"Battlefield shock" - real phenomenon or my misconception

[David Chapuis]

This was brought up marginally in the “Sneak Attack” thread on the “Tips and Tricks” forum. However, that thread has wandered off in so many directions from the original that I thought it would be better to start fresh – especially since “battlefield shock” wasn’t even part of the original question (not intentionally anyway).

My question is actually a three-tiered question:

1) Is “battlefield shock” (that is my term for it – is there another term for this that is more commonly used) a realistic combat phenomenon, or is it just a misinterpretation by me of events in various readings that I have done?

2) If “battlefield shock” is a realistic combat phenomenon, does it only happen at the operational level, or is it also seen at the tactical level (ie the CM battlefield level)

3) If “battlefield shock” does happen at the tactical level, how could it be added to a future CM release in a way that enhanced the game?

First let me try to explain what I mean by battlefield shock (which will be hard since I don’t even know for sure – but maybe you can help me refine it). Somebody else in the “Sneak” thread made a comment about maneuver theory and “firepower shock”. But I am not sure if they are referring to the same thing I am, since often there isn’t really any firepower (at least not significant amounts of firepower) involved.

Lets start with this definition for now - By “battlefield shock”, I am referring to events where soldiers, from units as small as 1 soldier to entire divisions, will seem to be shocked into a state of combat ineffectiveness for some amount of time from perceived threats as opposed to legitimate threats.

It seems like this “battlefield shock” occurs most often from encountering an enemy at an unexpected time/location/place/manner, ie being “surprised” in some form or the other by the enemy. However, the reaction is greater than what I would call a “surprise reaction”. It seems like “battlefield shock” occurrences start with a surprise reaction – all units can get surprised by an enemy – but then will continue past the point of what I consider reasonable from just being surprised. The reason I refer to it a phenomenon is because sometimes the reaction is brought under control, but sometimes it spins out of control.

From my readings, this seems like a fairly common occurrence on the battlefield.

An example. From the The Easter Offensive (Turley) during the April ’72 NVA invasion. This occurred at the Dong Ha Bridge over the Cua Viet River.

While Dong Ha was undergoing the final NVA preparatory fires, and before the enemy’s armor and infantry moved on the city, Sergeant Luom and his rocket team of the 3d Marine Battalion remained in their assigned positions. As the enemy barrages ceased, the first T-54 tanks arrived at the north end of the bridge. The classic confrontation between an Asian “David” and a 40-ton steel “Goliath” was about to begin.

Sounds like the perfect briefing for a CM scenario.

Sergeant Luom . . . extended his M-72 LAAW (basically an ineffective AT weapon) into the firing position. From a prone position on the bridge’s roadway, he could not get a clear shot at the tank, but fired anyway. The projectile passed high over the tanks round turret and exploded harmlessly. . . His assistant handed him another LAAW and, tanking more careful aim, he fired a second time. The small anti-armor rocket struck the T-54 at the junction where the turret joins the chassis. . . For several seconds everything remained still. Then, the commander’s head appeared at the top of the turret of the NVA tank as he looked across the bridge to see what had attacked their vehicle. Obviously, he could see little and thus hesitated at the unknown. Then, rather than exploit the psychological shock-action, mobility, fire power of his tank and its 100MM gun, he backed the lightly damaged T-54 off the bridge. Incredibly, the enemy’s armor column came to a halt with that single non-lethal hit. Luom’s action had temporarily stopped the NVA main ground attack. The extraordinary bravery of this one South Vietnamese Marine had caused an armored attack, which until that moment had been almost certain of success, to lose its momentum.

Now this seems like a pretty good, perhaps not perfect, example of “battlefield shock” during a tactical battle. The NVA did not think there would be resistance at this bridge, but thought it would be just across the bridge (there was a combat base approx 1500 – 2000 m behind the bridge). It seems like the mere appearance of the South Vietnamese willing to resist shocked this tank commander so much, the entire attack was abandoned for some time. The book doesn’t say how large the NVA force at the time of this incident was, but later it says there were confirmed to be over 100 tanks in the battle for the Dong Ha bridge, which lasted until the bridge was blown a couple hours later.

