"The High Water Mark" for the Germans?

[Gaylord Focker]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

Dorosh, what you write is full of hate, no matter how many smilies you use.

Why are you that full of hate?

Why are you denouncing me, and telling lies?

Where is your problem?

Though Dorosh may be an ass at times, a giant one even, he does have a good grasp on the events of the second world war, perhaps you should broaden your horizons a bit and let go of your own hate?

[kenm]

Try this out. The German high water mark was 12/7/41. As unpopular as this will be, in my opinion, the Germans lost the war when their allies the Japs pulled one of the stupidest attacks in all of recorded history and attacked Pearl Harbor.

Could the US have won the war alone? I don't know. Reality is GB was alive and kicking. The other wealthy members of the Empire were willing to pitch in.

Top off the bad decision making by the Japs, Hitler decides it's a good thing to invade Russia. Another genius decision.

There may be many weaknesses in the US and GB systems. Attacking superior countries isn't one of them. Delusional governments are created by lack of democracy.

[kenm]

Forgot to mention this is one of the most interesting threads I've seen. That's saying a lot cause you guys who post on this board are mana for any history buff.

Thanks.

[Gaylord Focker]

Kenm, the war against the Soviet Union could possibly have resulted in a victory had the Americans not entered the war.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

Kenm, the war against the Soviet Union could possibly have resulted in a victory had the Americans not entered the war.

I think one might say that the fight against the Axis was a close-run enough affair that the withdrawal of any of the major Allies might have turned the tables. Even a withdrawal of a sufficient number of minor players, especially Canada, might have done the trick.

I have criticised the Axis as stupid for taking on the rest of the industrial world—as well one might—but it is worth keeping in mind what formidable enemies they made, especially Germany. They were overcome in the end only through extreme and uncompromising efforts on the part of the Allies. Any flagging on their part might have witnessed something less than unconditional victory.

Michael

[ June 05, 2003, 12:11 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Generally a sound post, but I have to demur on a couple of points.

Originally posted by SFJaykey:

The Royal Navy might not have presented the great obstacle many seem to think it would have. The Admiralty had already issued an edict that no vessels larger than a destroyer were to enter Channel waters...

But that was to preserve them against need. Had Sealion been launched, that need would be present. Surely in a do-or-die situation like that, the Royal Navy would have thrown everything necessary into the battle. That's always been their tradition and I can't see them changing it here.

Germany in Spetember '40 would have been invading an isolated, largely unfortified Britain almost entirely bereft of heavy military equipment.

Let's not exaggerate. In September, 1940, Britain was not entirely isolated, it had the support of the Commonwealth, including the presence of CW troops.

Neither was it entirely unfortified. I know, you didn't say 'entirely' but 'largely', but I feel even that qualification gives a false impression as by September considerable measures had been put in hand to fortify the island, especially the southern beaches where the attack was expected. While not exactly an Atlantic Wall, against whatever the Germans might have been able to get all the way across the Channel, even under the most optimistic allowance, those fortifications would have presented no small obstacle.

Also, I would not have described the British forces as "almost entirely bereft of heavy military equipment". Granted there were huge shortfalls and not nearly enough to go around, but there was still some left, and what there was had mostly been organized into mobile reserves. There was a good chance that they could have been concentrated at the critical point, and that would have multiplied their effect.

But then, we are speaking of might-have-beens, so who really knows?

Michael

[A.E.B]

Where to start.....

I think the highpoint for Germany was the period between the defeat of Poland and the invasion of France. Given the apparent "friendship" between the Soviet Union and Germany, Britian and France were faced with an impossible task if they had to take the war to German (France invaded about 30 km into Germany during the Polish Campaign but promptly decamped back to the "safety" of their Fortifications).

If Hitler had simply gone on the defensive, and diverted resources from the army to the Navy and Airforce, Britian and France would have been trapped in a war they didn't want and which they couldn't possibly win. Therefore the most likely outcome would have been a diplomatic settlement that left Germany with its gains.

On Operation Sealion, the Germany Staff did do extensive planning, but then that's what military staffs do. The air/sea assault on Crete used some of the details that had already been worked out for Sealion. Given the crippling losses suffered by Student's parachute army, and the almost total destruction of the seabourne element by the Royal Navy despite German/Italian air superiority, it is probably lucky for Germany that they didn't put Sealion into operation.

