Facts and Myths of the Eastern Front: What the heck did happen?

[Grisha]

Originally posted by machineman:

No one is saying they did everything wrong. But to say the combat record of the Red Army is outstanding is pushing it. The fact that they did win in the end pushed a lot of things under the carpet, ie, from the Glantz article I posted above:

Soviet military history ignored other notable Soviet defeats during the later war years. Among those notable operations, which, like Mars, endured obscurity and silence, were the failed Soviet Central Front offensive of February-March 1943 in the region west of Kursk, the abortive Soviet Belorussian offensive of fall 1943, and futile Soviet attempts to invade Rumania in May 1944 and East Prussia in fall 1944. This silence was possible because each of these defeats occurred at the end of a major Soviet strategic advance, when victorious context masked the failure to vanquished Germans and history alike and shrouded the events in a cloak of anonymity, which has endured for more than fifty years. That cloak is finally being lifted.

And the details do have some relevance here:

A 15 December German Ninth Army report(after said operation Mars)judged that the Russian operation had sustained a heavy defeat and "bled itself out," adding:

The enemy leadership, which demonstrated skill and adaptability in the preparation and initial implementation of the offensive,..once again displayed its old weaknesses as the operation progressed. Indeed, the enemy has learned much, but he has again shown himself to be unable to exploit critical unfavorable situations. The picture repeats itself when operations which began with great intent and local successes degenerated into senseless, wild hammering at fixed front-line positions once they encounter initial heavy losses and unforeseen situations. This incomprehensible phenomenon appears again and again. But, even in extremis, the Russian is never logical; he falls back on his natural instinct, and the nature of the Russian is to use mass, steamroller tactics, andadherence to given objectives without regard to changing situations.

I would go so far as to say this has not only been a constant in the Soviet army post war, but was passed down to Soviet influenced armies since then, and did not work any better for the Syrians, the Egyptians or the Iraqis than it did for the Soviets in WWII.

Ahh, so the fact that the Soviets had some bad defeats in '43-'44 means that they were pretty poor overall? This near blanket statement doesn't sit well with me. While it is true that the Soviets could screw up even in 1944, they were also capable of operational excellence. Please read up on Operation Bagration of 1944, and the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945. Not only were they prime examples of tactical and operational maneuver, these two operations were also excellent examples of Soviet intelligence/reconnaissance(razvedka) and deception(maskirovka). These two operations are classic textbook operations fit for any country's military academy.

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[GriffinCheng+]

A lot of grest points mentioned, but let me add a gain of salt:

Why did the German line collapse so completely after Kursk? Were the loses so severe in that battle that Germany’s experienced troops were lost? Was it the fortress thing? Was it all Hitlers fault or were his generals to blame for mistakes as well?

I see that was not collaspe but loss the initative. After Kursk, the Soviets took the initative on attacks, ie when and where to attack, while the Germans were busy plugging the holes in the front. The strategic picture also got worsen when the Americans and British won the Desert War and knocking at the backdoor of the Riech -- Italy. Polically, if Italy was invaded, Hilter would lose his political prestige among his allies.

No, many of the best German troops survived Kursk like Wittman and Peiper. However, the loss of strategic initative made it a worse diaster than Stalingard -- where the German 6th Army was destoryed together with over 1 million men.

In many post-war books, German generals blamed the lost to Hilter, who was, as already mentioned, a easy taget. However, as Steve of BTS pointed in another thread, the General Staff was totally irresponsible. They planned an operation, but they did not plan what to do next or worse, when their plans went fubar. Take Operation Barbarossa for example, they only thought about a quick victory but no contingency plans were made if the fightings would extend till winter. To make things worse, they were hit by the worst "General Winter" of the 20th Centry.

As other posts point out, one of the worst mistakes made in Russia was a political one. At first, the Russian, expecially the White Russian and the Ukranians who hated the Communist regime, welcomed the arrival of the German "liberators". Soon, as "cleansing" of Salvs, communists, Jews and local officials were executed, the locals learned to pick the "less rotten orange".

- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims.

Not really, the chaotic situation of German High Command contributed more to this. Take Kursk as an example, it was postponed more than 3 times giving the Soviets enough time to prepare rugged defense for the Germans to walk into. Rommel made a remark that "The last idea who entered the Furher's room was usually correct".

- Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses.

One point I am quite sure is: most formations before Kursk did not receive replacments of losses and were usually worn down until disbanded. This may as well created an image that the commanders ignored human losses.

- Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal.

Nope. Take "Operation Mars" for example, it was one of the catascopic defeats for Zhukov. The Red Army were over-extended and lack supplies. German were able to retake Karkhov which led to the eventful Battle of Kursk.

- Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible.

Take the destruction of German Central Army Group in 1944 was a very good example of maneuver.

- The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty.

The author of "Panzer Battles" Von Mellinthin commented that the quality of the Red Army varied from one encounter to another. Sometime, they showed good determination but on another occation, they flewed right on the sight of Geramn.

I am not a gorg so if there are any helpful remarks, please let me know.

Griffin.

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"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

[This message has been edited by GriffinCheng+ (edited 02-12-2001).]

[Hussar]

The british historian Alan Clark (Purnells History of the Second World War) reckons that most judges now agree that Hitlers no retreat order in the Winter of 41/42 saved the day for the German Army. In retrospect Kluge's Chief of Staff wrote;

"Hitlers fanatical order that the troops must hold regardless. in every position and in the most impossible circumstances was undoubtedly correct. Hitler realised instinctively that any retreat across the snow and ice must, within a few days lead to the dissolution of the front and that if this happened the Wehrmacht wouls suffer the same fate that had befallen the 'Grande Armee'."

General von Tippelskirch went even further , rating it "Hitlers one great achievement".

Thr trouble was Hilter carried that policy on right on to the end of the war in circumstances when it was disastrous.

There were a lot of self serving biog's published by German Generals after the war that blamed Hitlers interference for every mistake, including their own. Manstein and Guderian in particular.

[tss]

GriffinCheng+ wrote:

To make things worse, they were hit by the worst "General Winter" of the 20th Centry.

I'm not certain about that. Here in Finland at least two 20th century winters were colder that winter 41-42. They were 39-40 (the Winter War winter) and one in the 80's (86-87?, I don't remember but I was in the elementary school back then).

On the contrary, the 1812-13 winter that destroyed Napoleon's army was one of the mildest of the century.

- Tommi

[GriffinCheng+]

Thanks for the info. I have never seen real snow all of my life.

I got the idea from the messages discussing "Road to Moscow". (Anybody remember this vaporware?) I think 1941 was at least worst in Russia.

Griffin.

Originally posted by tss:

[bI'm not certain about that. Here in Finland at least two 20th century winters were colder that winter 41-42. They were 39-40 (the Winter War winter) and one in the 80's (86-87?, I don't remember but I was in the elementary school back then).

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"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

[Jasper]

Ya know I find that the "the weather did it" mantra one of the stupidest arguments made about a history event, I always wrote it off to Cold War rhetoric. But it just never dies. I guess people think it wasn't as cold on the Russian side of the front as it was the German!

I've found reading period literature very enlightening. I've never liked the idea of having to pay some third party middleman, or author, for his opinions. All I want facts - I'll draw my own conclusions thank you.

I'll not debate the myths or gross generalizations of the German invasion of Russia. I've found reading period Russian documents very enlightening. As straight from the 'horses mouth' as possible I think. I'd suggest you read them and make up your own mind. Personally I found the article on "Ramming" one of the most moving things I've read in a long time.

Kinda hard to say "Yea well Lt. Col. Andropov writing in 1943 says his experience this, but XXXXXX writing in 1995 says 'All Russians did that' and so that's my opinion to."

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Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ or

http://hyperion.spaceports.com/~funfacts/ for military documents written during WWII.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Jasper:

Ya know I find that the "the weather did it" mantra one of the stupidest arguments made about a history event, I always wrote it off to Cold War rhetoric. But it just never dies. I guess people think it wasn't as cold on the Russian side of the front as it was the German!

It makes perfect sense.

It is just as cold on both sides, but one side is not bivouacking in terrain that has just had a major campaign fought over it, and one side is not a thousand miles away from their supply hubs. One side expected and prepared for the winter, one side did not.

