The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Currently, Bullethead, Cavscout and ScoutPL, while maintaining a constant position, have maneuvered Henri and Pillar into a deep hole

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

So then for example, bypassing an enemy strongpoint and attacking into his supplies/artillery with your own company would be "maneuver" with intent of "attrition"? (by the practical definitions you set out above). This is all based on accomplishing the mission of course.

This is maneuver for attritional purposes. You are either, as CavScout has said, exploiting passage of the enemy MLR and/or engaged in pursuit, or you are sneaking back there to cause indirect disruption of the MLR before it is breached by other forces. In both cases, you are maneuvering to a specific, intended point in order to shoot up a specific, intended target, per the mission assignment.

If that's the case, you and I are just using different words to describe the same thing and we agree.

More or less. But I still disagree with those who say that maneuvering to enhance combat is "attritionist" and meaning that in the negative, philosophical sense associated with Verdun. I think maneuvering to enhance attrition is the very basis of what's known these days as "maneuver warfare".

What do you think of the "Maneuver School" views on officer education, initiative, etc.

I'm all for teaching company-grade officers to use informed initiative. IOW, they need to be able to see for themselves and know the difference between what's possible, what needs doing, and what's suicidal, and then doing the best thing on their own hook without having to be told.

This is what sergeants have been doing since Christ was a corporal, despite the efforts of "by-the-book" butterbar replacement platoon leaders who just arrived yesterday. Things would be a lot better if there was no such thing as "by-the-book" except in terms of general principles.

Of course, I think this is putting the cart before the horse. The greatest threat to ground-gaining forces is a lieutenant with a map and compass, so IMHO they need to teach land navigation to officers before anything else

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

Maybe Bullethead himself can answer his own question (presenting his own views) or someone else could tackle it.

Well, what you reprinted wasn't what I asked. Here's the deal:

First off, Henri said:

As one or both of [L&L] put it, attrition warfare uses movement in order to allow fighting, whereas maneuverists use fighting in order to allow movement.

Then you said:

I think the "School of Manuever" is about concetizing and making explicit things that are prooven from history etc.

So I asked you the following questions:

OK, let's talk history. Napolean is widely credited with breaking the mold of "positional warfare" by targeting the enemy's main army instead of a spot of ground. He therefore conducted huge, daring maneuvers to bring about decisive battles in which he could inflict horrible attrition on the enemy while keeping his own force intact as much as possible in order to exploit battlefield success later. This is maneuver used to enhance battle. According to Henri, this makes Napolean an "attritionist". So is he or is he not an "attritionist" by your definition?

OTOH, there is von Falkenhayn, who caused Verdun to happen with attrition as the express intent of the campaign, rather than taking Verdun itself. He wanted to bleed France to death, figuring he could win in the end because there were more Germans than Frenchmen. His goal was either to cause France to surrender once a certain number of casualties had been inflicted, or to weaken them enough that breakthrough maneuver could be be achieved. This is battle used to enhance maneuver, which by Henri's definition makes von Falkenhayn a "maneuverist" despite his express intentions of attrition. So to which school does von Falkenhayn belong according to you?

As an aside, what do you think of von Falkenhayn's plan? Given the military realties of the time (continuous front with no flanks to turn, inability of frontal assaults to achieve breakthrough), can you think of a more logical goal for an offensive?

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Guest Pillar]

Bullethead:

This is maneuver for attritional purposes. You are either, as CavScout has said, exploiting passage of the enemy MLR and/or engaged in pursuit, or you are sneaking back there to cause indirect disruption of the MLR before it is breached by other forces. In both cases, you are maneuvering to a specific, intended point in order to shoot up a specific, intended target, per the mission assignment.

Well, I'm with you 100% until you say "intended target"... Sometimes targets of opportunity present themselves which weren't anticipated and I think some "informed initiative" would apply here.

More or less. But I still disagree with those who say that maneuvering to enhance combat is "attritionist" and meaning that in the negative, philosophical sense associated with Verdun. I think maneuvering to enhance attrition is the very basis of what's known these days as "maneuver warfare".

Again, it's because you and they are using two different languages, regardless of which is "justified", "invented", "by the book" etc.

I haven't heard a maneuverist say maneuver to enhance fire is a bad thing.

I'm all for teaching company-grade officers to use informed initiative. IOW, they need to be able to see for themselves and know the difference between what's possible, what needs doing, and what's suicidal, and then doing the best thing on their own hook without having to be told.