The experience of Sealion, Crete and Deipe also convinced the German High Command that a seabourne/airbourne invasion into the teeth of prepared defenses was suicidal. Therefore, though Britain wasn't defeated, it also couldn't challenge Germany on continental Europe, and therefore was "contained" as a threat.

I have also read (in Brute Force I think) that the Germany Staff didn't initially underestimate the Russian armed forces, and that their initial invasion plans revolved around a thrust to Moscow with an invasion army that had 2 more armoured divisions, 10 more infantry divisions and 500,000 tons more supplies than the force that actually undertook Barbarossa. However, constant arguments between different branches of the German government, and reports on the quality (or lack of) of Russian forces in Poland, coupled with Hitler's obvious desire for a war to settle matters in the east, led to a downgrading of Soviet capabilities to a level "do-able" by the available German forces.

Regards

A.E.B

[SFJaykey]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by SFJaykey:

The Royal Navy might not have presented the great obstacle many seem to think it would have. The Admiralty had already issued an edict that no vessels larger than a destroyer were to enter Channel waters...

But that was to preserve them against need. Had Sealion been launched, that need would be present. Surely in a do-or-die situation like that, the Royal Navy would have thrown everything necessary into the battle. That's always been their tradition and I can't see them changing it here....

</font>

[Gaylord Focker]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

Kenm, the war against the Soviet Union could possibly have resulted in a victory had the Americans not entered the war.

I think one might say that the fight against the Axis was a close-run enough affair that the withdrawal of any of the major Allies might have turned the tables. Even a withdrawal of a sufficient number of minor players, especially Canada, might have done the trick.

I have criticised the Axis as stupid for taking on the rest of the industrial world—as well one might—but it is worth keeping in mind what formidable enemies they made, especially Germany. They were overcome in the end only through extreme and uncompromising efforts on the part of the Allies. Any flagging on their part might have witnessed something less than unconditional victory.

Michael </font>

[Tero]

Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

i think the Axis would have defeated the Soviet Union had it not been for American, British, and Commonwealth forces,

I think the forces were not as instrumental (as such) as was the aid they sent. In a what-if scenario where the USA is not going to war against the Germans it would not have ensured the fall of USSR by default. And this because the fact FDR was already giving (or selling) aid to the British and the Soviets as it was. It was after all Hitler who deglared war on the US, not the other way around.

The Western Allies did tie up significant numbers of German forces but since the Germans were already stationing occupation forces in the west and engaged in pastisan warfare in Yugoslavia the mere presence of hostile forces in the UK was enough. The DAK expedition was a sideshow for the Germans.

IMO the crusial period was the period between the start of Barbarossa and the winter of 1943. And during that period the Western Allies were not engaged in land warfare against the Germans in a manner that was either (really) helping the Soviets or hurting the Germans. And the aerial effort against the German industrial effort the Western Allies were putting up was (in retrospect) of doubtful value before 1944.

The British Western Desert forces were already on top of the DAK, thanks to the US military aid. In a sense the Germans were already being contained with the help of the US industrial might. Without US ground forces against the Germans the war would propably have lasted longer but the outcome would have been the same.

and aid, as well as unintentional Japanese aid.

IMO the Japanese were not a major factor due to their defeat in the hands of the "old" Red Army at Nomonhan and Lake Hasan. AFAIK the deal the Soviets struck with the Japanese coincided with the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbour. I would not even put it beyond Stalin to having endorsed the attack on Pearl Harbour as a means of getting the US actively involved in the war. In a sense the intentional, deliberate and deglared aid the Finns gave by not taking part in the siege of Leningrad was far more effective as a contributing factor to the failure of operation Barbarossa than the Japanese unintentional help ever was.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by SFJaykey:

I agree, it is hard to imagine the RN holding back its most powerful assets in the face of invasion, but that was apparently the plan. There was a lot to fear in the Channel from U-boats, mines, and Luftwaffe...

But again I have to stress that the withdrawal of heavy units from the Channel was to safeguard them from slow attrition from the factors you mention. In the event of an actual invasion, they would have matched whatever the Kriegsmarin sent to escort the invasion fleet. If the KM used only destroyers and torpedo boats, the RN would have used destroyers and a few cruisers. If the KM had upped the ante to include cruisers, the RN would have sent more cruisers and maybe a battleship. If the KM pulled out all the stops and sent the whole waxworks, the RN would have sent a couple more battleships.