That is just one example, there are more in this book that I will post later.

[Dook]

There is a substantial body of thought that thinks something like "battlefield shock," to use your term, exists. Most recently, it was the idea underlying much of the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The media seized on the idea, simplified and distorted it, and "shock and awe" became the buzzwords of the war.

I'm not sure if your example illustrates the usage and kind of effects envisioned by proponents of the concept. It is more commonly used for offensive warfare and usually involves the use of rapid maneuver and decisive firepower against key enemy nodes to "break" the enemy psychologically.

Your example seems to be representative of a more common phenomenon, the "gee, I'm taking fire unexpectedly, maybe I better not cross an exposed bridge without figuring out what I'm facing" effect, for lack of a better term. Essentially, very few commanders will simply send men or tanks blindly into the fray without taking the time to assess the situation.

[Louie the Toad]

There is no doubt that battlefield shock exists.

However in CM should it be placed in the AI or remain in the mind of the shocked player?

As I write this I recall that the AI sometimes 'takes over' a unit for self preservation purposes. Isn't that what happened in the action on the bridge discribed above?

My conclusion is, that in the mind of the shocked player or with the AI .... to borrow a phrase:

"It's in the game!" ............ Toad

[Guest Mike]

I don't think yuor examle of hte Sth Vietnamese infantryman vs the NVA tank is relevant tho - the advance stopepd because the lead tank knew there was a threat out there, couldn't identify it, and so (quite reasonably IMO) decided it would be foolish to continue the advance.

Every "first contact" drill in the world has similar elements - identify the threat, eliminate or mitigate or decide to suffer it, then continue.

There's no evidence the T55 column couldn't fight effectively - however lacking targets there was nothing for them to fight at all!

Much better examples exist - from Chaerona about 196 BC for example - where half the Roman army defeated half the Macedonian army, then part of the victorious Romans wheeled about to take the remainder of the Macedonian army in the rear - these promptly surrendered although they had been defeating their opponents to the front.

In ancient times there are numerous examples of armies panicing due to teh appearance of enemy in their rear - sometiems even to the appearance of friends in their rear who they mistook for enemies.

There are numerous examples throughout history of troops who were tigers in one action and collapsed like a house of cards in another not long before or after.

[Michael Dorosh]

I think you're trying to use "battlefield shock" to encompass far too many different and unrelated battlefield phenomena, frankly. A soldier suffering combat exhaustion is a much different case than an entire division who has had its headquarters destroyed. They are seperate occurences.

There can also be more than one way of explaining many of the phenomena mentioned or inferred here. A division finding itself inactive on the battlefield may be said to be suffering shock, but there can be other explanations - lack of firm leadership, lack of clear orders, simple ennui, sheer surprise, confusion, whatever. Do all these things together = "shock"? If so, do all these things have to be present to properly call a state "shock"?

Given a self-admittedly poor definition of the term, I'm not sure there is much utility in trying to discuss what is ill-defined?

[Redwolf]

At an operational level, "shock" is not a psychological effect.

Instead, you can better compare it to a mechanical shock, for example when a structured object is hit by a heavy and fast object on one side, or when a body is hit heavily on one place. A mechanical shock means that the impact does not only damage those cells that are hit, but that the structure of the object is damaged by bejond the impact point. That is mostly because the connections and joints between the cells all over the area are stressed.

If you have a large military unit and hit it fast (or suddenly) and heavily on one point, then the whole unit will react. All the built-on structure of the unit in its buildup or its formation will be messed up. Your create (mechanical) stress on the construction.

As a result, units in this kind of shock are less capable of resisting a new impact elsewhere.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Dook:

There is a substantial body of thought that thinks something like "battlefield shock," to use your term, exists. Most recently, it was the idea underlying much of the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The media seized on the idea, simplified and distorted it, and "shock and awe" became the buzzwords of the war.

This is media only.