This is what sergeants have been doing since Christ was a corporal, despite the efforts of "by-the-book" butterbar replacement platoon leaders who just arrived yesterday. Things would be a lot better if there was no such thing as "by-the-book" except in terms of general principles.

Agreed. Again, I don't think you'll find a "maneuverist" advocating "uninformed iniative", suicidal moves, etc.

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Currently, Bullethead, Cavscout and ScoutPL, while maintaining a constant position, have maneuvered Henri and Pillar into a deep hole

LOL, I don't know about Henri, but I haven't even attempted anything here yet.

When I do you'll know it.

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Hence the problem. They have simply co-opted something that has exsisted and claimed that it is their invention. It is nothing new and is what has been practiced in war before. Maneuverist simply claim what has worked as "Maneuver Warfare" and what hasn't as "Attritionist Warfare".

No. There is a difference between attributing all success to maneuver vs. admiting something is NOT new.

Before you make such claims you must provide clear examples. I don't think anyone would take kindly to this kind of accusation without support, you know? Even a few page references would be of service to your argument, if rational discourse is what you seek. I surely wouldn't think someone such as yourself would be here with a personal agenda. Right?

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

So I asked you the following questions:

<snip>

Like I said, I'm not prepared to discuss that right now. Either I have to go do the reading on those events and become intimately familiar with them, or I can indulge in a pointless debate about something I know only the basics of.

In that case, all you'd have to do is introducce new information whenever it suited your argument and I'd be forced to reevaluate over and over. Not exactly good terms for a discussion are they?

Plus, I'm not going to BS you and pretend I have a thorough grasp on a historical event I've only read brief accounts of. Especially the Napoleon one.

You can respect that I gather.

[LuckyStrike]

Troll tactical primer for CM game:

Kill enemy, good

Enemy kill you, bad

Move where kill more enemy, good

Move where enemy kill more you, bad

[Henri]

Bullethead said:

Not arrogance, just fact. I've done it, you haven't. You go look at the pointy end of bullets for a while with other men under your command. Then try out your pet theories and see how well you do. If you survive that, I'll take you seriously.

I have no reason to think that you have a problem with the pointy end of bullets, but as I will show below, you do seem to have a problem with the edge of Occam's Razor (nothing can be true and false at the same time). As for the necessity of having looked at the pointy end of bullets, here is a quote from the Marine Corps MCDP 1-3.

"The nation that draws too great a distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools."

You have been attacking Maneuver Warfare and claiming that the Marine Corps doctrine supports attrition warfare; but the Marine Corps Warfighting Manuals clearly identify their warfighting doctrine as Maneuver Warfare, as I have pointed out previously. Here is more:

In Vietnam, where the opposing forces were quite dissimilar in their military capabilities, the incremental approach led to the U.S.ís overreliance on firepower and body counts. This, in turn, led to the conduct of military operations that were often irrelevant to the outcome of the war, even though a comparison of casualty ratios appeared favorable...

..Therefore, the Marine Corps has embraced a more flexible, imaginative, and effective way to wage war: maneuver warfare. Marine success with this approach has been demonstrated in places like Grenada and the Persian Gulf...

In your response to my quoting MCDP-1, you have attempted to show that the MCDP-1 quotes I gave are really in support of attrition warfare, which MCDP-1 clearly and explicitely indicates it is not. MCDP-1 is based on Lind's book, which is in agreement with Leonhard's theory. You can't be against Maneuver Theory and for the doctrine of MCDP-1, because Maneuver Theory is what MCDP doctrine claims to be based on.

To clear up some of the obfuscation, just a reminder of the contradictions between your position and MCDP; you wrote:

The whole point of maneuver is to achieve a better position from which to engage in attrition… IOW, destroying the enemy is the main objective on both sides of the ball.

As opposed to the MCDP view that:

Maneuver provides us a means to gain an advantage over the enemy. In too many battles, one or both sides have sought to gain advantage in combat through firepower and attrition...

...The Marine Corps must be equally prepared to win during both situations: those in which the enemy forces must be completely destroyed (as during World War II), and those in which the complete destruction of the enemy's forces may not be necessary or even desirable. As the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division in Des-ert Storm, stated, "Our focus was not on destroying everything. Our focus was on the Iraqi mind and getting behind [it]". He knew that the path to victory did not lie in the total destruction of the Iraqi forces, but in undermining their will to fight.

