Could Russia have won alone?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

"Let's do a what if scenario shall we? It's May 1940 and the British agree to a cease fire after the Dunkirque evacuation as Hitler hoped they would. Therefore when Operation Barbarossa begins later that year or in 1941 the German Army can focus entirely on the eastern front. It's unlikely the United States will fight against Germany anytime in the near future"

Okay, those were the basic terms we began this little exercise with.

The Spanish government might have considered it time that Gibralter was returned.....

So what? I mean, regardless of how they may feel about it, what can they do? Remember, in this scenario Germany is at peace with Britain, so Spain isn't going to get any help from Germany, which is in any case engaged in fighting with the USSR, remember?

The revolt in Iraq must be assumed to succeed...

How? Why should we assume that? In our time line, the Brits put down that revolt in about two weeks and that was while they were being confronted with the disaster in Greece, the disaster in Libya, and winding up the campaign in East Africa. Now, without those grievous distractions, why would they find it difficult to handle an uprising by a minor, inept regime?

I do not see it as a Russian win as we also have to take into account the Germans getting to nuclear power...

If you mean The Bomb, they gave up on that in 1942, and probably lacked the industrial infrastructure to make it happen while trying to conduct a conventional war anyway. If you only mean nuclear power production, they were working on that, but were years away from a successful reactor.

...so nothing is certain.

That much I agree with. But some things are likelier than others. Some are much likelier.

Michael

[JasonC]

Panther Commander - sorry, it is still just plain wrong. US - Grants 300, Sherman 75s 2000, Sherman 76s 2100, M-10s 50, Stuarts 1665. UK - Churchills 300, Matildas 1080, Valentines 3780 (including Canadian). Total 11,275.

Russian production 102,500. Russian pre-war fleet 23,000. Portion of force LL - 1 in 12, not 1 in 5.

And underwhelming as to quality mix. The Shermans were as good as T-34s - the better half (late) as good as T-34/85s. But only 2150 that good. The Brit stuff and Stuarts were marginally better than T-70s.

And no, the military and military industry did not run on oil. They ran largely on coal, which is what Germany had, and had in abundance. Synthetic fuel production is exactly getting diesel and gasoline and aviation fuel from coal, instead of getting it from oil.

You have to refine oil into such things anyway - oil is not gasoline. It is a different process to get them from coal and coal tar extracts, and a more expensive one. Making it economical to use natural oil as the precursor raw material, if it is available. But it is technologically fully possible to use coal feedstocks instead, and that is exactly what Germany did.

Successfully, until the USAF knocked out the hydrogenation plants - in 1944. Even afterward they were able to keep some small scale production going during bad weather periods. And non-av gas fuels could be produced synthetically from distributed production. Av gas depended on the hydrogenation process which required large, major plants. But no av gas meant no Luftwaffe protecting the rest of the oil target set. Only because of the USAF, though. Without it, no problem.

Also, there isn't any oil in the Med in that era. So there is nothing decisive about controling it. The Persian gulf is not on the Med, and that is where the oil is. And it wasn't a major source yet in the 1940s. Middle east oil was in its infancy, with small fields in Saudi and Iran. And of that trickle, the only way to move it was by ship, which the Brits were hardly going to let happen.

Relevant oil import sources for Germany were Romania, which they got, and possible the Russian sources in the Caspian, part of which they reached (wrecked) in 1942 and part of which remained in Russian hands. They never got rail lines repaired that far so they never got anything out. It would have taken a year or two of complete control of southern Russia to get a drop. (Russia itself, incidentally, had additional sources in western Siberia and the Urals).

The Med was a sideshow. It mattered to keeping Italy in the war and keeping the Brits occupied. The Med mattered to Britain because of its total shipping needs, which went up when they had to go around Africa to get to India, rather than going through the Suez canal. This mattered for overall British trade.

But not all that much, since the main UK supply links were to the US and Canada across the north Atlantic, not to India or the middle east. Where there was precious little, in the 1940s. The U-boat campaign was 10 times as important as the western desert was, for British supply purposes. And none of it mattered a darn for anything else.

As for fantasies about going through the middle east to India and similar rot, it never had the remotest connection to conceivable logistical realities. There is also no reason to think Germans in the Med would have brought Turkey in. Turkey was happily neutral. They had no reason to bet their country on a German win.

If they had, they might have made minor trouble for the Brits in the near east, and helped marginally in the Caucasus. But the Rumanians helped far more, both in oil and in infantry divisions, without making an appreciable difference in the outcome of anything.

The war was decided in Russia by the direct military strategies of the two main contending parties. With minor help from the western Allies in supplies, and later one especially, in distraction of some portion of German production, air power, etc.

The war was largely decided in the east before those things had a chance to matter very much. I mean, the big draw off of combat forces only happens in 1944, likewise the major damage to the Luftwaffe, to industry, etc. And by then the German had already been kicked out of the Ukraine and were losing badly. Bagration would have killed them even without the other catastrophes that hit at the same time (France, Luftwaffe collapse, oil target set hit).