It's worth keeping in mind that at this stage of the war, the KM might have had more to fear from the RAF in this kind of battle than the RN had to fear from the Luftwaffe.

During the Dunkerque evacuation, wasn't it like pulling the Admirals' teeth to even get their destroyers involved?

And with good reason. How many destroyers did they lose? But they went anyway, which is my point. When the stakes are that high, you play with what you've got and you take your chances.

Might have beens, as you say....the fun thing about hypotheticals is there is lots of room for debate.

Well, sure. I'll play this game all night long.

Michael

[ June 05, 2003, 07:22 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[SFJaykey]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

It's worth keeping in mind that at this stage of the war, the KM might have had more to fear from the RAF in this kind of battle than the RN had to fear from the Luftwaffe.

I think the Sealion planning assumed Germany would win the Battle of Britain, and the invasion would be conducted under skies controlled by the Luftwaffe. When Germany shifted from targeting the RAF to targeting British cities, any possibility of Sealion being successful evaporated.

And I will agree to disagree on the likely involvement of RN heavy units in the Channel.

[Keith]

Strategically, the high water mark occured during the fight for the Yelna salient near Smolensk in August/September 1941. Russian fierce resistance and counter attacks frusterated the German time table for the advance to Moscow and caused Hitler to shift the bulk of AG Center armor to AG South (for the Kiev encirclement) and AG North (to try to reinvigorate the stalled drive to Leningrad). Hitlers decision to disperse AG Center armor ultimately led to the failure to capture Moscow in 1941. By the winter of 1941 the Germans had lost thousands of tanks and vehicles due to wear and tear and the unavailablity of spare parts. These loses, particularly in vehicles, were never made good. Most importantly, the infantry ranks were decimated during the fall/winter of 1941, which resulted in the loss of countless veterans due to frostbite and combat. Everything went downhill from there because the best the Germans could hope for was a stalemate on the Eastern Front.

[Gaylord Focker]

Originally posted by Tero:

I think the forces were not as instrumental (as such) as was the aid they sent.

I disagree, only because Stalin was making such a huge fuss about the West opening another front in 1943 to help relieve the beleagured Soviets, wich ended up happening in Sicily, Italy, and later Normandy.

In a what-if scenario where the USA is not going to war against the Germans it would not have ensured the fall of USSR by default.

Barring some unexpected disaster it pretty much did ensure an Axis victory had the U.S not entered the War. There never would have been extra fronts tying down and diverting German Divisions and resources from the East, also no mass Allied Strategic bombing of the German war machine.

And this because the fact FDR was already giving (or selling) aid to the British and the Soviets as it was. It was after all Hitler who deglared war on the US, not the other way around.

FDR was sending aid, and that played a big part in Germany declaring war in my opinion since the U-Boats were very successful at that time, and was assumed the U.S would be too busy with the Empire of Japan, they were wrong.

The Western Allies did tie up significant numbers of German forces but since the Germans were already stationing occupation forces in the west and engaged in pastisan warfare in Yugoslavia the mere presence of hostile forces in the UK was enough. The DAK expedition was a sideshow for the Germans.

So you do you count elite Waffen SS divisions as stationing occupation forces as well? THe amount of men and materiel tied down in France and Italy, combined with the massive strategic bombings to come played an enormous role in later Soviet success.

IMO the crusial period was the period between the start of Barbarossa and the winter of 1943. And during that period the Western Allies were not engaged in land warfare against the Germans in a manner that was either (really) helping the Soviets or hurting the Germans.

So North Africa does'nt count?

And the aerial effort against the German industrial effort the Western Allies were putting up was (in retrospect) of doubtful value before 1944.

Realy? So all of those aerial flotillas of ME-109's and FW-190's were of no value in 1943 in combating American and British strategic bombing? Again, those Luftwaffe assets in the west were greatly needed and would have been put to good use in the east.

The British Western Desert forces were already on top of the DAK, thanks to the US military aid. In a sense the Germans were already being contained with the help of the US industrial might. Without US ground forces against the Germans the war would propably have lasted longer but the outcome would have been the same.

Interesting, but how do you come to that unfounded conclusion?

IMO the Japanese were not a major factor due to their defeat in the hands of the "old" Red Army at Nomonhan and Lake Hasan.

Well your wrong, because up until Pear Harbor, they were tieing up around one million siberian troops, that later headed to the eastern front.

