The Anemic? Katyusha

[Andreas]

Tigers were effectively knocked out, or were forced to withdraw, by concentrations of field artillery. It was clear that German tank crews feared the damaging effect of shell fire against such vital parts as tracks, suspension, bogie wheels, radio aerials, electrical equipment, and so on. The New Zealanders incorporated medium artillery in several of their artillery concentrations, and decided that medium pieces were suitable when a sufficiently large concentration could be brought to bear. However, owing to a dispersion of rounds, it was considered preferable to include a good concentration of field guns, to "thicken up" the fire. The division in question had no experience in using heavy artillery against Tigers.

Medium are 4.5" or 5" guns at this stage of the war, probably the latter. Field guns would be 25pdrs. Shame they do not define 'suitable' - 10, 100, 1,000 rounds?

2. At the junction of a main road and a side road, a Tiger was just off the road, engaging forward troops in buildings. Another Tiger, about 50 yards up the side road, was supporting the first. A field-artillery concentration was called for. It appeared to come from one battery only. Although no hits were observed, both Tigers withdrew.

Sensible move.

3. A Tiger on a ridge was engaged by what appeared to be a battery of mediums. After the first few rounds had fallen, the crew bailed out. (It is not known why.) Shortly afterward, while the tank still was being shelled, a German soldier returned to the tank and drove it off. About 10 minutes later, the remainder of the crew made a dash along the same route their tank had taken.

Crew panics (they don't like it up 'em), but no M-Kill.

4. A tank hidden in the garage of a two-story house ventured out for about 20 yards, fired a few harassing rounds, and returned to its shelter. Many hits on the building were scored by 4.2-inch mortars firing cap-on, but little damage was visible. Each night the tank was withdrawn from the area, even though it was in an excellent concealed position and was protected by infantry. Later the house was examined. Although it had suffered appreciable damage — and there were several dead Germans about there was no evidence that damage had been done to the tank itself.

4.2" = 120mm mortar?

http://www.lonesentry.com/tigerflorence/

All the best

Andreas

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Andreas:

4.2" = 120mm mortar?

107mm

[Andreas]

10.67cm, actually.

I meant in terms of HE load etc.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Regarding comms damage, vision slits, periscopes, I guess one can argue that CMBB does simulate this to some degree by the high incidence of killed TCs in a rocket strike. They do not button until the rockets impact (which is probably quite unrealistic), so a lot of them get taken out, leading to command delays, reduced spotting ability, etc. (which is probably quite realistic).

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

While I don't enough gray matter online to attempt anything resembling a major response, I would like to say a few things.

First, Andreas, the test results are interesting.

Based on a very small sample size, they suggest that the Katyusha may be much nastier than evidence I've seen in-game suggests. They may also support someone's "got raped" argument regarding my own experience on the receiving end of Nebelwerfer fires.

Second, your point, Andreas, about Panzer IIIs with 50/L42s is well taken and constitutes an oversight on my part. I was tired, working from fuzzy memory and oversimplified.

Third, to leap back considerably in this thread, I never said that the BM-13's rocket was equivalent to a 152mm shell in terms of effects. That was someone else's assertion, not mine.

Fourth, where I said "should" regarding likelihood of Tiger M-Kill from a BM-13's rocket, please substitute "in my considered opinion based on years of analyzing weapon effects both theoretically and practically, I would reasonably expect to see." "Should" is not the same as "will."

Fifth, Andreas, you seem to have a deeply entrenched resistance to acknowledging any of the evidence I've presented, to such an extent that I can practically hear you shout "yes, but." While you do seem open to having someone investigate the relevant German unit war diaries and the like, you not only cavalierly dismiss the various Soviet combat reports but also go to considerable pains to deny that the formations hit by the Katyusha fires were even composed of tanks.

Trust me, from the perspective of someone who spent over eleven years as a Soviet threat analyst, they not only know the difference

between a tank and a self-propelled gun, but they have separate and distinct terms for each, with the latter being designated SAU (samochodnaya

artilleriya unstanovka) or more typically, SU

(samochodnaya ustanovka). When describing an armored unit's composition, the numbers of tanks

and SP guns are generally separately broken out. Any number of accounts will bear this out, too. I therefore find it a bit ingenuous on your part to attempt to confuse the issue by asserting that the Russians are killing Marders and claiming tank kills. When they say tanks, they mean tanks. BTW, if you go look at the structure of a Panzerglocke at Kursk, the business end is composed of tanks, with the SPs further back and behind them the halftracks and behind them, in the middle as much as possible, the softskins. To assert the Germans would try to ram Marders headlong through successive defensive belts is patently ridiculous on the face of it. The only SPs I know for sure they tried to do that with were Ferdinands, and that was a debacle. As for Stalingrad, surely the identities and at least basic composition of the formations attacking is known. At that stage of the war, Panzer division tank strength was hundreds of tanks per division,

I believe.

