The Mortain fiasco

[JasonC]

On another thread, someone made the following comment about the Mortain counterattack (the attempt to cut off the Normandy breakout in the 2nd week of August) -

"had TAC Air not responded in such force the Germans would have broken through as the Allies only had light forces in the area"

This is false. The Mortain attack was a ridiculous overestimate of German capabilities and an entirely predictable fiasco as a result. Air power helped but the result was overdetermined - the Germans would have lost had the skies been overcast. The rest of this post is about some of the cards stacked against the attempt, and why it was doomed from the get-go, tac air or not.

At the time of the attack, the Germans had less than 600 operational AFVs in the theater. More than half, around 350, were assembled for the attack. The scale of the attack was approximately two Panzer divisions, with KGs or loaned units from several other formations rounding out 2SS and 2 Pz. 116 Pz lent its Panther battalion to 2 Pz; 1SS sent a KG including its full tank regiment, and scratch remnants of 17SS accompanied 2SS. All told 350 tanks and the equivalent of 10-12 battalions of panzergrenadiers took part. They had 5 days notice from the idea of the attack to execution. By the time the attack failed 10 days later, operational AFVs in the attacking units had fallen 80%, and overall German AFVs in the whole theater fell to 200.

What were they up against? On the first day, they ran into elements of the 9th infantry division (one combat team), and the brunt fell on the 30th infantry division. That day they penetrated up to 6 miles, and took Mortain itself, but without taking the high ground around it. The infantry force match-up was never better than equal. Bypassed US units continued to call down artillery fire, with one regiment alone getting the support of 10 firing battalions. Individual artillery battalions were firing 5000 rounds per day; the weight of shellfire dwarfed anything tac air was doing. The rest of US VII corps was soon engaged supporting the 30th, and the Germans made no further headway. Then 2 more infantry divisions (4 and 35 ID) and one armor division (2nd, a large 1942 pattern AD) hit the flanks of the attack. The infantry odds were by then 4:1, while the weight of artillery might have been as high as 10:1 against the attacking Germans (e.g. 2SS entered the battle with 19 105mm and 9 150mm howitzers in the division).

Several TD battalions were quickly added to the US infantry divisions, and it is doubtful the Germans had even local armor superiority (numerically) by the 3rd day or so. They certainly did have armor superiority on the first day - when they made their initial gains - but it was limited beyond that (perhaps 3-2:1 on day 2-3) and gone in a few days. Understand that the bulk of the US armor, ~1500 AFVs in the armor divisions, had not been committed at all until the breakout fighting in the previous ~10 days. 2nd AD's losses from the breakout through the end of July were only 600 men, so it was basically at full strength.

The US matched the tanks the Germans had concentrated (by assigning the 2nd AD to hit the counterattack), and still have more than a thousand AFVs left to flank the attack and create the southern wall of the Falaise pocket, race through Brittany, and seize several crossings over the Seine to ensure the fall of Paris - simultaneously.

The idea that 350 AFVs thrown pell-mell at more than a US army corps supported by heavy artillery and serious reserves, would somehow magically defeat them all, cut of the breakout, and save the day was delusional from the outset. The Germans faced overall armor odds of probably 5:1 in the theater. No amount of concentration or placement of their "1" was going to prove decisive. The actual result was to lose 2/3rds of their remaining armor, which left the foot elements of the army practically defenseless against the breakout, ensuring no successful defense of the Seine crossings, etc.

The nature of the tactical failure was simple. They Germans never had either the infantry or the artillery strength to destroy the US infantry forces bypassed by the tanks. This meant the US artillery (supplimented of course by tac air) got juicy observed targets, which meant soft-skinned vehicles and infantry didn't get anywhere. Which meant both no fuel for bypassing tanks if they pressed, and unsupported tanks facing reinforcing US TDs, bazooka teams, and light ATGs deeper in the US defended zone. A few days of that, then the US had brought tons of additional force to the area - including armor and along both long flanks of the drive - and it was hopeless. 73 operational AFVs made it back.

"It all would have worked but for the failures of the luftwaffe" is just very stale propaganda. The Americans were in fact delighted over the attempt, since it meant no armor to face outside, since most of it was thrust into the "noose". The only dispute it gave rise to on the Allied side was how deep to go for the resulting encirclement (near side of Seine or far), and how hard to press to close the neck of the Falaise pocket.