There are other contradictions as well, but this should be enough.If you want to back down from that extreme position I have no problem with that, assuming that despite your demeaning attitude we are participating in a civilized discourse attempting to clarify our positions.

Since we both claim to agree with the doctrine described in the MCDP manuals, it would appear that we are in agreement and since that doctrine identifies itself as maneuver theory, and since you say that you agree with it, it would appear that you are an advocate of maneuver theory - but you are not, are you? And neither is CavScout applauding you from the peanut gallery, who identifies maneuver theory with penis envy in his motto.

Now would you care to point out some of the Maneuver Theory parts that are contradictory to the Maneuver Theory espoused in the MCDP manuals? Forget about the straw men that attritionists attribute to supporters of maneuver Theory such as avoiding combat at all cost, or replacing combat with movement. Spell out the specifics: let's see you put the MCDP manuals in contradiction with Lind's book, which it is based on. I'm waiting. Let's hear it.

BTW, it may be tempting as some have done to say that Maneuver Theory and Attrition are just two sides of the same coin. They are not, the MCDP manuals say they are not, and you and CavScout and other attritionists believe that they are not, otherwise you would not be attacking Maneuver Theory.

Henri

[L.Tankersley]

All right, I'm getting sick of this. The amusement value of watching this discussion/train wreck has evaporated, and all that's left is annoyance. So before I wander off elsewhere, I want to make a few observations:

1. BH, CS et al, after reading this thread and large parts of the others, I (at least) haven't got the faintest idea what specific position Henri and Pillar are espousing (except that they call it "maneuver theory"). Arguing against a position that hasn't actually been defined is like punching a pillow: unsatisfying and unlikely to lead anywhere productive.

2. However, when you present your examples and say that they show how armies have conducted operations in the field for generations, and H&P agree and say that these are all applications of maneuver theory, why not just go with it? Say "Ah, yes, we agree after all, we just call things by different names" and move on. Because...

3. As near as I can make out, the basic communications disconnect here seems to be that what H&P call maneuver theory, you would call "common sense:" "Attack the enemy in such a way as to maximize his losses and minimize your own." (Note: obviously, you can't maximize one AND minimize the other in most cases, so there are tradeoffs to be made.) This can be done by:

* flanking the enemy

* exploiting weaknesses in the enemy position (not attacking into the teeth of the defense when an alternative is available)

* massing your force against an isolated part of the enemy force

* holding the enemy force in place with part of your force while maneuvering to a position of advantage with the rest

* dislodge an entrenched enemy from his positions by threatening/disrupting his supply lines rather than by frontal assault

* avoiding the enemy until you can threaten or occupy key terrain the enemy MUST defend, forcing him to fight at a disadvantage

...to name just a few. As near as I can make out, H&P would consider the above examples applications of maneuver warfare, while I'm betting that BH and CS would not (except possibly the last two). So really, you appear to be arguing about nothing but semantics.

[The only other explicit distinction I can recall being made between maneuver and attrition seemed to be that of command-push vs. command-pull. Put very simply, under this distinction as I understand it "maneuver == allowing and encouraging personal initiative at lower command levels" and "attrition == rigid adherence to orders from above regardless of the situation." If this is really the core of the debate, I don't think anyone would disagree that "maneuver warfare" is desirable; the questions then become "how much freedom should the subordinates have" and "do the subordinates have enough knowledge and training to effectively make use of their discretion?" With an untrained rabble, you don't want the peons taking matters into their own hands. (Or, as the aphorism goes, there's nothing more dangerous than a 2nd Lt. with a map.) An officer in a professional force, however, would presumably be capable both of exercising individual initiative, and of discerning when to exercise that initiative and when not to.

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Leland J. Tankersley

[The_Capt]

I've said it before and I'll say it again (for what I hope is the last time). As has been echoed many times and I am not even sure if I said it first:

Manoeuvre and Attrition are two sides of the same coin. The are methodologies and philosophies which encompass an entire school of thought and all of the shades of grey in between. They are twin children of Mars joined at the hip. Attrition often precedes and follows Manoeuvre and vice versa. There can be no extreme of any one camp. The trick is, and what seperates the great commanders from the good ones is knowing when, where, with who and why to apply them. Many of the answers to those question are unachievable and left up to the commander to instinctively know. We have taken steps to deliver a clearer picture of the two sides so that we can stop "hoping" someone "gets it" and trained ourselves and our officers to a higher level so that our chances are better that they (and we) will be able to better employ the principals.

