone was".

Now THAT is bad writing...

I dunno - makes perfect sense to me. I've always found Keegan very readable, but a little ... umm ... lightweight? Superficial? Something.

Regards

JonS

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Keke:

I mean the whole process.

Well, tactically, the Germans had a very good intelligence service. Their ability to keep up to date on first echelon Soviet forces was amazing, something they were able to do even two weeks after the commencement of the Vistula-Oder operation! Also, their signal intelligence and aerial reconnaissance was good as well though vulnerable to Soviet deception. However, the Germans were poor in just about every other aspect of intelligence, and this runs right up to the top of the organizations. There were about three different German intelligence organizations, one was military, one was government, and the other was paramilitary (Nazi Party). Hitler made it a point that all findings were to be sent to him exclusively - none of the three groups were to crosscheck each others data. The main reason for this was a political security measure by Hitler - to retain absolute control of power within the Nazi regime. Not only did the isolation of data create inaccuracies and errors, but this political bottleneck of Hitler's encouraged inter-organizational squabbling and backstabbing that exacerbated any possibility of cooperation to whatever degree between the three main groups.

The very psychological profile necessary to succeed in the Nazi Party was another hinderance to good intelligence. Arrogance was such a heavy factor in Nazi thinking that it eventually bit them in the behind more times than they would ever care to admit.

Finally, traditional German military thought never placed much value on intelligence that went any higher than tactical. The cult of the General Staff did not look kindly upon anything that might undermine the authority of the commander or his 1a. Hence, German officer regulations state that intelligence was primarily the duty of the commander, and to ease this duty the regulations went further on to state that in any given military situation the commander was to plan for the worst case scenario, rather than the most probable.

[PJungnitsch]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

Both in gather intelligence and in cogently analyzing it, the Allies held a significant edge from late '42 on.

Surely a lot of this (as well as the Soviet improvement in operational art) has to do with the increasingly strict command and control that Hitler practiced as the war went on, as in this directive. Much as Stalin's tight control was responsible for much of the early war Soviet fiascos. As the war went on Stalin relaxed and Hitler tightened control.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Well, tactically, the Germans had a very good intelligence service. Their ability to keep up to date on first echelon Soviet forces was amazing, something they were able to do even two weeks after the commencement of the Vistula-Oder operation! Also, their signal intelligence and aerial reconnaissance was good as well though vulnerable to Soviet deception. However, the Germans were poor in just about every other aspect of intelligence, and this runs right up to the top of the organizations. There were about three different German intelligence organizations, one was military, one was government, and the other was paramilitary (Nazi Party). Hitler made it a point that all findings were to be sent to him exclusively - none of the three groups were to crosscheck each others data. The main reason for this was a political security measure by Hitler - to retain absolute control of power within the Nazi regime. Not only did the isolation of data create inaccuracies and errors, but this political bottleneck of Hitler's encouraged inter-organizational squabbling and backstabbing that exacerbated any possibility of cooperation to whatever degree between the three main groups.

I agree. Btw, this "decentralization" was very typical for the Nazi regime on all fields of resource management.

Originally posted by Grisha:

The very psychological profile necessary to succeed in the Nazi Party was another hinderance to good intelligence. Arrogance was such a heavy factor in Nazi thinking that it eventually bit them in the behind more times than they would ever care to admit.

I tend to agree, although I dont think Bolshevist system produced any less arrogant leaders...

Originally posted by Grisha:

Finally, traditional German military thought never placed much value on intelligence that went any higher than tactical. The cult of the General Staff did not look kindly upon anything that might undermine the authority of the commander or his 1a. Hence, German officer regulations state that intelligence was primarily the duty of the commander, and to ease this duty the regulations went further on to state that in any given military situation the commander was to plan for the worst case scenario, rather than the most probable.

Isn't preparing for the worst case scenario a rather good way of planning? At least it works when I play CMBB... :cool: ...Wait a minute, the game covers only tactical level! :eek:

[Cpt Kernow]

Someone tell me now what

sinicise

means.

[Cpt Kernow]

Double post.

[ March 06, 2003, 07:07 PM: Message edited by: Cpt Kernow ]

[JonS]

absorb into the chinese culture. (Sino = chinese)

[Lumbergh]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Lt. Kije:

...I relish that final, exquisitely unreadable, phrase. Forgive me, but I must repeat it,

"...to sinicise the semi-nomads whose natural home the inter-zone was".

Now THAT is bad writing...

I dunno - makes perfect sense to me. I've always found Keegan very readable, but a little ... umm ... lightweight? Superficial? Something.

Regards

JonS </font>

[Lt. Kije]

Readable? Readable????? You bet.

I'll just go and nomadize myself now. Looks like a dessication is setting in. But wait, where shall I nomadize myself to? Hmmmm... perhaps the inter-zone? Yes, that's it! The inter-zone my destination is. This way I won't find myself sincized.

Gotta go.

-- Lt. Kije

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Cpt Kernow:

Someone tell me now what

sinicise

means.

Sinicize: to make Chinese in character or bring under Chinese influence.

The Random House Unbridged Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Of course, I had to look it up.)

The weird thing is Keegan's earlier work is generally quite lucid and engaging. He must have swallowed a verbosity pill in that passage.

And, btw, I don't object to Glantz's sentences. They're generally quite clear. It's his ability to sustain a narrative thread that seems to be the problem. When he's writing analytically, he's fine--which is the reverse of a lot of popular historical writing that narrates well but draws superficial or dubious conclusions.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Grisha:

There were about three different German intelligence organizations, one was military, one was government, and the other was paramilitary (Nazi Party). [snip]... this political bottleneck of Hitler's encouraged inter-organizational squabbling and backstabbing that exacerbated any possibility of cooperation to whatever degree between the three main groups.