In the miltary sense, "shock and awe" does not mean something like a psychological shock or a mechnical shock from a fast and heavy impact.

"Shock and awe" as a military theory means that you have all the battlefield aweness you can dream of and you deny any intelligence to the enemy. Once you did that you drive through the gaps without the enemy being able to resist. At the same time, heavy precision fire is brought down at the known enemy positions, but only fire from sources that cannot be fired back at (artillery, airplanes, missiles from ground or helicopters bejond range of enemy AA or AT fire).

Lats but not least movement of the enemy is prevented by the ground units which drove through the gaps and/or from the air.

There is an excellent artile somewhere, if you remind me I'll post the URL (I'm not posting from where the printout is).

[Los]

First off, I think the example with the tank describes nothing more than something the AI already does today in CM. An individual unit is attacked, whether it suffers casualties or not it might become suppressed or even attempt to withdraw. Or maybe the NVA commander had right clicked on the tank and gave it advance to contact orders instead of move, hunt, or assault orders. When a LAW hits the outside of a tank you hear a huge clang. You don't sit there and go , oh well, "I've seen the penetration table back some time ago and in it's just a Law and it probabbly won't kill me". A big bang means somebody's trying to do something bad to your tank and you're more than likely going to either A: Remove the threat (if you can see it) or B: Get out of the kill zone. Keep in mind also that NVA armor at that point did not have a tremendous amount of experience or training level, as they were used very seldom before that, so that unit may have been green.

Morale effects of enemy action against units who are the victims of that action already have morale rules taken into account.

A better issue where CM could use an adjustment in morale is this:

You are moving a whole company across a front of several hundred meters, there's a platoon of tanks leading with the grunts behind. A hidden 88 rips into the lead Sherman and it explodes in a spectacular fireball. Sqauds within the blast radius either take casualties or hit the dirt. (as they were physically effected by the attack).

But what about the rest of the company which is in LOS of this event but not in direct threat of flying shrapnel. Do they just ignore it as if nothing has happened and just trudge along? DO they hit the dirt too and stay under taking cover action until the player reorders them forward? Or do they potentialy even suffer further suppression results based on a temporary lowering of morale based on viewing such a catostrophic event so close and knowing they may be next?

I think that may be a better example of a "battlefield shock" effect to be considered for future implementation. Suppression doesn't always effect just the guy getting shot at, sometimes it effects everyone around him on LOS. This effect of course would be modified by various factors such as leadership, unit experience level and fitness, as well as terrain, whether the enemy is spotted, and other circumstances.

As far as larger morale issues that occur outside of the 20-60 minutes most CM battles are fought, they don't have much place in the calculations of the game during battle. The scenario designer can set all this up front. I mean, you can take the first SS panzer division and set it's morale to regular or green, if you want to simulate some sort of bind that they are in (i.e. trying to withdraw during the final stages of the bulge operation when evertything has gone wrong). Or tweaking fitness and supression to get units to a certain temporary or game lasting mental state. There's much subtlety in the scenario design system.(though no doubt more can be added).

Los

[ October 03, 2003, 09:59 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

[David Chapuis]

I don't think yuor examle of hte Sth Vietnamese infantryman vs the NVA tank is relevant tho - the advance stopepd because the lead tank knew there was a threat out there, couldn't identify it, and so (quite reasonably IMO) decided it would be foolish to continue the advance.

First off, I think the example with the tank describes nothing more than something the AI already does today in CM. An individual unit is attacked, whether it suffers casualties or not it might become suppressed or even attempt to withdraw.

I agree that this tank stopped and retreated with a rational purpose. It didn’t know what hit him so withdrawing is fine. But this was not just one tank trying to cross a river. This was an armored advance, with eventually over 100 tanks (not sure how many were present at this time) and supporting infantry. There was a preparatory artillery barrage by 5 regiments of artillery (over 100 guns). And taking this bridge was extremely important for the NVA. When it was blown (which it was), they had to go 9 miles west to get to the next bridge.