This is an art gentlemen not a science. It is like asking a painter to plan and describe why he has done something. Often "it just seemed right at the time".

[Croda]

If an uneducated person may chime in, I'd like to add the following take on the discussion.

It seeems to me that Attrition without Maneuver is a waste of man and material (read: WWI). Maneuver without Attrition is, pardon the expression, like going to the whorehouse without your wallet. Neither one makes any sense without the other.

To quote Sun-Tzu: For to win one-hundred victories in one-hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill...Your aim must be to take All Under Heaven intact...

Perhaps this better defines the aim of Maneuver warfare.

In the end, they are inter-related and one is worthless without the other. Do you think this argument may better be whether or not the goal is to destroy the enemy vs. destroy the state?

[Michael Dorosh]

How many commanders bandy about terms like "attition" anyway? Good point about the difference between Art and Science.

Nathan Forrest "got there fustest with the mostest." While I detest his activities regarding the Ku Klux Klan, you have to admire a guy who can put a complicated idea into simple language like that.

I sincerely doubt any World War One General would have ever referred to what he was doing with his division/corps/army as "attrition" even if that was, in fact, what it was.

I don't see what difference it makes what you call it - if it works, keep doing it. I had to laugh at the movie Saving Private Ryan for this - how many times did you count the use of the word "defilade"? There were other modern bits of military jargon - "expend ordnance" was another. I just don't see a school teacher from PA throwing words like that around in the field, especially when talking to a Tennessee backwoodsman like Jackson or a lingerie-shop salesman from New York like Reiben.

It seems many people have a funny notion of how soldiers talk. My favourite movie scene where they seemed to get it right was in Gettysburg - when Tom Berenger leaned down and drew in the sand with a stick the plan for Pickett's Charge, I thought that was a wonderful scene. He did use military words like "oblique" and he told his artillery commander to "fire all your long range ordnance" but at least he used them properly and in a historical context; an oblique was, I assume, a maneuver learned on the parade ground.

It was quite convincing. Longstreet knew he had to keep the plan simple, and so he laid it out in plain English that his commanders could understand, using jargon everyone was familiar with (in spare amounts) and then he trusted his commanders and the tens of thousands of men at his command to carry out his order, confident that he had been as clear and concise as possible. Lovely.

[Jasper]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Maneuver and Attrition are two sides of the same coin.

If you mean to say:

Technique and attrition are two sides of the same coin.

Then I agree. Apparently some people think there is no other technique than maneuver.

[Guest Pillar]

Patience guys. Some less interesting things have to be worked out before a complete discussion with examples and so forth of the depth you seek can be started constructively.

Bullethead and I are talking behind the scenes a little figuring out (hopefully) how this can be done.

For example, in order to illustrate things we might setup scenarios and exercises and then discuss different solutions based on different concepts.

Another exercise is being set up by Warren Mirron (The Capt) to show in action a "maneuverist" playing an "attritionist". The results will probably surprise many. The maneuverist will be seen "fighting", the attritionist will be seen "moving". The difference will be subtle, as it should.

I haven't made any attempt to start an argument with these guys, nor am I here to "proove" maneuver theory... so if that's what some of you viewers are looking for you aren't going to get it. That doesn't mean maneuver warfare is "loosing the debate".

Some more observant viewers of this discussion may have realised this already. In the meantime, I'd recommend concentrating on what Bullethead and I are trying to arrange rather than focusing on any pissing contests that may be appearing.

[Guest Pillar]

Henri, et al.

It's a bit silly to carry on a debate when everyone is speaking a different language.

Bullethead is not trying to equate the Marine doctrine to "attrition" in the sense you are thinking. He is simply saying that "Manuever warfare" involves firepower, or firepower involves maneuverwarfare. He's using the word "attrition" to describe "fighting".

If you ask him to explain why the Marines doctrine is "attrition" he'll just point out references involving firepower or fighting in general.

Bullethead is actually implicitly advocating Manuever warfare in all his posts, whether that is recognized by the viewers of this thread and even himself or not.

Bullethead's thesis that "Maneuver and Attrition go together" and his definition of "Attrition" are easily translatable to "Maneuver Warfare involves Firepower", which is perfectly compatible with what is described as "Maneuver Warfare" in general.

