Could Russia have won alone?

[MikeyD]

I just had a thought. What would it have meant, exactly for the Nazis to have made it to Moscow? There's no prescedent to expect the Russians would've called it a day. I can foresee a Stalingrad x10. A meat grinder for the Germans as they fight room-by-room for that monster city. A post above descrribed Moscow as a logistics hub. That could definitely work against the Germans as they'd have no way of cutting Russian supply lines. I foresee a great Russian pincer trapping much of the German army in the city and doing a 'Stalingrad' on their butts. Then The Russians more move west in revenge with nothing to halt them and don't stop until the they hit English Channel.

[K_Tiger]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Happy to do that - no, it was not.

Ok..your opinnion.

Yes, and all you need to stop that are a few guns on the Volga, not the city of Stalingrad.

Sounds easy...but the small, little thing, that tanks rolling out of those tank factorys..would made me a bit jerkily.

Now we are descending into fairy land again. First, 6th Army was not intact - it was at the end of a very tenous supply line, and it had been fighting for months. Second, who should have broken the Murmanskbahn?

Thats right, the 6th wasn`t in her best shape...but propably with some reinforcements from France... but AH was so self-assuredly.

The Murmansk line was attacked, Afaik, by 6 Divisions divided in 3 Parts 3x2. I belive only one of this three reached the target but was then repulsed. If the Germans had put them together they became able to cut off the line.

They never attacked Leningrad, because in September 1942 a Soviet offensive hit them. 11. Armee under von Manstein, which had been shipped up to Leningrad following the success at Sevastopol, to repeat the performance, was used up trying to fend this off, and managed so, barely. The artillery ammunition for the siege artillery was used in the defense. The attack could never be carried out afterwards. Then the battles around Rzhev and in the south drained the forces away.

Oh they did, but they reached only the outskirts...wasnt there an incident where a Officer drove some miles with the streetcar into the City?

[/QB]</font>

[Andreas]

Now, if you want to discuss matters of history, it would help if you could get basic facts right. See below.

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Ok..your opinnion.

Mine, and that of the official history of Germany in the war, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg, Band. VI 'Der Globale Krieg'. Just in case mine is not good enough for you.

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Sounds easy...but the small, little thing, that tanks rolling out of those tank factorys..would made me a bit jerkily.

Great, so now we see that this operational magick you previously advocated is not actually enough, and you need to take the city if you are serious about things? Previously, a magickally unharmed 6. Armee was doing great operational movements. Would those not have been impeded by those tanks rolling out of factories?

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

The Murmansk line was attacked, Afaik, by 6 Divisions divided in 3 Parts 3x2. I belive only one of this three reached the target but was then repulsed. If the Germans had put them together they became able to cut off the line.

1941, and no unit came close. By 1942 total stalemate had ensued on the Arctic frontline, only to be broken when the Red Army wiped the floor with the Germans in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in 1942.

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

Oh they did, but they reached only the outskirts...wasnt there an incident where a Officer drove some miles with the streetcar into the City?

1941 again, they captured a streetcar at the tram end station in Urizk (my grandfather was close by). The 11. Armee never attacked the city, in 1941 it was not even close, since it fought in the Nogai Steppe and on the Crimean approaches when Panzergruppe 4 was closing in on Leningrad.

Get your facts straight, otherwise you are wasting everyone's time.

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

To all the other things you wrote there is a true core....but this in the bottom...i really cant understand, from where you get this...is it a feeling??

Why yes of course. All of what I wrote was subjective impression.

Afaik....the kapitalistic USA was before the War the biggest ennemy from the Russians...always pushed by the propaganda. Hehe...

The USA did not shoulder the responsibility of being the nemesis of the USSR until after the war. Between the wars, that was handled primarily by the UK. In fact, the US at several occasions complained about how suspicious and hostile UK and France behaved against the USSR, both before and not least during the war. The USA and USSR shared many views on colonialism and imperialism back then. Views not at all shared with, say, the UK and France. Relations were not all that bad you know, although not very close perhaps.

"raises emotions" how sweet Tales can change after some decades. I know about an incident where a US Factory had to re-mark the Russian national meel "Borscht" with kirylik signs. The first delivering of food from the states with origin markings, made the People in Russia not really happy...

Might it not have been because they were unable to read the text on the cans, and thus unable to guess they contained soup? Would you dare eat something from a can with text you were unable to read? Say a can with only arabic text on it?

to be dependently from your former most hated ennemy, especialy in food...and that your own Governement arent able to support the own proud folk with the simplest hires...alone the thought the germans could cut of the supply from the USA must be a horror.