What doesn’t seem very rational is that the entire advance stopped, because 1 tank got hit by a rocket that didn’t destroy it. IMO, it seems like the appearance of the enemy affected the advance much greater than it should have.

Furthermore, something like this would never happen in CM. Don’t get me wrong – I do NOT, repeat NOT (it always makes me laugh when I read McArthur’s memos using that phrase ), want to change the game so that you lose control of all your forces from one shot. But I have read about lots of occurrences similar to this one, and I think, “that would never happen in CM.” Admittedly, many of those are outside the scope of CM, but not all of them are.

A better issue where CM could use an adjustment in morale is this:

You are moving a whole company across a front of several hundred meters, there's a platoon of tanks leading with the grunts behind. A hidden 88 rips into the lead Sherman and it explodes in a spectacular fireball. Sqauds within the blast radius either take casualties or hit the dirt. (as they were physically effected by the attack).

But what about the rest of the company which is in LOS of this event but not in direct threat of flying shrapnel. Do they just ignore it as if nothing has happened and just trudge along? DO they hit the dirt too and stay under taking cover action until the player reorders them forward? Or do they potentialy even suffer further suppression results based on a temporary lowering of morale based on viewing such a catostrophic event so close and knowing they may be next?

Yours is a good example of morale affecting other units that are not under direct fire. However, an 88 is a very legitimate threat to an advancing force. I am more specifically wanting to talk about threats that are more perceived than real. Said another way, threats that are perceived greater than they really are, and therefore have an affect - or cause a reaction - greater than what would be considered rational. And it seems like this happens most often when the threat comes in an unexpected location/manner, etc. I think my example does do a good job of showing that.

I think you're trying to use "battlefield shock" to encompass far too many different and unrelated battlefield phenomena, frankly. A soldier suffering combat exhaustion is a much different case than an entire division who has had its headquarters destroyed. They are seperate occurences.

You are probably right. But, correct if I am wrong, the results of the separate occurrences often look like the same thing.

Given a self-admittedly poor definition of the term, I'm not sure there is much utility in trying to discuss what is ill-defined?

It is ill-defined – sorry. But I’m hoping some of you that are more knowledgeable could help me refine my definition. So maybe when I post some more examples, which I plan to, it will become more clear.

[ October 03, 2003, 12:17 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[David Chapuis]

Originally posted by Los:

Keep in mind also that NVA armor at that point did not have a tremendous amount of experience or training level, as they were used very seldom before that, so that unit may have been green.

I am just wondering if you know that for a fact, or if that is just an assumption of yours.

A better issue where CM could use an adjustment in morale is this:

You are moving a whole company across a front of several hundred meters, there's a platoon of tanks leading with the grunts behind. A hidden 88 rips into the lead Sherman and it explodes in a spectacular fireball. Sqauds within the blast radius either take casualties or hit the dirt. (as they were physically effected by the attack).

But what about the rest of the company which is in LOS of this event but not in direct threat of flying shrapnel. Do they just ignore it as if nothing has happened and just trudge along? DO they hit the dirt too and stay under taking cover action until the player reorders them forward? Or do they potentialy even suffer further suppression results based on a temporary lowering of morale based on viewing such a catostrophic event so close and knowing they may be next?

I think that may be a better example of a "battlefield shock" effect to be considered for future implementation. Suppression doesn't always effect just the guy getting shot at, sometimes it effects everyone around him on LOS. This effect of course would be modified by various factors such as leadership, unit experience level and fitness, as well as terrain, whether the enemy is spotted, and other circumstances.

Here is another example similar to what you are talking about:

If two squads in a platoon became panicked and took off running, how often in real life would the 3rd squad become panicked also - even if the 3rd squad wasnt under fire and didnt even see what caused the other two squads to panic. And I'm not talking about just rationally thinking, "Our buddies are gone. It isnt smart to stay here tactically, so lets withdraw." I mean how often do they think, "Our buddies are running, I dont know exactly why - probably has something to do with half of them being bloody and dismembered - I am running too." Surely seeing your comrades in arms take off running has got to cause a pretty good morale hit.