What BH is frustrated with, is "maneuverists" (as he defines it) who think battles can be one with MOVEMENT alone. If you want to discuss that with him, I see some use. But to continue to argue over a point that arouse simply due to a difference in word usage is silly, and we should easily be able to percieve these differences and work with them rather than expend energy to try and convince one another how to use words.

Just keep in mind how Bullethead et al. are defining their words and you'll notice we aren't really disagreeing on anything.

[Henri]

Originally posted by Pillar:

It's a bit silly to carry on a debate when everyone is speaking a different language.

Bullethead is not trying to equate the Marine doctrine to "attrition" in the sense you are thinking. He is simply saying that "Manuever warfare" involves firepower, or firepower involves maneuverwarfare.

No one least of all me has denied that.

What BH is frustrated with, is "maneuverists" (as he defines it) who think battles can be one with MOVEMENT alone.

Show me an advocate of Maneuver Theory who has claimed that. Just a few days ago I wrote here that I agreed with Leonhard that Maneuver does not always exclude attrition, and I even gave an example that I invented.

keep in mind how Bullethead et al. are defining their words and you'll notice we aren't really disagreeing on anything.

Much as I would like to agree, I can only repeat Bullethead's position:

The whole point of maneuver is to achieve a better position from which to engage in attrition… IOW, destroying the enemy is the main objective on both sides of the ball.

I am sorry to say once more that this position is explicitely rejected by Leonhard, Lind, and the USMC MCDP-1 Warfighting Manual.

In my last message, I have quoted lines from the MCDP manual explicitely saying that the prupose of maneuver is NOT to engage in attrition, and that the main objective is not to destroy the enemy but rather to destroy his will to fight.

If Bullethead wishes to use words to mean different things than the USMC manuals, then he should define his terms as the USMC has done. Nothing would make me happier than to find that we are in agreement.

As for the statement by some that Maneuver warfare is just a fancy word to describe what the military has been doing all along, again in my last message I quoted a paragraph from USMC-1 explicitely stating that the US was using attrition warfare in Vietnam, and that this approach has been rejected in favor of "a new way of fighting" called Maneuver Warfare.I didn't invent that, it's the official position of teh USMC.

What more can I say?

As for those who say that the discussion is confusing, let me say that when I started this whole subject for the first time six months ago, I attempted not only to reply to attacks against Maneuver Theory but to explain what it was. As a result, I was admonished by one of the military to "stop talking down to me", and I was accused by some of being pedantic. Many have stated that they have learned a lot from these discussions, but it is understandable that some who are unfamiliar with the subject may find the discussion a bit hard to follow. I'm sorry about that, but I don't think that it would be appropriate to write a 50-page treatise in reply to every point under debate. However let me point out that every time someone has asked me to clarify a point about Maneuver Warfare, I have done that to the best of my ability, for instance when I was asked if there was a definition of Maneuver Warfare anywhere, or about what specifically Leonhard had to criticize in the Gulf War.

And finally, a word about expertise; Leonhard is a military officier who participated in the Gulf War, Lind is a recognized civilian expert on military doctrine on whose book the USMC MCDP Warfighting doctrine manual is largely based. They are not amateurs, nor are the military officers who have approved the MCDP manuals,nor the Colonel who wrote the exercises for Lind's book, nor the Colonel who wrote the preface to Lind's book.

For the record, I claim nothing about Maneuver Theory that goes beyond Leonhard and Lind, and I have seen nothing in MCDP-1 that contradicts them except perhaps on the extent to which Maneuver Theory was applied in the Gulf War and other minor details that don't impact the theory. It is also easy to verify that I have only engaged in debate with attritionists who have attacked me or Maneuver Theory. The original debate of six months ago began after I initiated a discussion of whether or not CM allowed or favored Maneuver Warfare; I was immediately attacked by some attritionists who qualified Maneuver Theory as Bull**** and so on.

The present debate began when you began this thread with some ideas about platoon actions; the fourth or fifth message of the thread is the following attack by Bullethead on Maneuver Theory:

Moving from Point A to Point B is a waste of fuel unless you then proceed to kill the enemy at Point B. The whole point of maneuver is to achieve a better position from which to engage in attrition--to stack the deck so the exchange rate favors you as much as possible. ..

Need I say again that this point of view is TOTALLY at odds with Maneuver Theory, and is explicitely rejected by all of the sources previously quoted?

Henri

[This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-21-2001).]