Sixth, the Tiger vs. artillery data was juicy and

most appreciated. Good stuff, that.

Shall have to address the other points later.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Fifth, Andreas, you seem to have a deeply entrenched resistance to acknowledging any of the evidence I've presented, to such an extent that I can practically hear you shout "yes, but." While you do seem open to having someone investigate the relevant German unit war diaries and the like, you not only cavalierly dismiss the various Soviet combat reports but also go to considerable pains to deny that the formations hit by the Katyusha fires were even composed of tanks.

But John - what you have there are not necessarily combat reports. They are snippets collected by what probably was an MA student 30 years after the event, and they could be anything, ranging from combat reports, to eye-witness accounts, to memoirs written years after, to stories told to the MA student by a bloke down at the Soviet equivalent of a pub. I have a bookshelf full of this stuff and do enjoy reading it. It makes nice reading, some of it is very valuable but rational analysis of enemy combat systems and losses it ain't. That's my point - based on your quotes, anything is possible. Even if they were combat reports, they would not be reliable sources for enemy losses, or indeed weapons systems. Remember - every tank a Tiger, every gun an 88?

To address them in more detail:

p.99 - 1941 = German light tanks are quite likely the object of this passage. Could be anything except 35(t), which were not near Smolensk at this time. Most likely early IIIs, with early IVs, IIs, or 38(t) also possible. Haven't run a test with these in CMBB, but I suspect it would be devastating for the lighter tanks to be fired at by M-13 rockets.

Loza - note this is a German defensive position. It is 1943, so Marders are a possibility.

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Trust me, from the perspective of someone who spent over eleven years as a Soviet threat analyst, they not only know the difference

between a tank and a self-propelled gun, but they have separate and distinct terms for each, with the latter being designated SAU (samochodnaya

artilleriya unstanovka) or more typically, SU

(samochodnaya ustanovka). When describing an armored unit's composition, the numbers of tanks

and SP guns are generally separately broken out. Any number of accounts will bear this out, too.

Well... That would be the same reports that refer to any SP gun as 'Ferdinand', because that had become the nickname for Stugs and other German SPGs in the Red Army? Or the same reports such as the official general staff study on Kursk that AIUI pretty much swallows the Rotmistrov myth of what happened at Prokhorovka hook, line, and sinker? http://stonebooks.com/archives/980505.shtml

Originally posted by John Kettler:

I therefore find it a bit ingenuous on your part to attempt to confuse the issue by asserting that the Russians are killing Marders and claiming tank kills. When they say tanks, they mean tanks.

I read a lot of the stuff - and I don't agree. You are assuming that these are high-quality reports on which the original book is based. Why?

Originally posted by John Kettler:

To assert the Germans would try to ram Marders headlong through successive defensive belts is patently ridiculous on the face of it.

Don't think I assert that anywhere, but the attack formation could contain older IIIs quite easily.

Originally posted by John Kettler:

As for Stalingrad, surely the identities and at least basic composition of the formations attacking is known. At that stage of the war, Panzer division tank strength was hundreds of tanks per division,

I believe.

Well yes, but I would have thought that if after crossing the Don a whole attacking formation of the Germans had been wiped out in a rocket attack, someone on the German side would have noticed and mentioned it. It should be easy to find a reference to it somewhere.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

Comparison of U.S. 4.2 inch mortar shell M3 and Russian 120mm mortar shell.

Per THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: From the Laboratory to the Field, Brophy, Miles and Chamberlain, Army Green Book Series, p. 134.

Weight of M3 shell w/fuze = 22 lbs.

Weight of TNT explosive = 8 lbs

This is a whopping fill/warhead weight ratio.

Per WEAPONS AND TACTICS OF THE SOVIET ARMY, Fully Revised Edition by David Isby, p. 250

Weight of F-843 HE shell for M-1943 120 mm mortar = 15.4 kg = 33.88 lbs. Page 251 notes that ammo with either wrought iron or cast iron casings may be used, with the latter giving better fragmentation but shorter range. (U.S. shell uses steel, not iron.) No data given on fill explosive or weight. Shall try Russian Battlefield.