[ May 09, 2004, 06:42 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[dieseltaylor]

Jason C

Very dismissive Jace, but surely we were in hypothetical land anyway. Your splendidly marshalled argument talks about the total war effort as it transpired - I am following the argument from the point of view that what could have happened if , effectively, the UK is out of the war in 1940.

The value in timing of the arrival of the Lend Lease tanks etc early in the war rather than in as a percentage in 1945 of total production is not addessed - why not - is the adage a stitch in time valueless.

Franco may have reasonably taken a view that GB was not in a position to go to war over Gib - a possibility. Turkey I believe would stay out but transhipment across its territory - a la Sweden is certainly not fanciable.

To argue that a defeated Britain would be able to exert the same kind of awe over the Iraqi's after losing a war is fanciable. We might think of the possibility that the Germans would forment the problem and tell the UK to butt out. The fact that it is relatively unimportant in itself , other than as an option to cause worry to the USSR is something. The effect on other colonies might be far reaching .....

A possibility, but then it is an alternative history we are looking at so lets try to expand the subject before shutting it down by quoting what subsequently happened for real,

Lendlease trucks

2.5 ton trucks = 151,053

jeeps = 77,972

75 mm sherman = 2,007

76 mm sherman = 2,095

only 10-15% of those manufactured in Russia.

SEE

http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlelendlease.htm

re trucks

http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlesRussiaproduction.htm

The links above show the effects of the invasion on Russian production of raw resources and food - building your army is fine if you can feed your population and assuming that the UK and US were not providing the stuff then I think Russian effectiveness would have been substantally reduced. The famines of the 30's would suggest that the Russians did not have an overabundance of resource stockpiled

so for those who want to see the real deal in Lend Lease

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/lend.html

lets just mention that in the list of thousands of types of product that there is a million tons of meat .....

[dieseltaylor]

I think I have spotted an error in the list on the last link which lists one type of steel provided as 425,331,742 tons which must have been remarkable value for 39 million dollars - and put in hoc world production for number of years ..... I think it should be lbs. [Approx to 200,000 tons]

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Panther Commander - sorry, it is still just plain wrong. US - Grants 300, Sherman 75s 2000, Sherman 76s 2100, M-10s 50, Stuarts 1665. UK - Churchills 300, Matildas 1080, Valentines 3780 (including Canadian). Total 11,275.

Jason, One thing at a time. Here is the story of your Lend-Lease armour almost by month. My source is Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two by Steven Zaloga pages 206-207.

“The first shipment of tanks dispatched in 1941, amounting to 487 Matildas, Valentines and Tetrarchs from the UK and 182 M3A1 light tanks and M3 medium tanks from the USA. In 1942, Britain provided a further 2,487 tanks and the USA 3,023 tanks. The first units equipped with Valentines and Matildas went into service in the Staraya Russa and Valdai areas in December 1941 and January 1942.

Although the Soviets had hoped to form homogenous Lend-Lease units, the Lend-Lease tanks were used in conjunction with Soviet tank types throughout the war. In 1943, the composition of Soviet tank brigades varied. Brigades equipped soley with Russian tanks amounted to about 61-68 per cent of the force; mixed brigades (Russian and Lend-Lease), 19-22 per cent of the force; soley Lend-Lease equipped, 10-17 per cent. At the beginning of 1943, there were 1,023 Lend-Lease tanks in Soviet units although 6,179 had been received since 1941. In 1944 and 1945, with a major influx of American M4A2 Sherman medium tanks, some tank corps and mechanized corps were equipped entirely with this tank type. For example, in 1945, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was equipped entirely with M4A2 Shermans in its tank units.

The role of Lend-Lease equipment in the Soviet war effort has been the source of bitter controversy, with some Western histories attributing to it a decisive impact on the war on the Eastern Front, and Soviet historians generally denigrating it as inconsequential. While the supply of Lend-Lease armoured vehicles was hardly decisive, it played a very useful role, particularly in 1941 and 1942 when the Soviet armoured force was recovering from the disastrous defeats of the summer of 1941, the evacuation of the tank factories and slump in Soviet tank production in the autumn and winter of 1941 and in the wake of the defeats in the Caucasus in the summer of 1942. Lend-Lease tanks during this period played a vital role in preventing the tank strength of the Red Army from stagnating or actually decreasing. Neither should it be forgotten that Britain sent the Russians 14 per cent of her own tank production, even though the Soviet Union out-produced Britain three-fold in tanks, and this in 1941 and 1942 when the British Army was very short of tanks in the Western Desert. Far more critical to the Soviet war effort was the supply of tactical vehicles, primarily from the United States. During the war, the Soviet Union produced only 343,624 cars and lorries due to the heavy commitment of major automobile factories like GAZ to armoured vehicle production. The USA alone provided the Soviets with 501,660 tactical wheeled and tracked vehicles, including 77,972 jeeps, 151,053 1-1-1/2 ton trucks, and 200,662 2-1/2 ton trucks.”