[Ksak]

Quoted from

FM 1-10 The Infantry Company

"Maneuver is defined as movement, supported by fires, to a position of advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy. An infantry rifle company is designed to move by foot. The company uses stealth, camouflage, and dispersion to close with the enemy. It uses the terrain and all available fires (organic and supporting) to support its movement. These fires may not always be needed, but the company always plans them. Maneuver is the primary means of gaining or retaining the initiative. It may also preserve the company's freedom of action and reduce the unit's vulnerability to enemy fires. Infantry companies take advantage of their ability to move across difficult terrain in any weather to surprise the enemy. Infantry commanders understand their mobility capabilities and avoid fighting heavy forces on terrain that allows the heavy force a distinct mobility advantage. The commander's concept orients on reaching the decisive point using the indirect approach. This requires avoiding the enemy's strength, moving through gaps or weaknesses or around his flanks, and striking him at critical locations to rapidly destroy his will and ability to fight. The CO must also have a thorough understanding of time-space relationships and the impact that their soldiers' loads have on mobility, and plan accordingly."

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If Pillar or Henri want to use this quote to support some Manueverist concept I suppose they could although neither can even define the term. I have not read the L&L boys so I cannot contribute anything from those authors' perspective. If Pillar or Henri have read these authors they have each failed miserably to articulate any viewpoint that amounts to anything more than word play. Pillar lost my interest in his first post when he used the ubiquitous B-school phrase "paradigm shift." This discussion reminds of the dribble coming the from those 22 year old TV financial analysts when they were saying that the Internet had created a paradigm shift that made corporate profits a meaningless term. We all know how that turned out. I was short the analysts in case you're wondering, and now I'm short Pillar and Henri too!

Every contibutor to this thread who has military experience, particulary the NCO and officer types, have told us that combat is all about firepower...closing with and destroying the enemy, and yes the very best way to destroy the enemy's will and ability to fight is to kill him in large numbers.

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

Like I said, I'm not prepared to discuss that right now. Either I have to go do the reading on those events and become intimately familiar with them, or I can indulge in a pointless debate about something I know only the basics of.

Well, the reason I asked was that you stated maneuver theory is all about what's "been proven by history". Seeing as you're such a devotee of "maneuver warfare theory", I figured that before you appeared in public carrying its banner, you'd have checked out history to see if its claim above was valid. Therefore, I assumed you had at least general familiarity with such notable, basic things from history as Napolean and Verdun, and could thus explain to me how even though they don't fit the definitions propounded by "maneuver warfare theory", they still support it.

In that case, all you'd have to do is introducce new information whenever it suited your argument and I'd be forced to reevaluate over and over. Not exactly good terms for a discussion are they?

Note that instead of just asking the bald questions, I provided a several sentences of "givens" beforehand stating the parameters of the problems. These "givens" sum up the general perception of the generals I asked about. And that's I'm holding you to, because if you minutely examine the career of any soldier, you can see he did different things at different times.

But just to make things clear, I will paint the out-of-bounds stripes on this field of debate, as follows:

1. Napolean

Given that:

A) his primary strategic goal was the destruction of the main enemy army;

he sought to achieve this goal through decisive battle; and

C) he tried hard to make this battle happen on his terms by the use of huge, daring maneuvers to make the enemy fight him on ground of his choosing in strength of his choosing;

D) he is by Henri's definition an "attritionist" because he used maneuver to set up and enhance his fighting, despite his grand (and at that time, revolutionary) maneuvering.

Prove:

That Napolean was really a "maneuverist" despite this problem with definitions.

2. von Falkenhayn

Given that:

A) he deliberately set out to conduct a campaign of attrition pure and simple because he believed decisive maneuver under prevailing conditions was impossible; and

he thought that after sufficient attrition, he would be able to conduct decisive maneuvers;

C) he is by Henri's definition a "maneuverist" because he used fighting to set up and enhance maneuver, despite his express intention of conducting a campaign of attrition.

Prove:

That von Falkenhayn was really an "attritionist" despite this problem with definitions.

Extra Credit:

Given that:

A) von Falkenhayn's assessment was correct--decisive maneuver really was impossible at that time due to a continuous front offering no flanks to turn and frontal assaults only getting many people killed for no gain;

wars are won solely through offensive, not defensive, campaigns;

C) it was his job to win the war for Germany, so that he had to conduct a decisive, victorious offensive; and

D) there were more Germans than Frenchmen, and more Frenchmen than Germans would probably be killed in a 1-on-1 fight due to superior German firepower,

Prove:

That a campaign of pure attrition was not his best option.