[shredder]

Are there any scenarios out there that depict the battle concerning Hill 317 just east of Mortain that was held by the 2nd battalion, 120th infantry, 30th division? I've read accounts of this impressive struggle and it seems like it would make for an ideal scenario.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

On another thread, someone made the following comment about the Mortain counterattack (the attempt to cut off the Normandy breakout in the 2nd week of August) -

"had TAC Air not responded in such force the Germans would have broken through as the Allies only had light forces in the area"

This is false

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jason your quite right, to the jist of your post, my post where you took the comment from, concerned TAC air vs tanks with a few comments thrown in from Alied commanders Ie, had the German attack continued with the same tempo as before the Typhoons arrived the Germans would have broken through, & Bradley's later comments that had the Germans just sidestepped south by several thousand yards they would have been in Averanches that day.

Again these are general comments maybe made in the spirit of Allied co-operation or typical exageration of enemy forces strengths etc, nevertheless they were made, just as other authors have credited the RAF with breaking the German attack

As to the effect TAC Air had on the battle that is debateable, just as it is debateble how far the Germnans would have advanced w/o the air attacks, vs the US Infantry, artillery etc.

The post was never intended to deal with ground operations or disposition of US forces faceing the attack, as that wasn't the focus of the discussion, aircraft effectiveness (or lack of) vs tanks was, as Mortain was the largest encounter between tank killer aircraft & German armor in the ETO.

Regards, John Waters

[Username]

I wonder what the ratio of arty shells fired were. I bet it was at worse odds than the ratio of guns. The allies went on a shooting spree with arty shells and actually were getting short of them at the end of the war. During the bulge, they really went overboard and after the battle, the situation was rationed.

But ALLIED arty was like nothing the germans had faced in the east. The fact that they stood against the combined arty/airforce/armor/etc disadvantage for as long as they did is amazing.

I remember a quote from Eisenhower when asked if he would be on a road, in his car, in france, if the allies didnt have air supremacy. He responded " I wouldnt even be in france if we didnt". If the germans had the arty/shells, he wouldnt be near the front either.

Lewis

[Jeff Duquette]

Nice post Jason. Agree 100%. A good book on the subject of Mortain is: Alwyn Featherston’s “Battle for Mortain”. I understand this book was originally published under the title “Saving the Breakout”.

Of interest is the almost cursory coverage of the Battle of Mortain within the official US Army history of that period encompassed in US Army in WWII (Green book series) “Breakout and Pursuit” by Martin Blumenson.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Shredder said: Are there any scenarios out there that depict the battle concerning Hill 317 just east of Mortain that was held by the 2nd battalion, 120th infantry, 30th division? I've read accounts of this impressive struggle and it seems like it would make for an ideal scenario.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One of the stock operations that come with the game covers the 2nd Armored Divisions relief attacks toward 30th ID. “Drive on Mortain”

There is also a stock scenario called “L’Abbey Blanche” covering some of 30th ID’s defensive actions during the initial stages of the battle.

[Kingfish]

I also have a huge scenario depicting the 2nd Panzer's drive towards Juvigny. Anyone interested can e-mail me for a copy.

[Peter Panzer]

...quite glad someone brought this up...

...during the opening days of the german counterattack, were the 30th division's tank destoyer assets strictly comprised of towed pieces (57's)? also, was there any additional supporting armor in the vicinity of hill 317 at this early stage?

[ 07-18-2001: Message edited by: Peter Panzer ]

[Iskander]

And the fact that the Brits had the Ultra intercepts about the entire operation may just have also had an affect upon this battle!

[Jeff Duquette]

76mm towed tank destroyers were apparently present with the 30th ID at Mortain. The 57mm was also present...57mm was organic ATG for US Infantry regiments of the time. Towed 76mm's were organic to 823rd TD battalion attached to 30th ID.

I personally think any ULTRA intelligence that may have been available was either discounted or not passed along to operational level commanders. US Army was caught off guard for sure at Mortain, but recovered quickly like they would do several months latter in the Ardennes, and again during Nordwind. 30th ID combined with numerous attached artillery battalions did much to spoil the German attack at Mortain.

I would reckon if ULTRA intelligence on the counter attack had been passed down to 1st Army we probable would have seen some sort of localized American reserve formations concentrated in the Mortain vicinity and backing up 30th ID...perhaps 1st ID or 2nd AD or 3rd AD.