He goes on later to say… “Indeed, US trucks with their “USA” serials still visible became so commonplace in Eastern Europe during the later years of the war that common folk-lore in the region interpreted these stenciled letters as meaning’Ubiyat Sukinayna Adolfa’ (Kill that Son-of-a-Bitch Adolf)

Besides criticising the quantity of Lend-Lease armoured vehicles provided the Red Army, Soviet historians have belittled the quality of the tanks provided. The Valentine and Matilda in particular have been singled out as being inferior to the T-34. This was evidently the case, but it should be remembered that the British Army did not have any better tanks at the time, and furthermore the Valentine and Matilda were far superior to the dreadful little T-60 and certainly comparable to the later T-70 which the Soviets were building in very large numbers. While the Soviet Army was unhappy with the American M3 medium tank, the same complaints were voiced by American tank crews who were also using it at the same time in Tunisia. The M3A1 Stuart light tanks were easily comparable or superior to Soviet T-60 and T-70 light tanks, and the M4A2 Sherman, while not as brilliant a design as the T-34, was far more durable and reliable than it’s Soviet counterpart. In the post-war encounters between the M4 and the T-34 in Korea and the Middle East the Sherman was invariably the victor despite the superiority of the T-34 on paper.”

So your use of the entire Soviet tank production doesn't tell the story of Lend-Lease armored contribution at all. Especially since in the year of 1944 and the first half of 1945 the Soviets produced 55,230 of your quoted total for the Soviet armoured forces, or more than half the total. I have those broken down by type if you are interested.

What is important, is when those tanks were 1 in 5, and not the 1 in 12. As you can see Mr. Zaloga goes into a very detailed analysis of this very subject. His view is much different than yours. I have seen nothing of your argument but a numbers comparison that shows that Lead-Lease was ineffective, while on the other hand, Mr. Zaloga gives some very compelling points, that they were, in fact, very effective.

Panther Commander

[JasonC]

OK, you want chapter and verse on the timing of LL tanks and how little they can have meant? Below.

In passing though, why is it so hard, why is it pulling teeth to just accept, that the major determinants of the outcome of the war were things like overall German strategy and mobilization decisions, Russian mobilization successes, how fast the Russians could learn how to use armor, and operational mistakes like those that resulted in Stalingrad?

Why does everyone look for the determinants of the outcome in obscure secondary matters instead of the obviously largest issues (grand strategy, learning&doctrine, major operational decisions) affecting outcomes on the obviously most important front (Russia)? What on earth is the "bee in bonnet"-hood about it? Would someone please explain it to me? Are the critical variables just too well known and boring, or what?

Now to LL tanks. They did not decide the war. LL helped far more in other areas (transportation equipment, feedstocks for ammunition production, food) and LL armor simply was not that important.

Some Matildas and Valentines arrived in time for the counterattack phase of the Battle of Moscow. They were the first to appear. But most came later.

The first US LL tanks saw action in the spring of 1942. But only a modest number of Grants and some Stuarts were received that whole year. Shermans only started arriving in 1943 - and mostly from the end of that year on. They were a modest help later, certainly, but not appreciably better than T-34s which the Russians had thousands of by then.

There were a few Grants at Kursk, 35 Churchills in one unit, and a number of units using Valentines (with 2 pdrs).

Total LL tanks from UK and US received by June of 1942, which might be considered "early", was 2250, or 20% of the LL tanks sent. Since that is 1/4 of the time from the invasion to the end of the war, the LL tanks were not significantly front-loaded.

The 1080 Matildas stretched from the end of 1941 to the August of 1943. Yes Virginia, they were still receiving Matildas with 2 pdr main armament after the battle of Kursk. Russia is where second line UK tanks were dumped, to get something out of them.

Actually the 11275 figure I gave is somewhat high, because that is the number sent. Not all arrived. Something like 1000 were sunk on the way.

Russian production in 1941 and the first half of 1942 - to compare with the 2250 LL tanks that arrived by then, mostly 2 pdr Brit infantry tanks or American Stuarts - came to

1600 KV-1s

8000 T-34s

2000 T-70s

4000 T-60s

LL were around 1/8 of the early tanks. They were mid range in armor and on the low end in armament, and well below average in speed. Clearly they were better than the T-60s, and in everything but mobility they were better than the T-70s.

And they arrived in the second half of this period. In the first 6 months, essentially nothing - as mentioned, the first actual fights were in the battle of Moscow at the end of 1941, a modest number of Matildas and Valentines being all that had arrived by then.

Against the German 1942 fleet mix these were fine, if a bit slow. The Russians equipped 2 tank corps with them in 1942. By the following year they are hopelessly outclassed by the upgrading German fleet.