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-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[CavScout]

If Maneuverists want to have a quotes battle, then fine by me.

"The infantry has been the force that closes with and destroys the enemy in the decisive phase of the battle. Before delivering the decisive blow, the infantry sets certain conditions to allow it to accomplish the mission with the minimum number of friendly casualties."

"Desert Storm demonstrated the potential for using intelligence and precision fires to set the conditions and reserving the maneuver force for employment in the decisive phase (Figure 1-1b). These maneuver forces are highly mobile combined arms forces. Before forces are committed, certain conditions must be set. These conditions include destroying the enemy's integrated air defenses, blinding the enemy, winning the information war, and eliminating the enemy's ability to attack with fires. With these and other actions, the conditions are set for decisive operations. In this phase, the highly mobile combined arms forces will be vectored in to dominate the enemy's combat formations."

FM 7-30 THE INFANTRY BRIGADE

Maneuver or attrition? Or both?

Or more to BH's points, "Maneuver is both an element of combat power and a principle of war. Forces undertake tactical maneuver to gain operational results. As the commander develops his concept of an operation and considers the maneuver of all his forces, he retains a balance when applying maneuver, firepower, and protection. Generating combat power on the battlefield requires combining the movement of combat forces and employment of their direct fires in combination with fire support. The brigade commander creates the conditions, largely through maneuver, that will allow his subordinate elements to accomplish the unit's purpose."--2-16 MANEUVER FM 7-30

"maneuver (JP 1-02, NATO) — 1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the

enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war.

3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment

of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position

of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (Army) — Employment of forces

on the battlefield through movement of combat forces in relation to the enemy, supported by fire or fire

potential from all sources, to gain potential advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the

enemy to accomplish the mission. See FMs 100-5 and 100-40."--FM 101-5-1

"Offense is the decisive form of war. The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force."

"The commander uses initiative to select the time and place to concentrate and synchronize his combat power to overcome the enemy defense; destroy his command, control, and communications system; and to defeat him in detail."--17-95 Cavalry Operations

"Agility is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy and is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. It is as much a mental as a physical quality. Greater quickness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against enemy vulnerabilities. Forces will need to mass their effect rapidly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one action, another has taken its place, disrupting the enemy's plans and leading to late, uncoordinated, and piecemeal responses. This process of successive massing against locally weaker or unprepared enemy forces enables smaller forces to disorient, fragment, and eventually defeat much larger opposing formations. To achieve such a defeat, leaders and units must be agile."--FM 71-2 THE TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE

Hell, even the Marines MCDP-1 says, "Pure attrition warfare does not exist in practice.."

[Guest Pillar]

"Moving from Point A to Point B is a waste of fuel unless you then proceed to kill the enemy at Point B. The whole point of maneuver is to achieve a better position from which to engage in attrition--to stack the deck so the exchange rate favors you as much as possible. ..

Need I say again that this point of view is TOTALLY at odds with Maneuver Theory, and is explicitely rejected by all of the sources previously quoted?

Henri"

So it appears. But once you get talking with Bullethead, you realize that he is refering to ANY action that "stacks the deck in your favour", not just "attrition" as we define it.

Bullethead would call a bypass maneuver into the enemy rear artillery assets "Maneuver with intent of 'stacking the deck' to improve the condition for ones forces", and he'd call the actual attack on those enemy artillery assets "attrition".

Sure, you could focus in on his usage of the word "attrition" and bother him about that, or you could argue with him and try to proove that what he is really advocating IS maneuver theory, or you could just accept that's the way he see's things right now and instead focus on developing some exercises etc. that might demonstrate this.

Follow me?

Finally, Ksak and people of his ilk (who are ready to loose interest in a discussion simply because people don't talk the way he likes them to, and fail to recognize the efforts (at least on my part) to consolidate small issues BEFORE delving into a deep analysis), are very much discouraging me from even bothering doing this publicly.

A basic point about constructive discussion is that you don't just waltz in and start with an effort to convince others of your position UNTIL you fully understand THEIRS. It seems even some of my discussion partners are failing to realize that my ONLY goal so far has been to understand THEIR position.

There's a reason why I haven't been doing any "lecturing" yet here myself, and it certainly isn't because I don't have anything to say.

In light of the attitude of the above, I am now sincerely considering carrying this on privately with Bullethead and perhaps CavScout and Henri if they're interested, since there seems to be no appreciation on this forum for what is going on.

