Treatise on Battalion Commanders

[Michael Dorosh]

I added the following info to one of my sites; any comments? Am interested in British, US and German policies regarding this and how they compared or contrasted, as well as corrections to the following:

The Canadian Army in World War Two fielded a very

considerable variety of battalion commanders in World War Two; some were strict disciplinarians, some were lax, some stayed well to the rear, others spent much time in the front lines, perhaps needlessly. While one cannot generalize about the bravery or personality of battalion

commanders in World War Two, it is possible to

characterize their age and experience.

In general, 1939 battalion commanders tended to be

prewar Militia officers, many of whom had experience fighting in the First World War; consequently, many tended to be aged in their forties. In England, with the British Army providing instruction and administrative guidance, younger officers were trained, and many platoon

and company officers from 1939 found themselves

promoted to battalion command, as the older COs were deemed unfit for active service due to their age. By the time the battalions were commited to combat in 1943-44,

a battalion commander in his forties was rare, and by 1945 a battalion commander in his late 20s was not uncommon.

While the Canadian Army is sometimes criticized for promoting too many officers from within the small confines of the Regimental families, the Army in fact had a policy whereby many COs were found among the staff officers of the various divisions, corps and army staffs. A history of

the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders tells us "A new policy had been adopted in the Canadian Army to give staff officers who were slated for more senior appointment regimental command experience and the Camerons...(often)...had to accept commanding officers with no previous regimental ties."

There do not seem to have been any hard and fast rules or set policies, however. General Crerar, in a draft memo in March 1942, stated:

While promotion to the rank of Lt. Col., and appointment as officer commanding, is not to be considered as confined to the officers of that regiment, it is important that promotion within the unit should be followed whenever conditions permit.

When the Canadian forces in England found themselves under the command of British General Bernard Montgomery, all infantry battalions were scrutinized by the General, and his recommendations were taken very seriously by senior Canadian command. While "Monty"

often only had the briefest of looks at a battalion, and its leadership, his snap judgements on what he saw quite literally could, and did, make or break the prospects of a company commander, battalion CO, or RSM.

It was recognized that commanding a battalion was a severe strain on any individual, and by 1944 it was decided that a commander could effectively lead a battalion for a limited period of time. Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, the GOC of II Canadian Corps, sent a memo to Canadian

Military Headquarters in the UK in October 1944 in which he stated

...it has been amply demonstrated both in North Africa and Italy that when active operations are continuous, the Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion is good for about four to six months.

Simonds recommended that rotating Commanding Officers out of their positions after a few months be made standard practice.

In many cases, rotation was not necessary as battalion commanders were not bullet or shellproof, and many were killed or wounded in action. While Battalion Headquarters

was not far enough back to be safe from enemy shells or mortars, many COs adopted leadership styles that increased their prospects of death or injury. Lieutenant Colonel Crowe of the Royal Canadian Regiment was killed in Sicily while trying to locate his battalion after a

breakdown of communications. His second in command had been killed while attacking three German tanks with a PIAT. (There is some irony that the CO and the second in command of the RCR were the only two officers of the battalion to die during the Sicily campaign.) While

Lieutenant Colonel MacLaughlan of the Calgary

Highlanders was derided by his men for occupying deep bunkers and wearing a US steel helmet, his successor Lieutenant Colonel Ross Ellis was admired for wearing a balmoral and frequently visiting the forward areas. Part of

the Highlanders' ire may have been directed at

MacLaughlan because of his strict disciplinary views, which were a contrast with the leadership style of his predecessor, J. Fred Scott. In the end, no place was safe for a battalion CO; many were wounded or killed in their own headquarters or during Orders Groups well behind the front.

When a CO was hit, replacement could come either by moving a Major or Lieutenant Colonel from a staff position outside of the battalion, or more likely, promoting a Major in command of an infantry company to the position - either

from within the same unit, or from another. The normal lag for a Major appointed to command a battalion, and his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, was three months. During this time it was possible for another officer to be brought in to replace him, and his status therefore was

considered "acting commander" until he was confirmed in the position.

The rewards for being a battalion commander were

minimal; while a competent CO could generally expect to get the Distinguished Service Order, it was by no means automatic. Bravery medals for Commanding Officers were rare, as they were expected to plan and to lead rather than

take an active part in the fighting. During especially confusing periods of action, the necessity for personal action did present itself - such as when the CO of the Regina Rifles Regiment had to gun down a German despatch rider who had ridden up to his headquarters by accident in the middle of the night - but this too was rare.