They did not save Russia in the 1941 campaign because they weren't there yet. They helped marginally in 1942, but the Russians lost heavily that year anyway. They accumulated reserves for their winter counterattacks out of domestic T-34 production, which was over 12500 for 1942 as a whole.

Some extra Valentines cannot have made any appreciable difference after that. The Russians continued to use Valentines as light tanks, despite their low speed, and liked their protection and mechanical reliability. But they had precious little to do with winning the overall war.

Note that the Canadians continued to ship them Valentines quite late, and the Brits kept them in production after they had abandoned the type themselves, because the Russians still wanted them. So it is not (remotely) the case that all of them arrived early.

The most powerful lend lease tanks were the 4000 Shermans. That was a meaningful amount of full quality armor. However, those mostly arrived in 1944 - including all the 76mm variety. By the time US tanks that could hit appreciably harder than T-34/76s had arrived, the Russians were fielding IS-2s and T-34/85s, in greater numbers.

Also, the US certainly did not provide 3000 tanks in 1942 alone. They may have supplied enough to raise the overal total that year to 3000. Or the source may be counting halftracks, SP-AA, and the like. But they certainly did not send 3000 full AFVs in 1942. They only sent 2000 Grants and Stuarts combined over the whole war, and the Shermans went in 1944 and 1945 (only a modest number of 75s during calendar 1943).

[ May 10, 2004, 12:54 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[A.E.B]

Hi all

Didn't this go off track fast.

The premise of this "counter factual" is the Britian makes peace with German in May 1940.

So:

No Battle of the Atlantic.

Germany is no longer subject to a naval blockade and has access to foreign imports - particularly food and oil.

No war in the Mediterranian or a war limited to Commonwealth vs. Italy if Italy insists on starting a war after Germany makes peace with Britian.

No Lend Lease to Russia, although Britain receives US aid in fighting the Japanese if Japan goes to war in 1941.

So in May/June 1941, Germany attacks Russia with all of its Air and Naval forces being available, and with minimal garrison forces required for occupied Western Europe.

Germany may not have been able to support more troops in Russia logistically, but all those troops and planes not lost/needed for the BOB and the Med are now available as reinforcements for Russia.

I suspect that the positions at the end of 1941/1942 would have been similar, Savastapol would have fallen more quickly,and the availablity of German Naval forces would probably allow German forces to hold Rostov thanks to naval supply.

In 1942 the push to the oilfields would have been easier with German naval assets avaible (11 inch and 15 inch bombardment).

My guess is that, without the support of the western allies, Russia would not have lost, but it would have had a hard time winning.

Stalemate, with a negotiated settlement?

Regards

A.E.B

[Mad Russian]

Jason, you forget I think the Germans would lose the battle in the east. What I disagree with is your premise that the Lend-Lease effort was ineffective. Since our sources don't agree on when the equipment was shipped and I have no idea what your sources are we are at a standstill on the actual dates. I have a German account of meeting American armor on 12 July 1941. The account claims that they destroyed American amphibious tanks. Americans didn't make amphibious tanks so that assumption at least is incorrect. M3 Stuarts were shipped from England in 1941 and those are more than likely counted as American tanks. The same could be held true of the 3000 tanks in 1942.

I agree that I am a bit dense. I must not be very good at communicating either. Since I agreed with your position that the Germans would lose the war for almost identically the same reasons that you quoted.

What I am not understanding is how you consider that the tanks sent whether they were in the front line main offensive areas or in backwater operational areas was insignificant. If they did nothing else except free up T-34's to fight somewhere else they were important. And a 2 pndr gun wasn't a bad tank against the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian armor that was fielded. Or in leading attacks on Axis infantry positions.

The only other thing, that I believe, we don't see eye to eye on, is the oil issue. You seem to think that tanks and planes run on coal and I don't. I may be too dense to figure that out as well. I just can't accept the fact that tanks and planes need fuel that comes from oil. I think that tanks and planes are made with coal and run on fuel that is produced by oil.

Answer me this one question about the oil issue. If the oil wasn't important why did the Germans go after it in the Caucasus? Why did Hitler make Hungary entering the war such a high priority?

I may differ in your views on how fast the Russians learned the deep penetration concepts as well. I have read that FM Paulus taught them after his surrender with 6th Army. AND that is when they started doing considerably better against the Germans. Think about this. When would that be? Around mid-1943. What was happening on the Russian Front in mid-43 to the end of the war. Did the Russians show considerably more finesse in handling their armored forces? Was that from lessons they learned or were taught?

With England out of the war, the Germans still lose. Partly because they failed to produce enough weapons of war. Parlty because the Russians were very good at concealing their offensives. Partly because they knew ahead of time what the Germans were going to do. Mostly because the German Grand Strategic planning was bad. The war may have been fought to a stalemate and not a clearcut victory. The Russians were having problems filling divisions in early 45. Make them fight more Germans by themselves, with no strategic bombing campaign and it gets very tough indeed.