IMO, this example seems pretty plausible, but it would never happen in CM (or did they make a change to CMBB for something like this) where a squad not under fire would become panicked because their buddies do.

[ October 03, 2003, 01:11 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[JasonC]

Several issues.

One the tank at the bridge is not a great example. There may be a component of it that is the thing you are after and I will get to that. But there is no reason to think the halt of the column was anything but voluntary.

The effect in that case is simple due to limited intel. Did one LAW team stop the column? The column did not know it was one LAW team. If they had they would have proceeded, obviously. But it was not involuntary panic or anything of the sort that prevented them from advancing. They simply had to make an estimate of what enemy was in front of them and they made one that happened to be wrong.

From their point of view, it was entirely possible the bridge and the area just beyond it was a heavily defended kill zone covered by an entire battalion just waiting to annihilate a large portion of the column. That the LAW team had simply been the first to pull a trigger, perhaps a little prematurely. Rather than proceed farther into what might be a KZ, they stopped to plan a response.

Now here is the only place where something like what you are after probably was involved in that case. Planning the response did not successfully happen, quickly. In CM terms, the old movement orders were "voided" and they experienced a new "command delay". But that command delay stretched.

Real commanders do not receive information about battle developments as fast and as reliably as CM players do. Except in time TCP-IP, they can also think as long as they like about a response, and only incur the fixed command delay the game imposes on each particular unit. That delay does not increase as the size of the force being redirected increases.

Actually, every HQ is considered to have the full plan the player came up with in less than a minute of combat time, immediately in his head. The command delay the game models is only him getting it down the last level to his men.

What you are really after is a *confusion* effect.

How would I try to model that, short of dropping borg sighting etc? I'd want a first contact - new contact kind of event. It adds command delay to the next order changes. How much should have a random factor, with wider variance for unled, led but without plus command rating bonuses, conscript or green quality. Lower for led, vet or higher quality, command bonuses.

What triggers? First contact unless on a "move to contact" order. Set a flag, only happens once per battle. (Implies unexpected, in some sense). Enemy sighting, for the first time only, in the rear 120 degrees of the unit (set a flag - only happens once per battle, for that unit).

Now, this would lead to only a momentary confusion effect - a hesitation, with any adaptations of old orders to the new situation delayed. The delay would only be long if the units were unled, green, etc. That something like that happened at the bridge is clear enough - but the hour long delay was a bad estimate of the forces in front of them, which is the kind of thing only a player made mistake can or should model in CM.

This is not panic. Panic is something else. Operational situations can let tactical developments result in panic. For example, if one's whole side knows the enemy is conducting a massive overall offensive and one is in danger of being cut off, with retreat imperative to survive, the reaction to seeing significant enemy forces well behind, on one's only potential route out, are going to be different and larger than when none of the above is true.

Here is how I would address the operational factors issue. I've proposed something similar in the past for different reasons, but it would handle this as well. Each side in a scenario should be given a global morale tolerance level. Passing below it conceptually induces a state of "break off attack" for attackers and "retreat" for defenders (or MEs).

The only actual implimentation is that every turn a side is below its global morale tolerance level, it *offers ceasefire*. Whether the player likes it or not. Therefore if *both* sides go below their tolerance level, a ceasefire will automatically occur.

If you drive the other side, only, below his, then you may end the fight at that point or not. Whether a side has been driven below its morale tolerance is not revealed, however. You only find out if you offer yourself, when it is accepted, etc.

I wanted this option in the past to allow scenario designers to engineer fights which did not end in annihilation of one side or the other.

But it would also sometimes induce outcomes that you might interpret as "shock" effects. E.g. a certain barrage breaks a third of the enemy force. The barrager thinks he is winning at the moment and is offering cease fire. The barrage drives his opponent momentarily below his tolerance, and so the barragee is forced to break off his attack.

For what it is worth.