While a battalion CO enjoyed a slightly higher rate of pay than his majors and captains, and certain physical creature comforts denied his platoon commanders (such as a warm and dry place to sleep), the overwhelming responsibility for the lives of several hundred men, and the stresses involved in leading those men against one of the

best armies in history, more than took their toll on even the strongest officers.

On the whole, the semi-professional Canadian Army

managed to produce many first rate battalion

commanders, many of whom went on to greater

responsibilities and higher commands. Notably, Bert Hoffmeister of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, who went on to command the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division, and John Rockingham, who commanded a brigade in Normandy after being promoted from command of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, and who later commanded the Canadian contingent in Korea. Like most battalion commanders in WW II, Hoffmeister and

Rockingham had not been full time soldiers before the war, and had started their military training in the part-time Militia before 1939.

One battalion CO, also a prewar militia officer, won the Victoria Cross for his leadership at Dieppe. Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt personally led charges against German

machinegun positions and led troops through enemy fire across a well defended bridge during the fighting at Green Beach. Staying behind with his rear guard while the remnants of his battalion evacuated, Merrit was taken prisoner and spent the rest of the war in captivity. His actions were exceptional (he was the only Canadian above the rank of Major to receive the VC in World War Two), but many other battalion COs displayed similar standards of physical courage and personal leadership during the fighting in Sicily, Italy and Northwest Europe.

[Redwolf]

Speaking of Battalion commanders, I especially like the passage in Charles MacDonald's "Company Commander" where is said he was glad to be shot at by a German MG. Because it chased the battalion HQ away that was going on his nerves for the past hours.

The whole book is giving quite some insight into the relatioship of Company and Battalion commanders.

[Brian]

Out of a matter of interest, what sort of average age were Battalion Commanders, Michael?

In the Australian Army, there was a trend, towards promotion and appointment of quite young officers to higher commands, as the war progressed. I know of several examples of where battalions were led in the latter stages of the New Guinea and the Islands campaign by commanders as young their late twenties. I know of one who was commanding a battalion by the age of 27, however, he was considered exceptional (Charlie Green, who later went onto command 3 RAR in Korea where he again proved an exceptional commander before his untimely death)

Was there a similar trend in the Canadian Army?

[Sir Uber General]

Well my bn pixel commanders usually have good bonuses so they are definately near the front! None of these steel hat wearing bunker cowering weenies for me!

its the nearly the weekend... you can probably tell

[Michael Dorosh]

check out http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/2divwwiibncomds.htm

I have a partial list, but it is most interesting.

Youngest Battalion CO was 24. Many in their 20s.

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]</p>

[CombinedArms]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by redwolf hates artillery:

Speaking of Battalion commanders, I especially like the passage in Charles MacDonald's "Company Commander" where is said he was glad to be shot at by a German MG. Because it chased the battalion HQ away that was going on his nerves for the past hours.

The whole book is giving quite some insight into the relatioship of Company and Battalion commanders.<hr></blockquote>

This is a remarkable book, which I praise every chance I get. Franko has done some excellent scenarios based on its incidents, notably, "We Run LIke Hell," when MacDonald's company fought a key delaying action in the Bulge.

MacDonald is also, of course, one of the major US historians of WWII. This was his first book, about his own company command experiences in the US 2nd division, produced right after the war.

It's fun to watch him worrying about mortar placement, shifting his FOs into better positions, and calling in arty strikes when the FOs aren't handy. We get to see him racing across Germany in the final months of the war (contrary to CM norms, in his case the briefings were usually right, there actually was no German resistance in the next village)--and ultimately, negotating the surrender of the entire city of Leipzig (it didn't quite come off.)

A great read all around--spiced by MacDonald's sharp eye and keen sense of humor.

[CMplayer]

It's interesting that MacDonald was at the northern 'shoulder' of the Bulge, while the author of the perfect companion book, 'If You Survive', George Wilson, defended precisely at the southern shoulder.

I'm not sure what the point is, but it struck me as interesting. (Wilson also had a thing or two to say about the higher ups)

[ 12-15-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[Redwolf]

Unfortunately MacDonalds Bulge book looks like a letdown on first sight. But I'm not really into it by now.

[ 12-15-2001: Message edited by: redwolf hates artillery ]</p>