AFAIK the deal the Soviets struck with the Japanese coincided with the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbour. I would not even put it beyond Stalin to having endorsed the attack on Pearl Harbour as a means of getting the US actively involved in the war. In a sense the intentional, deliberate and deglared aid the Finns gave by not taking part in the siege of Leningrad was far more effective as a contributing factor to the failure of operation Barbarossa than the Japanese unintentional help ever was.

I disagree, had the Finns invaded Leningrad with the Axis, with nothing else changed, it only would have resulted in more deaths, and not a victory.

[ June 05, 2003, 02:41 PM: Message edited by: Gaylord Focker ]

[Steiner14]

Originally posted by kenm:

Try this out. The German high water mark was 12/7/41. As unpopular as this will be, in my opinion, the Germans lost the war when their allies the Japs pulled one of the stupidest attacks in all of recorded history and attacked Pearl Harbor.

Kenm,

my vote goes for that date, too.

It also shows very good the non-existing collaboration of Germany, Japan and Italy, while the western Allies, despite all ideological differences, showed and excellent cooperation with the USSSR.

Was Hitler already silly enough, to help Mussolini always out from his disastrous adventures, instead of stopping him, but which i still can understand with good will from a strategical point of view, i have absolutely no clue, why Japan preferred to attack the US-fleet, with no chance to come the end of war only one step closer, but to involve the sleeping US tiger, while the Germans were almost pleading, to attack finally Russia in the east and to bind the rest of the red forces and to cut off lend and lease deliveries (IMO the difficult situation of Hr.Gr.Süd followed by Stalingrad, wouldn't had happened).

OK, this 'great' japanese decision was followed by Germany's genius act, the declaration of war against the USA , but IMO this wasn't war-deciding, because it was only a question of time, until the USA would have entered the war against Germany and was only waiting that a good reason appears (what a joke, that Germany itself presented that reason on a silver-tray).

IMO, on 12.7.41, with that attack, Axis gave the close victory against the USSR away, which only had to be grabbed, and lost the law of action freely to the Aliies.

Maybe someone has infos/opinions/theories, why Japan ignored the German pleading (please, rational ones, not 'because they were evil and stupid' )?

[ June 05, 2003, 04:12 PM: Message edited by: Steiner14 ]

[Gaylord Focker]

The USA embargo on Japan for it's agression was hindering the empire's ability to wage war since it was the U.S who was hooking them up with all that nice scrap metal, oil, and rubber.

Japan was looking at it as more of a now or never situation, wich never was never considered as since they wanted to make their empire larger, a war with the U.S was inevitable.

Also bigotries (ignorance) on both sides had the U.S and the Japanese underestimating each other at the start.

[ June 05, 2003, 06:00 PM: Message edited by: Gaylord Focker ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

Maybe someone has infos/opinions/theories, why Japan ignored the German pleading (please, rational ones, not 'because they were evil and stupid' )?

Because there was almost nothing of immediate value to the Japanese cause in the Soviet Far East. Plus, even though they were now preoccupied with fighting Germany, the Soviets had shown their ability to beat the living crap out of the Japanese in earlier engagements. Those were waters the Japanese were not eager to test again any time soon.

Michael

[ June 05, 2003, 05:36 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

I disagree, only because Stalin was making such a huge fuss about the West opening another front in 1943 to help relieve the beleagured Soviets, wich ended up happening in Sicily, Italy, and later Normandy.

By early 1943 the Soviets had the Germans pretty much contained. IMO the real reason why Stalin made the fuss was the fear of bleeding the Red Army white leaving it too weak to repell any attack by the Western Armies after the Germans had been beaten. Or worse yet for him, the Germans would have been pushed back to their own borders and then they sue for peace and the Western Powers accept their surrender. That would have left the Germans as nominal losers but intact and in a position to form an alliance with the West against the USSR.

There never would have been extra fronts tying down and diverting German Divisions and resources from the East,

Extra fronts ? The only entirely new front was formed in France.

And in case the US did not commit troops the US production would have been available to the British and the Soviets giving them the necessary logistical superiority.

also no mass Allied Strategic bombing of the German war machine.

The thing is there was no mass destruction of German war machine by this strategic effort. The US involvement (8th AF) was in no condition to fight effectively before they got the LR fighter escorts. Which happened in 1944. So in that respect the US involvement in the air offensive prior to 1944 was more of a moral booster than a real military hindrance for the Germans.