Even lacking much data, the 120mm Russian mortar shell is 50% heavier than the smaller bore 107mm

(4.2 inch) U.S. shell.

Hot new info!

Per this site, Table 16

http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/woundblstcs/default.htm

it looks as though the best fill candidates for the Russian 120mm mortar shell are either

50/50 potassium nitrate & TNT OR

cast TNT

Unfortunately, no fill weight is given, which is odd, considering how meaty this document is.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ November 17, 2005, 12:14 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[JasonC]

Reports from the side losing the equipment are always vastly more believable.

On pure theory, the British weight of fire tables would expect a battalion shoot of 192 132mm rockets affecting an area of about 400m by 300m, to achieve 1.5% knock outs of dug in infantry heavy weapons or guns, 2% of entrenched personnel, 20% of exposed personnel, and 20% of soft vehicles.

There are instances in the west of artillery fire (not rockets particularly) claimed as effective in an anti-tank capacity. But mostly they describe stripping infantry off the tanks, the attack then failing for want of combined arms, against an intact defense with all weapon types available.

In the Bulge fighting in front of Elsenborn, the US had a very heavy concentration of artillery available - a full corps worth with an extra artillery group of 155s. Some of these battalions fired 5000 rounds per day at the height of the fight, which lasted 3 days.

Artillery is described as the "first line of anti-tank defense", but the effect is described at immobilizations from broken tracks and damaged sprocket wheels. It is explicitly stated that it was the 155mms that were effective.

Meanwhile, the actual kills were made by a tank battalion (27 kills from about 50 tanks, half of one each average, with 11 lost in turn), an SP TD battalion light one company (22 kills from 24 TDs, thus 1 each average, only 2 lost). Towed 76mm TDs killed only 4 while losing 17, and towed 57mm were described as useless tank fodder.

Mines and 155s accounted for a large number of M-kills. Zooks were frequently used to finish those off at night.

As for smaller stuff, there are reports of concentrated US artillery fire in North Africa defeating German armored assaults. Again stripping infantry is the main story. Soft vehicles of mounted infantry likewise vulnerable. There are reports of tanks being KOed by artillery firing indirect, and the units present suggest it was mostly 105s (certainly by volume of fire). There were direct hits which killed Pz IIIs and IVs (30mm most plates besides front, perfectly killable with 105mm HE).

In Sicily and Italy, there are reports of gun lines of 105s helping stop tanks, and massive arty stripping them. But it takes naval gunfire and massive corp level shoots for hours. Also, the kill totals visible from the German side are generally more modest than the kill claims of the direct fire AT weapons alone.

Going through some German PD unit histories for Kursk, 3rd PD reports of one attack stopped "The attack failed because of heavy Soviet arty, tank, and rocket attacks. The division claimed 4 T-34s and 1 T-70 destroyed at a cost of two German tanks of unspecified type." No mention of the cause of loss. A Russian attack with rocket prep "By 0800, after strong artillery and rocket barrages, Soviet tanks and infantry recaptured Hill 207.3; the II/111th PzGren Regt was driven back, suffering heavy losses. According to the Corps report, "In an irresponsible manner, the assault guns assigned

there for tank security all withdrew to the rear at the same time to get ammunition, and Soviet infantry and tanks drove the German infantry from the hill." No reports of AFV lost, just pulled out, probably because of the shelling. These were almost certainly Marders - this division had 14 of them and only 2 StuG at the start of the offensive.

GD reports rocket fire on elements of the Panther brigade across an AT ditch, along with AT and artillery fire. It does not report losses or break them out. (None of the Russian-surveyed Panther kills at Kursk describe rocket hits). They report infantry supporting tanks held up by rocket fire occasionally. The report strong fire coming from a body of woods occupied by 10 multiple rocket launchers - and oh 100 tanks. A Russian attack on infantry - that fails - is described as preceded by strong rocket and artillery fire.

11th PD does not mention rockets at all. The SS formation mention their own rocket units and shoots. The same for 7th PD.

6th PD reports "The fighting to clear the last defenders of Melechowo continued all night and into the early morning of 9 July. The Soviets defended fiercely during the day using tanks, heavy arty, and rocket fire. Soviet air was also extremely active." Armor was present but losses are not broken out.

19th PD mentions one incident "The Soviets fired heavy concentrations during the attack and occupation of the new positions using arty, rockets, and mortars." Two senior officers of a PzGdr regiment were wounded. No mention of armor being present let alone lost.