I agree. Btw, this "decentralization" was very typical for the Nazi regime on all fields of resource management.

</font>

[Alkiviadis]

re: bad writing, Glantz, et. al. The point is yes, he is a lousy writer, an excellent historian. Tuchman, Gibbon, Dodge, Horne, Chandler are/were not only great historian, but at least talented wordsmiths, as a writer Glantz is just terrible, but that is the state of history here in the U. S. A.. Dry academics trading papers back & forth - they are trained to write this way. History is so censored here on the pre-college level that it is percieved as being boring, dry as toast.... sad & enraging.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Lt. Kije:

I'll just go and nomadize myself now. Looks like a dessication is setting in. But wait, where shall I nomadize myself to? Hmmmm... perhaps the inter-zone? Yes, that's it! The inter-zone my destination is. This way I won't find myself sincized.

[Fionn]

" Although strategically the Soviets were on the defensive, tactically, and operational within the western definition of operations, the Soviets often attacked at Kursk. This was a huge mistake."

I would disagree with this kip.

From the Soviet strategic ( and more importantly national policy objective) point of view all of those rather bloody tactical and operational counte-attacks played a VITAL role in ensuring the attainment of both the Soviet Union's Strategic goals and in furthering its attainment of its national policy objective via those strategic goals.

So while the attacks may have been "errors" in a strictly military book-keeping accounting of the battle they were essential elements in the greater context and, as such, provided the means by which to attain the overall goal.

The Soviets have never been shy of sacrificing men and material in order to attain the overall objective ( even if said sacrifices may seem like wholesale squandering to one's opponents). Soviet and Russian history is replete with "lost battles" which won the war . There is a great lesson in there for military historians and grognards en etudant.

[Fionn]

As to those complaining about Glantz's dryness. You should try reading a book whichc ame out a few years ago which uses statistical methodologies to assess Kursk. Number of 76.2mm shells consumed per tank hit, sorties per bomb drop per sector of front per time period etc etc... Sheesh Glantz is like a bodice-ripper compared to that.

It is, however, a fascinating study and really good for getting some data for Soviet-style operational analysis.

Things which doomed Zitadelle:

1. Lack of German Infantry divisions and the constant syphoning of concentrated, offensive-capable mechanised forces to the flanks of the attack and their committment to relatively static defensive roles by Soviet counter-attacks.

The Soviet counter-attacks exacerbated the problems caused by the lack of infantry divisions.

2. The German self-delusion that these syphonings of mech forces to the flank represented Aufrollen when all they really represented was the dissipation of combat power and the robbing of the schwerpunkt of both mass and momentum.

3. Sicily.

4. Soviet defensive preparations. German forces never achieved operational freedom. Their equivalents of the Operational Manoeuvre Groups of later lore were never unleashed due to the phased nature of Soviet defences and the aggressive nature of counter-attacks on the flank ( sucking combat power inexorably from the schwerpunkt ) combined with the disruptive nature of counter-attacks into the teeth of the advancing German forces.

The above is obviously vastly over-simplified but c'est la guerre.

Redwolf,

When you say "Simpson" I presume you are referring to Richard Simpkin correct?

Does anyone have a handle on any Simpkin books? I lent mine out and never got them back. I need to repurchase them since I want to quote a few relevant passages as part of my training curriculum for subordinates in CMMC2. Everywhere I've checked seems to say his books are out of print ( same for Leonhard's Art of Maneuvre Warfare... which also went to that great big black hole known as "an interested friend" *sigh* ).

As to Glantz's relative worth. He is an excellent researcher and I think much of any difficulty related to "getting into" his books has to do with the sheer volume of information he must present. I also am working on getting the full set of his books and that's something I've not done before for any historian. So I suppose my euros indicate my high regard for his books.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Fionn:

The Soviets have never been shy of sacrificing men and material in order to attain the overall objective ( even if said sacrifices may seem like wholesale squandering to one's opponents). Soviet and Russian history is replete with "lost battles" which won the war . There is a great lesson in there for military historians and grognards en etudant.

Hear, hear! Soviet forces will once again be squandered, and another battle lost, which will eventually win the war for them....in CMMC2 that is.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Fionn:

Redwolf,

When you say "Simpson" I presume you are referring to Richard Simpkin correct?

Yes, I just got "Deep Battle - The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii". I put myself on the amzon.com waiting list and got it after 4 months or so.

Do not try to order it from blackwells, they claim to have it "ready for order" which means they start trying to find it with no clue where. I went into a (Deep, hehe) battle with them.

Does anyone have a handle on any Simpkin books? I lent mine out and never got them back.

That sucks. I hope I didn't end up having yours. I'll be happy to fax passages.

I need to repurchase them since I want to quote a few relevant passages as part of my training curriculum for subordinates in CMMC2. Everywhere I've checked seems to say his books are out of print ( same for Leonhard's Art of Maneuvre Warfare... which also went to that great big black hole known as "an interested friend" *sigh* ).

I think you might be lucky here. Seems you can have it for $16 new and $10.50 used.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-form/002-6333657-4510409

I once had it in hand in a bookshop but it didn't look very interesting to me.

As to Glantz's relative worth. He is an excellent researcher and I think much of any difficulty related to "getting into" his books has to do with the sheer volume of information he must present. I also am working on getting the full set of his books and that's something I've not done before for any historian. So I suppose my euros indicate my high regard for his books.

I guess I need to run out of more readable books first

[Fionn]

Thanks Redwolf,

Unfortunately the URL doesn't seem to lead anywhere, is it complete? It tells me there is a bug on the page....

ref: Simpkin. Damn!!! Waiting list here I come * cue the least enthusiastic face ever *