Panther Commander

[dieseltaylor]

Jace

"Why does everyone look for the determinants of the outcome in obscure secondary matters instead of the obviously largest issues (grand strategy, learning&doctrine, major operational decisions) affecting outcomes on the obviously most important front (Russia)? What on earth is the "bee in bonnet"-hood about it? Would someone please explain it to me? Are the critical variables just too well known and boring, or what?"

What no comment on the very boring materials? I consider them very important. And you still seem to be arguing on the basis of what happened in the war as not allowing any change to what might have happened if we start from the position postulated.

AEB assumes that Italy does not invade France, I assume the opposite and we may end up with a useful fleet in the Black Sea early in Barbarossa .... The thread is not would Germany win by itself but would Russia beat the "Axis" - whatever that may have been in our alternate history.

We make assumptions to what if ..... is not that what the thread is about. To talk of Bagration is to assume that that operation will happen.

I mean no disservice to the Russians at all - I prefer playing as them : )

[Tom Murphy]

Jason C... on one hand you say lend lease does not matter.. then you point out US steel production. As far as Tanks and AT guns.. maybe not... But raw materials, Trucks, railroad cars, and transport aircraft was worth its weight in gold to the Soviet Union. By 1945 4 out of every 5 trucks in the Soviet Union was foreign made. Well you can't get very far in a T-34 without the trucks hauling the ammo, fuel, and food. Having said that, the Germans bit of more than they could chew in Russia. Too much space, bad weather, poor roads, and too much manpower. But without the US and Britain in the war.. The best the Russians could have hoped for would have been a peace agreement maybe with the original borders. They would have never taken Germany on their own.

[Merkin Muffley]

Without a UK distraction, would not Barbarossa have kicked off earlier because there would be no British mishief making in the Balkans?

Would that have secured Leningrad and Moscow that were so tantilisingly close to capture even in reality? Would the USSR have retained its cohesion with the loss of those cities - politically?. Would it have retained a significant economic capability with the loss of the c&c infrastructure and the loss of Moscow as the transport hub?

Would Germany have bothered declaring war on the US if it wasn't actively assisting the UK? Would the US ever have contemplated declaring war on the German anti-communist bulwark?

All these huge geo-political issues, but of course, its far more important to argue the toss over the LL proportion of Russian armour. For what its worth, at a CMBB level, I know the 6pdr Valentines are a sodding menace. If you are a tank. And almost completely harmless if you are not.

[Dandelion]

To add a further perspective, I've always considered war - the war and all war - primarily political/psychological struggles.

I'm not disinterested in assets. But comparing exact amounts of equipment strikes me as complicating matters.

E.g. everyone here knows the odds in May 1940. What happened cannot credibly be explained in terms of military or industrial assets. In fact very few campaigns of WWII can be explained in such terms.

Wars never go on until everyone is dead and neither do great battles, they all end when one side decides it is time to end. Military doctrine focuses on the shattering and dissolving of enemy organisation, not the annihilating of the enemy population.

In the struggle between the Axis and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the Axis powers were at a disadvantage in terms of assets. If both sides remained intact as political entities, the Axis would be the first to reach the bottom of the barrel, even at very favourable exchange rates. The Germans knew it and it would appear the Soviets knew it too.

But it really does not matter much, and certainly did not matter to German planners, since such a level of sacrifice would never be reached anyway. The political entity would either have to succumb or be destroyed at much earlier stages than total annihilation. Nazi Germany still had millions of men under arms when she drew her last breath.

The struggle could only concern the dismantling of eachother as entities before catastrophic amounts of sacrifice was demanded, endangering survival of the state as such. Bearing in mind that ultimately, any state is just an idea, regardless of manifestation.

It evidently took in the vicinity of 5 000 000 casualties to stop the Axis warmachine. It took another 10-15 000 000 casualties to ultimately destroy it. Give or take a few million.

As neither side was dismantled as political bodies, the war became one of attrition and the USSR proved capable of paying the price and win, destroying the armed forces of Central Europe.

With the given conditions in the what-if here, that outcome is IMHO quite inevitable.

The addition of the 20-25% of armed force that Germany normally devoted to other fronts would not, IMHO, have changed anything but timespan.

And if Germany was all alone, with no access to "Axis Minor" military and industrial assets, defeat would come very quick indeed. Lets remember that these assets were enormous, not just Ploësti oil but the military assets as well, with Romania alone suffering more casualties than the USA did. It's not as if they can be added or withdrawn without consequence.

But the Axis did stand a decent chance to win, even Germany alone, if we get to tweak conditions a bit more than allowed.

The real cause - again IMHO - of the defeat of the Axis was their being so amazingly inept in political warfare. Instead of contributing to victory, German foreign policy was a necessary - but not sufficient - ingredient in her own defeat. Practically all aspects of her foreign policy contributed to the survivability of the USSR as state and aided her enduring the mass sacrifice.