So, yes, the weather does effect both sides differently. The idea that the effect of the weather is the same on both sides of the front is overly simplistic, to say the very least.

Which is not to say that the excuse of the weather is valid, but only that your objection to the excuse is invalid.

Jeff Heidman

[Jasper]

"What? Really? Hang on I'll tell him. Sir, many reports coming from the front. It's still getting colder. Apparently the enemy have fired their 'winter' weapon. Intelligence reports that they can only use it once a year and that it will last a couple of months. Clever bastards."

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

It makes perfect sense.

It is just as cold on both sides, but one side is not bivouacking in terrain that has just had a major campaign fought over it, and one side is not a thousand miles away from their supply hubs. One side expected and prepared for the winter, one side did not.

So, yes, the weather does effect both sides differently. The idea that the effect of the weather is the same on both sides of the front is overly simplistic, to say the very least.

Which is not to say that the excuse of the weather is valid, but only that your objection to the excuse is invalid.

Jeff Heidman

Jeff H,

The way I look at the weather excuse is like this: if winter comes and your army makes no provisions for it, then is it the weather's fault, or the army's? I doubt the Germans suddenly forgot that winter follows fall follows summer. Unfortunately, they assumed that the Russian campaign would be over in three months, tops. If any one service can be made the scapegoat of this snafu, it would be German operational intelligence.

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-12-2001).]

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Jeff H,

The way I look at the weather excuse is like this: if winter comes and your army makes no provisions for it, then is it the weather's fault, or the army's? I doubt the Germans suddenly forgot that winter follows fall follows summer. Unfortunately, they assumed that the Russian campaign would be over in three months, tops. If any one service can be made the scapegoat of this snafu, it would be German operational intelligence.

Hey, no argument from me.

I was just objecting to the argument that the weather didn't matter since it effected both sides the same. It might have effected both sides, but it certainly did not effect them in the same manner.

Saying that the weather didn't amtter because it was just as cold on the Russian side of the line as the Germans side is simplistic and inaccurate. It effected the Germans much more severly than the Soviets.

Now, I will agree that the Germans should not have acted so surprised...

Jeff Heidman

[kipanderson]

Soviet Combat Effectiveness.

Hi,

You have asked a lot of interesting questions, only some of which I may know the answer to. Over the years I have done a lot of work on trying to calculate Soviet Combat Effectiveness during WW2 and due to the flood of great books and articles over the last five years I believe a clear picture has now emerged. I have been threatening to do a longer post on this topic, for what it’s worth, but for the time being here are some of may conclusions.

There are three forms of analysis I have used, a) TN Dupuy’s classic quantitative “combat effectiveness” approach, losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day and finally c) what might be called the “historical” record, i.e. the narrative of events in books such as those by David Glantz.

All this is now possible because since the archives were opened in the early 1990s it has become clear that the Soviets did, in fact, keep very detailed records of losses and the forces employed.

Here are my conclusions, however little they may be worth.

a) If you set Soviet combat effectiveness, during the second half of the war, from 1/7/43 to 31/3/45, to equal 1 then German combat effectiveness over the same period equals 1.15. To set this in context the similar figure for the Germans against both the Commonwealth and American forces during the campaign in NW Europe was 1.20 i.e. Soviet forces were of marginally higher quality than the western allies. The reason for this relatively high figure for Soviet combat effectiveness is that their losses and their overall force ratio advantage, were both very much lower than had been believed before the true figures became known. Taking into account all factors, importantly, including the relative size of the forces employed, one would have expected Soviet losses to number 1.4 times those of the Germans assuming, and this is a very important point, that Soviet forces had been of “identical quality” to German forces. In fact Soviet “actual” losses over the period numbered 1.6 times German losses. Only 0.2 different from the losses the Germans would have inflicted on their enemy had they been fighting “clones” of themselves but numbering the same as Soviet forces “actually” numbered.