Ah, venturing into the very issue I expressed a desire to avoid - the significance of LL. I'll still not go there

Was there a Russian, who sayed "Thank you" to someone from the USA??

Very probably. Just as there were very probably Americans saying thank you to Russians, or other ethnic Soviets. Here's a whole bunch of them saying thanks to eachother.

And a contemporary quote to catch the atmos

Lieutenant Alexandr Silvashko served under Marshal Konyev and remembers the scenes of joy and celebration on the banks of the Elbe: "We were like brothers. We had defeated the enemy together. We were united in fighting fascism and we had won."

Can't argue with that. And they even hugged, drank and danced together, you know. Here, have a smile

Cheerio

Dandelion

[ May 11, 2004, 03:17 AM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

[JasonC]

dt said "And you still seem to be arguing on the basis of what happened in the war as not allowing any change to what might have happened"

No. I asked why everyone chases what ifs into unimportant minutae and fantasy land, instead of the actually decisive, simple, practically available what ifs. I am not assuming everything happens as it did. Fiddling counterfactuals and seeing what might result is fine as a method.

But it is pointless to apply it to whether a movie star in New Orleans on vacation broke a nail. Why? Because it is an utterly secondary matter that cannot be expected to matter for the main outcomes. And it is equally pointless to apply it to what if the Italians suddenly developed orbital mind control lasers in mid 1942. Why? Because it is a probability zero event, pure fantasy.

The obvious place to apply it is to real options about the big decisions bearing on the decisive events that actually determined the outcome, in the real case. When I say, "if the Germans had mobilized the economy for total war, for a long war of attrition, before attacking Russia" - I am *not* leaving everything the same as it was. I am changing something - a single decision fully within the power of the German leadership to decide otherwise. Not a zero probability event. Not an unimportant side show. Something they could really have done, that would have immediately and directly had an absolutely huge impact on the decisive processes in the decisive theater.

Why does everyone chase any other hypothetical, but never focus on the one that actually decided the war? Germany threw away its chances in Russia before starting by making one transparently and transcendently boneheaded move - not turning the economy on before attacking the freaking USSR.

Is this of no interest? Why is everybody more interested in Suez adventures and imaginary British capitulations and whatever the heck, any roundabout counterfactual except the one easy one staring everybody in the face that would have made the biggest difference? What is the bee n bonnet that makes the others so all fired interesting, and the actually decisive flub un?

If you critique a game of chess afterward in a postmortem, you can talk about possibly pursuing a different opening at move 12, or going for complications at move 16 instead of simplifying, or maybe a possible pawn sack at move 18. But do you ignore the hung queen on move 21 that actually decided the game?

What kind of postmortem, what kind of counterfactual analysis, what kind of imagining different possibilities, is it, that ignores the real moves that made all the difference and could easily have been done differently, to chase remote fantasies through tortuous side-shows that maybe by the taffyest stretch might have mattered at the margin?

Are people just bored by the real ones? Hashed them out too much? Or is there some magical special formula being followed? Only counterfactuals with moral of the story X, or that tend to play up the importance of Y, or...? What is the bee in the bonnet?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Are people just bored by the real ones? Hashed them out too much? Or is there some magical special formula being followed? Only counterfactuals with moral of the story X, or that tend to play up the importance of Y, or...? What is the bee in the bonnet?

Probably just too obvious, and it does not involve arrows on maps.

[A.E.B]

Originally posted by JasonC:

..................big cut..................

The obvious place to apply it is to real options about the big decisions bearing on the decisive events that actually determined the outcome, in the real case. When I say, "if the Germans had mobilized the economy for total war, for a long war of attrition, before attacking Russia" - I am *not* leaving everything the same as it was. I am changing something - a single decision fully within the power of the German leadership to decide otherwise. Not a zero probability event. Not an unimportant side show. Something they could really have done, that would have immediately and directly had an absolutely huge impact on the decisive processes in the decisive theater.

Why does everyone chase any other hypothetical, but never focus on the one that actually decided the war? Germany threw away its chances in Russia before starting by making one transparently and transcendently boneheaded move - not turning the economy on before attacking the freaking USSR.

...............................................

What kind of postmortem, what kind of counterfactual analysis, what kind of imagining different possibilities, is it, that ignores the real moves that made all the difference and could easily have been done differently, to chase remote fantasies through tortuous side-shows that maybe by the taffyest stretch might have mattered at the margin?