[ 07-19-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Peter Panzer]

jeff duquette wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>76mm towed tank destroyers were apparently present with the 30th ID at Mortain. The 57mm was also present...57mm was organic ATG for US Infantry regiments of the time. Towed 76mm's were organic to 823rd TD battalion attached to 30th ID. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

thanks.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

... we probably would have seen some sort of American reserve formations concentrated in the Mortain vicinity...1st ID or 2nd AD or 3rd AD.

[ 07-18-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Um Jeff - they were concentrated in the Mortain vicinity.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

I wonder what the ratio of arty shells fired were. I bet it was at worse odds than the ratio of guns. The allies went on a shooting spree with arty shells and actually were getting short of them at the end of the war...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Really? Would you include, in your definition of 'short', having more rounds in theatre at the close of hostilities than had been fired in total during the previous 11 months?

I wouldn't.

Regards

JonS

[Jeff Duquette]

A success by the Germans at Mortain would conceivably have left 3rd Army in a very odd position...being overextended and cut off from resupply and communications if the Germans had succeeded in muscling their way into Avranches. As unlikely as that may seem now given our 20/20 hindsight, I suspect Omar Bradley may not have pooh-poohed such information and certainly would have strengthened the shoulder of the break-out occurring by the 3rd Army (IMHO).

[ 07-19-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Franko]

The whole Mortain campaign is a big favorite of mine, and IMHO JasonC's analysis is right on the money.

I have developed a couple of scenarios based on the Mortain fight, both of which come with my FTC Combat Pack (if anyone wants them, email me).

I seriously looked into the fight at Hill 317, but I thought the scenario would NOT have worked well for CM. First, the hill as a topographical feature would be difficult to model. Second, it was mostly an "artillery" fight, where one rather amazing Forward Observer (who wrote the book "Enemy North, South, East, West") plastering the hell out of Germans whenever they showed themselves. Though heroic, its not a "workable" game. I may try again, though.

[Jeff Duquette]

JonS...umm...no ****. Hardly in a reserve capacity however. 1st ID had infact displaced from Mortain on the 6th of August along with the attached CCA of 3rd AD. 1st ID along with CCA 3rd AD were in an attack posture near Mayenne. 1st ID and CCA 3rd AD were earmarked for a push on Alencon when the German attack around Mortain began.

2nd AD (minus CCA) was in the middle of a road march to support the intended attack by 1st ID from Mayenne to Alencon when the German Counter attack started.

The only one of Collin's divisional units in Reserve at the start of the attack was 4th ID. 4th Infantry had been pulled out of the line for a long over due refit. 4th Infantry had been heavily engaged since June 6th. However The 4th ID was pretty much pinned to its See River position during the counterattack as Collins did not want to leave this area exposed…for obvious reasons.

So 1st US Army -- IMHO -- was not in a state of alert relative to a major German Counterattack. And were not presenting a posture that implies they were anticipating an attack. If they were suspecting that the Germans would try to pinch off the 3rd Army Breakout I would suspect 1st ID, or 2nd AD, or 3rd AD would have been maintained in the vicinity of Mortain as a localized reserve. None of these formations were in a reserve posture near Mortain, but were in fact either involved in road marches to assembly areas for an attack toward Alencon, or were already assembled around Mayenne and preparing for an attack toward Alencon.

30th ID bore the brunt of this German surprise attack. But in retrospect the only thing the Germans really ended up accomplishing as a result of their efforts around Mortain was to push their heads into a noose. The Falaise Pocket was just around the corner.

[s_e_avenger]

IMHO the biggest factor was the 30th being able to recognize the good ground, sit there and just flat refuse to give it up. I think the outcome was far from a foregone conclusion. The defense at Mortain allowed Bradley to ignore the counterattack and continue the breakout.

As an aside, at one point the 30th was reduced to firing fresh radio batteries onto hill 317 in leaflet rounds.

GO OLD HICKORY!

[JasonC]

I agree with s-e-ave that the 30th did very well, both in terrain chosen and in fighting spirit. I doubt those alone would have been enough if the Germans had the infantry and artillery to deal with bypassed infantry - but they never had "odds" in either of those categories.

I also doubt that a portion of the German tanks reaching the coast would have mattered very much. They might then have been in just the right place, but there still weren't nearly enough of them, and there were too many American tanks running about - supported by all arms while the German tanks would not have been, that far in - for them to have held the "cut" open, even if they had made it. Again, 350 tanks (and far less by the time they fought their way in) just were not going to beat 5 times their number, and overcome a large advantage in the other arms, just through clever placement.