In all of AG south for all of Kursk, the German "dispatches" mention serious rocket fire half a dozen times, with other arty almost always involved as well, and only four of them clearly directed at forces with armor present. One results in the cause unspecified loss of 2 German tanks to 5 Russian. One results in the temporary withdrawal of some Marders. One results in some delay to Panthers and another may have cause losses (6 PD) of which nothing is said.

This is not the picture of some integral part of the Russian anti-tank defense capability. It is a picture of one leg of the Russian arty tripod, the others being standard tube artillery and heavy mortars.

Many descriptions of division level attacks to whole front offensives mention rocket prep fire. It is generally the crowning fireworks display of a half hour to many hours long prep fire by artillery of all kinds; it is indirect, at entire areas, area suppression.

They are not MLRS with improved conventional munitions blowing up tank stacks in TacOps. They are the equivalent of 122mm howitzer fire that goes out all in one big stonk and comes down scattered over a wide area, suitable for a target the size of an infantry regiment. If occasionally a tank is immobilized by one it is blind luck.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Thanks for the Kursk info on Katyusha reports from the German side. How're you fixed for Stalingrad?

Andreas,

Candidate of Military Science is doctoral level, and if memory serves, the authors of ANTITANK WARFARE were at the Frunze Academy, the most prestigious school of higher military training in the then Soviet Union. Therefore, we're talking

a facility at least on par with the U.S. Army Command & General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Random snippets of unsupported data don't cut it at either location. BTW, are you aware that the Soviets meticulously combed their military records and systematically catalogued every type of combat action imaginable as part not only of lessons learned but more specifically as the fundamental foundation of developing an integrated

approach to warfare in the Atomic Age? The resulting database was huge but served as an ongoing, deep resource from which to derive doctrine, operational art, and tactics.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Bigduke6]

I just set up a scenario where I placed three Tigers in a triangle with the legs 50 meters long. Flat open field.

I then placed a Soviet TRP in the middle of the triangle. I then fired ten, that's right ten, M-13 FOs one by one at the TRP. This is the equivalent of five battalions of M-13 fires on a single point.

Result: One Tiger immobilized. The round hit about 5 meters to the side. The other two Tigers were completely unharmed.

Comments any one?

I think one of the things we need to be careful about when going through the reports is words like "heavy" and "strong" rocket fire. How many rounds is that? What caliber? How protected are the targets from the fire? Did such a thing as "light" rocket fire even exist?

My guess, rocket fire by its very nature would routinely get described as "heavy". This should not necessarily imply the strike was particularly severe, as compared to other rocket strikes.

I also think that the CM engine wonderful though it is fails to consider secondary damage and temporary effects on armored vehicles. This works against rockets, as it seems to me the main effect they would have on armored vehicles would be precisely temporary, and of a secondary damage nature.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Comments any one?

Yes - what if you try it with one/two/three FOOs? I think it is essentially random, and that with the heavy dispersion you get declining returns. But the damage is what I would expect in terms of the potential threat the Katyusha warhead poses to a Tiger. Maybe gun-damage as well.

John

Basically it is like this. You are assuming something about the quality of the Soviet data. Unless you can show me that the incidents quoted are in fact derived from high-quality reports, I take leave to not assume the same thing you do. I have however seen things like the Kursk general staff study, and some of the nonsense that is advanced in it (Grossdeutschland an SS division, news to me, but if the high-level, serious STAVKA study on Kursk says so, and IIRC it does, it must be true then). Because of that I take leave to doubt that all Soviet studies were reliable, including the serious ones. Your mileage obviously varies. But if you can show the sources for this book you cite, I may change my mind.

When it comes to enemy damage estimation however, there is not a lot of room for discussion for me. Estimates of the side inflicting the damage are almost always going to be worth less than reported losses of the side that suffered the losses of the same incident. The nationality of the sides does not even enter this - the statement holds true for everybody.

And that is not 'cavalier' dismissal either. I have looked at the reports, I don't like what I see with regard to German losses in Soviet reports. That is not anymore cavalier than your apparent willingness to take them at face value.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Some further tests.

38(t) - can be killed by near misses

Stugs - can be killed by top penetration (rare) and very near misses

Panzer IVG (scratch the F in my previous posts, always G) - can be killed by very near misses (explosion crater under vehicle at full magnification)

Tigers - can be killed by top penetrations.

All are susceptible to gun damage and immobilisation. Of course, all are susceptible to shocked commanders.