Are people just bored by the real ones? Hashed them out too much? Or is there some magical special formula being followed? Only counterfactuals with moral of the story X, or that tend to play up the importance of Y, or...? What is the bee in the bonnet?

JasonC

I recieved an email once from another poster who, after yet another JasonC/Rexford/Mr Tittles/et al thread on penetration stats and T34 vs. Pz IV and StuG IIIs, as the same question - "why are you guys getting so worked up over this. We know what happened, Germany lost".

So basically, you can look at history simply as a list of facts. The historical players make their decisions because that is the decisions they made.

Or you can play around with alternative "what ifs".

What if Germany had fully mobilised its economy, including using women in the workforce, for total war earlier?

What if the Pz III had originally been fitted with the 50/L60 gun rather than the cut price 50/L42 as intended?

What if Germany had pushed jet fighter research while they had the chance?

What if Britian had pushed jet fighter research when they had the chance?

What if Hitler had been assassinated in 1944?

And so on and so on.

So why do people like counter factuals? For the same reason people like to refight historical battles - to see if the outcome can be changed.

In the fantasy of the counter factual Germany may not lose in 1945.

The Poster starting this tread posited the counter factual of whether Russia could have defeated Nazi Germany if Britain had chickened out and made peace in May 1940.

You can posit a counter factual on whether Germany could have avoided/delayed defeat in 1945 if it had mobilised its economy for total war earlier.

It is just a bit of harmless fun.

Now, if I had been the Byzantine Emperor in 1454, and I decided to............

Regards

A.E.B

[Andreas]

I thought Jason's problem was more with the connection to reality of the usual counterfactuals, and why nobody was interested in discussing the one situation that really could have changed things and that could quite realistically have happened.

If you exclude the fielding of the Nazi multi-flailed laser octopusses with telepathy comms, that is. That would have really messed things up in the atlantic for the Allies.

[A.E.B]

If you exclude the fielding of the Nazi multi-flailed laser octopusses with telepathy comms, that is. That would have really messed things up in the atlantic for the Allies.

Will they be in Escape from Castle Wolfenstein III?

Regards

A.E.B

[JasonC]

"your premise that the Lend-Lease effort was ineffective"

Straw man alert. Don't put words in my mouth. I said no such thing. I said the tanks didn't matter, that LL mattered for logistics, especially transportation equipment, feedstocks for ammo, and food. But not in weapons - the weapons were bit players.

Another guys seems to think if they hadn't had this stuff from imports they wouldn't have had it at all. No, they would have needed more of their own people working on it and that would have meant fewer workers for the tank production stream and fewer recruits in the infantry, and certainly would have hurt.

But economic costs generally fall where they hurt least - that is what substitution is all about. You don't give up the critical locomotive output, you sacrifice some tanks to get it yourself if the US doesn't send them to you. Wherever the bottlenecks are, you put more effort, balancing each.

The result is that overall logistic support helps the whole overall effort, not critical this or that. That way, LL was certainly helpful to the Russians. It amounted to around 7% of their total war production by value. Since it filled some local weaknesses its real value might have been higher than that, maybe 10-15%, being generous. It was nothing like most of it, though.

And what people don't seem to understand is how dwarfed such items are by the big economic decisions. I sometimes get the sense that people think of economics as something that just goes, does its thing, no decision making involved. And supplies some level of output that is just accepted and made the most of. This is not the case. Not in economic war planning.

The result of a decision to switch on the economy for total war is increases in things like AFV output rates by factors of 4 times. The result of just doing that earlier and rapidly rather than later and gradually, easily comes to 2 times. And 5-15% marginal output (from use of the rest of Europe or LL helping Russia) is just dwarfed by such things. They are an order of magnitude larger.

Whether and when to mobilize the economy is the critical decision. If you are going to win quick and cheap before numbers have any chance to matter, there is plenty to be said for putting it off. It keeps long term investment going. It keeps design cycles turning over, developing new types. It keeps the population at home relatively happy.

But if raw output is going to be critical in a war of attrition, the sooner you drop everything and get serious about absolute focus on armaments now and everything else be damned, the more stuff you are going to have, and have sooner when it makes the most difference. A German tank produced in July of 1944 can't hold the Ukraine.

Next, you don't seem to know what synthetic fuel production even is. When it was the basis of German pre-war planning for autarky in war (along with synthetic rubber and new aluminum plants for planes), and the primary goal of the 4 year plans.

Germany developed ways of making oil and oil products (gasoline, diesel, av gas) out of coal feedstocks. In 1939 synthetic fuel production was 2.3 million tons, and in 1943 it was 5.7 million tons. That is about 42 million barrels of oil per year (the latter year). The Leuna plant along, about 3 million barrels worth. They used 60 million tons of coal to get that.