When looking at losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day, I did not compare Soviet and German forces but Soviet and American forces. This does not tell us, directly, anything about Soviet combat effectiveness but does tell us something about the tactics being used, the style of combat. If the Soviets were suffering twice as many casualties per one hundred front line riflemen, per combat day, as the Americans in Europe then it can be taken as evidence that they “may” have been using more bloody tactics at the small unit level. If you go through the statistics in detail what you find is that from the autumn of 43 onwards losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day, were the same in US and Soviet units. Contrary to popular belief life in a typical, frontline Soviet rifle-company was no more dangerous than life in an American rifle-company. There was still horror and tragedy in bucket loads but not the mass slaughter some German accounts imply. What this implies, I put it no more strongly than that, is that similar tactics were being used by the Soviets and the Americans. No more mass infantry attacks against concentrated machine-gun and artillery fire, unless something had done horribly wrong, as it did now and then.

c) When is comes to the “historical” record the operation that has never really been able to “fit” into the traditional German view of Soviet combat effectiveness is Bagration, or the Destruction of Army Group Centre. It is not that the Soviets “won” the overall battle, but the nature of their victory, that has always been the problem. The Soviets won at both Stalingrad and Kursk. However, at Stalingrad the loss ratio, Soviet to German, was 4:1 at Kursk 3.5:1. During Bagration the overall loss ratio, Soviet to German, was 0.7:1, during the first two weeks 0.2:1. Something very different was happening. If one looks at he battle in more detail the picture becomes even more puzzling for those that take the “German” view of Soviet combat effectiveness during the latter half of WW2. German pockets of 10,000-20,000 troops, in areas that had been fortified as “fortress cities”, were being collapsed in 2-3 days and at very little cost to the Soviets. What was happening was that German combat teams were being despatched to block an advance, along one of the few “dry” corridors through the swampy terrain, and being pushed aside with ease. The speed with which the German pockets were collapsed, and the very light Soviet casualties, means that at the level of the contact battle, company v company, the Soviets must have been the equals of the Germans. If this had not been the case the causality ratio in the first two weeks would not have been so in the Soviets favour. Also the German pockets would not have collapsed as quickly.

Non of the above is conclusive, there are imperfections in the approach on all counts. However, taken together the above has convinced me that, indeed, Soviet combat effectiveness during the second half of the war was every close to that of the Germans. I will end with two pieces of information that go some way to illustrating why the view of Soviet combat effectiveness has changed in the last five years.

Firstly, it is now known that Soviet losses during 1943 were no greater than the annual intake of conscripts. Even as early as 43 the Soviets were no longer being “bled to death” as the Germans hoped, and many believed.

Secondly, the following is a paraphrase of something written by David Glantz in the mid-eighties. “ During the second half of the war force ratios were not as high as the Germans claimed, 7-8:1, nor as low as the Soviets claimed, 2-3:1. More likely they were 4-5:1 in favour of the Soviets.” We now know that the average force ratio throughout the second half of the war was 2.7:1. (These figures can be found in David Glantz’s own books form the mid nineties onwards, and other sources.)

As the true figures have emerged so the view of Soviet combat effectiveness, post Kursk, has changed.

I know from previous posts that Steve, as in BTS, believes the Soviets did not return to the level of combat effectiveness they had in 1940 until 1945. Clearly, I disagree with this. However, that is what makes the subject so interesting, we nearly all disagree.

The good news is that, for those of us that are interested, there is likely to be a continuing flood of new books on the subject for sometime to come.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. Sometime I will get round to making a far longer post giving a blow by blow account of how all the calculations are done, i.e. Dupuy’s combat effectiveness and others, with a full list of sources for all the data. (If any one is interested.)

[jmbunnelle]

Originally posted by kunstler:

After the war, the Americans painted the Russian army as a giant unstoppable juggernaut. It sure seemed like one from looking at the postwar map of Europe.

At the same time I have had more knowledgable people on the topic of WWII claim that the Russian army in 1945 was running on fumes and might easily have failed to capture Berlin. I find that hard to believe.

How bad a shape was the Red Army in in 1945?

The Red Army was definitely not a juggernaught at the end of the war. The creation of this myth in the late 1940's is a fascinating topic and one that has been covered very well in two studies, both dealing with Operation Paperclip, which was America's codename for its policy of hiring high-level SS and Nazis for intelligence purposes.