I tried two different approaches. One: spread three FOOs over 800m frontage to cover an advance of two tank platoons in a Kette formation; two: concentrate the three FOOs to really hammer the centre of the advance. There appears to be little in terms of actual tank damage to choose from either of these, except that repeat hits on the same vehicle lead to bailing, and these are more easily achieved with dense barrages. In terms of shocked commanders, you do better with the spread-out pattern though, so that's what I would choose for game purposes based on this very limited test.

Conclusion - at one FOO density, all vehicles tested against are susceptible to incapacitating damage or full kills from 132mm rickets. There appears to be not much difference if you increase the density to three FOOs on the same spot (one division according to rum's post above). Rumours of Katyusha's inability to kill any German vehicle up to Tiger in CMBB are greatly exaggerated. They die just fine, it is just less likely the heavier the vehicle gets, and it is pretty unlikely in the first case.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

Andreas,

I appreciate your taking the time to run the additional tests (any screenies?), moreso since I'm so sleep deprived I lack the energy to do so myself.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Found the Stalingrad Katyusha vs. Panzers engagement, I think!

Source: STALINGRAD: the turning point, Geoffrey Jukes, Ballantine Illustrated History of World War II, p. 44.

"...an improvised force of tanks, antitank guns and Katyusha rocket mortars was hastily assembled and sent down to confront Hoth at Abganerovo. Several days of fierce fighting followed the first clash on August 9th, but eventually Hoth's penetration was stopped, and he abandoned for the moment the attempt to break through from the south."

So, now we know know the name of the German formation reported devastated and repelled by the Russians (Hoth's IVth Panzer Army), we know the location (Abganerovo), and we know the starting date of the desperate clash (August 9, 1942). What we now need is the ORBAT for IVth Panzer Army, and we need to see its strength returns and casualty reports for the next several days thereafter.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ November 17, 2005, 01:12 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[juan_gigante]

Yeah, but how do you know what the Katyushas killed and what the tanks and AT guns killed? And the IVth Panzer is not a small formation. The engagement in question seemed to be a battalion level action or so, IIRC. Divisonal at most, right? So just because IVth Panzer is taking losses doesn't mean that the losses are from said engagement or from Katyushas at all. It makes perfect sense to me in this scenario that the Katyushas strip the tanks of infantry and AT guns and tanks to the actual killing of tanks. And besides, Andreas's tests have proven, to me at least, that Katyushas do have the ability of killing nearly any German AFV if a direct hit is achieved. I don't exactly see where the argument is about this anymore.

[John Kettler]

juan-gigante,

No question, a Panzer Army is not a small formation, and your point about apportioning losses is well taken. Nor is it about the ability of Katyushas in CMBB to wreak havoc on armor if they manage to hit any, either. For me, it's now about, having done a lot of digging for some pretty obscure data, seeing whether the war diaries and other records of IV Panzer Army have anything significant to tell us about being on the receiving end of massed Katyusha fires. The description of the nature and composition of the Russian blocking force indicates clearly the desperate, ad hoc nature of same. Even though it was a scratch force, somehow, in several days of bitter combat, it stopped Hoth's IV Panzer Army. I'd love to know more about the particulars and the associated battlefield dynamics. What, exactly, was done, and in what sequence, to stop and repulse that armored juggernaut? Remember, this is a defending force which doesn't even have infantry--just Katyushas, AT guns and tanks--yet has to fight off an extremely powerful force employing all arms in a highly coordinated manner.

Talk about asymmetric warfare! How'd they pull it off?

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

Um, Hoth hits the city on the 9th, but this is an exploitation. It is leading elements of his panzer divisions, only. The German side narrative describes a strong nest of anti-tank guns and turning the built up area into a "fortified city". They fight, he is stopped. He brings up his forces. By the 19th he breaks through again. Nothing is smashed.

He had been driving through air, the Russians make a "nest" in a city to check his leading recon elements and it succeeds. He tries a hasty attack and it is insufficient. So he brings up full combined arms for a deliberate attack, and wins easily.

As for the composition of the Russian force, it is clearly a motorized group, that is the point. Russian RDs have 76mm guns, but towed by horses - not good in a German exploitation advancing hundreds of miles. Russian AT regiments, on the other hand, are motorized. Rockets are motorized. Tanks are motorized. That is what lets them get in front of him. The key point is merely the operational speed to reach a defensible location ahead of the exploiting German mech. Nothing about antitank ability of rockets involved.