[Determinant]

Interesting thoughts. This is I guess classic OODA Loop stuff. An acronym which I believe means 'Observe, Orientate, Decision (make one), Action (do something)'. Once you've done something you're supposed to go back to observe the next new threat and sort that out.

If you cannot cycle through your OODA loop quicker than your opponent then you're always playing catch up. In fact you cannot work out what is going on. Bad things happen to you. But you are clueless and helpless. That is battle shock

We all experience bits of this from time to time. Being in a car crash. Seeing your wife give birth. Watching TV on 9/11 (we'll not forget the shock of that day will we?). That kind of thing. Near lock down of any rational cognitive response. How much worse when some evil little bastard is actually TRYING TO KILL YOU in the flesh. And you can't even work out how/from where etc.

As CMers we are, I suppose, interested in the behaviour of formed units under control. You're right to say that the flight of fugitives will encourage other fugitives to flee. But that is not a wargame. It's crowd behaviour. Like the bitter end of the 1/24th Foot at Isandlwhana or the 7th Cav at Little Bighorn.

But I have experienced something a little like battle shock when playing CM. It's called playing PBEM with an opponent who is much better than you. Someone who lives just inside your OODA loop. Crappy, crappy, hateful games. It really hurts but Brother do you learn (pride is such a small thing - but there). So in conclusion: CM offers us a window (small and a bit opaque, but a window nontheless) into battle shock.

By the way - my sympathy is with the NVA tank crew. Especially as I believe that even a LAAW will, technically, overmatch a T55 flank!

Happy gaming!

[Cabron66]

I don't think this would be easy to portray using existing AI capabilities. So many of the decisions made on the battlefield boil down to gut instinct, experience or luck. CM, by its nature, relaxes battlefield stress to an almost laughable degree. I mean that not as an insult, but as an observation. CM allows you to stop, pause, think, consider, change view points, scan over the terrain, gingerly stroll about the land while bullets suspended in the air wait for time to continue flowing, etc.

Most of what you are referring to is a result of not having time to think through and/or a lack of intelligence (pun!). Imagine this scene. That NVA tank gets hit. The top pops open and a man comes out waving a white flag. The battle stops. Several uniformed men come out onto the bridge while the AT crew patiently observes them. The NVA calmly discuss the situation while one of them chats with his girlfriend on Messenger. After a few minutes they decide that it was simply a lucky shot and go back to their positions. The tank commander climbs back up and, just before slamming shut the hatch, waves the flag again. The battle starts. The armoured column advances, takes a few mosquito bites while laughing like hyenas in their tanks, crosses the bridge and obliterates the enemy.

My point, as long-winded as it has become, is that you are talking about a very real phenomena, but also one which would be next to impossible to model in CM.

I'm not critical of your idea. Actually I think it's a very important point, but I think CM would have to be changed dramatically to be able to allow for these kinds of events. So dramatically that it might actually become a different game.

[ October 04, 2003, 05:32 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[David Chapuis]

The effect in that case is simple due to limited intel. Did one LAW team stop the column? The column did not know it was one LAW team.

Limited intel certainly played a very big part. As well as only one route of advance. But IMO you cant attribute the stopping of the column just to limited intel. It seems like the rational thing would have been to get more intel. But they just stopped. I attribute that to my – perhaps imaginary – “battlefield shock”. But I agree that the example is not compelling to somebody who disagrees.

What you are really after is a *confusion* effect.

I think that “confusion” is definitely a very large part of it. Definitely the effect I am trying to describe/define is based on a lack of full knowledge. But it seems more than just a confusion. It seems like confusion that is accompanied by a sudden panic – not panic in CM terms – but at least a short term panic that leads to some degree of battle ineffectiveness. Sometimes this results in just a quick panic reaction and then unit regains control. Sometimes the panic leads to running away or surrender.

Here is another example.

Congressional Medal of Honor

VAN T. BARFOOT

Rank and organization: Second Lieutenant, U.S. Army, 157th Infantry, 45th Infantry Division.

Place and date: Near Carano, Italy, 23 May 1944.