Gehlen (former SS head of German intelligence on the eastern front) and his men were very smart. When they saw that the Allies were closing in and the war was lost, they rounded up all of the covert information they had gathered on the Red Army during Barbarossa and buried it in an undisclosed location. This included, among other things, an enormous amount of documentation on Soviet battle tactics and troop deployments, complete statistics on tanks, artillery, etc., and their effectiveness in combat. They then surrendered to the Americans and used this hidden cache of information as bargaining leverage for themselves. Needless to say, the US momentarily suspended their tough, anti-Nazi stance. So they not only escaped prosecution, but Gehlen and all of his SS croonies were put on the CIC's (Counter-Intelligence Corps, forerunner of the CIA) payroll.

Immediately after the war, the CIC assigned Gehlen's organization the task of monitoring Soviet troop movements and military strength in the Eastern Bloc. Internal documents released through the Freedom of Information Act show that, in order to gain increases in their funding from the US State Department, the Gehlen organization drastically falsified the information they sent back to the US concerning Soviet military capabilities (stuff about how the "Red Menace" was poised to take over Western Europe, etc.). The State Department then used this misinformation as a justification for increasing the defense budget. In addition, it is also believed that they were, in the words of one former CIC officer, "sucking off both tits", or passing similar misinformation along to the Russians. Obviously, this fed straight into the Cold War paranoia and had serious repercussions for decades to come.

[Skipper]

Winter 1941-42 was indeed quite cold (although not the coldest in century at all). However, the German drive on Moscow was stopped dead in November - before the termometer fell below -5-10 C. Soviet counteroffensive happened during the cold weather.

The references to "general mud and general frost" who allegedly defeated the germans in fact mean the following:

German plan was to defeat RKKA within 500 km of the border, before bad weather starts.

As it turned out, OKW grossly underestimated mobilization capacity of Stalin's USSR.

Despite the initial successes, complete destruction of soviet first strategic echelon and most of the heavy industry, USSR maintained ability to fight back. Which in the end of the day spelt doom of the 3rd reich.

[Grisha]

Interesting post, kipanderson. I have Dupuy's book, Numbers, Predictions, and War, as well, but never thought to plug in the more recent figures coming out on the Russian front. In know the Vistula-Oder operation doesn't fit into your equation as it occurred in 1945, but I believe it surpassed even the excellence of Bagration. Hm, maybe I should apply QJM to this operation...

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Ahh, so the fact that the Soviets had some bad defeats in '43-'44 means that they were pretty poor overall? This near blanket statement doesn't sit well with me. While it is true that the Soviets could screw up even in 1944, they were also capable of operational excellence. Please read up on Operation Bagration of 1944, and the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945. Not only were they prime examples of tactical and operational maneuver, these two operations were also excellent examples of Soviet intelligence/reconnaissance(razvedka) and deception(maskirovka). These two operations are classic textbook operations fit for any country's military academy.

Again, no one is saying, least of all me, that the Soviets did everything wrong. From what I have read the deception and intelligence behind Bagration, for example, was indeed masterly. But I will say they did more things wrong than anyone else, they stubbornly kept doing many of the same mistakes over and over again, and they kept many of the same problems in their military up until now. When opposition was light and their force was overwhelming they could do textbook manuvers, especially late in the war. When they faced odds that were more even things fell apart until they could build up forces again.

Think of it this way. Say the Iraqi army in the Gulf war had 5X the number of Abrams tanks the US did, 5X the number of Warthog ground attack aircraft, a massively greater number of fighter planes, heaps of good quality artillery and double or more the number of troops.

They probably would have won against the coalition, no matter how clever Schwartzkopf was. But it would not have made them a better commanded or more efficient army just because they won, would it?

[Wolfpack]

Originally posted by kipanderson:

Soviet Combat Effectiveness.

Firstly, it is now known that Soviet losses during 1943 were no greater than the annual intake of conscripts. Even as early as 43 the Soviets were no longer being “bled to death” as the Germans hoped, and many believed.

Okay, but how much longer could they have kept this up before being forced to pull a significant amount of resources would have been lost to the war effort. The soviets were already short of food for the population, as more men would have been pulled off farms, and out of factories, how long until this really begins to affect the war effort. Do factors like this enter into your figuring anywhere? Just curious.