FDR was sending aid, and that played a big part in Germany declaring war in my opinion since the U-Boats were very successful at that time, and was assumed the U.S would be too busy with the Empire of Japan, they were wrong.

When you are debating what-if's you can not induce this kind of data as reasoning.

The premise is the US did not enter the war. That leaves the fact FDR was already supplying aid to both the UK and the USSR before Dec. 7th 1941. Had Hitler not deglared war on the US FDR would still have suplied both the UK and the USSR with aid.

So you do you count elite Waffen SS divisions as stationing occupation forces as well? THe amount of men and materiel tied down in France and Italy, combined with the massive strategic bombings to come played an enormous role in later Soviet success.

Which came first, the egg or the hen ?

Men and materiel tied down in France and Italy did not increase dramatically prior to Kursk. This puts the time in mid 1943. And IIRC the Germans had to call off troops massed for the Kursk offensive because of the invasion in Italy. By which time the Kursk offensive had ground to a halt anyway.

The same applies to the effects of the air war over the Reich. The number of men and materiel tied down remained constant.

So North Africa does'nt count?

If we go by the German priorization: no, it did not count.

Besides, there were no US troops in NA prior to 1943. Only US built machines manned by British/CW troops.

Realy? So all of those aerial flotillas of ME-109's and FW-190's were of no value in 1943 in combating American and British strategic bombing? Again, those Luftwaffe assets in the west were greatly needed and would have been put to good use in the east.

The damage inflicted to the industries was not really effective. The effects of tying down resources was real. But prior to 1943 the Red AF was still in the process of being rebuilt so I doubt there would have been much to do for the figters but strafing. Which would have put them at risk of being shot down by AAA.

Interesting, but how do you come to that unfounded conclusion?

They are unfounded only if you think I'm belittling the actual US war effort. Which I am not. I'm just working a what-if based on historical facts as of 1941 prior to Hitlers deglaration of war and extrapolation from them. And in that set of facts the US does not commit troops.

Well your wrong, because up until Pear Harbor, they were tieing up around one million siberian troops, that later headed to the eastern front.

Please, remind me: which came first, the attack on Pearl Harbour or the parade of the Siberian troops on Red Square followed by immediate deployment to the front to repell the attack on Moscow ?

The way I see it the Siberians were reserves held back until absolutely needed. The Japanese were not tying them down because the Japanese had gotten to run for their money against the Red Army and were not going to risk defeat in an area which was not beneficial to their strategic goals. Stalin secured the Japanese standing before releasing the troops from Siberia.

I disagree, had the Finns invaded Leningrad with the Axis, with nothing else changed, it only would have resulted in more deaths, and not a victory.

Really ? How many Germans were there in AG North ? Had the city fallen in (say) September 1941, would they have been deployed elswhere, like to support the attack on Moscow ?

[CombinedArms]

There's a least one factual error here...

Originally posted by Tero:

Besides, there were no US troops in NA prior to 1943. Only US built machines manned by British/CW troops.

US troops landed in NA in large numbers as part of the Torch invasion on November 8, 1942.

As I've said, I tend to see November 1942 as the turning point in combat terms. The Allies succeeded with a number of potentially risky offensives. If they had failed, who knows what might have happened. Since every one of them succeeded, the Axis war effort was on the strategic defensive from then on.

I'm thinking of:

Torch

El Alemein

Stalingrad encirclement

Guadalcanal

The Axis extremities were suddenly being successfully attacked. The Axis was never able to regain the strategic initiative.

[Tero]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

There's a least one factual error here...

I stand corrected.

However, being less than 30 days off my previous statement I do not feel it totally demolishes my premise since my original time limit was set at the winter of 1943.

As I've said, I tend to see November 1942 as the turning point in combat terms. The Allies succeeded with a number of potentially risky offensives.

Make that Western Allies and I concur.

If they had failed, who knows what might have happened. Since every one of them succeeded, the Axis war effort was on the strategic defensive from then on.

On the whole, I agree. In the case of the Eastern Front the situation was a stalemate until after Kursk.

The Axis extremities were suddenly being successfully attacked. The Axis was never able to regain the strategic initiative.