"Several processes were involved, the older ones of distillation and carbonization of coal tar to make fuel and oil and the newer methods of hydrogenation and the Fischer-Tropsch process." Alan Milward, war economy and society. So you understand, they are crushing coal, blowing hydrogen gas through a slurry of it at 600 degrees and 1000 atmospheres, etc. They literally make oil out of coal.

This is not normally done, economically, because the cost involved is far above the market price of oil, when it can be had for mere money. In a war it can't. The Germans knew they were going to war and would be cut off from outside oil supplies or blockaded, so they invested in technology and plant to do this between 1933 and 1939. They were still building more of the stuff when the war broke out - prematurely, from the point of view of their plans for this stuff. (Their target date was 1942).

German industry ran on coal, German railroads ran on coal, and the German oil products industry ran on a mixture of coal and Romanian imports. Even without external supply they could and did keep the Luftwaffe flying and the tanks moving and fighting. Until USAF bombers blew apart the hydrogenation plants.

Actually they were repaired (they are hard targets because the core equipment is made to withstand enourmous pressures and temperatures), but hit again, repeating this process but getting out only a trickle of their capacity. As a result the Luftwaffe ran out of av-gas - but not until mid 1944 after the plants were knocked out. And without the Luftwaffe flying, allied bombers KOed the rest of the oil target set, and ran the Reich out of gas. But not until late in 1944.

Next, I am told that the Axis powers had fewer resources than Russia - and I deny it, for starters - and that therefore the Russians would necessarily win a war of attrition - and I deny it, as not even following from the previous - even at quite favorable rates of exchange - and again I deny it. You can't lose 5 to 1 or 10 to 1 and win by wearing the other guy out, when you only have 2 times as much to begin with.

Nothing about going to zero is involved in that statement. Or any other straw man. Take your 200 against his 100 and exchange as much or as little as you like. You won't wear him out if you lose 5-10 for every 1 he loses. A war of attrition is perfectly winnable by a side that is smaller overall, if it has a favorable rate of exchange. The US in Korea inflicted 20 to 1 casualties on the Chinese. That China had a larger population was irrelevant - they could not win a war of attrition on those terms.

In the case of Germany and Russia, Russia outproduced Germany in tanks by a large factor only because they mobilized their economy sooner. It was entirely within Germany's capabilities to produce tanks at 1944 rates. If they had for four years instead of just one they would have matched the Russians in tank production. The Russians did not - remotely - match the Germans in tank kill ratios. The Russians would have run out - or low - of tanks long before the Germans did.

That this did not happen has everything to do with economic mobilization and nothing to do with "overall numbers" or any imaginary fatedness of Russians winning anything attrition-ee. The Germans got only a trickle of tanks in 1941 and 1942. The Russians absorbed huge losses but replaced them and built an AFV fleet 3 times the size of the German one, with high quality stuff this time not the prewar light junk.

After that fleet difference was in being, and after they had gone to school ("hard knocks") with the Germans about how to use the stuff, they then kicked the Germans out of European Russia. The Germans finally ramped their tank production - after they started losing. But since by then they were losing, their loss rates went up with their production.

So their fleet never got that growth spurt, and stayed stuck at 6-7k. And sometimes the running portion in Russia was only 3k. The Russians lost as much as they made - but had 20-25k right along. Panthers made in 1944 do not stop T-34s made in 1942. The Panther was a fine tank, but its shells move forward not backward in time.

All those late war tales of the Russians having 10 to 1 local odds are real enough, but they come about because the Russians have blown away so much and concentrated operationally and tactically. They did not have 10 times as many men. They did not have 10 times the industrial potential. (They had 2 times and 1 times on those scores, respectively).

LL helped (not in tanks, in transport equipment) but was not decisive - it is dwarfed by timing of industrial mobilization effects. Oil mattered but only late (because of synthetics) - it was beaten to the punch by fielded tanks remaining.

Which was a creature of economic decisions set by grand strategy - and in the case of Germany, by staggering levels of overconfidence based on pride and contempt for their enemies.

Which are errors. Decisive ones. Wars are lost through them. Pride is not just a vice, it is a blunder, to paraphrase Talleyrand.

[A.E.B]

JasonC

I agree with everything you just said.

In fact, it has been posited that Germany could have been defeated earlier if the chemical plant making octane booster had been bombed in place of the Hydrogenation plants.