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It is nearly always better to be beaten and learn, rather than to win and take no new knowledge from that victory.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

Grisha,

my advice, with regard to using Pupuy’s equations, is to go for it. You have probably figured it all out better than I did, but here are a few hints with regard to what I consider the easiest and best way to use the formulas for the Eastern Front.

First you need to know overall force ratios and the casualties in the operation in question. Then set up a calculation for an imagined operation with identical force ratios to those in the “actual” operation you are interested in. If the actual force ratio were 3:1, Soviets to Germans, using numbers such as 60,000 attacking Soviets and 20,000 defending Germans would be perfect. The equations work best within the range of 15,000 to 60,000 personal. Enter what ever you feel is most representative of the actual operation in terms of combat mode, i.e. hasty defence, deliberate assault, what ever. Do the same with regard to terrain, weather and so on. However, when it comes to any factor to do with troop quality and equipment enter a 1 for both sides. What you are saying is that the Soviets and the Germans were “clones” of one another. Run the equations and get the results in terms of casualties for each side, assuming they were “clones” of each other in terms of quality. Then go back and look at what the actual losses, in the real battle, for each side. Then compare the casualty ratio you get using the “cloned” forces in the Dupuy formula with the actual, historical, causality ratio in the real battle. If the actual casualty ratio in the real battle was, say, 1.45:1, Soviet to German, and the causality ratio in the imagined battle between the “clones” was 1.4:1, you know that in the real battle the Russians performance was only marginally less than that which a similar force of attacking Germans would have achieved.

Hope I have been of help, but probably not.

Wolfpack,

The short answer it no, such factors do not enter into the above calculations. However, I do have an answer of sorts.

The all time low point for the Soviets, in my view, both on the battlefield and on the home front, was spring 42. To be more specific to your question one can look at the production figures for 44 and compare them to 43 to see if there was any sign of a slow down. Let’s take tanks. Between the two years there was very little increase in numbers but there was a big increase in quality per unit. T34/85s replaced T34/76s and JS2ms replaced KV1Ss. And so on. When you look as the specification of the “typical” 44 Soviet tank and “typical” 43 Soviet tank there is a big increase in the latter year. Another factor is also worth noting.

With the end of the war all aid to Russia, and by the way to Britain, stopped died. The Marshal Plan was strictly for the so-called “defeated” nations. However, Russia did recover very rapidly under its own steam and until about 1970 grew at a stunning rate. (At this stage I should point out that I am an out and out “market economist” and do not wish to make a political statement, but I am familiar with the statistics of Russian growth.) The fact that in 44 Russian output continued to grow, certainly in terms of value, and that just post war there was no 1920s/1930s style famine, as far as I know, plus explosive growth, leads me to believe Russia was “coping” on all fronts.

Certainly, on the military front, by the second half of the war there was no uncertainty as to whom the winner would be. If you look at the post-Kursk operations to clear the Ukraine from August43-February44, at the strategic level, there was no contest. Long before D-Day.

All the best,

Kip.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by machineman:

Again, no one is saying, least of all me, that the Soviets did everything wrong. From what I have read the deception and intelligence behind Bagration, for example, was indeed masterly. But I will say they did more things wrong than anyone else, they stubbornly kept doing many of the same mistakes over and over again, and they kept many of the same problems in their military up until now. When opposition was light and their force was overwhelming they could do textbook manuvers, especially late in the war. When they faced odds that were more even things fell apart until they could build up forces again.

Think of it this way. Say the Iraqi army in the Gulf war had 5X the number of Abrams tanks the US did, 5X the number of Warthog ground attack aircraft, a massively greater number of fighter planes, heaps of good quality artillery and double or more the number of troops.

They probably would have won against the coalition, no matter how clever Schwartzkopf was. But it would not have made them a better commanded or more efficient army just because they won, would it?