I think the whole thing was desperation and a "map illusion" - the short length of the distances, the fantasy that anything "cut off" would die instantly, the illusion that 5 full strength mobile divisions (in name only) were taking part instead of 2 (actual strength available).

The Germans hit the Americans with significant armored counterattacks twice in the Normandy campaign. This one, in early August with ~2 divisions and the overall odds very strongly against them, failed in the manner described. The earlier one, by Panzer Lehr with about half a division's worth of actual front-line forces, was in mid July, and had a similar outcome. The tanks drove in a few miles, the infantry got stripped off them by ungodly artillery, the scattered forward tanks were hunted down by TDs (mainly), reserve armor from the US ADs, jabos, and bazooka teams.

American force designs and especially artillery strength, as well as their deployments, just were not fragile. They had infantry, zooks, 57mm ATs and FOs forward, with plenty more infantry available to reinforce from flanks or rear (reserve battalions, 2 up one back deployments, etc), plus TDs and armor, supported by massive artillery. The initial break in with the armor was far easier than making something of it.

Portions of the Bulge fighting saw the same problems, but the scale there was much larger, and the Germans did have infantry and artillery odds at first, which is when they made the big advances. Armor that pushed on further was cut apart, because bypassed infantry behind them refused to die and set the whole sequence in motion as described - Peiper was, and later the lead elements of 2 Pz near Celles likewise.

In Normandy, I think part of the fascination with the Mortain attempt is simply doctrinal. Many today agree with many on the German general staff before D-Day, that the right way to stop the invasion was a large scale armored counterattack. Rommel, in case anybody forgot, thought differently and cited superior air and artillery as reasons the beaches were the best chance they'd get. I do see merit in the armored counterattack view, but the Germans blew their shot at it long before Mortain. Two month after the invasion, with gobs of Allies ashore, and after the German armor had been attrited 75%, was hardly "le moment juste". I'll discuss what I think their best chance for the armor idea was, in another thread. I think it probably would have failed for the same general reasons, even launched at the right time - but it might have had a serious chance, while Mortain did not.

[Spook]

In balance, I too have to concur with Jason here. The notion presented in earlier times, that close air support was the "final reserve" that prevented the US forces that had advanced past Avranches from being cut off & destroyed, doesn't hold water.

For one thing, Let's assume for the moment that the German attack did make it to Avranches. What then? Who would've been the first to "wither"? The US forces that had moved past Avranches, or the Germans in Avranches? Well, for one thing, if the Germans were going to be able to stay in Avranches and stay supplied, then the whole salient of attack leading to that city needed to be defended. Did the Germans at that time have the manpower to hold such a line (facing both north & south) for more than a few days? Not to mention having enough German forces further south so to "pocket" the US forces south of Avranches?

Again, as Jason & others have noted here, the German manpower to do all this just wasn't on hand at that time. Not after the six-week meatgrinder it had been just to hold in the Allies before the Cobra attack.

But here's where that Allied air superiority of Aug '44 comes in instead as an operational issue. While probably not being the "decisive" factor of the Mortain battle, Allied air support was thick enough, and the weather was improved enough, to force German movements and resupply to relative crawls. If a German advance had forced through to Avranches, then Allied air would've focused into that battle sector even more than had been the case. Therefore, with air support & interdiction "pinning" the Germans in the operational sense, then US forces north & south of the salient could likely had maneuvered as to attack in advantageous spots, and with greater local odds. (And for US forces to the south, aerial resupply was a real option; it was actually used extensively to help keep some Allied advances moving in Sept '44.)

A parallel example exists in "what-ifs" on the Bulge battle. Some historians pose the "what-if" that the German offensive there should've focused on a "small solution" to swing along the Meuse after moving past Bastogne, and cut off the US-manned Aachen salient, thus capturing the bulk of the US First & Ninth armies inside. A reasonable theory, but I've never yet seen a serious analysis that indicates that the Germans had anything CLOSE to the needed manpower, armor, fuel, transport, supplies, and air cover to pull off even this, and to keep the US armies "pocketed." Rather, I think that any German units that had actually penetrated deep enough to try such a roundabout maneuver would've instead been cut off & destroyed.

The "Small Solution" to the Ardennes battle, advanced by German commanders as more realistic than Hitler's goal of reaching Antwerp, was reasonable in concept. But again, the resources for even this alternate plan just were not there.