[Grisha]

Below is a pdf of an article about testing by the US Army regarding the effectiveness of 'dumb' artillery taking out armor via barrages. The first tests were in 1988, and the Army was in for a surprise--because the Soviets had been right all along.

artillery link

[Andreas]

Hi Greg

Those are 155 rounds however, I don't think anyone here has an argument with them being able to destroy or seriously damage armour. Not sure what PD fuzes are, but M-13 did not have VT fuzes either.

All the best

Andreas

[John Kettler]

Grisha,

Terrific article! Many thanks.

Andreas,

True. If you know your Russian artillery, though, you know that precalculated scale of fire tables exist for all the Russian field artillery weapons.

There is, for example, an equivalent table for 122mm strikes against a range of defined targets, such as troops in the open, dug-in troops, field guns, SP artillery, missile launcher batteries, etc. Will provide some excerpts tomorrow if you like. Fundamentally, the only real difference between 122mm and 152mm, barring a direct hit, is radius of effect, in turn translating into more 122mm rounds to cover a given target than would be needed were 152mm to be used. PD = point detonating, as in a fuze which goes off immediately upon impact; contrast this with Delay, which goes off at some specified brief interval after impact, or MT (mechanical time) which goes off so many minutes after firing. Your comment regarding the absence of VT fuzes for the

Katyusha is correct.

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

A 132mm M-13 rocket has the HE power of a US 105mm round. It is not a 155 or remotely akin to one. 105s will KO armor with direct hits, unless it is Tiger thickness stuff. But they are not going to knock out tanks at 30m, or at 20m.

The article is a typical example of someone boosting his branch of service in an interservices debate. It is riddled with advocacy which you can readily detect if you are aware of all the issues and real capabilities, but will miss if you aren't. I was US arty (in the reserves) around this time, I am quite familiar with the period, attitudes, and arguments.

For example, his "armored" targets are mostly M113s or the equivalent, which is light armor not tanks. Yes he includes tanks, and shows pictures of tanks. But the conclusions are mostly about "armor". And statements like, fragments actually just penetrate the vehicles and hit the manikins inside, from misses up to 30m away, are not remotely true of M-48s or any other real tank. They are perfectly believable for a flock of M113s under a 155mm barrage.

Then there is the 50% KO test. Um, 2800 rounds of 155 is 140 tons of delivered munitions. At one company. That is more like the attack supply ammo ration of a division for a day in WW II. There are instances in WW II of US field artillery battalions (most 12 guns, some 18) firing 5000 rounds a day, but those are 105s not 155s. (To get equivalent shell weights you divide by 3). And those are outliers for the best supplied arty force in the war.

It also strains credulity that 56 rounds are already at the 30% level, but it takes 2800 to reach the 50% level. The targets or criteria are clearly quite different, or the level achieved by 56 rounds is vastly lower. The last is most likely. That is about the saturation needed for 30% against exposed personnel or soft skinned trucks, not armor. The neutralization percentage against the armor is under 30, and for the tanks it is undoubtedly lower still.

There is a revealing line in the supposed myths section, about it taking 50 rounds (of 155) to kill one tank. Rather than challenging that statement directly - as he clearly would have had he been able to - he says firing 50 rounds at a formation of "armor" will result in more than one vehicle killed *or damaged*. Well, the initial statement is not about M113s it is about tanks, but the response is about "armor" which includes the light stuff 155 shrapnel can penetrate.

And the initial statement is about destroy, not M-kill or F-kill, or annoy (comms, vision damage, etc). But still he does not say, "will damage 30%" or "10%", he says "more than one." 2 is more than one. So, if 50 rounds of 155 are fired at a light armor target, you will at least damage 2 or more. Whoopie doo, and the original statement about 50 rounds to kill a tank stands.

Then there is the target density issue. He speaks of formations of vehicles hit with 56 round shoots, and single shell shots into the same formation. But there is no test of 56 rounds fired at a single vehicle - because it would not be very flattering. Each single round fired at a large target is the most flattering possible match up, because locations "overkilled" is zero, and potentially lethal area to hit is multiplied by the number of targets. In general, if you halve the number of vehicles under the barrage footprint you will halve the losses. That is why these things are given as percentages. So if you want "more than one", just park more M113s in the impact zone, and you will get them for sure.

Then there are the pictures and their contrast with the text. The text says in their 56 round test shoot they got no direct hits, but damaged "armor" from near misses. The pictures show full KOs only from direct hits. They show M-kills and a few F-kills from near misses, not KOs. The text says there are full kills (or penetrations) from near misses, but does not specify "to tanks". The pictures give that impression, but there is nothing to actually support or even claim it.