Which mistakes are you referring to that the Soviets were continuously repeating? One difficulty the Red Army had till the end of the war was in the initial phases of a breakthrough assault. Apparently, there were more than a few occasions where the breakthrough forces were unable to open a gap through which the mobile groups could advance into. Thus, assests from the mobile group were used to assist in forcing that gap. Also, some commanders, like Zhukov, were accustomed to sending in wave attacks when things got difficult. However, you would rarely have seen Rokossovsky, Cherniakhovsky, or Vatutin commit such a wasteful action, and besides linear frontal attacks were discouraged with great emphasis in the combat regulation. On the other hand, Soviet forces were masters of intelligence gathering from a tactical to an operational level, as well as the art of masking their force redeployments and deceiving the enemy. I seriously doubt anyone, including the USA could've matched them in those last two capabilities during WWII. And as the Germans grimly proved, excellence in pure combat ability or equipment alone does not make a winning army.

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[Grisha]

Thanks, kipanderson, that helps a lot

[Henri]

Just a few comments to set a few facts straight.

According to the figures in Glantz and House compiled from Soviet and German souces, for most of the war until 1944, the ratio of men under arms Soviet/ German was less than 2:1 except for a very brief period in 1943.

This means that number thrown about of Germans claiming to be outnumbered 10:1 or even 3:1 could be due only to a better ability of concentration of forces on the part of the Soviets or exaggerations on the part of the Germans.

In May 1945 the Soviet Army on the Eastern Front stood at 5.7 million men (Clash of Titans, p.305), not counting Soviet Allies, so the myth of the Soviets standing on their last legs is also in error.

This was the army of highly motivated, well armed and experienced veterans against which the Allies would have had to fight if they had taken Patton's advice and attacked the Soviets after the end of the War.

The Allies were probably rightfully dubious about tackling such an army twice the size of the German army that had attacked Russia in 1941, and having to fight them all the way from the Elbe to Moscow...

Henri

[Herr Oberst]

I will not post any pro's or con's of positions, except to say that you should read "Russia at War 1941-1945" by Alexander Werth.

A short quote:

"Close on 20 years have passed since the end of the war in Russia and I am perhaps the only surviving Westerner to have lived in Russia right through the war years, and to have kept an almost day-to-day record of everything I saw and heard there."

Excellent reading and highly recommended.

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To the last I grapple with thee; from hell's heart I stab at thee; for hate's sake I spit my last breath at thee...

[Blackhorse]

This is an excellent and informative thread guys.

Herr Oberst, thanks for the heads up on that book.

[This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 02-12-2001).]

[CATguy]

The war on the eastern front is definetly the most savage and cruelest conflict ever waged in recorded history. The soviets lost over 49 million people due to combat deaths, starvation, extermination, and a whole plague of other calamities. As for the steorotypes of the Soviet soldier, in most respects he was just like other soldiers in other amries. The fought, died, and bled the same. The only respect to diffrence was the clear disregard for the individual and everything for the state (motherland). It was the utter desperate fight for survival that a the russian soldier had to endure. A great wealth of information has poured out of the former Soviet Union, so as to shed light on the facts. If anybody wants to question the 49 million I will gladly forward the thesis on this that was done in the early 90's.

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Which mistakes are you referring to that the Soviets were continuously repeating?

Also, some commanders, like Zhukov, were accustomed to sending in wave attacks when things got difficult.

That is the kind of thing. It shows up in all the war accounts I have read, especially where the Soviet army faces heavy unexpected opposition. Liddell Hart refers to the problem being not so much the top generals (although some were much more callous that way then others) and not so much the junior officers (the incompetant of which were thinned out by bullets) but rather the 'middle men' who showed a consistent rigidity and lack of tactical sense in the face of such events.

This characteristic does not show up so much in campaigns like Bagration, which was pretty much a route, but shows up in most of the earlier battles and any of the tough later ones such as the Seelow heights.

And as the Germans grimly proved, excellence in pure combat ability or equipment alone does not make a winning army.

No, but a winning in the end does not make for an excellent army either. The Iraqi example I gave still holds, from what I can see so far anyway. Give them the men and material advantages the Soviets had over the Germans in '44-'45 and Desert Storm would have been short and painful for the Coalition.

[Naja]

I just want to thank jasoncawley@ameritech.net for what was a very enjoyable dissertation on Soviet German strengths, weaknesses and myths that shape Western preconceived notions of the "Clash of Titans".... In the cold war, history was shaped by the same propaganda that prepares nations for the suffering that its current politicians expect to inflict on it's citizens in defense of what is supposed to be a right and just cause against evil regardless of borders and beliefs.