What you post doesn't answer is, if Germany had put its ecomony on a war footing in say 1939 rather than mid 1942, would it have changed the eventual outcome of WWII?

Regards

A.E.B

[dieseltaylor]

Jason C

Thanks for the detail of the fuel production.

I do not think anybody would disagree with your arguement on a total war footing being vital for Germany if it were to compete to win. That is such a big arguement that it makes all other discussions irrelevant - I think there is not much arguement there. That is why we look at history post 1940 and accept that Hitler is as he was and what could have happened politically.

The further we go from 1940 the more difficult it gets with what-ifs. We could do the small level - what if they never attempted to capture major cities etc. I am interested in the benefits to Germany from Britain being knocked out and the consequent downside to Russia.

I think it slightly better than evens that the USA would have provided Russia with strategic resource. If they had not, and the Germans and their allies attacked earlier and with more men that is the real biggy .....

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Next, I am told that the Axis powers had fewer resources than Russia - and I deny it, for starters.

Ummm... Going through the posts, I really only see anything resembling that statement in my post? If so it should correctly be quoted as the Soviet Union having an advantage in terms of assets. As that is what I wrote and meant.

In terms of ground troops, in the eve of attack the USSR disposed of 4 700 000 men in the standing army, with a further approximate 20-25 300 000 men available for callup. The Axis total sum for the east was 3 200 000 men, of which approx 2 500 000 were German. German (field army) reserves amounted to about 2 000 000 at this point, excepting forces tied down on other fronts. In addition about the same number of Axis Minor, not all at disposal. This merely as a photo of that second, things would change with time.

Size of tankfleets; the lowest figure on operational Soviet tanks in june I have encountered is around 7 000 (figures run as high as 30K), with a Axis opposition of about 3 700.

That's the advantage in assets I was referring to. Given factual production figures (including production of army units) relations had no possibility of changing in Axis favour, rather the opposite if anything.

I think I need to know which part it is that you deny before I have a chance answering that.

and that therefore the Russians would necessarily win a war of attrition - and I deny it, as not even following from the previous - even at quite favorable rates of exchange - and again I deny it. You can't lose 5 to 1 or 10 to 1 and win by wearing the other guy out, when you only have 2 times as much to begin with.

This seems also to refer to my text. I cut your answer short there, as you present further maths, but you can easily check the post above.

The correct quote of my post is "If both sides remained intact as political entities, the Axis would be the first to reach the bottom of the barrel, even at very favourable exchange rates."

Again I am not totally sure what your problem with the statement is. You need to help me out with the denial part here as well.

As the war actually went, the Axis achieved an exchange ratio of about 1 to 5 in terms of casualties (soldiers). A rather fantastic figure in any war. But the problem still presented itself, that when half the Soviet field army [potential human base] was reduced (as it was), there still remained a force as large as the initial total Axis ground force [potential human base]. And if an Axis soldier died for every fifth Soviet (which they manifestly did) there were by the time the Soviets were halved not many Axis soldiers left to exchange.

Which is basically what happened.

German total (military) casualties (KIA) in the east were approx 2 500 000 men, times five is 12 500 000, which is half the maximum potential of the Red Army and corresponds well to the approx figure given for Soviet total casualties WWII (KIA), namely 13 600 000.

Nothing about going to zero is involved in that statement. Or any other straw man. Take your 200 against his 100 and exchange as much or as little as you like. You won't wear him out if you lose 5-10 for every 1 he loses.

Well as it was, that's nonetheless exactly what the Soviets did, losing 5 to every 1 and still wearing the Germans down to collapse and winning in a very definitive manner.

But I didn't really get that strawman part? Strawman means putting words in somebodys mouth in this context no? My original text had no reference to any of your posts whatsoever, implicitly or explicitly. It was my presentation of my thoughts, in response to the original challenger Falcon.

That this did not happen has everything to do with economic mobilization and nothing to do with "overall numbers" or any imaginary fatedness of Russians winning anything attrition-ee.

Is this still referring to my text?

The Russians lost as much as they made - but had 20-25k right along.

I do believe that the initial 20-25K was a highly theoretical figure and that the Soviets went down to around 4 500 AFV in December 1941, thus not far from German overall figures, thus roughly equals for a short while (seeing as around 2000 were facing the Japanese), and thus did not keep a constant 20K rolling. If the USSR lost what she produced, the Germans would have had to destroy 100 000 AFV 41-45. Is it your opinion that they did?