I'd say they lost the strategic initiative soon after Barbarossa started. The Germans had no resources to spare to respond in a STRATEGIC level after Barbarossa drained them and the Japanese lost their ability to respond in strategic level by Guadalcanal.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Hans:

One more thought

What was the high tide for the Cold war? For the Russkies.

For Soviet Union in general I'd say the immediate post-WW2 years. In Europe the pre-1941 gains (West Ukraine, Bessarabia, Karelia, Baltic republics) had been cemented. In addition, Finland ceded Petsamo, and I seem to remember that a piece of Czechoslovakia changed hands. Also Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgary and a large part of Germany were occupied, along with a military base outside Helsinki. Of these Khruschev gave the military base in Finland back in early 1950's.

In Asia, Manchuria and the northern half of Korea plus the Kurilles were taken from the Japanese. But Manchuria and some such areas in the Far East were given to China after Mao had won the civil war, not that that would have improved the relationship very much. Troops were also withdrawn from North Korea.

But it is a bit problematic. Firstly, at that time Soviet Union was a crippled giant. A case could be made that the "high water mark" should be measured in economic terms, not just geographic. Economics aren't my best area, though. Secondly, how to assess Soviet global influence, which presumably is important as the cold war was fought mostly in the developing countries. But I don't consider those "allies" as being very much useful for Soviet Union, rather a burden as they were not genuinely under Soviet control like Warsaw Pact countries were but could jump over to the Maoist or the Titoist camp, and having to deal with bush wars like that in Vietnam was a nuisance for Kremlin whenever it was trying to improve its western relations. We probably would still have a wealthy and prosperous Soviet Union had Batista defeated the rebels so Soviets wouldn't have had to buy overpriced sugar from Castro just to keep Cuba from sinking...

[Marlow]

Dr. Suess thought it was the invasion of Russia. From a July 1941 editorial cartoon:

[kenm]

""Originally posted by Gaylord Focker:

i think the Axis would have defeated the Soviet Union had it not been for American, British, and Commonwealth forces,"

Then posted by Tero-

I think the forces were not as instrumental (as such) as was the aid they sent. In a what-if scenario where the USA is not going to war against the Germans it would not have ensured the fall of USSR by default. And this because the fact FDR was already giving (or selling) aid to the British and the Soviets as it was."

The US went on a war time economy after Pearl Harbor. No way would the lend lease program have contributed to the war effort in the same quantity without the shift to a total war economy. In 1941 the US was the only country with any significant surplus manufacturing capacity available to immediately make a major contribution to the war effort. That capacity was moderately in use during the 1940-41 years, but went all out after Pearl Harbor.

The stupidist attack I can envision was Pearl Harbor.

[kenm]

From Gaylord Falker on why the Japenese attacked America--

"The USA embargo on Japan for it's agression was hindering the empire's ability to wage war since it was the U.S who was hooking them up with all that nice scrap metal, oil, and rubber.

Japan was looking at it as more of a now or never situation, wich never was never considered as since they wanted to make their empire larger, a war with the U.S was inevitable."

This might be true for scrap metal and rubber but I thought the Dutch oil from Indonesia, which Japan conquered, was more than sufficiant to provide the demand of Japan. The US strategy during the war centered on cutting this oil supply off.

[manchildstein (ii)]

Originally posted by SFJaykey:

I think the Sealion planning assumed Germany would win the Battle of Britain, and the invasion would be conducted under skies controlled by the Luftwaffe. When Germany shifted from targeting the RAF to targeting British cities, any possibility of Sealion being successful evaporated.

it's been said that the raf was seriously 'on the ropes' just before the luftwaffe started targetting cities instead of airfields. apparently the target switching was in response to the raf's first raids against berlin.

as for dunkirk, i'd thought that every available british vessel was pressed into service for that. the conventional wisdom is that the germans could have simply crushed the bef beachhead with an attack by their encircling panzers. i think though that - everything else such as weather and luftwaffe ineffectiveness being the same - that the royal navy would have showed up and shelled the panzers into oblivion. i get this sense from what the allied naval guns did to german counterattacks at normandy 4 years later...

as for the high water mark, i would go with the moment the luftwaffe switched from targetting airfields, over to cities.

but the point about the period between polish and french campaigns is a good one... if by some accident of hystory hitler and stalin had been allies, they would have eventually ruled from kamchatka to gibraltar, and probably all of africa as well. that would have been a twip

[ June 08, 2003, 02:02 AM: Message edited by: manchildstein II ]