That 155s M-kill full tanks with near misses was well known in WW II, and I cited instances of it already e.g. in the Bulge fight in front of Elsenborn ridge. But they knew the results were M-kills, not full kills. Sometimes finished off at night by bazooka raids.

Even 105mm will KO with direct hits, as I mentioned with some North Africa examples (Kasserine period and soon after). But direct hits are common only from direct fire by 105s incorporated into a gun-line. They can happen indirect, particularly when target density is high and whole corps are firing thousands of shells. But they are rare even then, and as the article allows, in a typical shoot of 56 shells at a multiple vehicle target, there are near misses but no direct hits.

Then there are places where the author makes his case easier on himself than his evidence, by mentioning DP-ICM. ICM means "improved conventional munitions" - bomblets. DP means "duel purpose" - HEAT bomblets. Of course HEAT bomblets can KO armor - especially light armor, but even full tanks.

That works because each shell dispenses scores of submunitions, multiplying the chance of direct hit by an order of magnitude. Each of them being HEAT means a direct hit is still effective much of the time, even from a small submunition. (Not always, because there are orientation issues for the HEAT "jet"). But nobody had ICM in WW II. (There were some air-dropped analogues, not particularly effective, but no arty or ground rockets used submunitions).

Then there is the conclusion he wants, which is independent of the claims. His conclusion - that it is worth calling in arty fire on enemy armor - is certainly correct. But not for the reasons he gives.

There are four distinct reasons to call arty on enemy armor, none of them really covered by him. One, it can be done with impunity and repeated at will, as long as ammo allows. The tanks can't hit back. Tanks are very strong in maneuver arms fighting, and anything standing in front of them to get direct fire shots at them, takes their own direct fire shots right back. Indirect fire avoids this. One is primarily just exploiting a range asymmetry.

Two, the effectiveness of area fire increases with target density. But the effectiveness of maneuver arms generally falls with enemy target density, because those enemies aren't just targets to your own maneuver arms, but shoot back. The more concentrated he is, the harder it is for direct fire weapons to challenge him, inflict meaningful losses, and survive. But the more concentrated he is, the easier it is to get some kills with area fire weapons. One should therefore meet concentration of any maneuver force, including armor, with indirect firepower rather than shock arms, when possible.

Three, all forces depend on combined arms for effectiveness, tanks included. And artillery fire will be effective against all the supporting arms. It will strip infantry, force soft vehicles to halt or dismount prior to engagement, attrite light armor thin enough to penetrate with shrapnel (which from 155s is about as effective as 50 cal or ATR fire, from 105s is more like 30 cal MG fire), disrupt communications, sow confusion, restrict vision with dust and smoke, etc.

Four, artillery concentrates readily within 10-15 km ranges and shifts its fire to enemy points of main effort, in minutes rather than hours. Div or corps level arty can intervene here on the left battalion of the left regiment at 0900, and here on the right battalion of the right regiment at 0930. It is a form of reserve, readily shifted.

Since concentrated armor used offensively depends on picking specific points of attack and ignoring other areas, maneuver arms on defense are inherently divided - by space and limited range - with the attackers only needing to overcome a few of them. And those few are subject to strong direct fire. But defensive arty is safe from this and available wherever the attack falls.

All of those reasons would counsel using artillery fire on enemy points of armored main effort even if, as is in fact the case, it takes at least 50 heavy shells (of unimproved HE) to kill one tank. Single shot kills or anything approaching them are simply unnecessary. The focus on them stems from "him or me" tactical direct fire dueling, which thinks if I shoot and reveal myself and do not get somebody, I am in danger myself and will lose.

In fact, if you examine artillery effectivess in the large in WW II, 50 shells to kill a tank is far too generous. The reality is more like 10 shells to wound one infantryman, in effective cases, with averages frequently falling to more like 25 or 40 shells to wound one infantryman, in less effective cases. Occasional shoots at good targets caught in the open might fall into single digits, but there are still more shells fired than men hit, even when the targets were men in wool or cotton lying on the ground without shelter.

Armies fielded artillery round totals on the order of 100 million, for armies on the order of 10 million (total thruput). Casualties were also on that order, on the order of half of them caused by artillery. (One sees figures of 70% from "shell splinters", but that includes direct fire from tanks, grenades, etc in addition to indirect arty). Armored vehicles were on the order of 100,000, as were losses of them. And most of them that were destroyed, were destroyed by direct fire, not indirect artillery.

If even 10% of arty was fired at armored targets and actually had a better than 1/50 KO rate, arty alone would have killed all tanks twice over. In fact, it was single digit percentages in the cause of armor losses. Ergo, it took more like 1000 rounds of arty fire to KO a tank, not fewer than 50.