Which was a creature of economic decisions set by grand strategy

This is what I understand as the underlined message of your posts in this thread. The importance of economic strategy, specifically the timing of warfooting the economy, more specifically the belated German such? The concrete consequence of a earlier decision to mobilise the economy which you have presented repeatedly and put emphasis on, is a larger fleet of tanks.

This is not your only point, you have also pointed out that Germany was not as strategically vulnerable as suggested in other posts. But in this we agree, so I leave that debate to others.

All of this summarized to give you the chance of correcting my understanding of your line of argument. For the avoidance of strawmen.

I find your line of argument interesting but problematic. I will even explain myself.

I present two per se significant differences in opinion, but I can't see those particular differences very possible to debate in an interesting manner. First I do not find tankfleetsize quite that critical for the outcome and secondly I believe Germany had no real option, comparing with the UK economy, the worlds greatest at the time, collapsing totally after three years, never to recover, and Germany having no external sponsor equivalent to the USA to lean on. But shoot your torpedo against those two so we be even, if we debate it it'll just end in the yes-it-is-no-it-isn't backroom I think.

But, I do have of two logical problems with your claim, that I do believe can be debated in an interesting manner.

---

1. What increase of numbers could have been achieved?

The figure commonly used for total Soviet wartime AFV production is around 100 000. The Soviets are to have kept a rather steady 70% ratio of medium to heavy tanks. So around 70 000 such were produced. Give or take, there is no such thing as an accurate Soviet figure. This plus the 7-25 initial K's was what they had then.

Around 80 000 or so German AFV were produced during the war, of which around 23 000 or so are usually proposed to have been PzKpfw models >II. If including StuG and enclosed Jpz, German AFV production held a steady approx of 45% Medium to heavy "tanks", dropping only slightly to some 42% in 1943. The rest being light tanks, ACs, halftracks, open SPs etc.

That's of course not counting the amounts stolen from others, i.e. primarily Czech and to some extent French AFV. But these are irrelevant for this argument. But it is counting those built on German orders in occupied territories, i.e. primarily Cz.

After warfooting her economy, German AFV production rose from around 6 000 to around 20 000. She reached maximum monthly production of AFV in early 1943 afaik. Had she been at that speed all five waryears (counting 12month years, not calendaryears), output would by logic have landed somewhere around 100 000 AFV, of which 45 000 at best would have been medium to heavy tanks, StuGs or enclosed Jpz types. As it was, she only produced around 36 000.

The increase following from early mobilisation in numbers of tanks per se seems then to be a theoretical maximum of some 10 000 more than those actually produced.

That's if not putting in further what-if factors, like changes in AFV production priorities etc. Just extrapolating known figures.

2. What would have been produced?

You call the Soviet early AFV park prewar junk, and by and large I agree. You must then concur - I imagine - that the situation was the same with the Axis, as all fielded models proved if not insufficient then at the very least highly unsatisfactory against the Soviets.

The efficient models, those capable of dealing effectively with the brand new Soviet tankfleet from 42 and onwards, came rather late (e.g. IVH came only in late 42, VD in mid 43 etc). In fact They all seem to have entered production only after Germanys economy had been mobilised, when production figures were already reaching peak.

Thus the amount of these particular models made available was in fact maximum possible.

The extra production created by earlier warfooting would have been in the lazy years of 39-42. Thus the extra 10 000 tanks would have had to have been produced those years.

So we are specifying the gain to around 10 000 tanks of obsolete models.

Again, if we do not att further what-ifs, placing releasedates for models earlier etc.

---

Rounding off then, is it your opinion that this addition would have altered the outcome of the war? So decisevely so that it dwarfs all other aspects?

Cheerio

Dandelion

[K_Tiger]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Now, if you want to discuss matters of history, it would help if you could get basic facts right. See below.

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by K_Tiger:

[qb] Ok..your opinnion.

[qoute]Mine, and that of the official history of Germany in the war, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg, Band. VI 'Der Globale Krieg'. Just in case mine is not good enough for you.</font>

[Sergei]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Sergei:

I disagree. I don't think Germans had particularly good chances to win, and they were already lucky to have Stalin make some serious blunders during Barbarossa. But good luck doesn't equal good chance. Starting earlier would still have forced them to stop for supplies, meanwhile at least Finland would not have been prepared.

Thats your good right. Also with your opinnion about the luck the germans had. But there must something more than plain luck...Poland=Luck? French=Luck...Afrika=Luck...maybe a bit from all. </font>

[Sergei]

The Murmansk line was attacked, Afaik, by 6 Divisions divided in 3 Parts 3x2. I belive only one of this three reached the target but was then repulsed. If the Germans had put them together they became able to cut off the line.