The USSR was equally inept but that didn't matter much, since she was stronger anyway. Well, it did matter a lot to the millions who died, but not to the outcome.

Extremely powerful centrifugal forces were ignored or alienated, forces that could have ripped the USSR apart even without the aid of millions of Central Europeans. All good cards were left unplayed - Turkey being the prime such but Germany's own heavy influence in regions of the USSR being equally unused. Some bad cards were played, like extremist Ukrainians. In fact, it was never a priority to defeat the Soviet state. This goal was always subject to Nazi notions of race and state.

Even a slightly modified foreign policy would have altered Soviet preparedness for sacrifice, ever so little maybe, but perhaps enough. Wars are fought in heads.

US/UK aid raises emotions here, regardless if downplayed or emphasised. I'll not venture into that minefield and debate material effects. I do however want to point out that regardless of such effects, I am inclined to believe the psychological effect was significant. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of boots and trucks with "USA" printed all over them is actually a very powerful manifestation of solidarity, reaching a mass audience and transmitting the message in a very concrete manner. Same goes for the second front. Regardless of how peripheral the divertion of German assets might (and might not) have appeared, the Soviets still knew they weren't the only ones dying. I hesitate to underestimate the "not alone" feeling. And just maybe that feeling influenced somebody at some point just enough to go on. I actually think it did. You have to admit the possibility.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by A.E.B:

...Savastapol would have fallen more quickly,and the availablity of German Naval forces would probably allow German forces to hold Rostov thanks to naval supply.

In 1942 the push to the oilfields would have been easier with German naval assets avaible (11 inch and 15 inch bombardment).

Correct me if I am mistaken, but you appear to be making two assumptions here. The first is that the Germans would have moved virtually their entire surface fleet to the Black Sea. The second is that the Turks would have permitted them to pass the Dardenelles.

In the first case, the Germans would have been very vulnerable in the Baltic and North Seas in case Britain decides to jump back into the war. Räder if not Hitler himself would have taken a very dim view of that, it seems to me.

With regards to the second, it has been a while since I read the diplomatic history of that region, but ISTR that Turkey was party to an international treaty governing what kind, how many, and at what intervals warships would be allowed to pass. Something to think about.

Michael

[A.E.B]

Michael

I am aware that Germany taking its naval assets out of the Atlantic was a risk.

However, having signed an armistice with Germany, I can't see Britain restarting the war without Germany breaking the treaty first.

Would Turkey have said no to a German request to move heavy naval assets through the straits if Germany was already the victor in France in 1940 and Britain had given up?

Who knows.

That is the fantasy element of the counter factual.

But certainly the presence of the Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the remaining pocket battleships would have made a huge difference in the Black Sea.

The Gneisenau firing its guns from port disrupted a Russian advance in 1945.

The real difference to me is the removal of the Battle of Britain and Battle of the Atlanic. The resources Germany put into U-Boats could be diverted to other war production, the 1,000+ planes and aircrews lost against Britain are saved. The Paratroopers lost on Crete + the Ju52s remain and can be used in Russia.

But most importantly German can import strategic resources by sea. If Britain won't trade, then French and Dutch colonies may, the USA and Canada may, and the South Americans will.

Imagine if Germany could import enough Tungsten so that all of its tanks had HVAP rounds in 1941/42.

Again, I doubt that German could reach its intended stop line in Russia, but I also doubt that Russia could defeat a Germany whose entire resources where diverted to a single front.

In 1917 Russia had given Germany land for peace. Would they have done the same in 1943?

There is no right answers, just fun speculation!

A.E.B

[MikeyD]

"The sheer strategic pointlessness of attacking Russia in the first place, the madness of trying it without mobilizing the economy..."

Change the place name and that comment could've been ripped from today's headlines! Two factors mitigate against Germany succeeding against Russia alone. The first is the fuzzy reasoning for going into Russia in the first place, and the failure to delineate what would constitute political 'success'. Was Hitler ultimately planning to set up a puppet government in Moscow, proclaim publically to the Russian people that he had freed them from a tyrant, then proceed to merrily loot the country under their noses? Even if Hitler were to show uncharacteristic restraint it wouldn't be long before the vast country would eventually crumble in his grasp under those conditions - and Hitler was unlikely to have shown any restraint in Russia.

The second problem is the 3rd Reich 'was' Hitler, and Hitler as going increasingly insane. Where would the 3rd Reich have been once Hitler had been deposed or assassinated, let's say before 1948 (Stalin only lasted til 1953)? We'd eventually be looking at '3rd Reich as beurocracy', trying to juggle subject nations like a latter day Hungarian Empire. And there's no doubt that rather quickly the subject nations would simply drop one-by-one from Germany's grasp.