Entered service at: Carthage, Mississippi.

Born: Edinburg, Mississippi.

G.O. No.: 79, 4 October 1944.

With his platoon heavily engaged during an assault against forces well entrenched on commanding ground, 2d Lt. Barfoot (then Tech. Sgt.) moved off alone upon the enemy left flank. He crawled to the proximity of one machinegun nest and made a direct hit on it with a hand grenade, killing two and wounding three Germans. He continued along the German defense line to another machinegun emplacement, and with his tommygun killed two and captured three soldiers. Members of another enemy machinegun crew then abandoned their position and gave themselves up to Sgt. Barfoot. Leaving the prisoners for his support squad to pick up, he proceeded to mop up positions in the immediate area, capturing more prisoners and bringing his total count to 17.

Came across this in another thread, and thought this was another modest example of the kind of reaction I am referring to. Obviously I don’t know for sure why they surrendered (referring to the part in bold), but the way I picture it they saw their buddies in the next MG nest get attacked from an unexpected location, and they just panic and surrender. I just don’t see it being a process where they rationally consider their alternatives, but rather were “shocked” – for a lack of better term – into surrendering. And –it goes without saying -but it definitely is in the timeframe of a CM battle, but is something that would never happen in a CM battle – at least not the way that image that I get from reading that.

By the way - my sympathy is with the NVA tank crew. Especially as I believe that even a LAAW will, technically, overmatch a T55 flank!

Not according to this author. Although they did have some capacity to knock out a tank, he describes them as practically useless.

[Sergei]

duh

[ October 06, 2003, 04:10 AM: Message edited by: Sergei ]

[JasonC]

"the way I picture it they saw their buddies in the next MG nest get attacked from an unexpected location, and they just panic and surrender"

Um, no. That is indeed just "your way of picturing it". You don't have any reason to actually think so.

In the case of the tanks at the bridge, you have no evidence of panic whatever. You just don't understand why they'd stop and not continue, unless they panicked. But an inability to understand on your part is not a sign of panic on theirs. You don't know what happened. And I've explained how it easily could and probably did happen, without any panic. The initial halt was called simply because they didn't know what was there, and it took too long to get moving again because of confusion in a large unit. Aka the sergeant in the 1st tank was waiting for orders and not getting them. Does not equal "soiling his pants and ignoring his orders".

In the case of the medal citation, there is nothing in it to indicate the direction of attack was in any way unexpected. You have no reason to suppose that had anything to do with it. They obviously knew he was there - they left their positions to surrender to him. They obviously knew what he'd done - your own explanation is based on their fear they were next.

What you apparently haven't considered is the distinct possibility that was an entirely rational fear and not in any way panic. He worked around a flank, yes. He took out one flanking position. The Germans continued to fight. He took out another and they began to give up. Is this panic, demonstration effect, magic? There is no reason to think so in the citation.

Defenses are constructed to support each other. They "wire" together. Positions typically do not cover their own immediate front (sighting "sideways" makes them harder to spot and suppress) and certainly can't cover all the dead ground from their own location.

They need mutual support, to see the routes up to each of them. This is high ground, remember. Can you think of a way to put 3 MG positions on a hill, not right on top of each other but in some tactically useful configuration, and have all three of them all cover the same ground? It doesn't work that way.

The guy had probably just "unlocked" the position. I can think of dozens of terrain and tactical situations where a defender would know, as long as position A holds out I'm in the game, but as soon as it is gone I'm done for myself. Maybe the first cover the right, the second covered the front, and the third only covered the left approach to a ridge. After 2 are gone they've got the grenading SMGer up on higher ground behind them and know they can't stop any number of other Americans from joining him there, absent the help of the 2 KOed positions.

"OK", you will want to say, "so it is rational. But where is it in CM?" If you've set up the nutcracker on a given position you can kill it. You just execute the threat. If they break rapidly you get prisoners, if they fight to the end you kill them. Some will do one and some the other. Sift through a thousand QBs and you will find plenty of cases either way.