I trust you have never been to Lapland or northern Norway, but you might still be able to understand that there were no roads in those areas to enable such a plan if you really strain your brain to the extreme. Meanwhile, Russians could any time move men and supplies along the railway. It was understood by German local commanders that the whole affair was a folly, and rather those men would have found better use in south while defending the Petsamo nickel mines.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

By 1942 total stalemate had ensued on the Arctic frontline, only to be broken when the Red Army wiped the floor with the Germans in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in 1942.

1944

[dieseltaylor]

Stalin ...

"pp. 35-36

FROM PREMIER STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr. ROOSEVELT

In taking this opportunity to send you a personal message through the courtesy of Mr. Standley, who is leaving for Washington, I should like to say a few words about U.S. military deliveries to the U.S.S.R.

The difficulties of delivery are reported to be due primarily to shortage of shipping. To remedy the shipping situation the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to a certain curtailment of U.S. arms deliveries to the Soviet Union. We should be prepared temporarily fully to renounce deliveries of tanks, guns, ammunition, pistols, etc. At the same time, however, we are badly in need of increased deliveries of modern fighter aircraft-such as Aircobras-and certain other supplies. It should be borne in mind that the Kittyhawk is no match for the modern German fighter.

It would be very good if the U.S.A. could ensure the monthly delivery of at least the following items: 500 fighters, 8,000 to 10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminium, and 4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives. Besides, we need, within 12 months, two million tons of grain (wheat) and as much as we can have of fats, concentrated foods and canned meat. We could bring in a considerable part of the food supplies in Soviet ships via Vladivostok if the U.S.A. consented to turn over to the U.S.S.R. 20 to 30 ships at the least to replenish our fleet. I have talked this over with Mr. Willkie, feeling certain that he will convey it to you.

As regards the situation at the front, you are undoubtedly aware that in recent months our position in the South, particularly in the Stalingrad area, has deteriorated due to shortage of aircraft, mostly fighters. The Germans have bigger stocks of aircraft than we anticipated. In the South they have at least a twofold superiority in the air, which makes it impossible for us to protect our troops. War experience has shown that the bravest troops are helpless unless protected against air attack.

October 7, 1942

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

The Germans have bigger stocks of aircraft than we anticipated. In the South they have at least a twofold superiority in the air, which makes it impossible for us to protect our troops. War experience has shown that the bravest troops are helpless unless protected against air attack.

Gotta hand it to the tricky old fox. By the end of 1942 when this note is dated the Luftwaffe had only 375 singleseat fighters left facing the Soviets, and the Germans reported 36 000 Soviet sorties to a total of 18 000 German. Mid 43, the Soviets had 8 300 aircraft against a German 2 500, things had already become untenable.

Still, must have worked. The Soviets received around 20 000 LL aircraft. 12% of the entire Red Airforce.

/D

[Andreas]

Originally posted by K_Tiger:

It was your stuppid comment to put only guns on the Wolga to stop the logistical traffic on it. Of course, you need the Town, but you dont need to use the brute-force method. A bridgehead on the east side maybe gived my idea a fair chance.

It is not my stupid comment, but that of the official history - I suggest you take it up with the MGFA if you do think you have some insight to offer on where they went wrong in their analysis. It should be fairly clear to anyone who has ever stood next to a river that all you need to control it for traffic along its flow is to be on one side of it, with guns.

As for problems with Germans, none, since I am one. 'Wiping the floor' is a pretty accurate account of what happened - in the same way as the Wehrmacht wiped the floor with the Red Army in summer 1941. It is an English colloquialism.

Finally, even a 'what if' thread benefits from posters stating which year they are talking about. It should be clear that streetcar rides in the year of 1941 have little bearing on what 11. Armee did in 1942. So I am still unclear why you brought it up. My guess is that you simply did not know which year it happened, and are now not willing to admit your ignorance, instead resorting to insults. Oh well, do go on.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

By 1942 total stalemate had ensued on the Arctic frontline, only to be broken when the Red Army wiped the floor with the Germans in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in 1942.

1944 </font>

[dieseltaylor]

Amusingly apposite

"The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany

12th March to 22nd March, 1946

Eighty-Fourth Day: Monday, 18th March, 1946

(Part 2 of 9)

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[Page 175]

DR. SIEMERS (counsel for the defendant Raeder):

Q. The prosecution has submitted the diary of General Jodl as Document 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries from the first half of 1940, in regard to which I should like to have your opinion. These two entries concern Russia at a time when Germany and Russia were on friendly terms.