Even that order of magnitude might readily be optimistic. E.g. the defense of Elsenborn ridge might easily have used 100,000 rounds total, from over a corps worth of guns firing for 3 days. The Germans may have lost 50-100 tanks, but not to arty alone. Tanks and SP TDs identifiably got around 50. It is likely indirect arty only fully KOed around 10, and M-killed or otherwise significantly damaged perhaps 20-30 more. That is not a lot from 100,000 rounds.

Expecting a single shoot of 192 rounds (3 132mm rocket FOs and the usual unit of fire for these things) equivalent to US 105s in explosive power, to inflict meaningful losses on full tanks, is therefore not realistic. (That is akin to the 56 round 155 shoots in total HE delivered). Let alone a single FO. A few immobilizations from near misses, some gun damage from fragged sights and the like, that is going to be about it. Light armor might take more serious damage, sure.

[ November 18, 2005, 07:16 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Krautman]

Without intending to be overly audacious, one could probably assert that Jason has the occasional tendency to be just a tiny little bit too gregarious considering the rather wordy character of this cognitive opus ingens he just recently produced, scientifically as well as linguistically impressive though it may be.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

When Jim Dunnigan retires, you should replace him. Seems to me you'd have absolutely no problem putting together the latest edition of HOW TO MAKE WAR. You must have one heck of a library!

The above said, I'd like to comment on what you said earlier regarding the clash at Abgeranovo. I get that all the elements the Russian sent were motorized, and I personally think the complete lack of any mention of infantry is telling, but what I didn't see and would like to is some real tactical detail. Do your sources identify specific units, strengths, etc. for either side, from which we can derive a more detailed sense of the size of the forces involved, as well as the details of what happened? For example, what are the lead elements of a Panzer Army, and how does a force which has no infantry go about holding a hastily occupied town or city in the face of a foe disposing not only tanks and artillery but motorized or even armored infantry? Sounds like quite a challenge to me.

I thought the artillery vs. armor article was most interesting, but prompted by your comments, shall

go back and read it again, this time with a gimlet eye.

Please explain your basis for asserting that the terminal effectiveness for the RS-132 rocket is the same as for the U.S. 105mm HE shell. I did a lot of digging and found nowhere enough data to justify such a claim. To date, I can't even tell

you with confidence how much explosive was in it and what type. As I just saw in reading part of the CMAK Companion, the U.S. 4.2 inch mortar was greatly feared because the M3 shell's explosive power (remember the whopping fill ratio?) did a superb job of fragmenting the case, creating thousands of fragments with enough power to kill a man while leaving all but invisible wounds under battlefield conditions. In the case of the RS-132, I do not know warhead casing material either, though design would only require cast iron, in view of the minimal G forces involved. When analyzing terminal effectiveness, things like this matter. BTW, be sure to take a look at the ordnance data and other goodies at the WOUND BALLISTICS link I posted. There you'll find the casualty causation plots for a bunch of theaters. Surprisingly, there is quite a bit of variation between some of the theaters.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ November 19, 2005, 04:25 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[JasonC]

I'm wrong, the 132mm is intermediate between a 105 and a 155, and closer to the 155. I was reading 5 lbs HE for 5 kg HE, my mistake. 11 lbs of TNT is a serious enough charge to get M-kills from near misses. (A US 155mm has about 15 lbs). That means a 64 rocket shoot of them is comparable to a 50-odd round shoot of 155s.

[Grisha]

Jason,

I would think the real reason why arty was/is not used in an indirect AT role has more to do with coordinating a fire mission on a fast moving, dispersed formation. With the exception of the Americans, calling in an indirect fire mission on the spur of the moment just wasn't done (Finns with their massive survey also not included). If the area had pre-planned coordinates it still would take trained staff to triangulate from those to an area that was constantly shifting. Now, hit a static defense with armor dug-in, and it's a different story. The problem with that is most armor would be in reserve in preparation for a counterattack.

I made comment about this article in Consimworld forum (a traditional wargame forum) among a group of ex-artillery folks and they commented on similar tests in the 1990s, the results of which they'd seen in video or in person of M-1s with the same degree of damage as shown on the report.

In any case, this is neither here nor there. The tests are recorded and catalogued. As stated above it's more a case of catching armor with a good barrage, than whether the effects of indirect fire from 120mm on up (based on nomograms and the like) are sufficient to take out armor, even modern armor.