[ May 10, 2004, 01:05 PM: Message edited by: MikeyD ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Was Hitler ultimately planning to set up a puppet government in Moscow, proclaim publically to the Russian people that he had freed them from a tyrant, then proceed to merrily loot the country under their noses?

The signs are that Hitler intended to do to Russia, Byeloruss, Ukraine, and the Baltic Republics what he had done to Poland. Possibly, with the exception of the Baltic Republics, even worse.

Where would the 3rd Reich have been once Hitler had been deposed or assassinated, let's say before 1948 (Stalin only lasted til 1953)? We'd eventually be looking at '3rd Reich as beurocracy', trying to juggle subject nations like a latter day Hungarian Empire. And there's no doubt that rather quickly the subject nations would simply drop one-by-one from Germany's grasp.

The situation without Hitler to serve as a rallying point would likely have proven extremely unstable with rival factions vying for control. Barring some kind of miracle, the empire might well have collapsed into a violent civil war, with Britain and the US picking up the pieces. But who knows? The whole thing defies analysis.

Michael

[K_Tiger]

The Germans hade a good chance if they have started Barbarossa 6 weeks earlier and not helped the italians with the greeks. Second mistake was not to take Moskow as primari target, like the most higher ranked Officers wanted. Thats nearly two Month of good weather who was later badly missed. Im convinced it was a great chance to conquer Moskow. If Moskow falls, the biggest logistic Center in Western Russia would make the different. Also a Big faktor was the secret contract between Russia and the cowardly Japanese. Whitout the eastern forces...they hade hardly a chance to defend Moskow not to mention the following winter operation. Not to capture Leningrad with the first attack...was also a giant point against the germans. I think it was more a matter of time and operational mistakes than Lend-Lease or the resources the Russian fielded. Too i think the biggest ennemy for the germans was AH himself this little wannabe Napoleon.

I belive also, that it was a light chance in 42`to win if the main target would have been Moskow insteed of Stalingrad. Even in Stalingrad it was possible to win there. But the relativ low pressure on the town in the beginning and the denying from AH to free more troops from France (there was 39 Divisions for refitting and for a surely awaited Invasion). 9/10 of Stalingrad was allready in German hands....a higher ranked Officer sayed " We needed two elite or four med. Divisions to own the complete Town...nothing more". The loss of the experienced 6th Army and the 4. panzer Korps from Hoth....hurted alot and a recover was nearly impossible.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

The Germans hade a good chance

I disagree. I don't think Germans had particularly good chances to win, and they were already lucky to have Stalin make some serious blunders during Barbarossa. But good luck doesn't equal good chance. Starting earlier would still have forced them to stop for supplies, meanwhile at least Finland would not have been prepared.

[K_Tiger]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

.

To all the other things you wrote there is a true core....but this in the bottom...i really cant understand, from where you get this...is it a feeling??

Afaik....the kapitalistic USA was before the War the biggest ennemy from the Russians...always pushed by the propaganda. Hehe... "raises emotions" how sweet Tales can change after some decades. I know about an incident where a US Factory had to re-mark the Russian national meel "Borscht" with kirylik signs. The first delivering of food from the states with origin markings, made the People in Russia not really happy...to be dependently from your former most hated ennemy, especialy in food...and that your own Governement arent able to support the own proud folk with the simplest hires...alone the thought the germans could cut of the supply from the USA must be a horror.

Maybe this changed in the curse of the war...a bit..but there was no Mary Jane who danced hand in hand with Sergei Kalaschnikov over a green, flowered meadow, funny

Was there a Russian, who sayed "Thank you" to someone from the USA??

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> US/UK aid raises emotions here, regardless if downplayed or emphasised. I'll not venture into that minefield and debate material effects. I do however want to point out that regardless of such effects, I am inclined to believe the psychological effect was significant. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of boots and trucks with "USA" printed all over them is actually a very powerful manifestation of solidarity, reaching a mass audience and transmitting the message in a very concrete manner. Same goes for the second front. Regardless of how peripheral the divertion of German assets might (and might not) have appeared, the Soviets still knew they weren't the only ones dying. I hesitate to underestimate the "not alone" feeling. And just maybe that feeling influenced somebody at some point just enough to go on. I actually think it did. You have to admit the possibility.

Cheerio

Dandelion </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

I belive also, that it was a light chance in 42`to win if the main target would have been Moskow insteed of Stalingrad. Even in Stalingrad it was possible to win there. But the relativ low pressure on the town in the beginning and the denying from AH to free more troops from France (there was 39 Divisions for refitting and for a surely awaited Invasion). 9/10 of Stalingrad was allready in German hands....a higher ranked Officer sayed " We needed two elite or four med. Divisions to own the complete Town...nothing more". The loss of the experienced 6th Army and the 4. panzer Korps from Hoth....hurted alot and a recover was nearly impossible.

There was no way the Germans could have taken Moscow in 1942. In any case, what would they have wanted there? They were even incapable of taking Leningrad, despite attempting to do so. All they got was Sevastopol.