I should like to say in advance that the substance of the intentions which are contained in these entries sound rather fantastic and that is why I would like to have your opinion as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

I quote the first entry dated 13th February, 1940:

"Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the squadron Rowehl is to be employed in full force going from Bulgaria toward the Caucasus. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated."

The second entry of May, 1940, reads as follows, and I quote verbatim:

"Fuehrer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post in the Caucasus."

I would like you to tell me what the thoughts were which guided you in these plans as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and what facts were the basis of your thoughts.

A. If these entries were made on the basis of a report by Admiral Canaris, who was the Chief of Foreign Intelligence, and if they were entered by Jodl in connection with the special long reconnaissance squadron Rowehl, it is because of the latter's connection with this squadron (to whom he himself frequently assigned Intelligence or espionage tasks) that he had heard of my intention to use it - which was something which I wanted to have kept specially secret. He

[Page 176]

apparently informed the High Command of the Wehrmacht, where this action, or the intended action, met with complete misapprehension and rightly could not be understood.

My intention in this connection - and I had personally ordered it - was entirely clear. The statement that it was to do reconnaissance in or in the direction of the Caucasus is not quite correct. It would have been more correct to say in the direction of the Caucasus, Syria and Turkey.

But this mistake may have occurred in the report transmitted by Canaris.

I had received more and more Intelligence reports to the effect that from Asia Minor actions were to be undertaken against the Russian oilfields of the Caucasus - Baku - and likewise actions for the purpose of gravely disrupting the oil supply from Roumania to Germany.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force I was the one chiefly interested in bringing in Roumanian oil, as well as the Caucasian oil, more precisely petroleum and gasoline, on the basis of a trade agreement with Russia, because at that time the refineries were not completed and not working to capacity. A disturbance in either one of these supplying regions would have greatly damaged my Air Force. Therefore I had to watch this closely. I anticipated disruption of the oil regions in the Caucasus.

I had the agents' report checked by very reliable people and found that in Syria an army was actually formed under General Weygand which had the name of "Orient Army." I was more interested, however, in the concentration of squadrons of aircraft in the Syrian area, not only of French but also of English squadrons. As far as I remember I received these reports about the intentions of the Franco-British air squadrons through informants in Turkey - that is to say, from Turks, because there had been negotiations with Turkey regarding permission to fly over her territory in order to carry out the intention of the English-French air squadrons of suddenly bombing the Baku area and thereby severely damaging the Russian oilfields and eliminating deliveries to Germany.

I therefore had to, or rather I was obliged to, find out constantly, through long-range reconnaissance flights, the extent to which the airfields in Syria were becoming more active than before. There could be no other reason for massing aircraft there exactly at this time, for it was not a theatre of war nor was there any threat from Germany at that moment. On the contrary, it would have been understandable if all British and French aircraft had not been needed in England and France.

If, therefore, my long-range reconnaissance flights established the fact that the aerodromes in Syria were being used more than ever, and further confirmed that possibly the East Turkish airfields were being increased, this would have been, and actually was, a confirmation of the alleged intentions. In this case, as soon as I had recognised this clearly, I would have to point out to the Fuehrer that Germany should draw Russia's attention to the danger threatening her.

The second remark, the establishing of "listening posts," not in the Caucasus but in front of the Caucasus, naturally served the same purpose, namely that of setting up secret radio stations along the general flight direction Syria- Caucasus, Syria-Baku, East Turkey-Baku, one, two or three, in order to find out whether preparatory flights of the Franco-English Air Forces were taking place in this direction, that is to say, first of all reconnaissance on the oilfields, etc. in order to get more information that way also.

Since at the time I had not yet conclusive and final proof in my hands, I kept these things to myself and only dealt with them in the offices responsible to my sector of the Air Force, until I could obtain a clear picture. Only later, after the termination of the French campaign, absolute confirmation of these intentions was obtained by the discovery of the secret reports of the French General Staff and of the meetings of the Combined Supreme War Council of England and France, a confirmation of the fact that my information was entirely

[Page 177]

correct and that a plan for a surprise bombing attack on all the Russian oilfields had been prepared. In the meantime the confirmation of the plan to eliminate the Roumanian oilfields, already known to us, was communicated to the Roumanian Government, and this attack in neutral Roumania was then prevented.

Q. I understood you correctly, did I not, that these plans were made by both England and France?

A. Yes.

Q. And that the intelligence you received was to the effect that the attacks on the oilfields were directly aimed at the then neutral Russia and also, indirectly, at Germany by the cutting off of her oil supply.

A. Of course.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.