If there are readers who'd like otherwise, now is your chance to speak up.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-21-2001).]

[CavScout]

From ST 100-3 Battle Book:

a. Maneuver is a principle of war, an element of combat power, and a battlefield operating system.

(1) Principle of war: "Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power." (FM 100-5, Jun 93, p 2-5)

(2) Element of combat power: "* * * movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—direct and indirect fires.* * *

"Commanders may achieve the effects of maneuver without movement by allowing the enemy to move into a disadvantageous position. * * * Maneuver is rarely effective without firepower and protection." (FM 100-5, Jun 93, p 2-10)

(3) Maneuver operating system: "* * * movement [or employment of forces] relative to the enemy to put him at a disadvantage * * * to create the conditions for tactical and operational success." (FM 100-5, Jun 93, p 2-13)

[Guest Pillar]

Well, the reason I asked was that you stated maneuver theory is all about what's "been proven by history". Seeing as you're such a devotee of "maneuver warfare theory", I figured that before you appeared in public carrying its banner, you'd have checked out history to see if its claim above was valid. Therefore, I assumed you had at least general familiarity with such notable, basic things from history as Napolean and Verdun, and could thus explain to me how even though they don't fit the definitions propounded by "maneuver warfare theory", they still support it.

No problem. Maneuver theorists do use historic example extensively in their works, that is a fact.

I hope you can respect my honesty when I say I don't have an extensive knowledge of Napoleon, and only a general knowledge of Verdun and more importantly the entire front situation at the time of Verdun. If you think that invalidates my viewpoint that's unfortunate. I'm sure I could name a few historic events you are not intimately familiar with (the level you'd need to have a debate with me), but I'd be a fool to discredit anything you said as a result.

In any case, I'll take a look at what you just wrote under your "givens" and I'll conjure up a very amateur response. In turn, and keeping in mind ALL the things I've mentioned before, don't treat it like a treatise on warfare.

Normally I would have delved right into your questions immediately based on my general knowledge of those examples. However, I decided that in this thread the best option would be to be VERY reluctant until you got to the point of pressing me to answer despite my disclaimers and reluctance. So now, when you get your answer, keep in mind "you asked for it."

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

What BH is frustrated with, is "maneuverists" (as he defines it) who think battles can be one with MOVEMENT alone. If you want to discuss that with him, I see some use.

Actually, this isn't what I'm frustrated with. I admit that sometimes, in very rare situations, maneuver can win battles without going into the attrition phase. The classic example is Napolean's "Maneuver upon Ulm" in the fall of 1805, in which he caused the Austrian General Mack to surrender his whole army with hardly a shot fired, simply by a brilliant move from the Rhine to the Danube and into Mack's rear.

What I'm frustrated with is people who overlook the fact that this surrender, and any other examples like it, simply cut to the chase. Napolean went to Ulm to kick ass in battle. He was following his favorite plan of seeking decisive battle on terms of his choosing. He liked to do this by marching around the enemy's prepared positions and into his rear to cut his LOCs at a place that offered him terrain advantages and which prevented other enemy armies from giving help. The enveloped enemy would then be forced to fall back and fight him there, and usually lost badly.

But instead of fighting this LOC battle, Mack just gave up immediately upon finding out how screwed he was. So here we have a great example of "maneuver alone" winning a battle, giving Napolean all the fruits of decisive battle success without the casualties that usually go with it.

However, the only reason Mack surrendered was because Napolean was sitting there on his LOC with loaded guns and gleaming bayonets. If Napolean hadn't come prepared for and expecting to fight hard and decisively, Mack wouldn't have surrendered.

So it really wasn't "maneuver alone". It was maneuver intended to bring the guns to bear on the enemy. That the guns never fired in this case is irrelevant. They were there and expected to be used. So like I and others have said, there is no separating maneuver from attrition.

As for Henri, I've given up trying to discuss things with him. On the issues at bar at least, he's totally clueless, and he couldn't get a clue if he was standing in the middle of 40 acres of ripe clues, with a severe clue-storm falling, while armed with a belt-fed clue-harpoon gun with power winch and clue-seeking rounds, and doused in clue-in-rut pheromone.

------------------

-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Guest *Captain Foobar*]

whoa whoa whoa....

BH : I agree with your position (I think), but try to keep the bile to a minimum.

Pillar: Please keep the discussion going here on the thread.(this is me speaking up) I am interested in learning what your position is on this. Right now we are still in definition phase.