And so what if the Germans had taken Stalingrad? What would that have changed? Chuikov would not have written his memoirs, and what else?

[K_Tiger]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by K_Tiger:

I disagree. I don't think Germans had particularly good chances to win, and they were already lucky to have Stalin make some serious blunders during Barbarossa. But good luck doesn't equal good chance. Starting earlier would still have forced them to stop for supplies, meanwhile at least Finland would not have been prepared. </font>

[Feldtrompeter]

With GB out of war in 1940:

1) Italy would have made peace as well and thus probably would not have attacked Greece => no Yugoslavian coup and no delay for Barbarossa.

2) Barbarossa could have started earlier and stronger => Leningrad and Moscow would have likely fallen before the winter of 1941.

3) Germany would not have needed to spend tons of energy building up U-Boot fleets => more recorces for ground units and planes + more research concentration on those two areas.

4) International trade would have helped Germany a lot.

5) The German defeat at Stalingrad would probably never have happened.

6) The Russians would have come back into play as they did due to total war economy. => Russia would have gained ground.

7) Germany would likely have switched to total war economy as they historically did => rough balance in economical output.

8) From then on time would have surely been in Germanys favour due to Jet-technology (Me 262), rocket-tech and other technological areas like night combat systems (for tanks especially) and so on.

9) Germany would finaly have gotten total air superiority and then the defeat of Russia would have only been a matter of time despite Russian mass production.

10) The quote so often heard of "Too late too few" would likely turned into "in due time and in sufficient numbers".

I can't see the US helping Russia as well. Without GB fighting it is hard to believe they would step into a European conflict. => no lend lease.

Main reason why I think Germany would have won is that time would have finally ticked in her favour (in addition to a better starting campaign in 1941). That is due to economical catch up and the steadily increasing tech advantage for the Germans. The western allies would have had problems against Me 262 and without the western front the Germans would probably fielded that plane earlier and in numbers that would have been sufficient to gain air superiority. Other techs would have helped as well.

And imaging tungsten rounds for the King Tiger or the gun of the Sturmtiger! (that was planed to be mounted on the Panther II and the KT as well) Imports would have made that possible ...

And then the Russians would have been in a pityful place indeed. Moving and positioning as the Germans did at the western front ... by night ... and when clowds darken the skies ...

Economical output is a non-factor if you can't use it effectively. And that is what Russian would have faced the longer the war would have lasted, IMHO.

But I doubt GB would have stood neutral after Germany would have declared war so soon again - and even if it was Russia.

And then it would have come as it did.

[K_Tiger]

@Feldtrompeter

And imaging tungsten rounds for the King Tiger or the gun of the Sturmtiger! (that was planed to be mounted on the Panther II and the KT as well) Imports would have made that possible ...

Hehe.. a Sturmtiger with Wolfram ammo?? What do you want to sink with it...the Iowa??..

[K_Tiger]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by K_Tiger:

There was no way the Germans could have taken Moscow in 1942. In any case, what would they have wanted there? They were even incapable of taking Leningrad, despite attempting to do so. All they got was Sevastopol.

And so what if the Germans had taken Stalingrad? What would that have changed? Chuikov would not have written his memoirs, and what else? </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Correct me if im wrong, but wasnt Stalingrad the same logistical Keypoint for the south like Moskau was for the center and north?

Happy to do that - no, it was not.

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Wasnt the goods like food and oil shiped between The south to Moskau over the Wolga?

Yes, and all you need to stop that are a few guns on the Volga, not the city of Stalingrad.

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Maybe the best way to get Stalingrad was to cross the Wolga and to try to get the Russian forces in an operational way insteed to outslug it in the town.

Probably, but then you should not be going after the Caucasus at the same time. And Leningrad, and Sevastopol.

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

If the germans had beaten the Forces around Stalingrad, with an intact 6. Armee left... i belive this would have give the germans the advantage in this area. If aditional the germans would be in the situation to cut off the Murmansk-Moskau-Line...

Now we are descending into fairy land again. First, 6th Army was not intact - it was at the end of a very tenous supply line, and it had been fighting for months. Second, who should have broken the Murmanskbahn?

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Why not Moskau? They pushed all units till Stalingrad aside...That with Leningrad is right, but they never attacked the Town in a way they did with Sewastopol or Stalingrad.

They never attacked Leningrad, because in September 1942 a Soviet offensive hit them. 11. Armee under von Manstein, which had been shipped up to Leningrad following the success at Sevastopol, to repeat the performance, was used up trying to fend this off, and managed so, barely. The artillery ammunition for the siege artillery was used in the defense. The attack could never be carried out afterwards. Then the battles around Rzhev and in the south drained the forces away.

They also did push aside only units that were ordered to retreat anyway. When that changed, the German advance stopped. If it had been Moscow, it would have stopped a lot earlier.